

# **The Christian Philosophy Of Law, Politics And The State**

A Study of the Political and Legal Thought of  
Herman Dooyeweerd of the Free University of  
Amsterdam, Holland as the Basis for Christian  
Action in the English-Speaking World

by

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Dedicated to my  
beloved wife and  
fellow worker for Christ

GILLIAN SELAH

with the prayer that Marjorie, Jennifer, Christopher, Mary Elizabeth, Arthur Michael, and Stephen William may live to see the Christian philosophy herein described prevail in all English-speaking lands.

“Unto me, who am less than the least of all saints, is this grace given, that I should preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ; And to make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery, which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ. To the intent that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known by the church the manifold wisdom of God, According to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord; in whom we have boldness and access with confidence by the faith of him.” (Ephesians 3:8-12)



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## PREFACE

Concluding his *History of Christianity 1650-1950*, James Hastings Nichols of the University of Chicago wrote:

The modern Christian churches inherited the great new enterprise of medieval and Reformation Christianity, the endeavor to penetrate and "Christianize" civilization. For three hundred years they continued this attempt, yet, on the whole, with ever less success. There are, one might guess, as great a proportion of convinced and practicing Christians as ever. But the great forces and structures of modern civilization have increasingly eluded Christian guidance and have pursued new gods, tribal or utopian. In recent years Christians have become increasingly aware of the width of the chasm between the tone of the industrial West and anything that might be called Christian. It does not yet appear how they will adjust to this situation. Will they return to the policy of the church in the Ancient Roman Empire, in which, whether persecuted or recognized by the state, the church entertained no serious hope of transforming society, but sought rather to manifest another quality of life within its own community? Or will the church continue to seek, and perhaps find, some way of humanizing and rendering responsive to Jesus Christ a militarized, technological and mass civilization?<sup>1</sup>

What indeed has Christianity to say to the temporal activities and institutions of modern men? What is the relation of the Christian to the modern world? What is the nature of political obligation and the limit of political authority? How is government related to business, in-

dustry and technology? What is the relation of a trade union to a political party? What relation should exist between church and state and between state and religion? What relation should exist between the church and the school, between the government and the education of the children of Christian parents, and between religion and education? Has the church any right to "interfere" in politics and lay down official lines of policy for all the faithful in Christ to follow? Should Christians seek to leaven the lump of secular political parties and institutions or should they seek to form their own political and social organizations based upon their own Christian convictions? Is a public consensus to be found in some form of revived natural law in terms of which Christians and secular humanists can try to work together for the common good and by means of which greater social cohesion can be established between differing social classes, creeds and ideologies? How can an effective Christian witness be made in an increasingly pluralistic society such as the English-speaking world has now become? Above all, how can Christ's kingship over Anglo-Saxon culture be given concrete expression in the lives of his English-speaking followers?

All these questions have become increasingly urgent during the past hundred years, and they have received much attention in contemporary Christian writings. Not theologians only but Christian historians, philosophers, lawyers, sociologists and poets also have shared in the discussion and the debate. In this book we shall join the great debate by trying to answer these questions in the light of the Christian philosophy of the Cosmonomic Law-Idea, especially as this new Christian philosophy has been developed in the political, legal and sociological thought of Herman Dooyeweerd, Professor of the History and Philosophy of Law at the Free University, Amsterdam, Holland. According to Dooyeweerd, Christians will be able to exert a specifically Christian influence in the fields of law, politics, education, labor relations and industry only if they can put forward truly Christian answers to the pressing problems of our age. It is his firm conviction that such Christian answers are available to Christians

if only they will make the necessary effort of thought and if only they will submit their minds and hearts to God's Holy Word written in the Holy Scriptures and be guided by God the Holy Ghost.

If the reader is encouraged by this work to study for himself the great contribution to a truly Christian philosophy of law, politics and the state already made by such Christian scholars as Herman Dooyeweerd, H. Van Riessen, J. M. Spier, A. L. Conradie and H. Evan Runner, and if he will join forces with other Christians in taking effective Christian political and social action along the lines suggested in this book in his own neighborhood, village, town, city, state or province and nation to make Christ's kingship real, then I shall consider myself amply rewarded for all the effort and time it has taken me to write this book.

It only remains for me to thank my dear wife for her encouragement and support. I would also thank my esteemed Christian brothers, Bernard Zylstra, Gerald Vandezande, Harry Antonides and Professors H. Van Riessen, J. M. Spier, H. Evan Runner and A. L. Conradie for bringing me in touch with the most exciting intellectual development in Christian thought since the time Thomas Aquinas wrote his famous apologies in defense of Christian truth as he then understood it. I would especially thank Bernard Zylstra for his enthusiastic help in so many directions and for his guidance in the interpretation of Dooyeweerd's thought. Then I would thank Professor Robert L. Reymond who edited the original manuscript and Charles H. Craig, Director of the Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company without whose interest, support and spirit of Christlike understanding this book would never have been published.

Finally I would like to thank Miss Sandra Lee of Greengates for so generously giving of her time and talent in the re-typing of large portions of the typescript.

None of these persons, however, must be held in any way responsible for any of the opinions I have expressed in this book nor for any inadvertent errors I may have made.

May the Holy and Sovereign God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ bless all readers of this book and may God use it to his glory and in the extension of Christ's kingship over the hearts and minds of my fellow English-speaking peoples in the British Isles, North America, South Africa, and the Australasias.

Eastertide,  
1965.

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<sup>1</sup> James Hastings Nichols, *History of Christianity 1650-1950* (The Ronald Press Company, New York, 1956), p. 460.



## INTRODUCTION

One of the great tragedies of the Protestant Reformation was the failure of the great Reformers John Calvin and Martin Luther to develop a doctrine of law, politics and the state upon truly reformed and biblical lines. The Reformers did not bring about any radical departures in the spheres of political science, statecraft and jurisprudence for the simple reason, as the German scholar August Lang has shown, that they were so involved in theological disputes, religious controversy and the very struggle for survival that they simply did not have any time left in which to develop a reformed and biblical theory of politics and government. Although in his article published in the *Princeton Theological Review* entitled "The Reformation and Natural Law" in 1909 Lang addressed himself directly to the problem of Natural Law, his concern was with the whole cultural problem. Allow me to quote his own words:

Students of recent history have long agreed that the close of the 17th century, the conclusion of the religious wars, marks the beginning of a new epoch in Church history. The peculiarity of the new period is expressed in one word, what is called "modernism," or the modern spirit. But if the division is a real one, there arises the question, embarrassing to every evangelical Christian, How is the modern spirit, which since the 17th century has been unfolding itself with ever increasing vigor, related to the Gospel of the Reformation? How could the age of the Reformation with its conflicts of faith be followed so suddenly by an age whose views about historical criticism and natural science, about politics and social life, are in part directly opposed to the Reformation conception

of the world? What forces of the Gospel had a part in the development of the new way of thinking? What other unevangelical tendencies intruded themselves and therefore because they arose, for example in Catholicism or in the unbelieving and therefore pernicious development of civilization, must be combatted and eliminated?<sup>1</sup>

After thus showing the wide range of his interests Lang expressed the desire to make a contribution towards an answer to this question by "examining the relation between the Reformation and Natural Law" and he motivated his choice of topic by pointing out that "natural law was one of the principal historical factors in the formation of the modern spirit . . . it became also the starting point for natural theology," the broad religious basis of the religion of the English Deists and Cambridge Platonists as well as of the European movement of thought known as the "Enlightenment."<sup>2</sup> How, Lang asked, "could this natural law spring up on the ground of the Reformation, take such deep root and put forth such wide-spreading branches?" Later in his article Lang asked the more specific question, "How did it happen that it was precisely Calvinists who first among the men of evangelical faith, and so early as the 16th century, not merely developed Natural Law theoretically, but at the same time as political publicists, made it a weapon in the conflicts of the time?"<sup>3</sup>

Lang answered as follows:

The Reformation at its very beginning found itself in the presence of problems and exigencies of indefinite range, first of all conflicts of purely religious and theological character—doctrinal, liturgical and constitutional conflicts. What an amount of spiritual strength was consumed even by these conflicts. How much there was which went wrong. What unrest, what losses these conflicts produced. . . .

Much more dangerous however was the second adjustment, which lay more on the periphery of religious truth and yet was no less necessary—namely the adjustment to the general ethical, political, and social problems of the age, to science and art. The adjustment, I say, was unavoidable, for if Protestantism, over against the Medieval Catholic world, involves a new world view, then there must of necessity be a Protestant science of politics, a Protestant philosophy

and science, a Protestant art, etc. . . . For such an adjustment, however, in the very nature of things, time is required; it cannot be accomplished by one man or by one generation. It was indeed a thank-worthy undertaking, when Calvin in his *Institutes* did not entirely ignore politics, but the results were of such a kind that they did not give satisfaction even negatively, on the question of the obedience of subjects, and the rights of resistance much less positively.

But now the tasks and problems of culture came upon the young evangelical churches in a storm. . . . The Reformed were obliged to fight the hardest battles for existence; then after the final victory, they had new states to found both at home and in the wilderness; above all, they had to settle the question of tolerance between the different parties that had arisen in their own camp.

Calvin had inspired in his disciples that energy of piety which abhors all halfway measures, which boldly endeavours to make all the affairs of life subject to Christ, the Head and Lord. . . . But what was needed, viz., firm principles about the relation of the Reformation to the forces of modern emerging culture—to the state, science, and art—this was lacking, and how could it be attained all at once in the midst of all the unrest of the time? Regarded in this way, we believe the appearance of natural law doctrine becomes comprehensible. A doctrine of the state constructed on evangelical principles was not in existence. But such a doctrine was imperatively needed and demanded by the need of the time. Men needed to have clearness about the relation of the ruler to the subjects, about the problem of Church and State, about the relation between different churches in the same country. No wonder that in the lack of a conception of the state revised in the light of fundamental evangelical ideas, men had recourse to the political theory taught in the traditional jurisprudence, without heeding the fact that that theory had an origin foreign to the Reformation, and involved tendencies and consequences which would lead away from the Reformation. These tendencies, of course, became apparent later in slowly developing after-effects, and then, especially after the spiritual enervation sustained in the protracted religious wars, they could not fail gradually to dissipate and destroy the Reformation's basis of faith. . . .

Unless all indications are deceptive, the progress of events was similar in the case of other cultural

questions. The desire for knowledge, the desire for activity, which was experienced by the individual after he had been liberated through the Reformation, plunged itself into all the problems of the spiritual life of man, became absorbed in the traditional manner of their treatment, and was all too quickly satisfied with solutions which were not in agreement with the fundamental ethical and religious factors of the practical religious life of the Reformation. The reaction did not remain absent. The evangelical life of faith became shallower instead of deepening itself and developing in all directions. . . . If it is true that the religious spirit of the Reformation in passing through Deism, was moving on a downward path, the reason for its deterioration was that the adjustment between the Reformation and culture was neither brought to a satisfactory conclusion nor even earnestly enough attempted.<sup>4</sup>

As a result of this uncritical acceptance of the received classical and medieval doctrines of law, politics and government and because of their failure to redefine the basic postulates of jurisprudence and political science in terms of the biblical and Reformed doctrine of man in society, Protestant Christians were unable to withstand the onrush of the new secular humanist conceptions of law, politics and the state which emerged in the writings of political thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke in England,<sup>5</sup> Johannes Althusius and Hugo Grotius in Holland,<sup>6</sup> and Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson in the United States;<sup>7</sup> conceptions which were to destroy the ideological and philosophical basis of the so-called Ancien Régime as this social order had developed in Western Europe since the revival of civilization at the end of the barbarian invasions and which still underlie the modern British and American liberal humanist theory of the nature, purpose and origin of human government. In his book *The European Mind*, Paul Hazard has clearly revealed the secular and apostate basis of this modern liberal humanist theory of natural law and of political obligation. Thus he writes: "Natural Law was the off-spring of a philosophy which rejected the supernatural and the divine and substituted for the acts and purposes of a personal God an immanent Order of Nature."<sup>8</sup>

In the face of this humanist onslaught upon the medieval synthesis of classical Graeco-Roman and Latin Christian conceptions of law, politics and the state, Reformed Christians found themselves in the unhappy position, of which most of them were not even conscious, of trying to answer the modern liberal humanist set of political, legal and economic principles in terms of classical and Catholic principles. Lacking a carefully worked-out Reformed doctrine of law, politics and the state, it is hardly surprising that Protestant Christians have been powerless to meet the needs and challenges of modern society and to provide it with Christian answers to all its pressing problems. Not that modern men have looked to Christian citizens for such guidance. As James Hastings Nichols has pointed out in his *History of Christianity 1650-1950*:

In the seventeenth century, for the first time in a thousand years in Western history, a deliberate attempt was made on a grand scale to organize a religiously neutral civilization—a political, economic, ethical and intellectual structure independent of Christianity. This great transformation was effected in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the movement sometimes described as the Enlightenment. . . .

Modern Western culture, whatever its positive meaning, may be distinguished from that of earlier phases by its emancipation from explicit Christian direction. . . .

In their domestic policies . . . modern Western states have no longer recognized Christian criteria for policy. Most of them, to be sure, at least in the early modern period, thought of themselves as "Christian states" and maintained established churches. But the emergence and prevalence of the theory of "sovereignty" show that in fact the modern state has insisted on its independence of and superiority to Christian direction. The actual criterion has been the military, commercial and general economic welfare of the state. The modern state has generally declined to serve as the "secular arm" of a Christian society, and the political influence of the Christian churches has been confined to secondary and indirect manifestations. Modern political thought has found the governing sanctions for political association in the nature of man in general, without benefit of biblical revelation or ecclesiastical authorities. The established churches,

Roman Catholic, Anglican, Lutheran and Reformed, contested this development and relinquished their control of state power and social discipline only under constraint, but the governmental elites and the dominant social classes have admitted ever less religious interference in politics. Modern Christians have generally thought and acted in politics independently of their faith.<sup>9</sup>

This secularization of Western political life which thus began in the seventeenth century reached its apostate apogee in the French and Russian Revolutions of 1789 and 1917 respectively. The leaders of both these revolutions not only ignored the God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ but as a matter of deliberate state policy sought with all the means at their disposal to deprive God of any influence upon the lives of millions of citizens and to persecute, imprison and kill his faithful servants. Both revolutions refused to recognize a deeper ground of political life than that which is to be found in "nature" and in man's reason, scientific method, and brute will to power. The sovereign God of the Scriptures was dethroned and apostate man enthroned upon the vacant seat. It is the will of unbelievers, humanists and apostate Christians which henceforth decides political issues. All power and authority on this earth is now proclaimed to proceed from the sovereign will of the state or of the will of the majority or of whoever seizes power.

Most modern forms of the state and most modern theories of law and politics are derived from and related to these two revolutions in one way or another; and it should come as no surprise that modern "progressive" secular thought has corrupted the Christian citizens of the English-speaking world no less than those of Continental Europe, Russia and China to such an extent that Christians themselves no longer expect a unified directive to be available to them in the Word of God for matters appertaining to subjects, political, economic, educational or juridical.

In his book *The Christian in Politics*, Walter James even goes so far as to justify such passivity and acquiescence in the pagan political and economic status quo by arguing:

The Christian is called upon to act beside other men and no assurance is given him that he will sense God's purpose better than they. He can no more aim to be a Christian statesman than a Christian engineer. Politics has at any one time its own techniques, aims and standards, vary though they may, and in the light of them as they are in his lifetime, the Christian's effort must be to make a good politician and no more. He stands here on a par with the non-Christian, just as there are no denominations in the science of physics. His religion will give him no special guidance in his public task, as it will do within his personal relationships and close neighbours.<sup>10</sup>

In a similar vein D. L. Munby argues in his Riddell Lectures, *The Idea of a Secular Society*, that a secular society is neutral in faith and studiously non-committal in its views of the nature of the universe. It is egalitarian in aim, democratic in shape, pragmatist in morals, and it welcomes the increasing specialization in human life. It is everything which the majority of Christians most dislike. Yet it is there and for the true gospel's sake it ought to be there. Munby calls upon Christians to accept the secular society in which they now live and to entangle themselves in the modern world, not to disentangle themselves from it, "because there God is to be found."<sup>11</sup>

In thus advocating that Christians must abide by the prevailing doctrine of neutrality which seeks to exclude religion from politics and in suggesting that Christians should restrict their religion to the field of personal relationships, both James and Munby have neatly fallen right into the secular liberal humanist trap which tries to place religion *alongside* man's other activities and interests, whether these be academic, social, economic, political or artistic. This modern idea of "religion" is one which the secular apostate world around us today loves to have Christians accept. Unbelieving humanists have no objection to our Christian faith at all, provided we reserve it strictly for ourselves in the privacy of our homes and church buildings, and just as long as we do not try to live up to our Christian principles in our business and public life. On no account must the Spirit of the Lord Jesus Christ be allowed to enter the "market place" where modern

men deal with the real issues of life today, with such vital matters as education, politics, labor relations and profits and wages. These activities are all supposed to be "neutral" and they can therefore be withdrawn from sectarian influences so that the secular spirit of the community may prevail. This is the spirit of reason, science and the common sense of the practical Anglo-Saxon for whom truth is only what works out in practice and for whom the God of the Bible is thought to be the projection of the father image or at least a being concocted out of man's image of himself.

According to the secular humanists, people may hold differing views and religious beliefs with respect to their personal lives, but in politics, education, industry, law and labor relations, such basic religious convictions need play no part. In all these areas of modern life it is supposed that men and women, races and classes, and nations and peoples can be united by an appeal to common utility, expediency and technical reason rather than by an appeal to a religious criterion such as, for example, is revealed in the Word of God. As Bernard Zylstra well said in his address entitled *Challenge and Response* before the National Convention of the Christian Labor Association of Canada in 1960 held at Snelgrove, Ontario, Canada:

Neutralism is the view that man can live wholly or partly without taking God's Word into account. Those who pay homage to the fiction of neutrality maintain that many segments of modern culture are merely technical. It is then thought that a corporation, a union, a school, a government can be run by making exclusively factual, technical decisions which have no relation to one's ultimate perspective on "the basic issues." It is clear that this "technicalism" which controls most university faculties, is but the analogue of neutralism. It is the result of a pragmatic philosophy. The defenders of "technicalism" are among the most dangerous guides to a wholly secular world. For it is inevitable that the realm of the "neutral" and the "factual" will constantly increase until it has swallowed all of human morality and faith.<sup>12</sup>



This hatred of modern secular humanists for Almighty God expressed in this "neutrality" concept is the hardest of all practical forms of modern idolatry and unbelief to overcome since they suppose that their faith in reason and scientific method is nothing less than the universally valid dictates of human reason and thus they can shrug their shoulders and claim to have a "neutral" or "technical" or "scientific" reason for refusing to accept a Christian solution for any problem whenever one is proposed. This modern faith in human reason is behind all organizations and institutions directed by secular humanism and explains their attempt to gain monopoly control in society. Unfortunately, far too many Protestant Christians in the English-speaking world have fallen for this line of humanist argument, including the late William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury. After arguing the case for "the Church's right to interfere in politics," Temple made nonsense of this right by conceding to the expert the right to determine the means adopted to realize the policy suggested by the Church. As he said in his book *Christianity and Social Order*, "The Church may tell the politician what ends the social order should promote; but it must leave to the politician the devising of the precise means to those ends."<sup>13</sup> Temple obviously must have forgotten that the means adopted will inevitably determine the nature of the end achieved. Aldous Huxley authored a whole book entitled *Ends and Means* in which he analyzed the supposed distinction between ends and means and proved by numerous examples that it is a useless distinction to draw for the reason we have just given.<sup>14</sup>

Too often in the past two hundred years the expert's theories have been represented by the expert as "facts" and "laws of nature." And yet it is beyond dispute that such expert theories have hindered the proper ordering of human society. As J. C. Gill points out in his pamphlet *The Mastery of Money*:

The factory laws and the humanizing of the scandalous Poor Law of 1834 came about because there were people who valued human life and believed in God, and refused to accept the expert opinions of the

political economists of their day. They would not be silenced by them. From then till now, laws and customs have developed which it was forecast by the experts, would accomplish the nation's ruin.<sup>15</sup>

It was proclaimed by the experts of the day that if the Ten Hours Bill was passed, prohibiting the employment of women and children for more than ten hours a day in the factories in the land, England's economy would go bankrupt.<sup>16</sup>

Temple no doubt conceded to the expert his right to decide the best course to pursue in realizing a given social end of policy, because it sounds so fair and reasonable to heed the expert. It seems to many a sign of true tolerance if one does not drag religious principles into a political argument or a labor dispute and if one does not consciously start from a religious presupposition for one's policy and conduct. What this argument seems to have forgotten is that everyone including the so-called expert also starts from a presupposition and that there can be no facts at all without some undergirding value system and frame of reference. Christians have too easily conceded the claim of the expert to his claim to neutrality. Why make enemies unnecessarily? Who am I that I should think myself to have a corner on the truth? What insufferable pride is this for me to think that Christian truth is absolute? And with more satanic sophistry the modern Christian is finally silenced and he withdraws into the citadel of personal relationships leaving the entire realm of modern culture, politics and industry to the humanists, scientists and technicians. Such a withdrawal of Christians from the most important areas of modern life, e.g., politics, industry, education and communications is exactly what Satan most encourages Christians to do, for no battle was yet won in history where the soldiers refused to fight.

If Christians accept James' and Munby's thesis, not only will the Christian case go by default but also Christians themselves will inevitably become traitors to Christ's cause in modern society. In fact, all that is now necessary for the complete triumph of apostate secular humanism is for Christian men and women to sit back in their pews at

“church,” sing hymns, and do absolutely nothing outside in the workaday world of business, education, labor and politics.

The affirmation of neutrality blatantly assumes that English-speaking people can become independent of God to the point that they can with impunity completely disregard Christ's claims upon their hearts' allegiance. Neutrality in fact constitutes the essence of the secular humanist mind, which since 1689 has been trying to make of the Christian faith a thing apart from week-day British, American and Canadian life. Liberal humanist historians such as G. M. Trevelyan and Thomas Babington Macaulay in their treatment of the so called “Glorious Revolution” of 1688-89 and its resultant constitutional settlement taught generations of British school children to “see” it as a triumph of liberal and Whig principles of government. Thus Trevelyan writes in his book *The English Revolution 1688-89*:

The Settlement of 1689 was in its essence the chaining up of fanaticism alike in politics and in religion. Religion in those days was the chief motive of politics, and after the Revolution a movement towards latitudinarianism in religion enveloped first England and then for a while all Europe. This latitudinarian movement, of which the origins can be traced in Charles II's reign in the Royal Society and the Broadchurch theologians, was one of the causes of the reasonableness of the Revolution Settlement, because the men of 1689 found the idea of Toleration less abhorrent than it had seemed in 1640 and 1660. And one of the chief results of the Revolution was the wide extent and long duration of the latitudinarian influence in the eighteenth century. After a last outburst of Church fanaticism at the end of Anne's reign in the Sacheverell affair and the Schism Act, the spirit of religious persecution withered in the Hanoverian atmosphere. “Enthusiasm” became bad form among the governing classes. And even the “enthusiasm” of Wesley was not an armed and persecuting creed like the earlier Puritanism. Living in an age of Toleration, the Wesleyans had no need to assert their tenets by force.<sup>17</sup>

If we ask the question to what social ends this freedom was put, the answer given by the events of modern British

history can only be freedom from God. Modern secular liberalism in all its manifestations denotes this freedom from the authority of the Living God of the Holy Scriptures. It is as Sir Isaiah Berlin pointed out in his famous lecture on *Two Concepts of Liberty* a purely negative idea of freedom. According to this view, freedom is what is left to a man after the effects of coercion have been deducted from the sum of his powers. I am, in other words, free negatively to the extent to which no human being interferes with my activity. The reference to other human beings in this view of liberty is important. Physical incapacity, acts of God, the workings of vast impersonal forces can and do constrict me in my movements, but they do not touch my liberty, for they cannot be ascribed to human agency.<sup>18</sup> This idea of freedom of the Revolution Settlement of 1688-89 was enacted in the Bill of Rights in 1689, the Triennial Act of 1694, the Toleration Act of 1689 and the Act of Settlement of 1700. This new liberal definition of freedom as independence from the authority of God meant that the old Christian doctrine that kings rule only by the "grace of God" and derive their power from him was extinct. As a tragic result the distinction between Power and Authority was lost. In fact if not in theory sovereignty passed out of the hands of the King who had previously ruled as God's earthly vicegerent into the hands of politicians, financiers and businessmen who now ruled by manipulating votes. A new form of coronation oath, imposing specific obligations to govern "according to the statutes in Parliament agreed on" and to maintain them was prescribed to Prince William and Queen Mary and all their successors.<sup>19</sup> New oaths replaced the ancient oaths of supremacy and allegiance.<sup>20</sup> Of the true secular humanist significance of these radical changes in the structure of the British Constitution Sir David Lindsay Keir has well written:

Thus perished, at the hands of an assembly animated by an authority which can hardly be otherwise regarded than as popular sovereignty in action, the idea of a sacred and inalienable governmental powers, inherent in kings possessing a divine, indefeasible hereditary title . . . Thus also were dissolved moral

obligations, fortified in many cases by oath, incurred towards a kingship so constituted. As the Restoration statutes had demolished the moral and religious sanctions underlying the solemn League and Covenant, so now did the Revolution statutes destroy those underlying kingship by Divine Right. The subjects of William and Mary . . . repudiated an allegiance hitherto regarded as sacred . . . This duty might in certain cases be reinforced by oath. Yet its basis was to be found not in the imperious voice of conscience but in the law of the land in which the will of the community was enshrined . . . Royal powers might be regarded either as the outcome of an original contract between King and people . . . or, if contract seemed to assure too much to the Crown, then simply as a revocable trust conferred by the people, such as Locke presently enunciated in his Second Treatise on Civil Government. This inevitably leads to an essentially practical and largely secular notion of monarchy.<sup>21</sup>

In this way the British Constitution began the journey along the dismal road towards complete secularization in the twentieth century, and of what the Canadian philosopher John Farthing has well epitomized in his great work on the Canadian Constitution, *Freedom Wears a Crown*, as "government by arithmetic." According to Farthing numbers rather than principles have become the dominant factor in Canadian politics, and he suggests that the winning of elections rather than the upholding of integrity and truth in the national life has become the dominant concern of Canada's major political parties. As he well writes:

The Canadian government is now based on three principles: That a Prime Minister has the absolute right to effect the death of a Parliament as soon as it threatens to oppose his will: or, in other words, that the will of a Prime Minister is absolute as against the will of all other representatives elected by the people.

That any and every question can be for all time answered and settled by the majority vote in any single election; or, in other words, the majority will in any election completely determines without further question, right and wrong, truth and error.

That on one day in every four or five years the government presents a four or five-year accumulation of all such questions and issues to the people, and in

so doing asks them to decide whether they do or do not wish to receive any further monthly cheques from a bountiful government . . . .

Such are the ideas on which our national life is now based . . . Having been bilked of our Constitution as a democratic people, and being far gone in the process which is uprooting all sense of authority in our national life, we are left with only the bare and arid fact of power based on absolute will. A majority vote: that is what we have the moronic audacity to call democracy. Deny the ideal of democracy and with it goes the sense of loyalty; the sense of constitutional authority enshrining an ideal; the sense of tradition and of history which nourishes respect for such authority. Thus having so destroyed our Constitution we destroy all truth and principle belonging to the fabric of our national life. We are left with nothing to revere but the idol of power based on appeal to mere opinion or will. So long as it is the will or opinion of the greatest number, it is sacred, no matter what it may be.

Power is freed from respect for authority; opinion from concern for truth; will from principle; and the life of a people in the present from all that comes from the past to inspire and guide it to the future. Propaganda in the service of power leads all opinion to a national worship of the new golden calf: the greatest possible number.<sup>22</sup>

Farthing's bitter words apply just as much to the degeneration of the British and American Constitutions as they do to the Canadian.

For the Christian citizen the will of the majority may never be considered the origin of political obligation and the source of authority over men, but rather he finds it in God. The right to exercise authority over man is derived from God alone. No one has the right to rule over another man; otherwise, such a right necessarily and immediately becomes the right of the strongest. Neither can a group of men by some so-called contract undertaken in the remote past compel you or me to obey a present government official. What binding force is there for me in Locke's allegation expressed in his infamous humanist treatise on Civil Government that ages ago one of my ancestors made a "social contract" with the other men of his time, surrender-

ing his absolute right to freedom in order the better to secure his right to life, limb and property? As a person created in God's holy image I stand free and bold, over against the most powerful men in big government and big business. In the sphere of human government I do not yield or bow down to anyone who is a mere man, as I am mere man, nor do I have to bow down to the will of the majority. Do I have to obey the will of the majority should it decide to abolish the Ten Commandments? Of course not! The Christian citizen who values his freedom rejects this liberal humanist and democratic theory that Parliament or the Congress is supreme and that either elections or majority votes can determine principles or should interfere with his God-given rights and freedoms. Authority over men cannot arise from men, certainly not from the will of the majority since history proves that very often the minority was right. As Bishop Gore used to say "Christ had a profound contempt for majorities." Was it not the majority who brought about our dear Lord's death, crying, "Crucify him, Crucify him"?

Together with this manipulation of majority vote at every General Election we may also refer to another deplorable development in British political life. We refer to the transformation of the exercise of ruling power from a primary personal function and office under God into a purely bureaucratic function, the dreadful feature of which is the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of crystallizing, settling and fixing responsibility. For a thousand years we have tried in the English-speaking world to subject the power of our rulers and politicians to the control of conscience because in the last resort it is only God himself who can subject the power of politicians, judges, police, employers and workers, doctors, clergymen and teachers to conscience. Such a doctrine of individual responsibility for one's conduct has not only curbed the arbitrariness of the Crown and of the executive branches of British and American states but also of each individual citizen. According to this historic Christian doctrine of government, which can be traced back to the biblical idea of human nature as created in God's holy image, each of us from the Queen and

the President down to the humblest village policeman is held responsible to God's higher moral law. In his classic work on *The Law of the Constitution*, A. V. Dicey of Oxford University pointed out that no one in Britain is allowed to plead in his defense for any unlawful act that he did it under the orders of a master or a superior. "It is this doctrine of individual responsibility," he writes, "which is the real foundation of the legal dogma that the orders of the King are no justification for the commission of a wrongful or illegal act. The ordinary rule therefore that every wrongdoer is individually responsible and liable for the wrong he has committed is the foundation on which rests the great constitutional doctrine of ministerial responsibility."<sup>23</sup> Each of us from the Queen or President down to the humblest citizen of Britain, Canada or America is held responsible for what we do or do not do to God's Moral Law as revealed in the Ten Commandments. Thus in principle God is the real source of our political and legal obligations as is proved by the fact that in spite of humanist objections to the contrary, we still have to take oaths upon the Bible in all our American, British and Canadian courts of law and no one can hold any public office under the Crown or the President unless they have first sworn on the Bible to obey the known laws of our lands.

Unfortunately these historic Christian doctrines of the origin and purpose of government have become eroded under the pernicious influence of humanistic and so-called scientific theories of law, power and the state. As a result our British and American governments stand in grave danger today of becoming the servants of Satan rather than of God, in so far as they have become cold, cruel and above all impersonal in their increasing infringement upon family, educational, recreational and business life. Our governments are in grave danger of becoming soulless and a complete reversal of what Christians have understood as to the nature and purpose of the state. This depersonalization of our governments into impersonal bureaucratic machines or great Leviathans is inevitable as long as the liberal humanist theory of the nature and purpose of government continues to be taught in all our so-called "liberal" universi-



ties and law schools and as long as it dominates the thinking of most of our lawyers, professors and politicians.

The division of Anglo-Saxon life into two parts, the sacred part when men and women may worship Almighty God on Sundays, and the secular part when people think they can safely ignore God's claims upon their lives is, of course, a division that no true Christian could possibly accept and remain a Christian. A religion that only has its meaning on Sundays is no religion at all. Real religion pervades the whole of life: our social, political and industrial and educational no less than our personal and private lives. In fact, it is precisely in his political and business life that a true Christian will seek with God's help and guidance to live up to his Christian convictions, for it is precisely in political and business life today that the power of Satan, sin and selfishness is so great.

Whether James or Munby like it or not, it is impossible for anyone to withdraw certain areas of life from the sphere of religious motivation. By religious motivation let me make clear that we refer to the most important basic commitment that a human being makes with respect to whatever he considers to be his god and in whatever thing, person, power or force he places his final trust.

The opposite of true religion is never described in the Bible as atheism, secularism, agnosticism, or neutralism as Bishop John Robinson seems to suggest in his book *Honest to God*.<sup>24</sup> Instead it is described as idolatry, apostasy, and rebellion. Unbelief is not thought of in the Bible as the absence of belief but as misdirected faith in a false god or idol. According to the Word of God people can no more grow out of religion than they can grow out of their skins. To ask whether a person believes in "God" is thus completely to misunderstand the vital issue at stake. The proper question facing all and each of us, as the biblical writers are never tired of reminding us, is rather what or who is your god? As the biblical writers see it, it is impossible for anyone to withdraw certain areas of life from the sphere of one's basic convictions and fundamental criterion of value. Whether "God" is taken to mean one's own human scientific and technical reason, political party, fami-

ly, trade union, social class, property and money, spouse, profits, wages, sex, alcohol, nation or state, science or the Lord Jesus Christ—all of these commitments are of a religious nature since they involve a person's belief about that which he believes to be ultimate and capable of saving him from disaster and meaninglessness. Any community or group of people who share a belief in any one of these gods and share a common system of values can thus be described as a "church." Any lord or savior is known and experienced through the community of people whom he or it delivers and who serve him or it. This is true of "Americanism," of Hitler and his Nazi party, of John Bull and the Union Jack, even of a bartender and his clientele. All of these are "lords" and "churches"—communities within which meaning and purpose for life are discovered by people. Martin Luther realized this well when he said: "Whatever then thy heart clings to and relies upon, that is properly thy God."<sup>25</sup> Religion in other words is what a person worships and lives for in life. Human life is religion because we have all been created in God's image and none of us can escape our need for purpose and meaning in life.

In terms of this biblical understanding of religion it is not hard to realize that secular humanists who uphold the doctrine of neutrality in politics and social life and claim to be agnostics and "free thinkers" in respect to the biblical revelation are just as religious in their own apostate way as any Christian, and they believe often ardently and with true religious fervor in the independence of modern man from God, in man's inherent goodness and perfectibility, in human progress,<sup>26</sup> in the sovereignty of the will of the majority, and in the infallibility of scientific method and social planning.<sup>27</sup> What really is at stake here is the *faith* by which men in fact live, and the external criterion of value by which men's choice of standards and values in life depends.

It would never occur to the biblical writers to record the biography of a man or a nation apart from reference to this faith and value criterion or "god." Taken by itself the

word "god" carries as little specific meaning as the word "good." As E. La B. Cherbonnier points out:

Both [these words] are empty receptacles whose content varies from man to man and religion to religion. They are functional words, the linguistic reflection of the fact that man is that creature who, in the exercise of his freedom, necessarily appeals to some criterion of good and evil. To ask *whether* a man believes in "God" is consequently to misunderstand the issue. The proper question, as the biblical writers never forget, is rather What (or who) is his god?<sup>28</sup>

The most important question we *all* have to ask ourselves in life is therefore the urgent question: Which of the various gods is the true God and what am I in fact and not in theory making my matter of ultimate concern in life? Am I worshipping the Almighty Dollar or the Automobile or the material standard of Comfort? At the moment a lot of Anglo-Saxons would appear to be worshipping the great god "automobile," judging by the tender care it receives every Sunday and by the amount of income spent on its purchase and upkeep. To imagine that you have stopped being religious when you stop going to church to worship Jesus Christ as your Lord and Savior, and when you stop making Christ the criterion of your value—judgments, is thus to make the biggest mistake of your life.

To suppose, as Bishop Robinson seems to suppose, that Europeans and North Americans and Russians and Chinese are no longer religious because they have stopped being Christians is simply to ignore the frenzied pursuit of millions of modern men throughout the world today after various false gods and saviors. Idolatry is just as rampant in Britain and North America, Asia and Africa and the Australasias in the nineteen-sixties *anno Domino* as it was in the nineteen-sixties before Christ, and it has become even more of a menace since it has learned to wrap itself up in the scientific jargon of the Huxleys, the Chisholms and the Russells of our modern world. Yet unrecognized perils are always the most dangerous to combat. As La B. Cherbonnier truly says: "The sophisticated 'isms' and 'ologies' in which modern man puts his trust simply func-

tion as graven images in modern dress.”<sup>29</sup> In his fundamental work on *The Protestant Tradition*, J. S. Whale warns us:

We should be living in an atmosphere of fantasy if we assumed that the only religious loyalties available to modern men are provided by those traditional faiths of which they are the natural heirs—notably Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism and Christianity. There are other faiths to which men give themselves. The *mystique* of racial destiny or imperial mission takes many forms, as the pages of de Gobineau, Dostoevsky or Kipling testify. Political ideologies evoke and sustain the devotion of the elect Party and, through it, of the disciplined multitude; either assuming an explicitly religious character, or using quasi-religious ritual forms and philosophies of history. Fascism, Nazism, Communism, Japanese *bushido* and Emperor cult are modern versions of the immemorial “religious” secularism which would deify the State or Society by giving it an absolute character. The omniscient State absorbs the sacred rights of the individual; it repudiates the unique status of the human person with cynical ruthlessness, prescribing not only how he is to live from the cradle to the grave, but how he is to think and what, in fact, he is to worship. Nationalism becomes the chief end of man. The parade-ground is its symbol; the ant-heap its working model. Right and wrong are no more than tiddly-winks for political opportunism to play with. Truth has no transcendent, absolute, meaning . . . .

Our liberal philosophers would be more convincing to many if they looked to Mount Zion as well as to Hellas, and learned from the Hebrew prophets rather than the Greek philosophers something of the meaning of religious faith. For this is ultimately a religious issue. In E. M. Forster’s *Two Cheers For Democracy* and in George Orwell’s *Shooting an Elephant* (to name two of many modern liberal manifestos) there seems to be little recognition of the dimension of the transcendent and the eternal, coming down from heaven upon the plane of human history like the plumbline of the prophet (Amos vii, 7-8), what our Calvinist, Puritan or Covenanting forefathers knew as the prerogatives of Christ the King. When the Huguenots were besieged in St. Quentin by the Spanish representatives of Hapsburg absolutism,

an arrow was shot over the city wall into the market place, carrying a scornful demand for surrender. Coligny ordered it to be shot back again bearing the words *Regem habemus* (we have a King) . . . .

Without a similar world-transcending faith, liberalism is wistful and lost. It complains that a Hitler, a Stalin or any dictator typical of the modern age has no sense of the sanctity of individual personality. This is true. It is the most ghastly truth of our time. But if there be no living God, the sovereign Creator and Redeemer in whose image man is made, why should the individual take precedence over the mass; over the Party or Nation or Race? . . .

It is precisely in those countries where they care nothing for Christ's death that in a very short space of time they come to care nothing for a man's life . . . . It has become increasingly evident to us that the sacred right of the individual human person is a *sacred* right, but only because it presupposes dogmatic faith in a revelation from on high. The sanctity of the free personality of man is going to depend in the future, as it has done in the past, not on the so-called decencies of man, nor on the benevolent paternalism of the welfare state, nor on the tender mercies of private enterprise; nor on the visionary operations of inevitable progress; but on the vitality of supernatural religion; *in short, on the vindication of the crown rights of the Redeemer in His Church.*<sup>30</sup>

Religion understood in these terms is man's ineradicable situation; it is what makes a man specifically a human person rather than an animal. Man is created in God's image and he is therefore responsible to God, to whom he must one day render an account of all his doings.

The Christian citizen will therefore seek to be directed by the true God's will as revealed in the Holy Scriptures, while men who lack this light and direction for their lives will be prompted by reason of their now perverted religious nature to do for themselves what God's Word ought to do for them. Man acts in this religious way of demanding an ultimate point of reference for his thinking and doing because of his having been created in God's image, that is, as a religious being. For this reason the prophets of ancient Israel did not define man as *homo sapiens*, a rational animal, but as *homo religiosus*, a religious animal. On this defini-

tion it is meaningless to distinguish between religious and non-religious areas of life or between religious and irreligious men. He who rejects one religion or god can only do so in the name of another.

None of us can escape our religious nature. We will place our final trust and faith either in the God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ or in some idol of our own devising and, as Paul teaches, thus try to hold down the truth in unrighteousness.

For this very good reason James' and Munby's arguments for keeping religion out of politics and for joining the secular bandwagon of apostasy from the living God of the Holy Scriptures in the name of neutral secularism or liberal humanism are exposed as being only specious propaganda on behalf of the god of modern secular humanism. It is not a question of whether we should or should not bring religion into politics and legal life, but *the* crucial question is this: By which religious motivation and by which religious criterion of value and religious directive will men and nations in fact be governed in their political and social life? As William Penn saw over two hundred years ago when he warned Americans in his famous words: "Men must choose to be governed by God or they condemn themselves to be ruled by tyrants." Again Peter Howard has also warned us:

The Red men are few. But they are formidable in their Marxist faith. They succeed because they are red-hot where so many democrats are lukewarm . . . We stand for nothing, so we fall for anything. If we are Christian, we shrink from the charge of "meddling in politics." We dare not say that Communism is wrong, and so we cut Christ to the shape and size that suits anti-Christ. We sit while others shout. We compromise while others communize. We stay at home while others vote at Trade Union Meetings. We denounce those who fight for faith as fanatics.<sup>31</sup>

A true Christian will surely prefer to be guided by a biblical motivation and evangelical criterion of value than by a secular humanist one. A person can no more avoid being religiously committed in his political and social behavior than he can avoid breathing the air around him. If

he is not consciously being directed in his behavior by a Christian motivation, then he will be directed by a humanistic, communistic or materialistic motivation, whether he is conscious of the fact or not, and whether he admits to it or not.

If Christians really acknowledge that God rather than man or the state or the party or the dollar is sovereign in this universe, then I do not understand how they can avoid admitting that God's dominion and supremacy must extend over every aspect of life, political, economic and social as well as personal, and that the living Lord cannot be shut up within the walls of a church building or a limited circle of Christian believers. Do the Christian neutralists such as James and Munby think that God has abandoned the world outside the church to Satan and the powers of darkness? God's sovereignty and supremacy are surely at work in the life of that unbaptized unregenerate world outside the Church, and for that reason every child of God redeemed by Christ from the power and grip of sin and selfishness cannot summarily withdraw from that life in the world without committing treason against Christ the King and thus denying his Redeemer of his crown rights over the whole creation. If God and his Christ are at work in that unregenerate world by means of temporal conserving and restraining grace, then the Christian's hand, too, must be put to the plow in that world in order that there also, as well as within the circle of the faithful few, the name of the Lord may be glorified.<sup>32</sup>

If God is supreme and sovereign, then his divine norms and standards of justice, truth, goodness, beauty and love must have the final control and motivation in everything the Christian thinks, wills and does. These norms rather than those of an apostate political, legal and social science must become the directives by which the Christian is guided as a citizen, as a worker, as a scientist, as a teacher, as an artist, and as a parent; and they alone must constantly enlighten him or her in solving the problems with which he or she is faced in *all* areas of life.

The apostle Paul teaches us that God the Father has committed all power and authority upon earth to his Son through whom he now rules all things (1 Cor. 15: 24ff.). The risen and ascended Christ has been entrusted by God the Father with the great task of transforming not only individual lives but all cultural, legal, political, scientific, and economic life. As the Lord of history and of time and space, Jesus Christ can be satisfied with nothing less than a Christian organization of human society as a whole, and it therefore becomes the bounded duty and privilege and glorious task of all Christians to struggle for a condition of modern society which will give the maximum opportunity for other people, as well as for themselves, to live a full, free, more abundant human life and to make sure that Christians are never controlled by an apostate and rebellious world, but that they control that world in the strength and power of Almighty God.

In this book we shall show how this agelong vision of Christians can be made to become a living and present reality by considering something of the political and legal thought of Herman Dooyeweerd of the Free University of Amsterdam. His profound contribution to a truly Christian philosophy of law, politics and the state, and therefore to the establishment of a truly Christian ordering of human society, has been largely unknown and therefore ignored in the English-speaking world because of the limitations of the language barrier, the complexity of the Christian philosophy of the Cosmonomic Law-Idea and the religious background and coloring of Dooyeweerd's teaching.

Unknown to most English-speaking Christians, the much needed work of adjustment of Christianity to modern culture, politics and science, the absence of which was so bemoaned by August Lang at the beginning of our own century, has in fact been underway in Dutch Reformed circles since the founding of the first truly Christian and biblically-motivated university in Amsterdam in 1880.<sup>33</sup> Under the heroic leadership of Abraham Kuyper, statesman and Christian philosopher and teacher, and his two most outstanding pupils, Herman Dooyeweerd and D. H. Th. Vollenhoven, the great work of relating Christianity to



the modern world on Christian rather than secular terms, begun during the sixteenth century, has once more been taken in hand after having been allowed to lapse for nearly three centuries. If English-speaking Christians will give as much heed to the teaching of Herman Dooyeweerd as they once gave to Calvin's teaching, then a great reformation of Anglo-Saxon Christianity will take place, and Christianity will once more begin to revitalize and renew the flagging moral and spiritual energies of the great English-speaking democracies, and give to the American, British, Canadian and Australian peoples the vision of God, without which they will most surely perish.

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<sup>1</sup> August Lang, "The Reformation and Natural Law," *Calvin and the Reformation* (Revell Company, New York, 1909), pp. 57 f.

<sup>2</sup> Ernst Cassirer, *The Platonic Renaissance in England* (Thomas Nelson, London, 1953); Rosalie L. Colie, *Light and Enlightenment* (Cambridge University Press, 1957); Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1961), pp. 166ff.

<sup>3</sup> August Lang, *op. cit.*, pp. 72f.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 94ff.

<sup>5</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, edited by Michael Oakeshott (Blackwell, Oxford, 1956); John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Civil Government*, edited by J. W. Gough (Blackwell, Oxford, 1946).

<sup>6</sup> G. H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (G. G. Harrap, London, 1938), pp. 415-433.

<sup>7</sup> Ernst Cassirer, *op. cit.*, pp. 166ff.; F. S. C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West* (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1947), pp. 66ff.

<sup>8</sup> Paul Hazard, *The European Mind (1680-1715)* (New Haven, 1952), p. 269; also consult Basil Willey, *The Seventeenth Century Background* (Chatto & Windus, London, 1949), pp. 1-23.

<sup>9</sup> J. H. Nichols, *History of Christianity* (The Ronald Press Company, New York, 1956), pp. 6ff.

<sup>10</sup> Walter James, *The Christian in Politics* (Oxford University Press, London, 1962), p. 191.

<sup>11</sup> D. L. Munby, *The Idea of a Secular Society* (Oxford University Press, London, 1963), p. 58.

<sup>12</sup> Bernard Zylstra, *Challenge and Response* (Christian Labor Association of Canada, 90 Hadrian Drive, Rexdale, Ontario), pp. 7-8.

<sup>13</sup> William Temple, *Christianity and Social Order* (SCM Press, London, 1950), pp. 47ff.

<sup>14</sup> Aldous Huxley, *Ends and Means* (Chatto & Windus, London, 1938). For a trenchant criticism of Temple's social teaching, consult

J. D. Carmichael and H. S. Goodwin's *William Temple's Political Legacy* (Mowbray, 1963).

<sup>15</sup> J. C. Gill, *The Mastery of Money* (Industrial Christian Fellowship, St. Katharine Free Church, Leadenhall Street, London. E. C. 3, 1948), p. 16.

<sup>16</sup> J. C. Gill, *The Ten Hours Parson* (SPCK, London, 1959); J. T. Ward, *The History of the Factory Movement, 1830-1855* (London 1962); J. C. Gill, *Parson Bull of Byerley* (SPCK, London, 1963).

<sup>17</sup> G. M. Trevelyan, *The English Revolution* (Home University Library, Oxford University Press, London, 1948), pp. 241f.

<sup>18</sup> Sir Isaiah Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty* (Clarendon Press Oxford, 1958), pp. 7ff.; cf. R. Kooistra, *The Free Canadian* (Christian Labor Assn., 1962).

<sup>19</sup> Sir Charles Grant Robertson, *Select Statutes, Cases and Documents* (Methuen, London, 1942), pp. 116-120.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 12-123.

<sup>21</sup> Sir David Lindsay Keir, *The Constitutional History of Modern Britain, 1485-1937* (Adam and Charles Black, London, 1946), pp. 270ff. For an account of the Christian conception of monarchy, consult F. Kern, *Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages*, translated by S. B. Chrimes (Blackwell, Oxford, 1939); also Harold Nicolson, *Monarchy* (London, 1962); John Farthing, *Freedom Wears a Crown* (Kingswood House, Toronto, 1957).

<sup>22</sup> John Farthing, *Freedom Wears a Crown* (Kingswood House, Toronto, 1957), pp. 61ff. This book is required reading by all Christians concerned for the future of their English-speaking nations.

<sup>23</sup> A. V. Dicey, *The Law of the Constitution* (Macmillan & Co., London, 1931), pp. 206ff.

<sup>24</sup> John A. T. Robinson, *Honest to God* (S.C.M. Press, London, 1963), pp. 36-44.

<sup>25</sup> Martin Luther, "Larger Catechism," *Luther's Primary Works* (London, 1896), p. 34; also consult Karl Heim's brilliant discussion of Luther's dictum in his book, *The Transformation of the Scientific World View* (S.C.M. Press, London, 1953), pp. 1-26; also Gordon W. Allport Advent Paper, *The Roots of Religion* (Forward Movement Publications, 412 Sycamore St., Cincinnati, Ohio), and his book *The Individual and His Religion* (Constable, London, 1951), pp. 1ff.

<sup>26</sup> J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (Macmillan, London, 1928).

<sup>27</sup> F. A. Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science* (Free Press, Glencoe, 1952).

<sup>28</sup> E. La B. Cherbonnier, *Hardness of Heart* (New York, 1955), p. 40; cf. D. Ramsey, *Religious Language* (SCM, London, 1955) p. 49; "Religious language talks of the discernment with which is associated, by way of response, a total commitment."

<sup>29</sup> La B. Cherbonnier, *ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>30</sup> J. S. Whale, *The Protestant Tradition* (Cambridge University Paperbound, 1962), pp. 264-267 (italics mine).

<sup>31</sup> Peter Howard, *Britain and the Beast* (London, 1963), pp. 12ff.

<sup>32</sup> Abraham Kuyper, *De Gemeene Gratie*, Vols. I, II, III (Kok, Kampen, 1931); Cornelius Van Til, *Common Grace* (Pres. and Reformed Pub. Co., 1954).

<sup>33</sup> Hendrik Van Riessen, *The University and its Basis* (Christian Perspectives 1963, Association for Reformed Scientific Studies, 139 Geneva St., St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada), pp. 40ff.

## CHAPTER I

### DOOYEWEERD'S PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

#### A. Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer

Before we can begin to understand the teaching of Professor Herman Dooyeweerd, we must first know something of his historical background and of the antecedents of his legal and political philosophy. Primary among these is the Dutch statesman and historian Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer (1801-1876).

While the theologians and leaders of the Reformed Church of Holland were succumbing to the spirit of the age of reason during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a "thin line of faith" was kept in existence in the hearts of many ordinary Dutch Protestant Christians. This line of faith is distinguishable in the history of the Dutch Reformed Church during these two centuries. After the great international Synod of Dordrecht (1618-19), this line of faith became very weak as the leaders of the state church surrendered first to scholasticism in their opposition to Cartesianism and then to Cartesianism itself.<sup>1</sup> Yet, in the congregations far removed from the arid debates of the theologians, adherence to the full Word of God remained intact. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the line of faith was rejuvenated by a great spiritual awakening known as the "reveil" which followed the Napoleonic Wars, beginning with the evangelical revival in Scotland, and spreading to Switzerland, France and Holland.<sup>2</sup>

The revival of evangelical Christianity first appeared in Holland in the aristocratic and cultured circles of Amsterdam and the Hague, and then spread to the University of Leiden where the great Dutch poet Bilderdyk became converted to a living faith in Christ as the Lord of all life as well as his own personal Savior, and as a result, he rediscovered the meaning and value of historic Calvinism, that is, the awareness of the total authority of the Word of God for the whole of life. As Bilderdyk understood it, Christ was the King of Dutch culture and society, as well as the Savior of Dutchmens' souls. This meant that the religious revival in the Netherlands began to assume a much greater significance than it did elsewhere where it was more oriented to pietism and personal religious experience.

Such pietism, no doubt, expressed the religious reaction of devout evangelicals against orthodox formalism, and it tended to concentrate upon the doctrine of salvation and to develop an Arminian rather than a Reformed doctrine of grace. God's offer of salvation was supposed to be made to all men and it was believed that Christ died for all mankind. Given such a doctrine of grace it is not surprising that pietists have tended, with a few notable exceptions, to think of religion as being mainly concerned with the salvation of the individual and with his spiritual states of mind and feelings. As a consequence, pietism has greatly assisted the secularization of Western society as a whole, since its religious individualism takes for granted or ignores the structures of church and state, seeking within society to build up significant religious cells. The main concern of Dutch pietists, as of Wesleyan pietists in England and America, became the salvation of one's individual soul rather than of society as a whole. Instead of thinking that Christians should be concerned with the whole of life—business, political, educational and cultural, pietism demands the segregation of a certain sphere of life as peculiarly religious and teaches that the believer should concentrate his entire efforts upon cultivating subjective religious states of mind and feeling, as well as various personal devotional and ascetic disciplines. The larger

questions of church and state and culture tend to become discounted, sometimes because of apocalyptic expectations, or because they are considered to be religiously neutral. As a result, the attention of the evangelical pietist tended to become concentrated upon personal rather than social morals, and the sins of the flesh have been more often feared than the spiritual sins, such as selfishness, pride, envy and jealousy.<sup>3</sup>

Bilderdyk did not succumb to this type of sectarian religiosity and he was able to convert many young Dutch aristocrats to the vital necessity for reasserting Christ's claim to sovereignty over the whole of Dutch culture and society. As he saw it, pietistic withdrawal from the world denied the office and vocation of the Christian to bring the whole of life into subjection to Christ, and he regarded those fellow Christians who looked upon prayer, meditation and works of mercy as higher concerns than one's daily activity and witness in culture as false to the great cultural mandate given by God to restore his creation to its original state.

Amongst these converts was Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer, the son of upper-class parents, who had been brought up as a typical liberal modernist Christian, under the influence of a rationalistic supernaturalism which sought to combine the orthodoxy of the Canons of Dordt with the rationalistic humanism of the age of the Enlightenment. The Christian ought to be biblical but not dogmatic. Reason and revelation must be synthesized to become worthy of a gentleman's acceptance. Christ was admitted to be an exceptional person, whose virtue should become an example for all to follow. The ministers whom Groen heard preach as a boy did not deny man's fall into sin; yet nevertheless, they maintained the purity of man's rational nature. It was not considered quite proper in the religious circles in which Groen moved to be "enthusiastic" in one's religious life. Instead, one should as far as possible try to live by the golden rule.

At the age of thirty, during his stay in Brussels at the time of the Belgian Revolt, Prinsterer came under the influence of the court preacher Merle d'Aubigne, also a

man of the reveil movement. As a keen student of the Reformation about which he wrote an account of the Reformation in England,<sup>4</sup> d'Aubigne preached a simple but forthright Gospel message and he was able to introduce Groen to the dynamic Christianity of sixteenth-century Calvinism.

From this time onwards Groen came to realize with increasing clarity the tremendous inroads which the secular spirit of the Enlightenment had made upon European culture and society, and he began to raise his voice in protest at the betrayal of Christian civilization. His position first as Secretary to the Dutch government during the reign of King William I gave Groen the opportunity to study "practical politics" from a first-hand standpoint. As a result of poor health he resigned from this office and was appointed archivist of the personal papers of the House of Orange-Nassau. This position enabled Groen to find enough time in which to develop his own positive Christian approach to the problems of Dutch political life and culture.

The political world in which Groen moved had few clear-cut lines. In the eighteen-thirties and forties Dutch conservatives and liberals were beginning to sort themselves out in the Dutch Parliament after the upheavals caused by the French Revolution and Napoleon's occupation of the Netherlands. For a number of years following the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15 the distinctions between liberals and conservatives were very blurred.

At first Prinsterer tended to support the conservatives, but he gradually reached the conclusion, as a result of an intensive study of the French Revolution, that the Dutch conservatives were not basing their policies and principles upon a Christian evaluation of contemporary affairs. As a Christian historian he tells us in his introduction to the *Archives de la Maison d'Orange* that he wrote history with definite principles in mind. These can be summed up as the "unconditional subjection to the law of God who has revealed himself in the Holy Scriptures."<sup>5</sup> Groen did not consider it correct to set aside the highest truth in the writing of a science which is called to give witness

to the whole truth. P. A. Diepenhorst in his biography of Groen van Prinsterer says that this definite Christian approach to historiography was not well received at the time Groen first introduced it, but later historians, such as Fruin and Motley, have recognized that in this way Groen was the pioneer of modern historiography.<sup>6</sup>

As a confessor of the total authority of the Word of God for the whole of life, Groen came to realize that the dilemma between liberalism and conservatism was a false one. He proved that his fellow Christians in supporting the conservatives were in effect making a synthesis between their religious faith and the unchristian policies and practices of the party of the right wing of Dutch politics. He pointed out that both conservatives and liberals in Holland were in agreement on the basic principles of modern politics. Both parties accepted the doctrine that the source of power was to be found in the populace rather than in the sovereignty of Almighty God. Both parties had reacted against the extremities of the practical results of the French Revolution. Yet neither party repudiated the rationalistic ideas of the Enlightenment which had brought Europe to the brink of disaster. All the leading politicians of Holland remained "enlightened" and the theories of Rousseau and Montesquieu were the common property of both groups. The only point where there was any disagreement was in the area of the practical, and of the means to be adopted to realize the utopian ideals of the Enlightenment. Groen's tremendous significance for the future development of Christian Democracy in the modern world lies in the fact that he broke with this false choice between liberal and conservative by showing that both liberalism and conservatism are united in their common apostate humanistic presuppositions about man in society. He was the first Christian statesman to bring out into the open the fundamental issue in modern politics: Will men and nations accept God's authority and sovereignty in the state or will they make their own reason sovereign? Is God or man sovereign in the body politic? As Groen made clear, all shades of difference between liberalism and conservatism are the same for the person standing



on the anti-revolutionary or Christian historical side.<sup>7</sup> There cannot be a status quo since history will move men from their compromising stand as conservatives to the more liberal, till finally radicalism will control the minds and actions of the leaders of the people.<sup>8</sup>

By the end of the 1840's Prinsterer had worked out the basic political philosophy which today forms the basis of the oldest of Dutch Protestant political parties, the Anti-Revolutionary Party. Groen was not opposed to all change in history. The freedoms sought by Dutch liberals were often admirable, e.g., political democracy, economic competition, guarantees of civil rights and toleration of minority groups; and in certain circumstances, as Calvin himself had taught in his doctrine of the Christian's right to resist tyranny, a revolution might be the only way to achieve them. But what Groen could not and would not accept was the liberal and radical democratic affirmation, which seemed to him to be embodied in the French Revolution, of the supremacy of the will and of the sovereignty of human reason, and of the state over against the Word of God and the sovereignty and authority of God.

Through his work as historian at the royal court, Groen came to realize the real spiritual meaning of the French Revolution. It had marked nothing less than a full scale religious revolt against God and "*an overturning of the divinely established Order.*" Groen henceforth made it his life's work to remind his countrymen of the relation between religious apostasy and political and social revolution, and he published two works, the first titled *Ongeloof en Revolutie* (Unbelief and Revolution) and *La Parti Anti-Revolutionnaire et Confessionnel dans L' Eglise Réformée des Pays Bas*. As we shall be dealing with the former work in our consideration of the religious significance of the French Revolution in Chapter Five, we shall here consider the latter book in which Groen defends his break with Dutch Conservatism and his decision to organize the Anti-Revolutionary Party, based upon a Christian confession of God's total authority over the whole of life.

An article had appeared in a Swiss paper in 1860 written by a Walloon minister in the Hague attacking

Groen's Anti-Revolutionary Confessional Party for demanding Christian day schools and thus de-christianizing the public schools and the whole sphere of public life. The reaction of unbelief was said in this article to be only the result of the Anti-Revolutionary Party's narrow-mindedness, intolerance and outmoded point of view, and above all, of its confusion of politics and religion.

In reply, Groen took up his pen and published *La Parti Anti-Revolutionnaire et Confessionnel dans L' Eglise Réformée des Pays Bas* in the same year, in which book he informed his friends in Switzerland, France and elsewhere about his true position and to correct this gross misrepresentation. Groen thus wrote in reply:

The true source of our weakness and misfortunes, the principal cause of the triumph of indifference and unbelief is to be found in the influence of the individualistic views, which, as a curious and sad mixture of Christian faith with the spirit and doctrines of the Revolution, aim at the dissolution of the religious and political institutions and interrupt the natural and historical development of society in its divine coherence.<sup>9</sup>

This is the note which rings through the whole book and is Groen's main contention. As the situation in the English-speaking world today is very similar to that in which Groen lived and wrote, insofar as in our Anglo-Saxon democracies the main issues in the fields of economics, politics, labor relations and education are all decided on the basis of reason and issue out of the principle of unbelief, we shall now quote part of Groen's argument. According to Prinsterer the only antidote to unbelief and its revolutionary consequences for human society is belief:

The Anti-Revolutionary Party, they say, harms both religion and politics, because it obstinately confuses that which ought to remain distinct and separated. However, how can they, fervently attached to the evangelical beliefs, forget that the spirit ruling at the time in which we still live, had its root and origin in the disdain for revealed truth, or that the overthrow of the religious, political and social orders—not a passing change, but a state, a revolutionary situation: *the permanent Revolution*—has been and

remains the inevitable consequence of the denial of man's dependence on the God of nature, history and the Gospels? Moreover, how can they forget that in order to dispel evil, it is not sufficient to attack the symptoms, but that the germ must be removed? Systematic unbelief has no antidote but faith. The anti-revolutionary principle, therefore, is nothing but the Christian, protestant principle, the principle of the Reformation; the only one which, in the name of revelation and of history, can successfully combat an anti-religious, anti-social principle, and thus realize through the Gospel what is true and salutary in the unattainable ideals of the Revolution for the benefit of church and state.

The simplest way to reveal the nature and full significance of the anti-revolutionary principle, therefore, is to ask: "What is the Revolution?" For by learning to know it, one will be able to conclude from its physiognomy, the distinctive traits of the principle which contains it. The principle of the Revolution is the idolatrous cult of humanity; man recognizing no sovereign but himself, no light but his own reason, no law but his will, worshipping himself while dethroning God. Destruction of all social ties, universal license an unheard-of state of affairs which leads of necessity, by way of intermediate religious systems, to the final limits of doubt and, in politics, to the dissolution of society. . . .

What is the true remedy in such a state of affairs? We must get at the root of the evil ('We must attack the evil in the root.') We must renounce completely this independent subjectivism which, taking into account neither God's sovereignty nor man's frailty and fall, undermines the foundation of all truth and is ever demolishing without ever being able to build up. We must again seize upon the unchangeable truths, so long gone unappreciated, submit ourselves to the Divine authority, and return to the Christian principle.<sup>10</sup>

Unlike the conservatives of his generation, Groen alone was thus willing to deal radically with the religious root of the French Revolution. As Evan Runner points out:

It was this that Groen van Prinsterer saw, and his prophetic insight and evangelical obedience elevate him above all the other conservatives of his time. It was what led him to break with conservatism. His

act of evangelical obedience has given the Netherlands another political history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than the Anglo-Saxon countries. The difference is not a matter of national or radical differences; it is a difference in religious insight. . . . His fundamental analysis can be summed up. . . , "To get rid of the evil it is not sufficient to combat its symptoms, but the germ has to be removed. The only antidote to systematic unbelief is belief."<sup>11</sup>

In his analysis of contemporary political and social trends in the light of God's Word, Groen thus got beyond humanistic political thinking altogether. As he saw it, both liberals and conservatives were just as basically opposed to the Word of God and neither party had any real desire to acknowledge God's sovereignty over Dutch society. Groen devoted the rest of his life to the task of arousing his fellow Reformed brethren to insist upon the Word of God, as interpreted by the Reformation, as the independent and final authority in their public as well as in their private life.

Of this biblically-orientated political philosophy of Groen van Prinsterer, Michael Fogarty well writes in his classic study of *Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820-1953*:

The affirmation of the supreme authority of the Word of God had in his thinking, and has to this day in that of the Dutch Christian Democratic movements of which he is the ancestor, the same significance as the affirmation of Papal Infallibility and the Temporal Power has in that of Catholics. Here was the essential 'no,' the limit of the claims of the State and for liberal or socialist philosophy: but also the essential guide and safeguard, thanks to which Christians could place themselves confidently on the ground of modern democratic freedom. The first Anti-Revolutionary members appeared in the Dutch Parliament by the 'fifties,' largely in connection with the schools question, though they were not yet an organized party.<sup>12</sup>

In other words, Groen van Prinsterer was willing to accept the techniques of modern democracy, but he denied the totalitarian claims of the liberal humanists to order

human affairs solely in accordance with human reason without any reference to divine revelation. As Fogarty says:

What did call forth mass Christian movements—above all political movements—before 1880, and led Christians to insist on an independent voice in the modern world, was the fact that the liberal and related movements were humanist in the sense of laicist, and moreover were militantly so. They denied that the Christian revelation had any over-riding authority in matters of, particularly, politics and economics; or even, often, that it had any authority at all. And they did not stand by their own principle of tolerance and mutual respect. In country after country they insisted that the State was entitled at its convenience to interfere with, suspend, or destroy the Church's internal management, its religious foundations and its schools, that is, its machinery for preserving the message of Revelation intact, for expressing it in the highest form of Christian life, for defining and proclaiming its relevance to current problems, and for transmitting it to the next generation.<sup>13</sup>

Groen's determination to fight the prevailing unbelief of his day led him to found the Anti-Revolutionary Party, and he represented it for many years in the Dutch Parliament single-handed, earning for himself the title "The General without an Army."

For many years Groen's main effort was concentrated upon winning the right of Christian parents to educate their own children in their own Christian day schools. He was opposed by the "Liberal" Party, which supported the already existing state monopoly of education created by the French Revolution. Only such religious views could be expressed in these so-called neutral state schools as were common to Jews and Christians, that is, deism. In 1842, private schools, religious or otherwise, were permitted for those who could afford them, although many "Liberals" would have required attendance at the state schools whether the parents liked it or not, a pattern of compulsion which was soon to be repeated in America, Canada and Britain.

The Revolution of 1848 extended the franchise to about two per cent of the population, permitting "Liberal"

merchants and bankers to vote for representation in the Second Chamber. Civil liberties and "liberty of education" were also proclaimed. Groen argued that this should mean freedom for religious instruction in the schools, but with no avail. He found, as Reformed Christians were to find in America and Canada, that freedom for a humanist only means freedom for humanism, not for Christianity.

Both Calvinists and Roman Catholics in Holland agreed that religious faith should permeate the whole process of the education of youth. Unlike most Americans, Britons, and Canadians of today, they were not satisfied with merely starting the school day with morning prayers and Bible readings, and perhaps adding a few hours of religious instruction to the school curriculum. Both groups in the Dutch nation held that education is the joint responsibility of the parents and the school teachers rather than of the state, and that there should be an inner consistency between the inspirational influences of family and school. It was not much use for Christian parents to inculcate Christian values at home only to have them sneered at and derided by unbelieving scientific humanist teachers at day school.

By a Christian education Groen van Prinsterer understood not an education with some general religious coloring—neither directly influencing nor offending nor holding any particular belief or value-system—but rather an education that is consciously and definitely based upon the principles and truths found in the Word of God and in the historic confessions of the Christian faith. Groen wanted the children of the New Covenant not merely to be taught some knowledge of the Bible at school and to learn to pray, but rather that they should study all their subjects in the light of God's revelation of himself, given both in nature and in the Scriptures. His desire was not merely to add the fourth "R" (religion) to the other three "R's" but to have all subjects of the school curriculum taught and studied from a truly biblical and Christian point of view. In short, he wanted Christian children to be taught to worship God with their minds as well as with their wills or "hearts" and to learn to think about

God's creation as Christians, not as secular scientific humanists and unbelievers.

With this objective of Groen van Prinsterer surely no Christian parent can possibly disagree. A truly Christian education does not consist, as Mr. Butler falsely supposed in his *Education Act* of 1944 enacted in the British Parliament, in merely adding religion to other subjects taught at school, but in providing a Christian curriculum of studies in which all subjects from history to physics and chemistry to even mathematics are taught by believing Christian teachers from a truly biblical and Christian perspective. When the writer put forward this point of view in a recent letter to the editor of the *Church of England Newspaper* it was met by a storm of disapproval from so-called Christian teachers who objected most strongly to the writer's question: How can Christian teachers reconcile their baptismal oaths "to renounce the world, the flesh and the devil" with their contracts to teach in the godless school system now operated by the Ministry of Education?<sup>14</sup>

The Calvinists and Roman Catholics not only wanted to establish their own denominational schools, but also wanted equality with the "public" state schools in the matter of government financial support. In the face of tremendous opposition from modernistic Christians, liberal humanists, and rationalists, the Calvinists and Roman Catholics in Holland joined forces and launched what has since come to be called the "sixty years school struggle." The school question became a national issue of such critical importance that it provided both the Anti-Revolutionary Party and the Roman Catholic People's Party with the incentive to take direct Christian political action at the polls to secure their just rights.

The "school war" lasted sixty years. The first limited subsidies for private schools were enacted by Parliament in 1889 and then they were increased about twenty years later. A Royal Commission then recommended the acceptance of the idea of full financial equality. Gradually the modernists and humanists and liberals were forced to accept the justice of the principle of full financial equality.

Gradually a compromise was reached and in 1917 a full legal settlement of the school question was reached. Since then, the Dutch Constitution has stipulated that the central Government is permanently obligated to provide the means for education in all forms and in all types of schools.

As many English-speaking Reformed and Catholic Christians, who take their educational responsibilities seriously, are now engaged in a similar school struggle to win the same right to educate their own children in Christian day schools without any financial penalty in so doing, we shall now list the main principles which today underlie the Dutch educational system.

In a lecture given before St. Michael's Roman Catholic University, Toronto, Canada on December 8th, 1960, Dr. Maarten Rooy of the liberal humanist University of Amsterdam defined these principles as follows:

(1) Education is a joint responsibility of the family and the school. Education is more than the conveyance of factual knowledge. It implies training the powers of interpretation and judgment in the perspective of a faith or of a philosophy of life and value system. All education must be implemented within a basic concept of the human being and his relation to the universe.

(2) Freedom of education should be seen in close relationship with the freedom of religion. Those who wish for their children an education in harmony with the religious and moral principles they inculcate in the home must be given the necessary facilities.

(3) If it is recognized that the state must provide for education out of public funds, since it is too expensive to be paid only by parents, then it is a principle of equity and justice that these funds should benefit both public and private schools that live up to the same legal provisions and standards.

(4) Public funds are collected by compulsory taxation, irrespective of the creeds of the citizens. Because all education is recognized as a matter of state care, the payments for all schools should be made from the consolidated budget. Hence there can be no question of individual citizens or corporations "ear-marking" tax money in preference for this or that form of education.<sup>15</sup>



These principles are derived from Groen van Prinsterer's political philosophy that in the modern state formal recognition of freedom is not enough. The state must provide whatever material means are shown to be necessary to implement those freedoms. Any school system which thus discriminates in favor of one particular system is grossly unjust to the supporters of Christian day schools since they are thereby reduced to an inferior rank and status of citizenship. The prevailing Anglo-Saxon liberal humanist doctrine that public funds should be denied by law to certain schools, simply on the grounds that they wish to teach the Christian philosophy of life, is not in conformity with the principle of distributive justice. This principle surely requires that Christian day schools should receive financial aid from the state in proportion to the number of pupils of the total population which they educate.

Is it not time that liberal humanists within the English-speaking world openly admit that our Anglo-Saxon societies are now "pluralistic" and that justice requires that full freedom be granted to all ideological groups within our societies to educate their children in accordance with their own life- and world-view without financial penalty? If Holland's school system can reflect to the highest possible degree such a respect for basic human freedoms, especially the freedom to educate one's own children in accordance with one's own basic religious and moral convictions, then there is no technical reason preventing all Christian parents in America, Britain and Canada from enjoying the same educational rights. Let all Christian parents in the English-speaking world who wish to bring up their children in the "fear, nurture and love of the Lord" organize a great Christian day school movement and demand as a matter of distributive justice of their respective governments full financial support for such schools. *The battle for the minds of future generations of Americans, Britons and Canadians will be won or lost in the schools and it is therefore imperative that Christian parents should establish Christian day schools without any further delay before another generation of Christian children are lost to Jesus Christ.*

During his own life time Groen van Prinsterer did not harvest any great success. Again and again he had to cope with great and many disappointments. Throughout his lifetime he stood virtually alone but he never forgot that *one* man, provided he is on God's side, always constitutes a majority. But when that section of Holland which had become religiously self-conscious in 1834 also awoke politically after Groen's forty years of prodding, Abraham Kuyper and his associates were able to build on the strong Christian intellectual foundations laid down by Groen and with the guidance of God's Holy Spirit to accomplish the great revival of Reformed Christianity which gave birth to two great national Christian political parties, a Christian labor union and a Christian school system. Thanks to Prinsterer, Dutch Christians came at last to realize that God's laws and ordinances must be obeyed in the totality of life of every believer. His courage never abated and he did not look for immediate results but humbly obeyed his God, who gave him the strength and joy to persist in his confession of the gospel truth. After his death the fruit of what he had sown was harvested by others. As Paul said of his work for the Gospel, "I have planted, Apollos watered; but God giveth the increase" (I Cor. 3:6). The Lord does indeed give the increase but only in his own time. Let not English-speaking Christians become discouraged but remember Groen van Prinsterer and remain faithful to Christ as he remained faithful.

#### B. Abraham Kuyper

The second outstanding influence upon Dooyeweerd's development as a Christian jurist and political scientist was Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920). As leader of the Anti-Revolutionary Party, as editor of the daily newspaper *The Standard*, as well as of the religious weekly *The Herald*, as founder of the Free University of Amsterdam and co-founder with Groen van Prinsterer of the Christian day schools of Holland, and above all, as Prime Minister of his nation between 1901 and 1905, Abraham Kuyper proved that the Christian's relation to the modern world need not be one of passive acquiescence and apathetic indifference.

Upon his seventieth birthday at a national celebration in his honor it was said of him: "The history of the Netherlands, in church, in state, in society, in press, in school and in the sciences of the last forty years, cannot be written without the mention of his name on almost every page, for during this period the biography of Dr. Kuyper is to a considerable extent the history of the Netherlands."<sup>16</sup>

What was the secret of Kuyper's almost superhuman powers? In 1897, at the twenty-fifth anniversary of his editorship of *The Standard*, Kuyper said:

One desire has been the ruling passion of my life. One high motive has acted like a spur upon my mind and soul. And sooner than I should seek escape from the sacred necessity that is laid upon me, let the breath of life fail me. It is this: That in spite of all worldly opposition, God's holy ordinances shall be established again in the home, in the school and in the state for the good of the people; to carve as it were into the conscience of the nation the ordinances of the Lord, to which the Bible and Creation bear witness, until the nation pays homage to God again.<sup>17</sup>

In his assessment of Kuyper's contribution to his own thought, Dooyeweerd mentions (1) Kuyper's discovery of the Scriptural principle of the sovereignty of God as the basic idea of philosophy, (2) Kuyper's grounding of all human thought and science in the heart, (3) Kuyper's doctrine of common grace as the foundation of human culture, (4) Kuyper's doctrine of the antithesis between regenerated and unregenerated human science, and (5) Kuyper's doctrine of sphere-sovereignty.<sup>18</sup>

Kuyper first intended to reform the theology of the Dutch Reformed Church, since he began his career as a minister in the state church, but this gradually developed into a re-examination of all spheres of human knowledge, which he tried to relate to the underlying presuppositions of Calvinism. Thus he said in his famous *Lectures on Calvinism* delivered in America at Princeton University in 1898:

Theology is only one of the many sciences that demand Calvinistic treatment. Philosophy, psycholo-

gy, aesthetics, jurisprudence, the social sciences, literature, and even the medical and natural sciences, each and all of these, when philosophically conceived, go back to principles, and of necessity even the question must be put with much more penetrating seriousness than hitherto, whether the ontological and anthropological principles that reign supreme in the present method of these sciences are in agreement with the principles of Calvinism, or at variance with their very essence.<sup>19</sup>

What then are the basic principles of Calvinism as understood by Abraham Kuyper? In his Stone Lectures, Kuyper answers that Calvinism is neither an ecclesiastical, nor a theological, nor a sectarian conception, but an all-embracing view of life.<sup>20</sup> Such a life- and world-view, in whatever culture we find it, demands an insight into the three fundamental relations of all human life: namely, our relation to God, our relation to man, and our relation to the world. The reader is asked to refer at this point to the scheme we have provided of Kuyper's theory of the main life- and world-views of mankind (pp. 45-48).

Calvinism expresses these relations as follows. For our relation to God it believes in an immediate fellowship with the Eternal, independent of priest or church; for our relation to man, the recognition of each person as a value, which is his by virtue of his creation in the image of God, and therefore, of the equality of all men before God and his magistrates; and for our relation to the world, the recognition that in the world the curse of sin is restrained by God's common grace,<sup>21</sup> and that the life of the world is to be honored in its independence from ecclesiastical control, and that we must, in every domain, discover the treasures and develop the potencies hidden by God in nature and in human life.<sup>22</sup>

# THE MAIN LIFE- AND WORLD-VIEWS OF MANKIND

LIFE SYSTEM	OUR RELATION TO GOD	OUR RELATION TO EACH OTHER	OUR RELATION TO THE WORLD
PAGANISM	Worships God in the creature and recognizes no distinction between man and the world. Mythopoeic way of regarding the universe.	The strongest and cleverest persons must rule over the weak, e.g., the witch doctor, tribal chief or king. Weak and ignorant are without 'mana' or magic power and so must become the slaves e.g., of the more powerful, Indian caste system, Arab slavery. Collective rather than individual sense of responsibility, and the tribe, clan or group takes precedence over the individual.	Owing to its pantheistic tendency it places too high an estimate on the world and so tends to lose itself in the world, e.g., idol worship, worship of sacred cows, cats, snakes and monkeys. Society is governed by custom and remains culturally undifferentiated.
ISLAM	Isolates God from the creature and thus is able to distinguish man from the world and capable of a scientific approach to reality.	The believer in the prophet Mohammed has the right to rule over all unbelievers as well as over his wives who are veiled as a sign of their subservience to their man. A developed legal system and an awareness of certain rights of individual Moslems but not of unbelievers. No true sense of the equality of all men.	Tends to hold a low estimate of the world and believes that 'what will be will be.' Moslems are thus fatalistic (Kismet-Fate). For this reason Moslems for centuries did not try to change their environment but accepted it fatalistically.
ROMAN CATHOLICISM	Acknowledges both the transcendence and the imman-	All men are related to God hierarchically within the so-	In principle sees all the world as under God's curse

LIFE SYSTEM	OUR RELATION TO GOD	OUR RELATION TO EACH OTHER	OUR RELATION TO THE WORLD
	<p>ence of God who is related to the world by Natural Law acting as a bridge. God is related to man by means of a mystical middle link, the Church of Rome, which alone mediates God's grace through her control of the seven sacraments. Capable of a scientific approach to reality.</p>	<p>cial order, with the Pope of Rome at the head of the social pyramid as the Vicar of Christ, then kings, nobles, burghers, merchants, peasants. Holds an aristocratic and feudal rather than a democratic view of the nature of human society. Believes that society must be governed by Natural Law which man can discover by means of his reason. Tends to prefer autocratic and oligarchic forms of government but will tolerate democratic states if necessary. Believes that Truth is what is defined by Canon Law and not by secular organs of government.</p>	<p>and therefore to be shunned in favor of concentration upon the vision of God, e.g., celibacy of the clergy and the flight to monasteries. Rome claims by means of her control of the miraculous sacramental powers of God's grace to be able to exorcise the demonic forces at work in the world by taking up under her wing the secular institutions and values of society and thus to baptize them into Christ, e.g., Rome's claim to control marriage and to subordinate the state to her own purposes. Rome's thought is dominated by the nature and grace motive.</p>
CALVINISM			
Puritanism	Acknowledges the sovereignty of God over creation and believes that man can enter into direct, personal and immediate relations with God the Father through God the Son in the fellowship of the Holy Spirit.	Believes that all men and women, rich and poor, weak or strong, colored or white, stand as equals before God in their sin and that it is sin that creates social disharmony, not environmental conditions. Christ alone can cure men and women of this sin. Believes in the right to	Honors the world as God's creation and calls upon man to have dominion over it and to remove the effect of sin in the world, e.g., abolition of slavery, child labor; the provision of hospitals and schools. Believes that God's common grace saves men from the worst consequences
Presbyterianism			
Anglicanism (Reformed Wing)			
Methodism	Accepts the majesty of individual conscience and the		

LIFE SYSTEM	OUR RELATION TO GOD	OUR RELATION TO EACH OTHER	OUR RELATION TO THE WORLD
	right to private judgment led by God's Holy Scriptures and Holy Spirit. God is the source of all earthly power and authority and the creator of all facts within the Universe.	self - government in both church and state and prefers a democratic ordering of social relationships. Believes in constitutionalism and the rule of law. Freedom means dependence upon God.	of their sinfulness and provides the only basis for human culture and science. Man is called to serve God and his neighbor both in church and out in the world. Dominated by Christian basic motives of creation, fall into sin and redemption by Jesus Christ in the Communion of the Holy Spirit.
MODERN HUMANISM	Thinks that God does not exist or, if he does, does not care.	Denies and abolishes all differences between the sexes, between races, classes and nations on the grounds of a supposed common reason all share. It thus tends to put every one on a common level of equality, trying to make women into men, children into adults before they are grown up, colored men into white and vice versa. It does not really believe in true personal individuality but would place everyone under the ban of social uniformity, e.g., the rationalistic reorganization of all social relationships and application of technical ration-	Sees this world as the only place where man can save himself by building a Utopia by means of the scientific conquest of nature and of society, i.e., the control of the population by social scientists and by means of social engineering. Looks to medicine and psychology to cure men of their anti-social conduct. Humanism in all its forms is dominated by the basic motive of science and the free autonomous personality.
Scientism	All moral, legal and political values are held to be relative and the product of historical forces.		
Socialism	Man's reason is the only valid source of all norms and values. Man's mind creates the 'facts' of science. Man is born naturally good and he only behaves badly because of evil social conditions which can and must be changed by the scientific reorganization of society, by planning, and by the scientific management of men.		
Communism	Thinks that all power and		
Conservatism			
Nihilism			

LIFE SYSTEM	OUR RELATION TO GOD	OUR RELATION TO EACH OTHER	OUR RELATION TO THE WORLD
	authority proceeds from the will of the state or of the majority by reason of a 'social contract.'	ality wherever possible. It oscillates between the poles of individualism and collectivism. As a result of the failure of laissez-faire economics, now prefers socialistic panaceas for man's life in modern society. Freedom means independence from God.	



The importance of this summary account for our purpose lies in Kuyper's conception that man's relation to man and to the world, which involves the very possibility of any kind of human science, depends on his prior relation to God. What he understands by this "immediate fellowship with the Eternal," Kuyper tries to explain in his next lecture on the connection between Calvinism and religion.

In the first place, Kuyper states that religion is not confined to one group or church, but is common to all men. No man can claim to be constitutionally devoid as a human being created in God's image of the *semen religionis* which the Creator has implanted, together with the sense of the divine, in every man. Moreover, Kuyper claims, religion is a relation of the *whole* man to God. Quoting Christ's repetition of the great commandment, "Thou shalt love God not only with all thy heart and with all thy strength, but also with all thy mind," Kuyper states that the religious organ is to be found, not in a part of our being, for example our intellect, will or feelings, but in our whole being,<sup>23</sup> at that point where all the faculties are drawn together in a unity. He says:

If such an action (i.e., our interpretation of our relation to God) is to put its stamp upon our entire life, it must start from that point in our consciousness in which our life is still undivided and lies comprehended in its unity—not in the spreading vines but in the root from which the vines spring. This point, of course, lies in the antithesis between all that is finite in our human life and the infinite that lies beyond it. Here alone we find the common source from which the different streams of our human life spring and separate themselves.<sup>24</sup> . . . as the entire creation reaches its culminating point in man, so also religion finds its clear expression only in man who is made in the image of God, and this not because man seeks it, but because God himself implanted in man's nature the real essential religious expression . . . God himself *makes* man religious by means of the *sensus divinitas*, i.e., the sense of the Divine, which He causes to strike the chords on the harp of the soul. The heart . . . is to be understood not as an organ of feeling but as the point from which God acts and from which He acts on the understanding.<sup>25</sup>

In these passages Kuyper with one tremendous sweep has destroyed the whole apostate humanist anthropological concept of man. He has led us beyond the temporal functions of man, including thought, to the central religious root, the human heart, as the concentration and deeper unity of our whole existence.

From this it follows that there is no aspect of our existence which can be considered to be indifferent or religiously neutral. God is absolute sovereign; all life belongs to him and is created by him, according to its proper law and nature. *The sovereignty of God over the whole cosmos is thus, for Kuyper, the fundamental principle of Calvinism.* "First stands the confession of the absolute sovereignty of the Triune God," he writes, "for of Him, through Him and unto Him are all things. This is the fundamental conception of religion as maintained by Calvinism, and hitherto, no one has ever found a higher conception."<sup>26</sup> Everything created, he continues, was furnished by God with an unchangeable law for its existence. Because God has ordained such laws and ordinances for life, all life must be consecrated to his service. "If everything that is, exists for the sake of God then it follows that the whole creation must give glory to God."<sup>27</sup>

What then does the Calvinist mean by his faith in the ordinances of God? Every aspect of life, Kuyper answers, has a law for its existence, instituted by God himself. These laws or ordinances we may call laws of nature, provided that by this term we mean, not laws originating *within* nature, but laws imposed upon nature.<sup>28</sup> From this doctrine of God's sovereignty over all aspects of creation, Kuyper developed his conception of sovereignty in each orbit, applying it especially in his political and social philosophy. Ultimate sovereignty belongs to God, while derivative sovereignties belong to the various spheres of human society, so that these spheres are coordinately, rather than subordinately, related.

Defining what he understands by sovereignty in the sphere of society, Kuyper writes:

In a Calvinistic sense we understand hereby, that the family, the business, science, art and so forth are

all social spheres, which do not owe their existence to the state, and which do not derive the law of their life from the superiority of the state, but obey a high authority within their own bosom—an authority which rules by the grace of God, just as the sovereignty of the State does.<sup>29</sup>

Evan Runner points out that if we are to understand Kuyper's teaching on sphere-sovereignty we must recover an insight into the biblical doctrine of "office" as service of the living God. He says:

The biblical idea of office brings us to the heart of religion. While the word itself scarcely occurs in Scripture, the idea of office is expressed by such terms as "service," "servant of the Lord." Present in the idea are such related concepts as commission or charge or mandate and delegated authority, definite appointment to carry out the mandate. "Office" speaks of service in the first place, but there is the additional idea of preserving order. Thus office in the Scripture suggests the allocation of a particular task (of service in preserving order) and the bestowing of a particular right to perform it. Such office implies a Sovereign, One whose absolute right it is to give the command, to make the appointment, to hold responsible and then the delegated sovereignty, the right to act sovereignly in the name of the Sovereign by virtue of His commission. Office means therefore limitation; for the person in office is not himself the Sovereign but stands under the absolute sovereign authority. We conclude that office expresses the fact that man is placed to a certain task with a divine calling to perform it. It is the familiar idea of the cultural mandate. How better could one express the scriptural revelation that all our life is religion, a single-hearted service of God in the whole creation. For that reason the concept of office is close to that of the fear of the Lord, in fact to that of faith and of being a child of God.

Office is not merely service; it is also administration . . . Office as administration (preserving and orderly form giving) includes the idea that the future weal or woe of what is being administered depends upon whether the office-bearer does or does not serve God. Scripture speaks of a number of such offices, that are both service and administration; of prophet, teacher, priest, judge, king, father, husband, etc. The authority of a father over his children does not really

lie in his having begotten them but in his having been charged by God himself with that responsibility. This is a divine ordinance and that is what is meant by office.<sup>30</sup>

As Kuyper sees it, all the offices that thus stand alongside one another in our functional life find their concentration in the office of man as covenant head of the creation. Christ, the second Person of the Godhead, possesses absolute sovereign authority and power. As such, our Lord Jesus Christ is the full and complete Office-bearer, and he is therefore the origin and source of all power exercised on earth. Christ has delegated only partial sovereignties to men. In him alone all these earthly sovereignties are united in an undivided service of God that involves nothing less than the redemption of the whole of human life.

In this way Kuyper arrived at his idea of the universality of religion or of life in its totality as religion, which makes it possible to see the difference between the church as an institute of special grace and the central religious rule of Christ over the hearts of all men. With this view of Kuyper's we may compare a similar view being expressed in England by Frederick Denison Maurice during the same century in his book, *The Kingdom of Christ*. Maurice began with the fact that the Christ who comes into this world comes into his own, and that it is Christ himself who exercises his kingship over men, not a vicegerent—whether Pope, Scriptures, church or inner light—separate from the Incarnate Word. Early in his life the conviction had been forced on him that Christ is the Lord of mankind whether men believe in him or not. So in a letter to his mother he wrote:

God tells us, "In Him," that is, in Christ, "I have created all things, whether they be in heaven or on earth." Christ is the head of every man. Those men who disbelieve it "walk after the flesh" . . . They do not believe this, and therefore they do not act upon this belief . . . But though tens of hundreds of thousands of men live after the flesh, yea, though every man was so living, we are forbidden by Christian truth and the Catholic Church to call this the real state of

man . . . . The truth is that every man is in Christ . . . . Except he be joined to Christ, he could not think, breathe, live a single hour.<sup>31</sup>

For Maurice the center of the creation is the Christ of God in whom all things were created to live in union with God and with each other. Christ reveals the true nature of life and the law of the created society as well as the sin and rebellion of its members; he redeems men in and for communion with one another in God.

The essence and meaning of the whole history of the Kingdom of God recorded in the Scriptures is contained in Christ's amazing prayer, "That they may all be one, as thou, Father, art in me and I in Thee, that they may be one in us."<sup>32</sup> Hence Maurice, together with Groen van Prinsterer and Abraham Kuyper, found himself in conflict not only with "unsocial Christians" but also with "un-Christian Socialists"; the former based man's relation to Christ on external rites, substituted religion for a faith in Christ's kingship over the whole of life and took no responsibility as Christians for human social life; on the other hand, the socialists were inclined to base society on man's supposed animal nature, and to make common self-interest and utility the only ground for social action and policy.

For both Kuyper and Maurice the office of the ecclesiastical institution is limited to the administration of the Word and the blessed sacraments. Its office-bearers have an authority limited to the ecclesiastical sphere. But the Word of God for both men and every other sphere is a rule for the whole of life; each with its God-given rights and responsibilities must express God's will for its own area of activity. Such in brief is Kuyper's doctrine of sphere sovereignty. Of it Runner says:

Sovereignty in this expression means delegated sovereignty, and also limited sovereignty, sovereignty that is limited to a certain sphere. But it carries also the meaning of co-ordinate sovereignties. No delegated and limited sovereignty is subordinated to any other; each delegation of authority is directly from Christ. Thus, for instance, the husband's authority is not derived from the state of which he is a citizen or

subject, but from Christ Himself (Eph. 5:23ff., I Cor. 11:3). Thus all these co-ordinate services and administrations do not within themselves display relationships of part and whole, but each of them is part of that total service of God that is rendered to God by Jesus Christ, as Head and Root of re-born humanity.<sup>33</sup>

Kuyper lived at a time when the centralization of power in the state was becoming increasingly evident in European political, legal and constitutional developments. To that tendency which Lord Hewart gave the name *The New Despotism* in a book which discusses the growing encroachment of the administrative organ of the executive branch of government upon civil and criminal law,<sup>34</sup> Kuyper directed the following prophetic word which has been well paraphrased by Runner and which we do well to remember.

The State has as much power as God bestows upon it; no more but also no less. It sins not only by usurping authority but also when it does not make use of all the authority given to it. The power of the state is constantly limited by that of all the other life-spheres. It does not stand by itself, but is only one of the links in the great chain which holds all the Creation intrinsically together. It cannot interfere in that life which properly belongs to another sphere because God has not delegated it competence therefore. The father, for instance, exercises his proper authority also by divine commission, and the government may not enter into that divine arrangement. Government as *office* is an institution of divine origin, quite independently of whether the persons of the government fear God. The grace of God lies in the existence of the governmental authority itself and therefore we must obey it, but only within the God-ordained limits of its powers. Thus the state takes its place not *above* but *alongside* the other spheres.

A nice illustration of sphere-sovereignty is provided by considering what is involved in the completing of a marriage. Marriage, says Kuyper, is a matter for the bride and bridegroom. It is their solemn oaths to each other that is the essential thing. But, of course, the two families are also involved. And church and state. Neither the state, however, nor the church performs the marriage. But the state regulates the marriage with respect to its civil side and the church with respect to its sphere of competence.<sup>35</sup>

In the great address Kuyper delivered upon the official opening day of the Free University in 1880, he used a graphic figure of speech to express his wonderful view of man's life in the spheres of society.<sup>36</sup>

"We see," he said, "that our human life is neither simple nor uniform, but an infinitely complex organism, so put together that that which is individual exists only in groups and that only in those groups the whole can be revealed. We might call the parts of this one great machine clogged wheels, the spheres of human society. [I am expanding Kuyper's illustration a little to bring out its full force.] As this machine is put into motion, each wheel turns on its own individual axis (the law for that sphere) but the cogs slide into each other as happens for example in the gear system of a car. The wheels work upon each other, but they do not interfere with each other. If, however, one wheel were of its own accord to extend its circumferential boundary, its cogs would crash into the other cogs and damage, if not destroy, the operation of the machine."<sup>37</sup>

From such a standpoint Kuyper could point to the fact that in the past when one life-sphere attempted to interfere in the proper affairs of another—e.g., the government in business or churches in state and vice versa—things did not go well. Thus, for instance, even totalitarian godless Communism has found that it interferes with sphere sovereignty at its peril. The developments within Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 are a striking example of this principle. The Communist leaders, in spite of their theories of free love, trial marriage, and divorce by consent, were forced by the resulting social confusion to reacknowledge to a certain extent the intrinsic significance of marriage and family as well as that of private property. Here, in the midst of man's rebellion against God's norms and ordinances for human society, something of his righteousness and superior power is revealed.

By means of his doctrine of sphere sovereignty, Abraham Kuyper has provided Christians with a weapon against both the rugged, selfish individualism of the nineteenth-century laissez-faire variety and the suffocating collectiv-

ism of the totalitarian Communist variety. As developed by his pupils, especially Herman Dooyeweerd, Jan D. Dengerink and H. Van Riessen, the doctrine has become the keystone of the Christian philosophy of human society. It is a badly needed corrective to the theologism, ritualism, pietism, and sacerdotalism which have contributed so much to the disintegration of Protestant Christianity in the English-speaking world and rendered Protestant Christians so impotent and directionless and politically irresponsible in the twentieth century. With Van Riessen, we must agree that there is no evangelical theme more in need of a forceful, relevant interpretation and application to the English-speaking world of our time than this one of sphere sovereignty. "At this point," he writes, "the decisive blow will be dealt in the struggle against totalitarianism and for a Christian society."<sup>38</sup>

Dooyeweerd is not only indebted to Kuyper for his doctrine of sphere sovereignty, but he is also greatly influenced in his own thought by Kuyper's doctrine of the antithesis between regenerated and unregenerated human science and scholarship.

What then does Kuyper teach about the antithesis between Christian and apostate science and learning? Kuyper answers this question by asking whether religion is "normal" or "abnormal." Must we reckon *de facto* with man in his present condition as normal, or as having fallen into sin and become abnormal, in which case religion must necessarily assume a soteriological character?<sup>39</sup> If we consider man as normal, his religion is then conceived of as a slow process of development from the most primitive stages to its present status as the "unconscious feeling for an unknown Infinite" and sin itself is explained in terms of an evolution from a lower to a higher moral position.<sup>40</sup> According to the abnormalist theory, man, being created in the image of God, was also created with a pure and genuine religion. The degrading religions of primitive pagan communities are not natural to man but the outcome of his Fall, and religion can consequently only be restored to its original purity in a soteriological manner, by a radical regeneration of man. Palingenesis (rebirth), however, is



not only an immediate act of God's grace "setting right the crooked wheel of life," but also it involves the necessity of Scriptural revelation, which presents us with a clear consciousness of our relation to God. In our abnormal condition, our immediate communion with God is lost; sin has brought separation and darkness, and the "necessity of artificial illumination" arises. As Kuyper well puts it:

When the sun shines in your house, bright and clear, you turn off the electric light, but when the sun disappears below the horizon, you feel the *necessitas luminis artificiosi*, i.e., the need for artificial light, and artificial light is kindled in every dwelling. Now this is the case in matters of religion. When there are no mists to hide the majesty of the divine light from our eyes, what need is there for a lamp unto the feet, or a light upon the path? But when history, experience, and consciousness all unite in stating the fact that the full and pure light of Heaven *has* disappeared, and that we are groping in the dark, then, a different, or if you will, an artificial light *must* be kindled for us—and such a light God has kindled for us in His Holy Word . . . .

For the Calvinist, therefore, the necessity of the Holy Scriptures does not rest in ratiocination, but on the immediate testimony of the Holy Spirit,—on the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*.<sup>41</sup>

If we accept the Abnormalist rather than the Normalist point of view, then we must believe that all human life, including the life of human science and scholarship, must be regenerated by God's special grace in Jesus Christ because it is now corrupted by both original and actual sin. The radical fashion in which sin influences intellectual activity Kuyper describes as follows: (1) Corresponding to the abnormal condition of the universe, falsehood in every sense of the word is now prevalent. This especially affects those sciences which depend upon personal communication, sympathy, and understanding, that is, the cultural and social sciences. (2) In addition to actual falsehood, we have the unintentional mistake, in observation and memory as well as in the actual processes of thought, from which follows (3) self-delusion and self-deception, making true self-knowledge impossible. (4) Because of the ab-

normal condition of our imagination, the boundary between phantasy and reality becomes blurred. In some the imagination works weakly, in others it is over-excited. (5) The abnormal element in the condition of other minds affects us. The power of education, language, and the spirit of the age in which we live cannot be resisted. (6) The effects worked by sin on the body deserve equal consideration. No one is in a normal bodily condition and our spiritual disposition is consequently affected. (7) The different parts of the content of our consciousness affect and contaminate each other. Thus the evil indefinitely multiplies.<sup>42</sup>

Palingenesis is therefore not confined to the order of religion, but, in conformity with Kuyper's conception of the radical unity of man in his religious root, the heart, it is of immediate importance for the proper exercise of thought itself. There will thus be two kinds of science, determined by a twofold point of departure: the one rooted in the unregenerate heart, the other in the regenerate. Since there are two kinds of people in the world due to the fact of regeneration, whereby the unity of human consciousness has been broken, there must of necessity be two kinds of science, of which only one can be essentially true. For this reason "the idea of the unity of science, taken in its absolute sense, implies the denial of the fact of palingenesis, and therefore from principle leads to the rejection of the Christian religion."<sup>43</sup>

From this it follows that for Kuyper there can be no conflict between faith and science. What Dooyeweerd terms Kuyper's "great Scriptural conception" is his insight that *all* science is rooted in faith. According to Kuyper faith is the presupposition of every science. Faith is "that formal function of the life of our soul which is fundamental to every fact in our human consciousness."<sup>44</sup> Without believing in oneself one cannot take the first step in the quest of science; it is the starting point of conduct for which there is no empirical or demonstrative proof. All rational demonstration proceeds on unproved axioms accepted by faith. As a matter of fact, all of life proceeds on faith. "In every expression of his personality as well

as in the acquisition of scientific conviction, every man starts out from faith."<sup>45</sup>

For this reason it follows that the *whole* scale of the Christian sciences, theology included, must be contrasted with the *whole* scale of the non-Christian or apostate sciences, modernistic "liberal" theology included. While formally faith functions in both cases, so that we may say that "Christianity and paganism stand to each other as the plus and minus form of the same series,"<sup>46</sup> they are at the same time absolutely antithetical to each other, because both proceed from a central religious attitude of the heart, the one Christian, the other apostate.

With regard to this antithesis that characterizes the world in which we live and extends to the realm of scientific and so-called "neutral" academic thought, Kuyper states that it is not a conflict of faith and science but a conflict between two different kinds of *faith*, the one Christian and the other apostate. Thus he writes:

Not faith and science, therefore, but two scientific systems, or if you choose, two scientific elaborations, are opposed to each other, *each having its own faith*. Nor may it be said that it is here science which opposes theology, for we have to do with two absolute forms of science, *both* of which claim the whole domain of human knowledge, and both of which have a suggestion about the supreme Being of their own as the point of departure for their world-view. Pantheism as well as Deism is a system about God, and without reserve the entire modern system of theology finds its home in the science of the Normalists. And finally, these two scientific systems of Normalists and Abnormalists are not relative opponents, walking together halfway, and further on peaceably suffering one another to choose different paths, but they are both in earnest, disputing with one another *the whole domain of life*, and they cannot desist from the constant endeavour to pull down to the ground the entire edifice of their respective controverted assertions, all the supports included, upon which their assertions rest. If they did not try this, they would thereby show on both sides, that they did not honestly believe in their point of departure, that they were not serious combatants, and that they did not understand the pri-

mordial demand of science, which of course claims unity of conception.<sup>47</sup>

In spite of Kuyper's radical distinction between the "Normalists" and the "Abnormalists," between a degenerate and a regenerate science, he nevertheless, like Calvin himself, acknowledges that pagan thought, both ancient and modern, reveals many excellent characteristics. The names of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are still honored by Christian thinkers, and the philosophy of Aristotle had been an invaluable aid in the training of the Christian scholar.<sup>48</sup> This is explained by Kuyper in terms of the doctrine of common grace. How can we account for the good with the bad in the unregenerate? Kuyper asks. He answers, not by ascribing such goodness to some innate natural goodness in the heart of the unregenerate, but by recognizing in the heart even of the unregenerate God's common or general grace and help. In his great work on *Common Grace* Kuyper points out that this doctrine was first formulated by John Calvin.<sup>49</sup>

By means of his common or temporal conserving grace, God maintains the life of all men, relaxes the curse which rests upon them by reason of their disobedience, and arrests the process of corruption and decay, while his church mediates to men his saving grace in Jesus Christ. Without God's common grace, which thus curbs the effects of sin in human life, there could be no possibility of human science and culture at all, and pagan life and thought would collapse in chaos.<sup>50</sup> Thus man's temporal life with its family, state, marriage, legal and economic relationships is preserved in heathen lands which have not heard the Gospel even when renewing, regenerating grace is not available. Even when men deny God, his goodness and favor towards man enables them to perform civil good, to honor legal contracts, think rational thoughts, compose great music and create great art, to love each other and to enjoy social graces and virtues. According to Kuyper it is God's common grace which makes human culture possible. Human society would have been utterly destroyed if the common grace of God had not intervened. As such, common grace is the foundation of culture, since God's great plan

for the creation is achieved through common grace. It is not spiritual and regenerative but temporal and material.<sup>51</sup> It is based upon and flows forth from the confession of the absolute sovereignty of God, for, says Kuyper, not only the church but the whole world must give God the honor due to him; hence the world received common grace in order to honor him through it. Thus Kuyper upholds the catholic claims of Christianity and urges its validity for all men.

Kuyper's conception of the sovereignty of God in all spheres of life, his doctrine of the heart as the central unity of human existence, his doctrine of sphere sovereignty, of the antithesis between regenerate and unregenerate science, and of common grace, have played a fundamental role in Dooyeweerd's attempt to construct a truly biblically-based Christian map of the modern world. They have provided him with the foundations upon which he has been able to erect his impressive superstructure of the Christian philosophy of the Cosmonomic Law-Idea. It is to Dooyeweerd's own teaching that we can now turn, having examined the political and philosophical background and origin of his thought.

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<sup>1</sup> Herman Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight of Western Thought* (Pres. and Ref. Pub. Co., 1960), pp. 160ff.

<sup>2</sup> J. H. Nichols, *History of Christianity*, p. 139.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 80-93, Chapter 7: "Pietism and Evangelicalism"; cf. *The Bible and the Life of the Christian* (Groen van Prinsterer Society, Grand Rapids, Michigan, U.S.A.), pp. 79ff.

<sup>4</sup> J. H. Merle d'Aubigne, *The Reformation in England*, Vol. I, and II (Banner of Truth Trust Paperback, London, 1963).

<sup>5</sup> P. A. Diepenhorst, *Groen Van Prinsterer* (J. H. Kok, Kampen, 1932), p. 183.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 198.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 312.

<sup>8</sup> Karl Marx published his *Communist Manifesto* only a year after Groen published *Unbelief and Revolution*. His warning to Europe has come true in the spread of Communism.

<sup>9</sup> Groen van Prinsterer, *La Parti Anti-Revolutionnaire et Confessionnel*, p. 9.

<sup>10</sup> Groen van Prinsterer, *The Anti-Revolutionary Principle*, translated by J. Faber from the French edition of the third chapter of

*La Parti Anti-Revolutionnaire et Confessionnel dans L'Eglise Reformée des Pays Bas* for the Groen Van Prinsterer Society, (Grand Rapids, U.S.A.), pp. 1, 2ff., 4.

<sup>11</sup> H. Evan Runner, *Christian Perspectives*, 1962 (Guardian Pub. Co., Hamilton, Ontario, 1962), pp. 223ff.

<sup>12</sup> Michael Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe 1820-1953* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1957), p. 160. This book is the only book in English which deals with the subject comprehensively.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 152.

<sup>14</sup> *Church of England Newspaper*, March 6th, 13th, 20th, and 27th issues, 1964. For a further exposition of a true Christian education consult Cornelius Van Til, *The Dilemma of Education* (Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1956); H. Blamires, *Repair the Ruins; Reflections on Education from the Christian Standpoint* (G. Bles, London, 1950); C. S. Lewis, *The Abolition of Man* (G. Bles, London, 1947); Walter Moberly, *The Crisis in the University* (SCM, London, 1949).

<sup>15</sup> Maarten Rooy, *Education in a Pluralistic Society* (mimeographed only).

<sup>16</sup> Abraham Kuyper, *Lectures on Calvinism* (Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1961), biographical Note in Introduction, p. ii.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. iii.

<sup>18</sup> Herman Dooyeweerd, "Kuyper's Wetenschapsleer," *Phil. Reformata*, 4, 1939, pp. 193-232.

<sup>19</sup> Abraham Kuyper, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>21</sup> For Kuyper's doctrine of common grace, see his *De Gemeene Gratie*.

<sup>22</sup> Kuyper, *Calvinism*, p. 40.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 50ff.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 45ff.; for a further discussion of this, consult Cornelius Van Til, *A Christian Theory of Knowledge* (Syllabus, 1954, Westminster Theological Seminary), pp. 148-196.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 90.

<sup>30</sup> H. Evan Runner, *Christian Perspectives*, 1961 (Guardian Publishing Co., Hamilton, 1961). His whole chapter on Sphere-Sovereignty deserves the closest study.

<sup>31</sup> F. Maurice, *The Life of F. D. Maurice Chiefly Told in his Letters*, Vol. 1. (London), p. 155.

<sup>32</sup> F. D. Maurice, *The Kingdom of Christ* (London, Everyman ed.), pp. 254ff.

<sup>33</sup> Evan Runner, *op. cit.*, pp. 69ff.

<sup>34</sup> Lord Hewart, *The New Despotism* (London, 1928); also C. K. Allen, *Law in the Making* (Oxford Paperback, 1961), pp. 517-590.

<sup>35</sup> Evan Runner, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.

<sup>36</sup> The reader should read this address in its entirety.

<sup>37</sup> A. Kuyper, *Souvereiniteit in eigen Kring*, address given at the dedication of the Free University, October 20, 1880, Amsterdam.

<sup>38</sup> H. Van Riessen, *The Society of the Future* (Presbyterian and Ref. Pub. Co.), pp. 68-86; cf. A. Kuyper, *Christianity and the Class Struggle* (Grand Rapids, 1950).

<sup>39</sup> Kuyper, *Calvinism*, p. 54.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 54ff.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57; also H. Evan Runner, *Christian Perspectives*, 1960, pp. 85-158. For an exposition of a Christian theory of knowledge, see Cornelius Van Til, *The Defense of the Faith* (Philadelphia, 1955) and his classroom lectures, *A Christian Theory of Knowledge*.

<sup>42</sup> A. Kuyper, *Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid*, II, pp. 53ff.

<sup>43</sup> Kuyper, *Principles of Sacred Theology*, translated in 1895 by J. Hendrik de Vries and republished by Eerdmans, p. 154.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 125.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 143; cf. Alan Richardson, *Christian Apologetics*, (S.C.M. Press, London, 1948) pp. 35, 94ff.

<sup>46</sup> Kuyper, *Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid*, Vol. II, pp. 97-131. For further discussion of this matter consult Henry Van Til, *The Calvinistic Concept of Culture*, pp. 125-128.

<sup>47</sup> Kuyper, *Calvinism*, p. 133.

<sup>48</sup> Kuyper, *De Gemeene Gratie*, Vol. I, p. 497.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 497.

<sup>51</sup> Henry Van Til, *The Calvinistic Concept of Culture*, pp. 118ff.

## CHAPTER II

### THE TRANSCENDENTAL CRITIQUE OF WESTERN THEORETICAL AND SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT

As we have sought to explain in the previous chapter, Herman Dooyeweerd is the product of Dutch Calvinism as revived by Groen van Prinsterer and Abraham Kuyper. He was educated in the Faculty of Law at the Free University of Amsterdam, where he became a full professor of the Philosophy and History of Law in 1926. The author of many works in the fields of philosophy, jurisprudence, and political science, he has in addition held many posts of a public nature in the Netherlands. For many years he was executive secretary of the Abraham Kuyper Foundation at The Hague, and as such he established its quarterly *Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde*. He is a Fellow of the Royal Dutch Academy of the Sciences and he has played a notable part in the policy making of the Anti-Revolutionary Party.

From the very beginning of his academic development as a jurist and a philosopher, Dooyeweerd has sought consciously to work out a doctrine of law, politics, and the state on the definite basis of a biblically and evangelically orientated philosophy of human life. Together with D.H. Th. Vollenhoven, Professor of Philosophy at the Free University, Dooyeweerd has developed a new school of Christian philosophy now generally known as the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Law-Idea, the main outlines of which he has expounded in his monumental treatise *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought*, first published in Dutch in 1935-36 with the title *Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee* and



then translated into English and enlarged into four volumes in 1953-58.

This new Christian philosophy has found adherents in all parts of the world, especially in Calvinistic circles in the United States and South Africa. Numerous publications are now appearing in the various fields of the human and social sciences inspired by Dooyeweerd's pioneering activity in relating theoretical thought to its primary religious roots.<sup>2</sup> Critiques of this new philosophy are also beginning to appear from Roman Catholic quarters on the continent of Europe, with which Dooyeweerd has been in constant oral and written debate. One such Roman Catholic philosopher has recently tried to prove that Dooyeweerd is actually a Neo-Thomist!<sup>3</sup> It is fervently to be hoped that Anglican theologians and writers will likewise reveal an interest in the most important development in Christian philosophy since Thomas Aquinas wrote his great *Summas*. As one of the few Anglicans who have so far shown any interest in Dooyeweerd's philosophy, the present writer wishes to offer this book as a salute from the *ecclesia Anglicana* for Dooyeweerd's marvellous contribution towards a truly biblically-based Christian philosophy.

Before we can understand Dooyeweerd's profound legal and political thought it will be necessary for us to give a brief summary of his general philosophical viewpoint and life- and world-view. Readers who are not well-versed in philosophy may, if they choose, turn immediately to the following chapters of this book. However, they will find a careful study of this chapter well worth their while in coming to better understand Dooyeweerd's political and legal thought.

Dooyeweerd unblushingly takes the revelation of God contained in the Bible as his starting point. As he sees it, religion cannot be assigned to a separate department in man's life but permeates his whole being and activities. Thus he opposes all forms of modern humanism which would place religion alongside man's other interests and activities, whether these be academic, social, economic, political, or moral. Religion cannot be placed on the same level as these other activities, since they themselves are

only temporal expressions of man's most basic self or heart, which as Kuyper has shown is a religious self. For Dooyeweerd all philosophic and theoretical or scientific thought proceeds from presuppositions of a religious nature. The starting point, not only of all practical but also of all theoretical activity, proceeds from man's religious depths. Such a starting point can be found only in man's heart or transcendental self. All the issues of life arise out of the human heart which is the concentration point of our entire human existence. Out of it arise all our deeds, thoughts, feelings, and desires. In our hearts we give answer to the most profound and ultimate questions of life, and in our hearts our relationship to God is determined. The heart or transcendental self of man may never be identified with any of our vital functions such as feeling or even faith. It is deeper than any vital function and it transcends the temporal world altogether. It is as far from the body as it is from the mind. The heart is the point where man decides his relationship with Almighty God. It can never be neutral. It loves God or it is hostile to him. It is being renewed by the Spirit of Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Spirit, or it still lives in apostasy. As a consequence, theoretical and scientific thought can never be a neutral and autonomous activity.

Western science and philosophy have assumed that theoretical thought in the very nature of the case is an autonomous activity based upon a supposed universality of reason. Dooyeweerd has shown, however, that this so-called universality of reason itself contains a great problem. If all philosophical schools chose their points of departure in reason alone and not in deeper axioms, it ought to be possible to convince an opponent in a purely theoretical way that his arguments are true or false. But what actually happens is that philosophers reason at cross purposes; a philosopher of the Thomist school, for example, can never succeed in convincing one of the Kantian school.<sup>4</sup> In reality the universality of reason is an uncritically accepted dogma, cloaking diverse supra-theoretical points of departure. However, Dooyeweerd continues, the time has come when we may no longer accept this dogma as self-

evident, but must examine it as a critical problem, and this requires a critical investigation into the structure of thought itself.

Dooyeweerd defines this transcendental critique thus:

By this we understand a critical inquiry (respecting no single so-called theoretical axiom) into the universally valid conditions which alone make theoretical thought possible, and which are required by the immanent structure of thought itself.<sup>5</sup>

In examining the structure of thought, three transcendental problems arise. Dooyeweerd defines the first transcendental problem as follows:

What do we abstract in theoretical thought from the structures of empirical reality given in naïve experience, and how is this abstraction possible? How is theoretical and scientific thought characterized in contrast with pre-theoretical naïve experience?<sup>6</sup>

To answer this question, Dooyeweerd must first of all give an account of what he understands by naïve experience. He finds it necessary to emphasize from the start his break with the traditional Western humanist conception of naïve experience as a theory of reality, the so-called copy theory. Naïve experience is *given*, it is the first datum for any theory about the nature of *reality and of knowledge* and not that theory itself.

In naïve experience we experience the aspects of the cosmos in their mutual coherence with each other and with ourselves. All aspects of reality are grouped in an indissoluble duration of time, as individual structures intertwined in concrete events. Further, Dooyeweerd writes, there is as yet no vestige of abstraction, no analytical distinction between the aspects of the cosmos. We become aware of them only implicitly.<sup>7</sup>

Although abstraction is absent from naïve experience, Dooyeweerd nevertheless allows a non-theoretical relation between what he terms the subject and the object. We experience things as objects opposed to ourselves as subjects, and in this subject-object relation reality remains intact as a nexus. In this relation objective functions are ascribed to things and events with modal aspects where

it is not possible for them to function as subjects. Thus, for example, we know that a rose does not feel or think or engage in aesthetic valuation as a subject; yet we ascribe to it objective qualities of sensory color and odor, objective cultural qualities and objective beauty. Furthermore, this subject-object relation in the attitude of naïve experience is grasped as a structural relation of reality itself—the objective functions belong to things themselves only in relation to possible subjective functions which the things do not possess themselves in the aspects of reality involved. By “object” Dooyeweerd thus denotes things or concrete events as individual unities. Science cannot have an object in this sense. By the term “subject” he denotes man as a unity of all his different functions, and he sharply criticizes theories of knowledge in which the object is identified with the known and the subject with the knowing function.

Thus for Dooyeweerd, in his naïve experience, man stands as subject in an integral subject-object relation to concrete things and events, while the various modal aspects of this relation are only known implicitly without being explicitly distinguished from one another.

In theoretical and scientific thought, however, this cannot be the case, since, as Dooyeweerd argues, theoretical thought can never be satisfied with the mere meaningsystasis of cosmic reality.<sup>8</sup> It must necessarily analyze this systasis (this “standing-together”) into a dis-stasis (a “standing-apart”) of modal aspects. Because of its own internal structure, the analytical or logical function in man must necessarily separate or distinguish between the unbroken texture of naïve experience into different modalities or aspects. Thus the various modal functions of man and the corresponding modal aspects of the cosmos in which these functions are operative are theoretically distinguished and set over against each other. The integral character of our knowledge is broken up in this way, and the various modal aspects of our act of knowing are analytically separated.<sup>9</sup>

Theoretical thought, then, has an antithetic structure on account of the antithetic relation which logical analysis brings about between the analytical and non-analytical

function. Every attempt by the analytical function to grasp the opposed non-analytical function in a logical concept is resisted by the latter because of its non-logical character. Dooyeweerd calls this antithetic relation the *Gegenstand-relation*. It does not correspond to the structure of empirical reality, but is merely the consequence of the necessity of theoretical abstraction of the modal aspects from their coherence in the cosmos. These aspects can be theoretically abstracted, but their coherence can never be eliminated from reality.<sup>10</sup>

Thus the difference which exists for Dooyeweerd between the naïve pre-theoretical thought and the theoretical attitudes of thought may be stated as follows. First of all, while the theoretical attitude of thought breaks up the cosmic coherence of meaning theoretically into various modal aspects which are set antithetically over against each other, the naïve pre-theoretical attitude leaves the cosmic coherence of meaning intact. Secondly, while the pre-theoretical attitude of thought operates with the concrete subject-object relation, which is a structural relation within the cosmic coherence of meaning, the theoretical attitude of thought operates with the intentional *Gegenstand-relation* by which also the concrete subject-object relations of naïve experience are broken up into their abstracted modal aspects.

The distinction between these two attitudes of thought is of basic importance for philosophy, says Dooyeweerd, since it underlies the problematic character of theoretical and scientific thought. When this is overlooked, the subject-object relation in naïve experience is invariably identified with the theoretical *Gegenstand-relation*, and this has had far-reaching consequences for man's understanding of his place in the universe and of his theory of knowledge about that universe.<sup>11</sup>

Dooyeweerd thus points to the medieval scholastic concept of substance and the Kantian concept of "thing-in-itself" as foreign to naïve experience and the result of the above false identification. They are mere figments of an apostate imagination. Naïve experience is thus not so easily to be dismissed. It must be accepted as the primary

datum of a true view of reality. He points out that humanist philosophers have tended since Descartes and Locke to tear reality apart in the diversity of its modal aspects, completely denuding God's world of all its glorious qualitative aspects of sound, smell, touch and sight. In so doing, modern apostate philosophers have falsely interpreted man's naïve experience as a theory about reality and identified it with the so-called uncritical "copy theory" of the plain man. Then in alliance with certain modern scientists and physiologists with their theories about the "specific energies of the senses" they have undertaken the easy task of refuting this so-called naïve realism and suggested that the world is only an appearance, not reality itself.

While thus recognizing the validity of our naïve experience, Dooyeweerd, of course, allows the right of the scientist to "abstract" one mode from reality and make it the "object" of his special attention. This process of abstraction of scientific "facts" from naïve experience Dooyeweerd considers to be the scientific attitude towards reality, and it is perfectly permissible, provided that the scientist does not absolutize the particular aspect of reality he is investigating and provided he does not forget to return to ordinary humdrum life in the ordinary world and remember that he is still a man rather than an investigating machine. Above all, he must not mistake the abstractions of his particular science as the only truth available to himself or others. Scientists who fall into these traps are guilty of scientism, of absolutizing their own particular methods of investigating reality.

Under such theoretical and scientific analysis, Dooyeweerd continues, the cosmos reveals its aspects as number, extension, mathematical movement, the energetic, the biotic, the sensory, the analytical-logical, the cultural-historical, the linguistic, the social, the economic, the aesthetic, the juridical, the moral and the pistical (faith).<sup>12</sup> Dooyeweerd is prepared to admit that further examination may reveal more aspects than the fifteen presently enumerated by him. It should further be noted that the terms "aspects," "modalities," "modal aspects," and later "spheres of law" or "modal spheres," are interchangeable terms.

By this, Dooyeweerd states, he means the fundamental universal modalities of temporal being which do not refer to the concrete "what" of things or events, but are only different modes of the universal "how" which determine the aspects of our theoretical view of reality. The so-called "historical event," for example, is an event the historical *aspect* of which we primarily emphasize. The same event will also have many other aspects or modalities.

The second transcendental problem Dooyeweerd formulates as follows:

From what point of view can we reunite synthetically the logical and the non-logical aspects of naïve experience which were set apart in opposition to each other in the theoretical antithesis?<sup>13</sup>

As it stands, the second transcendental problem seems to be concerned with the question of how the antithetical relation can issue on a theoretical synthesis, that is, in a logical concept of the non-logical Gegenstand. However, except for stating that the true starting point of the theoretical synthesis cannot be found in any of the two poles of the antithetical relation, Dooyeweerd does not return to it until the second volume of *The New Critique of Theoretical Thought*, where he presents his own epistemology (theory of knowledge). Here he proceeds at once to an associated problem, which stands revealed as the true transcendental problem, namely, what is the point of departure of the philosopher in his account of cosmic reality? Dooyeweerd is not simply concerned with how the special scientific act of thought—the theoretical synthesis—is achieved, but how the philosophical "glance of totality" over all aspects of the cosmos is achieved.

According to Dooyeweerd this is the central problem of the transcendental critique. By raising it he claims that every possible starting point of philosophical thought is subjected to a fundamental criticism, for a truly critical attitude of thought does not allow us to choose such a starting point in any special aspect of reality.

By this Dooyeweerd means that there are as many types of theoretical thought as there are aspects of the cosmos. In every case there is a synthesis of the logical

aspect with one of the non-logical aspects of our experience. When we take any of these non-logical aspects as a point of departure, we interpret the whole of reality in terms of that one aspect. This is the remote cause of all 'isms' in philosophy: biologism, materialism, scientism, historicism, etc.

Dooyeweerd maintains that only the Word of God can provide us with a true point of departure and thus enable us to "see" the facts studied in the various sciences in their proper order and relationships. The facts do not "speak" to us unless we see them in their order. If the scientist or philosopher refuses to be taught by the Word of God what this order of the creation is, then he will be forced to substitute some principle of total structuration of his own devising. Such an apostate thinker will then be forced to seek his ultimate principles of explanation and point of departure in one aspect of the created universe rather than in the Creator of the Universe. For this reason Dooyeweerd speaks of all non-Christian systems of thought as being *immanentistic* in character, because they refuse to recognize the ultimate dependence of human thought and science upon God's revelation. As a result, all such immanence philosophy and science, that is, all human thought which takes its origin somewhere in temporal reality and not in God's revelation of himself as Creator of the Universe cannot grasp the intrinsic unity and coherence of all reality but is bound to fall into a false dialectical dualism in which one aspect is played over against another aspect, i.e., matter over against form as in the history of Greek philosophy.

Evan Runner points out in his wonderful lectures delivered at the first Unionville Conference of the Association of Reformed Scientific Studies held in 1960 that the apostate scholar:

... thinks of himself as just this thing here. But since this something that is just here, our temporal existence, exhibits a great diversity of moments or aspects—e.g., the numerical, spatial, energetical, physical, organic, psychical, analytic, historical-cultural, lingual, social, economic, aesthetic, jural, ethical and pistical—all these are seen in the light of the Word of



God as relative aspects of the religious unity of our life. Apostate man, however, is driven by his religious needs for security and meaning in life to find a substitute to fill in for the true unity and to absolutize one of the relative aspects of life and to elevate it to the place of the heart . . . . He must find an absolute in the relative. He is bound to the creation-structure; he must know himself. At the same time we see him wilfully substituting his lie to replace the Truth. He must have his absolute, even if it means that he must distort what observation will readily disclose to be relative. His rational analysis is accompanied by the deeper drive, which in the fallen state requires a distortion of the very "facts" he is in process of analyzing.<sup>14</sup>

In this tendency to absolutize something which is only relative may be found the origin of most of the philosophical and scientific "isms" which have plagued the history of human thought. All these are totality views about man that arise not from a mere scientific observation and analysis of positive facts presented to our minds—if such were in fact the case there would be no conflict between them—but rather from apostate man's failure to realize that these aspects of his life are relative and not absolute, and from the consequent effort to explain all the remaining aspects of reality in terms of the one aspect that has been religiously absolutized and so made the source of unity of all the other aspects. As an example we may refer to Hegel's attempt to take the analytical-logical aspect of reality as his point of departure with the consequence that the whole of reality became for him logicized or idealized. For Hegel the rational alone is the real.

Dooyeweerd points out that these "isms" are uncritical in two respects: first, the antithetical relation gives no ground for the pretended absolutism of any aspect, and avenges itself in the antinomies of which the history of philosophy is full. Secondly, each "ism" returns the basic problem of theoretical synthesis, for it presupposes a synthesis of the logical and the non-logical aspect, which is then proclaimed to be "absolute." But the absoluteness of any aspect cannot be proclaimed before that aspect has been abstracted by means of a theoretical analysis.<sup>15</sup> The

"divine irony" thus reveals itself in this, that the absolutization of any cosmic aspect is at the same time relativized by the possible absolutization of every other aspect.<sup>16</sup>

The problem here revealed by Dooyeweerd's critique is the problem of the Archimedean point of philosophy. As is well known, Archimedes once said, "Give me a place on which to stand outside the earth, and I will move the earth." So the Christian philosopher finds his Archimedean point in the Word of God, the Word of God from the Beyond in terms of which man alone can determine the meaning of his life in this world. Dooyeweerd expresses it differently by saying that the philosopher must ascend a tower from which he can survey all aspects of the cosmos. Only thus can he achieve that "glance of totality" so sought after by Kuyper.

Dooyeweerd admits that the notion of the Archimedean point has been recognized in the history of philosophy, as the existence of the "isms" mentioned above illustrate. In all these cases one aspect or one type of theoretical thought is absolutized and is considered as an Archimedean point from which the whole of reality can be interpreted. What is not realized, however, is that this process of absolutization itself is not a theoretical but a religious activity, moreover, a religious choice of standpoint in an idolatrous sense.<sup>17</sup>

From this, Dooyeweerd concludes that we can obviate the "isms" of philosophy only if we choose the Archimedean point in the human heart or self which is operative in all acts of thought and which constitutes a "subjective totality," a "concentration point" of all the modal aspects. While theoretical thought is dispersed in all the diversity of meaning in so far as it is always directed to some or other abstracted aspect of the cosmos, the self, while participating in every single modal aspect, yet transcends them all. "There is no single modal aspect of our cosmos in which I do not actually function," Dooyeweerd writes. "I have an actual function in all the modal aspects. There I remain the central point of reference and the deeper unity above all modal diversity of the different aspects of my temporal existence."<sup>18</sup>

Without critical reflection on the self there can thus be no reflection on the totality of meaning or on the nature of philosophy. A deeper knowledge of the self is required, as Socrates realized when he raised the Delphic maxim to the primary requisite of philosophical reflection. "Know thyself" must be written above the portals of philosophy.<sup>19</sup>

At once the third transcendental problem arises:

"How is this critical self-knowledge, this concentric direction of theoretical thought on the self, possible, and of what nature is it?"<sup>20</sup>

This question is pertinent because we have seen that for Dooyeweerd theoretical thought is abstractive thought, and can function only within the diversity of moments. As the self transcends this diversity, it cannot become a *Gegenstand* to the logical function; only *aspects* of man are accessible to theoretical analysis. As Dooyeweerd says:

If you ask the special sciences active in the field of anthropology: what is man? you will obtain a diversity of items from physical-chemical, biological, psychological, cultural-historical, linguistic, ethnological, and sociological points of view. These items are invaluable. But no special science, nor an encyclopaedic sociology, can answer the question what man *himself* is in the unity of his selfhood. Human I-ness functions, to be sure, in all modal aspects of reality. But it is, nevertheless, a central and radical unity which as such transcends all temporal aspects.<sup>21</sup>

If the self cannot thus be adequately defined in terms of any one science or group of sciences how can it be defined? Dooyeweerd replies that the human "I" is nothing so long as we try to conceive it apart from the three central relations which alone give it meaning. The self or heart of man exists in three fundamental relations: in relation to cosmic time, in relation to other selves, and in relation to God. Apart from these relations, the selfhood is an empty abstraction which dissolves itself into nothingness. But as we have already seen, the selfhood cannot receive its positive content from its relation to cosmic time alone, because in its radical unity it transcends time. The temporal order of becoming with its diversity of aspects, can only turn away our view from the real center of human

existence, so long as we seek to know ourselves from it. Neither can the selfhood receive its positive content from other selves, because when viewed in themselves alone, all selves are equally without content. They all refer beyond themselves for their fulfilment. As Dooyeweerd points out, "The ego of our fellow-man confronts us with the same riddle as our own selfhood does."<sup>22</sup> For Dooyeweerd, as for Calvin, the self's relation towards God is the determining one. The self can be understood only in the light of its true or pretended origin. Self-knowledge is thus in the last analysis dependent on our knowledge of God. The character of the selfhood's relation to its true or pretended origin determines the character of its relation to cosmic time, to other selves, and also the content of the selfhood itself. Thus Dooyeweerd adopts the same position as Calvin. He writes; "The words with which Calvin starts the first chapter of his textbook on the Christian religion: The true knowledge of ourselves is dependent on the true knowledge of God, are indeed the key to answer the question: 'Who is man himself'?"<sup>23</sup>

Dooyeweerd hastens to explain that this knowledge of God is not the same thing at all as mere theological knowledge of God, for theological knowledge is still theoretical knowledge. It is the result of the synthesis of the logical aspect of thought with a non-logical Gegenstand, in this case, the modality of faith. The knowledge of God to which Dooyeweerd is referring here he terms a "supra-theoretical" knowledge, a "central" and religious knowledge rooted in man's heart. Such a central knowledge in his own words "can only be the result of the Word-revelation of God operating in the heart, in the religious center of our existence by the power of the Holy Spirit."<sup>24</sup> This correlativity of self-knowledge and God-knowledge is involved in the biblical declaration that man was created in the image of God. Thus the Word of God, operating as a *power* in our hearts, reveals God to us, but also our own selfhood in its radical integral unity. Just as God is revealed in the Scriptures as the Creator, the absolute and integral Origin of all things who can have no second origin over against him, e.g., matter, so man, created in his image is revealed

to himself in the religious unity of his creaturely existence (the heart).

Dooyeweerd's reply to the third transcendental basic problem can thus be stated as follows: self-knowledge is dependent on knowledge of the true or pretended origin, a knowledge which is not "theoretical" but "religious."

What does Dooyeweerd mean here by the term "religious"? He does not mean what most people understand by this term, that is, faith. For him religion transcends all modal aspects including that of *faith*. Thus it cannot be grasped in a theoretical concept. It can only be approximated in a theoretical idea. Hence he defines religion as follows:

Religion is the innate impulse of human selfhood to direct itself towards the true or pretended absolute origin of all temporal diversity of meaning, which it finds focussed concentrically in itself.<sup>25</sup>

He calls this the law of religious concentration. On account of this law, Aristotle's view of man as a rational animal, a being defined in terms of his analytical-logical function, is determined by his view of God as *noesis noesoos*, and Kant's view of noumenal man, as a being qualified by a transcendent moral function, is determined by his moralistic view of God as a postulate of practical reason. Even in primitive religions this law of concentration is found to be operative.<sup>26</sup>

According to Dooyeweerd, then, the true knowledge both of God and of ourselves surpasses all theoretical and scientific thought. This knowledge cannot be the theoretical object of any dogmatical theology, philosophy, or science. He says that religion, even in its apostate forms, is never a mere temporal phenomenon which manifests itself within the temporal structures of human life. Therefore, with respect to its inner essence, religion can never be adequately described "phenomenologically" and by scientific analysis and definition because it cannot be made a *Gegenstand*.<sup>27</sup>

For this reason religion is no mere "psychological" phenomenon as Sigmund Freud supposed in his book *The Future of an Illusion*; it is no mere emotional feeling per-

ception as Schleiermacher expounded in his famous *Addresses on Religion to its Cultured Despisers*. It is not to be characterized as an experience and awareness of the holy and the sacred as Rudolf Otto supposed in his book, *The Idea of the Holy*. It cannot be treated as the Gegenstand of theoretical thought as William James tried to treat it in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Religion is man's specific condition. It is what makes us human rather than animal. It is the existent condition in which the human ego is bound to its true or pretended firm ground and origin which is revealed in the restlessness of man in search of the Absolute. Sharing in the meaning character of all created reality, the selfhood can find no rest in itself, but restlessly seeks its Origin in order to understand its own meaning, and in its own meaning the meaning of all created reality.

As Augustine summed it up long ago in his beautiful words, "Thou hast so created us that our hearts will always be restless until we find our peace in Thee." This restlessness of the selfhood is transmitted to all the temporal functions in which it actually operates. In this way scientific and theoretical thought, as activities of the selfhood, also come to share in the restless search for the Absolute.

Thought will not be set at rest in the preliminary philosophical questions, until the *Arche* is discovered, which alone gives meaning and existence to philosophic thought itself. Philosophic thought cannot withdraw itself from this tendency towards the Origin. It is an immanent conformity to law for it to find no rest in meaning, but to think from and to the origin to which meaning owes its ground.<sup>28</sup>

If theoretical thought is not able to reach the true absolute Origin of meaning in God, it is forced to raise some aspect of the cosmos to the status of being absolute. In Dooyeweerd's opinion this is the cause of all absolutization of the relative. Every such absolutization of a theoretically isolated aspect of reality to act as root and origin of all the others is basically of a *religious* nature and a manifestation of the law of religious concentration to which theoretical thought is subjected.<sup>29</sup>

If the selfhood is unable to find the true absolute in God, it is forced to absolutize some aspect of the relative in order to give itself content in the light of the absolutized aspect. In the last analysis, religion is absolute self-surrender. The selfhood can only find its own meaning and content in self-surrender to the absolute God or, in the case of apostasy, to the absolutized relative.

In Dooyeweerd's opinion, all theoretical knowledge thus presupposes self-knowledge, while the latter is only possible in religious self-surrender to the one true God or to an absolutized relative aspect of God's creation. The self-knowledge gained in this way is therefore of a *religious* and not of a theoretical or scientific character. From this, Dooyeweerd rightly concludes that theoretical and scientific thought is not self-sufficient and the so-called autonomy of scientific thought is therefore exposed as a myth. The content and direction of theoretical thought are determined by a supra-theoretical starting point in which the selfhood participates and whence it receives the direction of its concentric activity.

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<sup>1</sup> H. Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought* (Philadelphia, Pres. and Ref. Pub. Co., 1953-1958, 4 vols.).

<sup>2</sup> A. L. Conradie, *The Neo-Calvinistic Concept of Philosophy* (Natal); Vincent Brummer, *Transcendental Criticism and Christian Philosophy* (T. Wever, Franeker, 1961).

<sup>3</sup> Michael Fr. J. Marlet. S. J., *Grundlin Der Calvinistischen Philosophie Der Geetzesidee Als Christlicher Transzendental-philosophie* (K. Z. Verlag, Munchen, 1954).

<sup>4</sup> Dooyeweerd, *op. cit.*, I, 37.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 41.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 41ff.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 470.

<sup>9</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Ibid.*, I, p. 3. For a vindication of the validity of pre-theoretical and practical thought, the reader should consult Michael Oakeshott, *Experience and Its Modes* (Cambridge, 1933). He calls the various modes of theoretical thought "arrests in experience," modes or modifications of experience. Cf. Evan Runner's lecture "Scientific and Pre-Scientific," *Christian Perspectives*, 1961.

<sup>10</sup> Dooyeweerd, *ibid.*, I, pp. 39ff.; cf. H. H. Price, *Thinking and Experience* (Hutchinson's University Library, London, 1953), pp. 298ff.

<sup>11</sup> Dooyeweerd, *ibid.*, I, pp. 3, 34, 41; Vol. II, pp. 11ff.; cf. J. R. Smythies, *Analysis of Perception* (Routledge, London, 1956), p. 1ff.

<sup>12</sup> Dooyeweerd, *ibid.*, I, pp. 3, 5; Dooyeweerd, *De Modale Structur van het Juridisch Oorzakelijk Grondbegrippen ded Vakwetenschappen* (Amsterdam, 1954), pp. 2, 6-7; cf. Charles Morris, *Signs, Language and Behavior* (Prentice-Hall, New York, 1950), pp. 123ff.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 45.

<sup>14</sup> H. Evan Runner, "The Relation of the Bible to Learning," pp. 120ff. Dr. Runner's three lectures should be read by all Christian students.

<sup>15</sup> H. Dooyeweerd, *Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought* (Grand Rapids, 1948), p. 38.

<sup>16</sup> H. Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, II, p. 333.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 21.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>22</sup> Dooyeweerd, *In The Twilight of Western Thought* (Pres. and Ref. Pub. Co., 1960), p. 183; cf. John Baillie, *Our Knowledge of God* (London, 1949), pp. 201ff.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 184.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 185.

<sup>25</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, I, p. 57.

<sup>26</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Phil. Ref. 1*, Vol. II (1936); Dooyeweerd refers to Ernst Cassirer for proof of the last sentence. Cf. *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, Vol. II; also consult Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (Doubleday, New York, 1953), chapter 7: "Myth and Religion."

<sup>27</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, I, pp. 57ff.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 11.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.



### CHAPTER III

#### THE GROUND MOTIVES OF WESTERN THOUGHT

As we saw in the last chapter, Dooyeweerd has discovered a twofold presupposition of theoretical and scientific thought: first, an Archimedean point from which the selfhood can direct its view over the diversity and coherence of meaning in the cosmos; secondly, a choice of what the self considers to be the absolute ground and origin of all meaning, and which determines the content of its view. And as we also saw, this is always a religious act, "because it contains a choice of position in the concentration point of our existence in the face of the Origin of meaning."<sup>1</sup> This religious choice of the selfhood is not yet, however, the starting point of theoretical thought in the fullest sense of the word. While it is true that the supra-theoretical presuppositions make their influence felt in philosophy through the self, this self is not an island of thought unto itself. The selfhood can exist only in a religious community. Moreover, scientific thought is not an individual activity, but a social task involving a tradition of thought. But such a religious community shares a common spirit which, as shared and accepted by the individual self, constitutes the true starting point of theoretical thought, its religious a priori or religious basic motive. As Dooyeweerd well says, "Philosophy itself is not the mere product of individual thought. Rather, it is, just as human culture, a social task, which can be fulfilled only on the basis of a long common tradition of thought. This, too, requires a spiritual community as its root."<sup>2</sup>

In the history of Western scientific thought Dooyeweerd has so far unravelled two such basic religious ground-motives or spiritual tendencies which have played a major role in the development of Western civilization.

"These fundamental motives," Dooyeweerd writes, "are the true motive forces which have dominated the evolution of Western scientific and philosophical thought. Each of them has established a community among those who have started from it. And the religious motive as hidden motive force of his spiritual community dominates the thinker all the more if he is unconscious of it. The thinker, indeed, can fashion this motive according to his individual view, but the motive itself is supra-individual."<sup>3</sup>

Two such basic religious motives have appeared in the history of the human race. The first is the motive of creation, man's fall into sin, and man's redemption in Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Ghost.<sup>4</sup> According to this motive all mankind is spiritually included in Adam. In him the whole race has fallen into sin and disobedience to God, and in mankind also the entire temporal cosmos was affected by the Fall because it is found concentrated in man. In Jesus Christ the creation which had apostatized in the Fall is again redirected to its true origin and is again one in root, as the members of one body. Our selfhood is then for Dooyeweerd rooted in the spiritual community of mankind. It is no self-sufficient "substance," he writes, no "windowless monad," but it lives in the spiritual community of the "we" which is directed to a divine "Thou" according to the original meaning of creation.<sup>5</sup>

#### A. The Christian Ground Motive

While we shall be dealing later on in greater detail with the Christian life- and world-view, it may be useful if we indicate briefly at this point something of the profound meaning of the Christian ground motive.

The Christian believes that in Jesus Christ man has already in principle, if not always in fact, been brought to his proper "place" in God's creation, that place where all the complex functions of his earthly life assume a meaningful place within the whole. This meaningful place is the cen-

tral place where man is called by his Creator to stand; it is religion; man is created and placed before God in a covenantal fellowship of persons to render to his Creator praise in a whole-hearted service of love and obedience, first to God and then to his neighbor, within the length and breadth of God's creation.

By describing religion as a "place" we are not referring of course to a spatial place because when we say religion is a place we mean something beyond all merely temporal aspects of reality. As Evan Runner points out:

The word "place" is the bearer of many meanings; it is, as we say, multivocal, as opposed to univocal. It can have any number of modal meanings. For example, when my friend suddenly does something that hurts me I can say that there was no place for such an act, that it was not "fitting." I mean then an ethical "place." I mean that our friendship excludes what he did. Of a musical composition I can hold the opinion that some subordinate motif or part does not belong, does not have a place in the whole. Then I mean an aesthetic "place." . . . Besides all these modal meanings of the word "place" there is that fulness or fulfilment of meaning of the word "place" when we speak of place in its central religious sense.<sup>6</sup>

According to the Christian religious presupposition the world is not fundamentally the aesthetic "world" or the "world" of science or the "world" of thought or the "world" of sports or the "world" of business or the "world" of politics. These are all worlds, "universes of discourse" as Charles Morris well calls them in his book, *Signs, Language and Behavior*.<sup>7</sup> The world as it is being recreated in Jesus Christ is the concrete world that God created, headed by and centered in man, the world of religion, the world of God's wonderful covenant fellowship with us, the world in which all these other "worlds" or aspects of man's life in God's creation assume their rightful and meaningful place. When God asked Adam the question "Where art thou?" He was not asking, "Behind which bush art thou?" He was saying that he did not find man in the place in which he had put him in the creation. This is the religious meaning of "place" and is

what Christians are referring to when they say that man cannot really "see" the world and truly understand the real meaning of his life unless he stands in his rightful place.

Thanks to the propaganda of "scientific humanism" which today controls most of our English-speaking universities and schools, millions of people have been conditioned to think of the universe in terms of the picture painted by the astronomers and the physicists as a vast system of stars spread out in aeons of space rather than in terms of man's covenantal relationship with God. In relation to such a so-called "scientific" picture the only meaning most people today can possibly attach to the word "creator" is that of a sort of "old man above the sky." The reason that the men of the Bible were able to use the word "God" without this absurd pagan suggestion and indeed were expressly forbidden ever to think of God in terms of such physical categories in the Second Commandment was that they did not start from this astronomical physical "place" at all. Christians mean something quite different when they talk about the world or the universe from what scientific humanists understand by these terms. Until modern humanists have grasped this fundamental difference in approach they would do well not to dismiss the Christian life- and world-view as being scientifically outmoded.

This is not to suggest that modern astronomy is false and ancient Hebrew astronomy is true. How often do we read accounts of the development of the metaphysical and religious ideas of the Bible which imply that the difference between the biblical world-view and ours is simply one of size and scientific accuracy. Modern liberal humanist theologians such as Bultmann and his school of demythologizers have even suggested that the biblical writers could quite happily believe in the living God as a sort of old man above the sky because their thinking was so much cruder than ours and their scientific knowledge so much less advanced than our own. In the book *Kerygma and Myth* Rudolf Bultmann states categorically that "the cosmology of the New Testament is essentially mythical in

character. The world is viewed as a three-storied structure, with the earth in the centre, the heaven above, and the underworld beneath. Heaven is the abode of God and of celestial beings. The underworld is hell, the place of torment. Even the earth is more than the scene of natural, everyday events."<sup>8</sup>

Such statements are of course a gross libel on the men of the Bible which cannot stand up to any serious examination. No doubt the men of the Bible did have astronomical notions which were different from ours, but this has nothing whatsoever to do with the point we are making. What Dooyeweerd and Evan Runner are trying to make clear is that the ancient Hebrew and biblical view of the universe was not astronomical at all. It was religious and concerned with such ultimate questions as man's origin, nature and destiny.

It is time that scientific humanists realized that astronomical statements, or for that matter scientific statements of any kind, never give us knowledge of the real world at all, that is, the world experienced by men and women. They are simply abstract analyses of what we *already* know in experience. The statement, water is  $H_2O$ , for example, is utterly meaningless unless we *already know* water as stuff we drink, bathe in, or put up our umbrellas to avoid. As Dooyeweerd is always stressing, we only know the real world in experience by living, moving and having our being in it. What the scientist does is to analyze our experience of life in this world in terms of certain abstractions like distance, time, number, space and so on. Now the scientific humanists would like to persuade the rest of us that these abstract concepts of the physicist, chemist and astronomer are the basic realities of the universe in terms of which our more immediate and naïve experience ought to be explained, but this procedure is to stand life upon its head. As Herbert Dingle, the noted astronomer-physicist and philosopher of science, has said, "It is inconceivable that experience should be refuted by deductions from experience."

As John Wren-Lewis points out in his booklet, *Return to Roots*:

We do not know the Universe in experience as a system of stars spread out in aeons of space, or as a space-time continuum, or anything of that sort. We know it first and foremost as an encounter with other persons, a network of persons in relationship. Space, time, matter and so on are abstractions of certain aspects of our communication with each other. The statement that London is 180 miles from Manchester, for example, is an abstraction from concrete experience of (for instance) the effort needed to get from one place to see someone in the other; to think that the distance is somehow more basically real than the relationship between the people is to prefer abstraction to reality and to cut off the branch we are sitting on. Even the stars and galaxies are known to us, first and foremost, as parts of the background against which we meet our friends under the night sky. . . .

It is therefore quite wrong to think that the Universe is really a place, a system of stars or particles of matter spread out in space, with ourselves inside that system as inhabitants of a minor planet of a minor star near the edge of one galaxy. The truth is that the Universe is, as far as we can ever know, a personal reality, a system of encounters between people, and all the stars and galaxies and vast distances spoken of by the astronomer are just as much contained within the universe of persons as are the vast numbers of molecules and atoms and electrons which make up the air that carries our speech.<sup>9</sup>

The biblical religious understanding of the universe is personal in just this sense, as is shown for example by the Rabbinic statement that Adam (mankind) before the Fall filled the whole world. For modern humanists to think like that requires a mental revolution. But is not that just what our Lord demanded as a pre-condition of understanding the real nature of the cosmos in which we live? The Greek word "metanoia" translated "repentance" in the New Testament means literally a "change of mind" and when the first Christians preached to the people of the Roman Empire they were accused of "turning the world upside down." The revolution was no less necessary for the inhabitants of the Roman Empire than it is for most people in the English-speaking world today, for they made just the same mistake in thinking about the universe as we do.

They thought of it as first and foremost a geo-physical place, even if on a much smaller scale than that pictured by modern astronomy.

This mistaken view of the real nature of the universe is not the fault of scientific method as such. It is something far older and more deeply engrained in human nature. The error comes, not in practicing science, but in thinking that the scientific categories are the fundamental truths about the world—and this of course is no mere intellectual error but an expression of the fact that for the most part people behave as if the real business of life were using things, including people, as a means to their own selfish ends, their relation to God and their neighbor being only frills on the surface of that real business.

This utilitarian attitude towards other people is what the Bible understands as the terrible tendency with which every human being is born to put himself at the center of the universe where God alone ought to be. The fact that human beings see life as a matter of using things first and loving God and their neighbor only second is the essence of what the Bible means by saying that our world is a fallen world. It is fallen in the sense that man is so blinded by his sinfulness that he is no longer capable of seeing the world aright as the place where he is called to serve the living God and his neighbor. Instead he now thinks of it as his own world to exploit in his own selfish interests, using his science and even his religion in the service of selfishness rather than of the Creator and his immediate neighbor.

Only when this Christian basic religious motive revealed in God's Holy Scriptures takes hold of our hearts and redeems us from this selfish way of thinking of the world, by uniting us to Christ in the communion of the Holy Spirit, only then are we made to "see" the meaning and purpose of our lives. Only when our minds are regenerated by the power of God's Word acting upon our minds by the Holy Ghost, only then do we become aware of our true origin, nature and destiny and of our glorious office as persons called to glorify God and worship him for ever; only then are we made aware of our true and

central position in the cosmos, a central position where all the aspects of our created life are concentrated in the meaning of life as service not of ourselves but of God and of our neighbors. Under the divine illumination of God's powerful saving Word operating in the deepest recesses of our being, we are enabled by God the Holy Ghost to recover a true view of the universe, not as a mere geo-physical location for the satisfaction of our instincts and animal passions, but of God's creation as the plan of that wonderful covenant fellowship which the Lord God has established with man, who now in Christ has the vocation to think God's marvellous thoughts after him by means of his science, to render back to God the offerings of worship and thanksgiving which are God's due and to carry out the great cultural mandate "to have dominion over the earth" in singleness of heart to the glory of the Creator.

#### B. The Greek Form-Matter Motive

The second basic religious motive is that of the spirit of apostasy from the true God of the Scriptures which prefers one's own selfhood in preference to love of God and one's neighbor. It leads the human heart in an idolatrous direction, and is thus the source of all absolutizing of creaturely aspects. Hence the apostate ground motive through which it manifests itself in the lives and thoughts of men can and does receive diverse contents. Dooyeweerd suggests that in the history of Western thought this spirit of apostasy has disclosed itself mainly in two such basic ground motives or presuppositions: (1) the motive which dominated the classical Graeco-Roman world of culture and science, and which since Aristotle has been called the *form-matter* motive; and (2) the motive underlying the modern humanistic life- and world-view, which since Kant has been called the *nature-freedom* motive.

A third motive is that of nature and grace, introduced by medieval scholasticism, as an attempted synthesis between the Christian and the Greek motives, but which in modern times can also be directed to a synthesis between the Christian and humanistic religious motives.



These apostate religious ground motives of both classical and modern humanist thought and science reveal two common features. First, they cannot escape the law of the divinely instituted order of creation, and simply follow an existing pattern. Only because of the law of the religious concentration of the cosmos can they absolutize an aspect of the cosmos.<sup>10</sup> Secondly, these motives contain in themselves a religious antithesis. Because they absolutize a relative modal aspect of meaning, they evoke a relative correlate which claims an absoluteness of its own. As implacable and irreconcilable opposites they give rise to a religious dialectic in which now one, now the other, pole of the antithesis enjoys a priority. A true synthesis of these religiously-opposed poles is impossible by virtue of each one's claim to absolutism. At best it allows the awarding of the first rank to one of the antithetical motives.<sup>11</sup>

Dooyeweerd clearly distinguishes between a theoretical dialectic and a religious dialectic. The theoretical dialectic or antithesis initiates the act of knowledge and requires a theoretical synthesis by the thinking self. Dooyeweerd criticizes attempts to treat the religious antithesis as a theoretical antithesis. According to Hegel, for example, the religious motives are opposed to each other as parts of a larger whole, which encompasses both, the parts opposed being each other's correlates and thus not absolutely excluding each other. Among the different religions there is, then, an ascending evolution. The Christian religion is for Hegel a synthesis of the Greek and oriental religious motives, the highest form of religion, though it means a symbolical representation of the Absolute.<sup>12</sup> According to Dooyeweerd, Hegel's thought is dominated by the basic religious motive of Humanism, especially by absolutized metaphysical thinking. Dilthey, again, in attempting to penetrate to each religious point of view in a neutral manner, does not realize that he himself is revealing the bias of a fundamental religious motive, the Humanistic, specifically absolutized historical thinking.<sup>13</sup>

In the light of these distinctions, Dooyeweerd analyzes the three apostate motives of Western thought and science.

tific thinking about man in society and reveals their religious dialectic and the theoretical antinomies to which they give birth.

The first great religious ground motive which we shall consider in the remainder of this chapter is the Greek motive of matter and form. This dialectical form-matter motive, first given this name by Aristotle, was, according to Dooyeweerd, the fundamental motive of Greek philosophy, science and political thought. It originated, he maintains, from the conflict within the Greek religious consciousness between the old nature religions of pre-Homeric Greece and the cultural religion of the old Olympic gods which Nietzsche terms the Dionysian and Apollonian element of Greek culture. The first is a deification of the formless stream of life out of which periodically emerge generations of beings subject to death and fate, *anangke* or *moira*. This cult of the ever-flowing stream of organic life on the one hand, and on the other hand of *Anangke*, the blind avenger of every attempt to bind the divine organic forces to a bodily and restricting form, was, according to Dooyeweerd, the origin of the Greek matter-motive or religious *a priori*, which found its most complete expression in the worship of Dionysus.<sup>14</sup>

The form-motive, on the other hand, was the central motive of the younger Olympian religion, the religion of form, measure and harmony, where the gods themselves acquire individual immortality. It was rooted in the deification of the cultural aspect of Greek society and found its expression in the cult of the Delphic god Apollo, the legislator.<sup>15</sup>

The Olympian gods were believed to have left "mother earth" with its eternal cycle of life and death, beginning and ending, and to have received a personal and immortal form, imperceptible to the eye of sense, an ideal form of perfect splendid beauty, the genuine prototype of the Platonic "ideal" as the imperishable metaphysical form of true being. However, these gods who thus transcended the cycle of life and death could have no influence over it. They had no power over *Anangke* (Necessity) who controlled the earthly cycle. Moreover, they could establish

no moral sanction, and so they ultimately became the official gods of the Greek city-state (the polis), while the religious life of the people was bound to the mystery cults of the older religion, for example, the Dionysian and Orphic mystery cults.

The form-matter basic religious motive originating in the religious consciousness of the Greeks from the meeting of these two antagonistic religions was not as such dependent upon the mythological and ritual forms of the matter. As its central motive, it ruled Greek thought from the beginning. It determined the Greek view of nature, which excluded in principle the biblical idea of creation and the fall into sin. It lay at the foundation both of the Greek metaphysical view of being, in its opposition to the visible world of becoming, as well as of the Greek view of human nature and of man in society.

The tension between matter and form provides us with the background for understanding the thought of Heraclitus and Parmenides on the one hand, and of Plato and Aristotle on the other.

The ground-motive of Greek philosophy is of a dialectical nature because immanence thought, that is, human thought which takes its origin somewhere in temporal reality rather than in God's revelation of himself as Creator of the universe, cannot fully grasp the intrinsic unity and coherence of reality which derives from God's creation of the world, but instead is bound to fall into a dualism in which one aspect of reality is constantly played over against another aspect.

For this reason the Ionian philosophy of nature bestowed primacy upon the matter-motive by deifying the formless vital current as the divine origin of all things which have an individual form and by conceiving of this vital current as true nature or physis. According to Anaximander, all things eventually return to their origin in the invisible and unlimited Apeiron. Heraclitus rejected the existence of an eternal form of being and proclaimed the divinity of the eternally flowing vital current.<sup>16</sup>

The next stage in the dialectical development of Greek philosophy was the bestowal of primacy upon the form-

motive in the thought of Parmenides, the founder of the Eleatic school. Contrary to Heraclitus, he denied the true reality of flowing matter (*hule*) and sought divine physis only in eternal invariable being. Matter became the principle of imperfection, and the divine nous was interpreted as pure form which is independent from all matter. The only sure way to truth and to knowledge of the Absolute was therefore to be found in metaphysical thought (*theoria*) and not in the belief (*pistis*) of the common people since this latter was based upon uncertain opinion.

After the controversy between the Heraclitian and Eleatic conceptions of divine physis, Greek thought abandoned every attempt at reducing form to matter or matter to form. Physis or nature was considered a compound of both. However, as the form-motive of the Olympic religion gained primacy in the Greek city-state as well as in philosophy, divinity was sought above the physis or natural and interpreted as pure form which transcends the world of sense phenomena. For Plato, these pure forms became the transcendent *eide* which could only be reached by means of the *theoria*. The dualism between form and matter was maintained in Plato's cosmogony in which the form-giving power of the divine Demiurge or divine Reason was opposed to the power of blind *Ananke*, the principle of matter, which could only be restrained by persuasion and not by divine domination.

Although Aristotle abandoned the Platonic conception of transcendent pure forms, he could not escape the fundamental dualism within his religious basic ground motive. His metaphysic reveals the polar antithesis between pure matter (*proto-hule*) and pure form (divine thought) and he knows no higher principle as a starting point for a true synthesis.

This form-matter religious ground motive not only affected the development of Greek philosophy and science, it also influenced the Greek conception of politics, law and the state.

Whereas the Egyptians and Mesopotamians had sought to integrate their lives in the institution of a divine monarchy conceived as the mediator between the gods and na-

ture, and hence as the basis of all ordered social existence and harmony, the Greeks sought to integrate their lives in the institution they called the "polis" or city-state.<sup>17</sup> The idea of the "polis" achieved its fullest expression during the great classical period, the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. Classical city states were extremely varied, and behind them lay a long complicated history, characterized among other things by a very uneven development in size, in economic activity, in culture and political techniques. Yet every city-state shared a common ground with every other one; they were each of them closed, autonomous communities in which the sole source of authority was the community itself, and not an outside agency, human or divine, or some individual standing above his fellow-men. Whereas the Near Eastern ruler legislated and decreed in the name of a god, and politics was a function of the religious organization of religion, if not of religion itself, Greek religion became a function of political organization. In the Greek city-state kinship, the previously accepted bond of primitive society, had given way to citizenship. Likewise the subservience to the rule of the divine or semi-divine monarch lost its hold upon the Greeks, and their own kings either disappeared or became functionaries of minor importance. City life might not have begun with the Greeks, but thanks to their political genius it took a revolutionary emphasis and distinctive form, namely in the emergence of the ideal of citizenship as the best method of living a civilized life.<sup>18</sup> After the rise of a centralized system of government at Athens which destroyed the old kinship and tribal organization of the *demes*, the city-state was generally considered the all-inclusive whole of Greek society. This was due to the fact that the "polis" had become the center of the cultural religion of the Olympian gods and the seat of Greek culture and science. By means of the social organization provided by his "polis" the Greek citizen believed himself to be superior to his barbarian neighbors who still roamed the plains as nomads.

Eleutheria—freedom—was perhaps the most favored word in the Greek political vocabulary. With it a third dimension was introduced into politics alongside authority

and obedience, a contradictory dimension leading to tension and conflict. The polarity between freedom and authority was the most fructifying element in Greek life, as it never was in the ancient Near East for the simple reason that the idea of freedom was basically incompatible with their totally authoritarian notions of society and the cosmos. Thanks to this freedom of thought, the mythopoeic way of regarding the world gave way to the scientific and rational way of regarding it.<sup>19</sup> Thanks to this freedom of thought, the science of history as we know it in the Western world was born in the writings of Herodotus.<sup>20</sup>

With the extension of Greek civilization the Greeks came to make the acquaintance of foreign peoples, some of old and advanced societies like Babylon and Egypt, and at the other end of the scale, some barbarian peoples such as the Scythians, Thracians, and Lybians. The comparison of different customs, values and social institutions with those of their own people challenged reflection and criticism. It was this which led to the invention of history, which is simply the Greek word meaning an investigation or inquiry. History sought to answer such questions as how did different peoples come to develop different values, customs and institutions? Why do the barbarians behave differently from the Greeks? At first tentatively, such as Xanthus of Sardes, Hellanicus of Mytilene, and then confidently like Herodotus, individuals set out to ask questions of the past, to ask why men did what they did, and, as R. G. Collingwood writes, "to discover what man is by telling him what man has done."<sup>21</sup> According to Collingwood, "History for Herodotus is humanistic as distinct from either mythical or theocratic."<sup>22</sup> Thus in the preface to his famous *Histories of the Persian War* he tells us that his purpose is to describe the deeds of men, and his object is that these deeds shall not be forgotten by posterity. In short, the new science of history is to become a source of knowledge upon which to base future conduct, by telling us what men have done in the past and why they have done it.<sup>23</sup>

Such investigations showed that profound differences existed between the institutions and values of the Greeks

and those of neighboring peoples, as well as the fact that profound changes had occurred in the realm of Greek customs and mores during the course of time. At the same time that the Greek historians were investigating the past, great dramatists such as Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides and Aristophanes were probing the deepest recesses of the human heart. In their splendid dramas men saw their own hearts held up before them by the poet and saw the process of conflict in that heart—conflict with itself, with brute circumstance, with society and government and with the laws of God and man. Men learned to look deeper into the mystery of their souls and to bear themselves differently towards the inner life of their fellow men. Of all the men of classical antiquity these Greek dramatists most nearly approached the biblical interpretation of life. But unlike the great Hebrew prophets they had no solution to offer for the problems their plays present. In Aeschylus and Sophocles the capricious jealousy of the gods against the mortal men of Homeric legend becomes transformed into the nemesis of Fate which awaits those who break the eternal laws of the universe and who try to over-reach themselves. Of both dramatists we may say it was their purpose to “justify the ways of God to man.” Thus Aeschylus represents human suffering as the punishment of sin, and Sophocles tries to justify the law of nemesis against human presumptuousness. In his great choral odes in *Antigone*, Sophocles asserts as had never been done before in ancient paganism the dignity, worth and value of man.<sup>24</sup> In this same tragedy we also meet one of the first great affirmations of the existence of an eternal and immutable Justice and a justice which human authority ought to express but all too often fails to express. Thus Sophocles has his heroine Antigone declare that her conscience is altogether clear even though she had deliberately overstepped a law of King Creon by burying her brother against his royal decree. She defends her action by appealing to a law and justice higher than any man-made ordinance:

Your order did not come from Zeus, Justice  
That dwells with the gods below, knows no such law.  
I did not think your edicts strong enough

To overrule the unwritten unalterable laws  
 Of God and heaven, you being only a man;  
 They are not yesterday or of to-day, but everlasting  
 Though where they came from, none of us can tell.  
 Guilty of their transgression before God  
 I cannot be for any man on earth.<sup>25</sup>

As for Euripides no playwright other than William Shakespeare has exerted so great an influence upon the affairs of mankind. He accomplished a revolution in human thought greater than that of Zarathustra and the Buddha combined. His plays have been called "the New Testament of paganism" and we may add of atheism, since classical religion before and after Euripides were two different things. As Aristophanes said of Euripides, "He has made men think that there are no gods." With Euripides the gods became mere natural forces. Destiny is now regarded as blind chance, and quite irrational "goddess of change, blind Chance, disposing countless human lives to misery or fortune."<sup>26</sup> Again he says, "The forces that control our lives are as unpredictable in their behavior as any capering idiot."<sup>27</sup> As for the gods, Apollo, he suggests, is only a fiction upheld by the priests of Delphi. Eros and Aphrodite, Artemis and Dionysus may be divinities, but they look more like irresistible natural powers. Zeus certainly exists, but what he is no man knows.<sup>28</sup> While not rejecting the gods out of hand, Euripides thinks of them more as motionless statues, deprived of their inner content. The speech of Teiresias in the *Bacchae* may reflect his own belief: "We entertain no theories or speculations in divine matters. The beliefs we have received from our ancestors cannot be destroyed by any argument, nor by any ingenuity the mind can invent."<sup>29</sup> Yet these gods are powerless; they cannot contact mankind.

Starting from these ideas of the historians and dramatists, a group of men known as the Sophists proceeded to subject every aspect of Greek political, social and religious life to scathing criticism and analysis. As the most gifted of the Sophists, Protagoras put it: "Man is the measure of all things, of those that are that they are, and of those that are not that they are not."<sup>30</sup> For the Sophists all laws, morals, institutions and customs are only



relatively, not absolutely, valid. There is no absolute morality and no absolute justice. In Pindar's words quoted with approval by Herodotus, "Use and custom is lord of all."

Applied to the realm of political discussion these ideas resulted in the distinction being drawn for the first time between conventional law and natural law. According to the Sophist Hippias, conventional law often does violence to the demands of nature and he therefore regards it as a despot. The unwritten laws of nature he regards as eternal and immutable because they spring from a higher source than the decrees of men. To Hippias' way of thinking all men are by nature relatives and fellow citizens, even if they are not such in the eyes of positive law.<sup>31</sup> As another Sophist Alcidamas put it: "God made all men free; nature has made no man a slave." With one stroke of his stylus he had undermined the whole prevailing ethical and legal justification for slavery. The Sophist Antiphon even denied that there was "naturally" any difference between a Greek and a barbarian. The Roman Catholic historian H. A. Rommen in his great work on the history of the doctrine of *Natural Law* points out that by thus contrasting what is naturally right with what is legally right these Sophists attained at this early age to the idea of the rights of man and to the idea of the unity of mankind.<sup>32</sup>

By depreciating nature as the unfolding of an orderless vital process in the sense of the Greek matter-motive, Protagoras at the same time depreciated the ancient kinship and tribal organizations. As the centers of the older natural religions, the latter had preceded the formation of the Greek polis. Protagoras viewed them as unstable social products of nature, lacking law and morality. According to him, legal and ethical norms can only originate from the *nomos* (legislation) of the city-state, not from nature. Thus Protagoras rejected an individualistic conception of the polis. He thought of it as a real communal whole whose laws, viewed as the expression of the general opinion of the democratic community, impose themselves upon the citizens irrespective of their individual opinions.

With later Sophists, however, a radically individualistic conception of the "polis" emerged. And this radical individualism, as it is represented by Polos, Thrasymachus and Callicles, had its background in a shift of emphasis of the primacy of *nomos* to nature. But this was now thought of in Protagoras' sense of an orderless vital process in which the stronger individuals have a natural right to oppress the weaker. It is the Greek matter-motive unchecked by the form-motive which dominated this radical sophistic individualism.<sup>33</sup>

These Sophists who conceived of "*physis*" or nature as being amoral, ruthless, "red in tooth, and claw," taught that human nature was naturally hedonistic and self-assertive and that men were either lovers of pleasure or lovers of power. For Antiphon "nature" is simply egoism or self-interest. The man who follows his own nature would always do the best he could for himself. The argument of Thrasymachus that justice is only the "interest of the stronger," since in every state the ruling class make those laws which it considers most conducive to its own class advantage, is in the same spirit. Nature is not a rule of right but a rule of strength. A similar point is made by Callicles in Plato's dialogue, the *Gorgias*, when he argues that natural justice is the right of the strong man and that legal justice is merely a fiction invented by the ruling class to protect its own interest.<sup>34</sup>

From the biblical point of view these Greek dramatists and Sophists were the few honest men in classical antiquity. They alone recognized the fact of sin in man but they did not call it by such a name. They alone saw through the pretensions of the free citizens and ruling classes of Greece that the "polis" was the embodiment not of justice and harmony but of brute power. They alone had the moral courage to face the truth that human beings are not naturally good nor that they can achieve perfection by knowledge. Modern humanist historians, philosophers and idealistic theologians have completely failed to appreciate the tremendous significance of these Greek Sophists. Refusing to admit the awful truth about human nature which these ancient critics of the City of Man propounded with such

devastating effect, neither ancient humanists nor modern ones have accorded to these men the full praise they have deserved but have dismissed them as misanthropists. Had Plato and Aristotle admitted the truth about human nature and human reason revealed by these Sophists, they would not have elaborated their idealistic systems of political science which are nothing less than ideological rationalizations of vested interests.

As may be imagined, the ideas of the Sophists and dramatists created a ferment in Athens and wherever they spread. The working classes and lower orders of Greek society seized upon them as a means of winning and extending the franchise and their liberties. By calling in question every accepted political, religious and moral value of the city-state it created a crisis in Greek civilization of the first order. As Zeller said:

Sophism had by its philosophic scepticism not merely thrown doubts on the possibility of science but by its relativistic theories and the thorough-going individualism of some of its members had shaken the existing authorities of religion, state and family to their foundations.<sup>35</sup>

### C. Plato's Doctrine of Man in Society

It is therefore not surprising that as a result of this scathing attack upon all existing institutions and values civil war broke out in the Greek city-states. This internal schism came to a head in the great Peloponnesian war which divided Greece at the close of the fifth century and in which Athens and Sparta took the leading role. Each city appealed to the kindred faction in the city-state opposed to it, and every city divided against itself. As Lowes Dickinson wrote: "The general Greek conception of the ordered state was so far from being realized in practice that probably at no time in the history of the civilized world has anarchy more complete and cynical prevailed."<sup>36</sup> Describing this spirit of faction and class warfare as it first showed itself at Corcyra, the great Greek historian Thucydides writes in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*:

Such was the savagery of the class-war at Corcyra as it developed and it made the deeper impression through being the first of its kind. . . In every polis there were struggles between the leaders of the proletariat and the reactionaries. . . This access of class-war brought corresponding calamities upon the countries of Hellas—calamities that occur and will continue to occur so long as human nature remains what it is.<sup>37</sup>

Thus was the mortal blow dealt to the classical quest for a harmonious social life centered in the city-state. According to Arnold Toynbee in his *Study of History*, "In prospecting for a date for the breakdown of Hellenic Society the historian would probably lay his finger on the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C., a social catastrophe which Thucydides denounced at the time as 'a beginning of great evils for Hellas' . . . the mortal blow was delivered six hundred years earlier than Gibbon supposed, and the hand that dealt it was the victim's own."<sup>38</sup>

Instead of resolving the tensions generated within Hellenic society by the acid criticism of the dramatists and Sophists by establishing social justice for all, the ruling classes, first of Greece then later of the Roman Empire, proceeded to tighten their grip upon the common people and the slaves. To justify such exploitation to themselves, it was necessary to work out an ideology of power in terms of which to justify their right to rule. It had to be shown that the only way to make Hellenic society safe for civilization was to entrust political power to the hands of the few, rather than of the many, as the Sophists were demanding. Such an ideology of power was provided for the political world of classical antiquity by Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Livy and Vergil. Concurrently with these attempts to justify and rationalize power, power itself became more and more concentrated into the hands of smaller groups of men, until it was eventually summed up in the claims to total sovereignty over society of Augustus Caesar and his successors. With the destruction of citizenship as a meaningful concept that occurred with the downfall of the Roman Republic at the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C.,<sup>39</sup> the individual was once more reduced to the level of insigni-

ficance he had previously suffered under the Oriental despotic monarchies of the Ancient Near and Far East. The classical humanist quest for excellence and virtue was surrendered in exchange for security and protection, and the hopes of mankind became placed in the august hands of the Caesars of Rome and Constantinople to whom men henceforth placed themselves in tutelage.

The first great thinker to provide the ruling classes of Graeco-Roman society with an ideology by means of which to justify their exercise of power was Plato. His first ambition had been to enter public life in the role of a reformer of his country's ills. Then he discovered his true vocation as a man of thought and so founded the Academy where he hoped to train the future rulers, both of Athens and of other Greek city-states. The pernicious intellectual influences emanating from Plato's Academy in the ancient world have only been equalled in modern times by those emerging from L'Ecole Polytechnique in nineteenth-century Paris and the London School of Economics in the twentieth-century.<sup>40</sup> May Protestant Christians who sneer at the vital necessity for Christian schools and universities realize before it is too late the power exercised by secular humanist universities and schools to shape the future development of Western society.

For Plato, as for all succeeding philosophical idealists, the secret of power is "order"; and order both within the individual and within society, if it is to be well-founded, must be "just"; that is, it must bear or appear to bear a definite and intelligible relation to a cosmic principle which lies deeper than all mere conventions of behavior, whether of individual or social life. Plato was thus committed to the discovery of such a principle of order and stability as the basis for a valid science both of "nature" and of "man." In other words, to answer the Sophist charge that the institution of slavery, the degradation of women and the ruthless exploitation of the proletariat was unjust because it was against the natural law of the universe, Plato had to try to prove that, on the contrary, slavery, the inferiority of women and the exploitation of human labor were all just because they were all founded on principles of ultimate

reality. As Benjamin Farrington has pointed out in his book, *Greek Science*:

The new conception of science which came in with Plato and Aristotle demonstrably had its origin in the new form of society which rested on the division between citizen and slave. There is no aspect of Plato's thought which does not reflect a fundamental dichotomy derived from this division in society. In the developed theory of slavery the slave was not regarded as a rational being. The master alone was capable of reason, the slave might hold "correct opinion" if he strictly followed the directions of his master. This master-and-slave relation became fundamental for Plato's thought in every sphere.<sup>41</sup>

For Plato such a principle of "order" cannot be discovered by mere observation of the phenomenal world but exists in a postulated ideal world of pure thought and hence it is "hard to communicate." Nevertheless, Plato claimed that he had found it. Where? The answer is in the philosophical speculations of the Ionian thinkers. But whereas these men had sought to make the universe amenable to rational inquiry and scientific treatment, and hence capable of being controlled by man, now Plato reversed the process and he tried to "theologize" physics as a method of controlling men. By interpreting politics in terms of "physics" he hoped to show that there is a parallel between the "legitimate" and the "natural."<sup>42</sup>

Plato's "theological physics" are set forth in his dialogue, the *Timaeus*. In this dialogue Plato gives us an account of his world-view or cosmology. Behind the world we see with our senses there is, declares Plato, another world of pure thought. It is ruled by a Cosmic Mind or Intelligence who is not only the author of all motion and movement in our phenomenal world but also of the characteristic structure of the universe and all that it contains.

In this theory we can see Plato trying to express the important truth that God's Law for his creation is not to be found in any subject-object functioning. Plato realized that there exists both subjects and objects and so he granted the subject-object relation. But the Law was something different from both. The Law was a separate realm of

law-essences. This Platonic ontological view is known as realism. Of this Platonic realism Evan Runner has this to say:

In this Platonic realism we once more find analytical advance that does not bring us one whit closer to the Truth. . . . It is, of course, correct to say, as Plato does, that the Law is not something within the cosmos of functions. But Plato does not say that because, being in the grip of the Word of God, he knows the truth about the Law. . . . Analytically, Plato has found difficulties with identifying the Law with any functions. But that does not bring him to the Truth about the Law. For the Truth cannot be found analytically. Without the revealing POWER of the Word of God Plato can only use his analytical results in the service of one more religious distortion. And that is what realism is.

Plato taught a separate world of law-essences, of things that are at one and the same time abiding and sure principles of oughtness and perfect eternal models of all earthly forms of existence. I am speaking of Plato's world of ideas. In this world we find, for instance, what it is for the good to be, or the law for the good. But this law is itself a perfect Thing, a substance; it is the Good itself. Likewise, we find there what it is for the beautiful to be, or the law for the beautiful; but again, the law is also a Thing, the Beautiful itself. And so also we find in this world of ideas Man Himself (the law for what it is to be man).

These law-essences are law substances that simply subsist in the cosmos and have the force of law. Gods and men are subject to them. They are called purely intelligible essences, which means that they are beheld by mind alone and not by the changing senses. It is right at this point that we see the apostate character of Platonic realism. Really to know the Law is to tremble before the God of the whole earth, Whose word the Law is. In Plato the law has been divorced from the sovereign God; it exists in itself. It is substance. And it is intelligible substance. That is, with all the supposed calmness and self-possession of normalcy I simply look out with my Mind toward a realm of eternally-existent, purely intelligible law-essences and behold the Truth. And it is not the religious depth-relation to God that is necessary here to know

the Law and the Truth but only our rational life elevated to the heart-position. The veritable Truth of God, that reality is the covenant of life between man and God, has been utterly lost sight of. Whatever may be correct and noble in Plato's analysis, we have to do in his philosophy primarily with the falsity of apostasy. Plato, fallen from his representative place (Office) in the cosmos, cannot "see" the nature of the Truth.<sup>43</sup>

In short it is the difference between Isaiah's vision of the dependence of the creation upon the will of the living God of Israel and that of a blind man trying to describe the sound of the trumpet to a deaf man. H. Wheeler Robinson, writing of the Hebrew conception of Nature in his work *Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament*, says:

The Hebrew vocabulary includes no word equivalent to our term "Nature." This is not surprising if by Nature we mean "the creative and regulative physical power which is conceived of as operating in the physical world and as the immediate cause of all its phenomena." The only way to render this idea into Hebrew would be to say simply "God." In fact we may say that such unity as "Nature" possessed in Hebrew eyes came to it through its absolute dependence on God its Creator and Upholder. It has been said that "Greek philosophy began, as it ended, with the search for what was abiding in the flux of things" (J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 15). *The Hebrew found that in God.*<sup>44</sup>

Returning to Plato's cosmology we may further note that his Cosmic Mind does not operate *in vacuo*. On the contrary, it presupposes a substrate of uncreated primordial matter, variously described by Plato as Necessity, blind chance or the "errant cause." This primordial matter is in a state of perpetual insignificant flux until it receives the "forms" or "patterns" which Mind or Intelligence imposes upon it. Thus in Plato's own words, "The genesis of this universe may be ascribed to a combination of Intelligence with Necessity, the one influencing the other so as to bring what comes into being to the best possible issue."<sup>45</sup> In this Platonic world-view matter and motion, considered in abstraction, are neither good nor bad. They



only become bad when they are impressed with form in the phenomenal world. On the other hand, the forms or patterns, which by impressing themselves on matter impart to it the nature of physical bodies, do not on that account lose anything of their formal character; they remain forever timeless and immutable. Thus in the process of becoming, as Plato sees it, the role of Mind or Intelligence is not so much creative as demiurgic; that is to say, Mind or Intelligence is conceived as a Craftsman who makes use of the material he has rather than an original and true Creator of matter *ex nihilo* (out of nothing) in the Christian sense of God as the Creator. Plato's God merely furnishes the "archetypes" of being. As G. Grube suggests:

In teaching this Plato remains true to the old Greek principle that nothing can be created out of nothing and, within the myth itself, his Maker is not a creator in the strict sense. Above and beyond him are the eternal Forms, a pattern to which by the very nature of his being he must needs conform.<sup>46</sup>

The idea of an absolute creation and of a creative act which presupposes nothing at all, whether a pre-existing matter or a pre-existing form, is an idea which originated solely with the Hebrews and constitutes the fundamental differentiation between the biblical idea of God and the Greek.

Because of his prejudice against the physical and material aspect of human life Plato conceived of the Cosmic Mind's effort to impart form and structure to matter as being difficult, and as a result matter is regarded as a principle of disorder, if not a positive source of evil. The world of "body," that is, the material organism of the Universe, therefore never really becomes, since to do so would be to transcend its nature as a body. It always remains a mere reflection of the patterns in the real intelligible world. In the real world, of course, everything realizes its entire nature simultaneously; e.g., all the properties of a triangle are present in the triangle at any given moment. And so for Plato the world of becoming in time, temporal succession, is merely the "moving image" of eternity. Such a view of matter marked a radical departure from the

Ionian point of view, which had been that there is a necessary order in the material world, and that the human mind grasps truth in so far as it grasps this necessary order. This order they believed could only be grasped by sense-evidence. For Plato, however, true science is teleological. It consists in interpreting phenomena in the light of the ends at which the Mind, which strives to direct all things, is presumed to aim. These ends are discovered, not by observation, but by reason. Not by trying to act upon nature, but by argument about ends, will the truth be discovered. According to B. Farrington the explanation for this reversal in Plato's approach to reality is due to his attempt to justify the institution of slavery.

The master-slave relation provides the basic pattern for both Plato's and Aristotle's thought in every sphere.<sup>47</sup>

"Both men," says Farrington, "viewed the master-and-slave relation as a pattern that pervades all nature, and hence both regarded matter as being refractory, disorderly and disobedient. The Supreme Mind has as much difficulty in making matter do what he wants as does the master in making the slave do what he wants."<sup>48</sup>

Such an approach to reality was bound to stultify all true scientific thinking about Nature, and Plato must therefore be held responsible, along with his pupil Aristotle, for arresting the development of Greek science. Until the Christian Church restored dignity to labor and abolished the universal cleavage of ancient society between free-man and slave there would be no advancement of Natural Science.

Plato's cosmology not only arrested the development of natural science by separating the logic of science from its experimental practice; it also foisted a doctrine of human nature upon Western men which was to arrest the development of individual personality. To begin with, Plato envisaged man as a microcosm of the universe, a composite of "body," "soul" and "mind." In this psychological hybrid, neither Christian nor scientific, the part Plato defined as mind was dogmatically identified with the cosmic principle and conceived as a "scintilla," a sort of chip off the Cosmic

block and divine essence, and hence under certain conditions it is held to be capable of apprehending the archetypal forms. This composite, however, includes elements which are held by Plato to be extraneous to this principle, viz., those which make up the "body" and "soul." Plato's doctrine of matter as a principle of disorder and limitation gives rise to grave problems which affect his anthropology. Is the material body, for example, to be thought of merely as a tomb or prison-house as Pythagoras had suggested? If so, it would follow that the supreme problem of mankind must be one of escape. A hardly less serious difficulty is that which concerns the human essence, whether or not its character is archetypal. By suggesting that matter is evil and a principle of disorder raises in an acute form the question of individuality. As the late-lamented Charles Cochrane asked:

To see in matter merely a principle of limitation . . . . would be to raise in an acute form the question of individuality; to ask in effect whether Peter, Paul and John are not essentially one; destined as such to self-realization only as they succeed in discarding that which "separates" them as individuals in order to find their place in a comprehensive whole.<sup>49</sup>

If the humanity of the individual, that is, his essential spiritual being, is by nature substantially based upon only a participation in a common Universal Mind or Reason, then in relation to men it must inevitably work out as the recognition of that element which is common to all; of that which is alike in all, and hence to deny any significance whatsoever to individuality as such. For Plato it would appear that the individual does not matter, except insofar as he participates in a Cosmic Mind. All that is essential about the individual is that which is in him by virtue of which he belongs to the species, that which is typical in him, that which is the same in all, the universal, that which is rational.

That Plato has in fact sacrificed the individual in the collectivity is apparent to any attentive reader of *The Republic*. In this political tract for his times freedom for Plato has no meaning except in regard to function. The

individual counts only as the performer of his work within the State and his importance depends upon the value of the work he does. As Ernest Barker puts it:

What Plato's *Republic* provides its citizens is not so much freedom and protection as a definite life . . . all the opportunities of a civilized existence. Thus liberty is found in the services or the function that each individual performs.<sup>50</sup>

As Plato sees it, the individual cannot be distinguished from the State in which he lives and which he thinks is rooted and grounded in the very constitution of the human mind, and being so grounded the polis must be perfectly natural and not a product of a social contract as the Sophists taught. The State is natural because it is an institution for that moral perfection of man to which his nature moves. All features of its life—slavery, private property, and the inferiority of women—are for Plato justified because or insofar as they serve that purpose. The existence of the Greeks polis is thus justified by Plato in terms of its purpose or end, which is to make possible a civilized life, rather than in terms of its origin.

A moral life for Plato consists in every part of the soul subjecting itself to, and developing in accordance with, the law of its life which the insight of its reasoning part, the mind, has dictated. It is only when the appetitive part of the individual stands in subservience to the reasoning part that it succeeds in achieving the good life for itself. In his famous simile of the charioteer driving the unruly steeds of passion, Plato implies that a truly human order is one which involves the subjection to reason of all elements of irrationality; and this order he declares to be a replica or counterpart to the fixed and immutable order of the heavens.<sup>51</sup>

As the individual is divided into three parts, so the State rests upon a threefold division. The slaves and workers living "by their bellies and loins" correspond to the appetitive element in the individual. The police and soldiers, in whom bravery and the martial spirit predominate, correspond to the soul or spirit of the individual. The rulers or guardians, in whom the reasoning faculty predominates,

correspond to the intellectual faculty of the individual. The ultimate organization of the Greek polis must thus rest upon a rational organization, and hence it is necessary to restore oligarchy in place of democracy. Aptitude to govern, rather than mere desire and will to rule, becomes Plato's criterion by which the individual's place in the polis is determined. The Athenian workers and slaves are justly deprived of any Sophistic "natural rights" to liberty and equality with their superior masters and rulers. The liberties of literature and thought and artistic expression are also drastically reduced. Everyone is to read only those books and to see only those plays which portray the gods as good, and a rigid censorship is suggested as the answer to the acid criticism of sophistic and dramatic individualism. Likewise, social customs must be controlled in the interests of stability and harmony. Men only may make love in a given way and be educated by the state in accordance with the Platonic world-view. As in men's hearts, so in the city, order must be imposed and all individual self-expression suppressed. Not even the rulers are exempt from this rigid regimentation. They are subjected to the rigors of an education combining Spartan simplicity and Platonic scholarship. Just in case the guardians forget their duties, Plato devised effective sanctions in the common-ownership of property and of wives.

In Plato's *Republic*, then, individualism has been suffocated in collectivism. In a word Plato has laid down the program of both classical Caesarism and modern totalitarianism.

If he were alive today he would no doubt give his full approval to the Chinese Communist attempt to "communize" the people of China and deprive them of the last vestiges of their humanity and individuality. Like the Communists Plato has identified liberty with the economic, military and deliberative service of the State.

#### D. Aristotle's Doctrine of Man in Society

Unlike his master, Aristotle begins his attempt to save the Greek city-state from collapse by envisaging the principle of order as immanent rather than transcendent; that

is, as diffused through individual objects in nature rather than hidden up in the heavens. Where Plato had separated the world of sense perception from the world of pure "ideas" or "forms," the proper objects of scientific, necessary and true knowledge, Aristotle transfers the "ideas" as the form which determines the formless matter into the individual object, which therefore becomes for him the primary substance. Our concern is not with Aristotle's theory of knowledge and of universals, but only with its application to *homo sapiens*, that is, with its utility as the basis for a "science" of human nature. And here we may note, to begin with, that Aristotle accepts without question the radical distinction between form and matter inherent in Platonic idealism, and like Plato he looks upon matter as a principle of disorder. As with Plato, the master-and-slave relation provides the basic pattern for his thought in every sphere. By calling slavery natural Aristotle meant, as Gregory Vlastos pointed out, that "it follows a pattern that pervades all nature." In Aristotles own words:

In all cases where there is a compound, constituted of more than one part but forming one common entity . . . a ruling element and a ruled can always be traced. This characteristic (i.e., the presence of ruled and ruling elements) is present in inanimate beings by virtue of the whole constitution of nature, inanimate as well as animate; for even in things which are inanimate there is a sort of ruling principle, such as is to be found, for example, in musical harmony.<sup>52</sup>

In other words, there is a principle of rule and subordination in nature at large. For Aristotle, therefore, order in nature appears in the imposition of form and structure upon a recalcitrant matter. But whereas Plato believed in the existence of Forms apart from matter, Aristotle rejects their hypostatization and declares that Matter and Form appear as two aspects of existence. Basing himself upon the work of the Ionian thinkers, Aristotle worked out a theory of causation which could best account for development in nature. Out of the Ionian reflections upon the nature of things from Thales to himself, Aristotle saw emerging a fourfold theory of cause.

The early Ionians, with their quest for a first principle had been looking for the MATERIAL cause of things. The Pythagoreans, with their emphasis on numbers, had hinted at the FORMAL cause. Heraclitus, with the active role he assigns to fire, and Anaximenes with his doctrine of air had been concerned to find the EFFICIENT cause. Socrates, in insisting that the reason for things being thus rather than so because it's best that they should be as they are, had suggested the FINAL cause. Taking up these four causes, Aristotle declared that to possess the complete rational explanation of any product of nature or art, one would have to know first out of what thing the particular object under investigation had grown or had been made, what is the element in the concrete thing before us which is combined with a certain type of form or structure. This Aristotle called the material cause of the thing. We must also know what is the characteristic form or structure which is combined with material in the individual thing now before us. This is what Aristotle called the source of the motion and later known in logic as the efficient cause. And most important of all, we must know what the object before us will be when and if the process of its making or growing has reached completion. This Aristotle called the "end" or "cause" as end or "final cause."<sup>53</sup> In this scheme for obtaining knowledge of the facts and objects of nature the excellence of such facts and objects must be appraised in terms of their ends, and for Aristotle natural and biological processes only acquired meaning and value so far as they tended in the direction ordained by nature, that is, towards the realization of their appropriate form.

Applying this scheme to human beings means understanding them from the standpoint of their entelechy, that is, as impelled by the law of their nature towards a pre-determined type. The type in question is unique, being made up of body, soul, and mind, the last of which constitutes its differentia. Man is distinguished from all other living beings by his Mind or Reason, which enters from outside into the soul-germ which is transmitted from the father to the child, and which remains unaffected by the death of the body. For such a composite creature as man

the "goods" must also be composite; for while its ultimate excellence may well be that of scientific contemplation, this mind has no residence apart from the body and soul in which it finds itself. Man achieves his telos by education into citizenship. As the highest good for any organism is to be found in the complete development of the nature of that organism, and therefore the realization of all its most distinctive qualities, so man must strive after his particular good and realize his full humanity, that is, his rational faculties. It is therefore in the life of reason that the true end of man must be sought. Aristotle distinguished two kinds of reason: the practical reason and theoretical reason with universal and unalterable truths. In fact it is only in the activity of the latter type of reason that man can achieve his true end and live the highest kind of good life, because reason is the expression of the divine in man. The good life in the last resort is in the life of the mind, whether it is devoted to creation, to art, or the quest for knowledge in science and philosophy. In other words, Aristotle like Plato has sought to justify the life of leisure of the ruling classes of Greece by grounding it in a doctrine of the superiority of reason over the base passions which they fondly believed resided in the breasts of the slaves whom Aristotle defined as "living tools."

Despite superficial differences, the picture of human nature thus presented by Aristotle points to conclusions identical with those of Plato. While disagreeing with his Master on his doctrine of Forms, Aristotle nevertheless fully agrees with Plato in supposing that the individual substance possesses significance only, so to speak, as the carrier of a type. Likewise, both thinkers are agreed that, while everything in man belongs to the ephemeral world of "becoming" and "appearance," the typical rationality in men alone is permanent, essential and intelligible. For both it is not the individual that matters but the genera Man. The idea of Man is eternal, immutable, and necessary; the individual is only a temporary and accidental being partaking of the Universal Form of Man. Writing of Aristotle's system, Etienne Gilson says:



While the reality of the individual in Aristotle's thought is much more strongly developed than it is in Plato, nevertheless in both the universal is the important thing. Although the only real substances he will recognize are the men, that is to say, the specific form of humanity as individualized by matter, Aristotle considers the multiplicity of the individuals as a mere substitute for the unity of the species. In default of an Humanity which cannot exist apart, nature contents herself with the small change, that is to say with men. Each is born, lives a brief span, and disappears for ever without leaving a trace behind; but what does that matter if new men are born, live and die, and are, in their turn, replaced by others? *Individuals pass away; but the species endures.*<sup>54</sup>

Again, like Plato, Aristotle taught that for the realization of his rational and intellectual life man requires to live the life of the polis. Thus conceived, the polis constitutes a response to the specifically human demand for a specifically human order. The State is at once due to man's reason and it is also the necessary expression of this reason. The good of the State and the good of the individual are for Aristotle one and the same thing.

Far from the State being a means for keeping the middle classes in power as the Sophists had declared and as something "naturally" immoral and "naturally" unjust, it is on the contrary natural and proper in the sense that the State is man's destination in which and through which his "telos" or "end" is realized. It is therefore natural insofar as man is concerned. But its "naturalness" is in no sense that of a mere spontaneous growth. On the contrary, it is that of an institution designed within limits determined by the potentialities of the material, to secure mankind from "accident" or "spontaneity," thereby making possible the attainment of his proper telos or end. From this point of view the order embodied in the polis is admittedly unhistorical. What it offers, indeed, is immunity from the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune and chance. And this is why, declares Aristotle, "the man who first invented the state was the greatest of benefactors." The State is natural then, not in the sense that it is a product of historical growth, but in the sense that it is only in the State that a

“civilized” as opposed to a “barbarous” life is possible. Though the State came into existence for the sake of mere life, it exists for the sake of the good life. For man’s end is not reached until his well-being is secured, and it is this which drives him on from primitive existence in a family tribe, and village towards life in the polis, and it is both the aim and the cause of the whole process. As we have seen to say that the State secures the end of man is with Aristotle equivalent to describing it as his nature because the realization of the nature of everything is its end. Against the Sophists, then, Aristotle finds the polis natural and essential to man, since it is only in the State that all man’s latent possibilities can come into full play. The object of history for Aristotle is not the emergence of individual persons but of the State.<sup>55</sup>

Just as the State is thus “natural” for man, and therefore the Sophists’ charge that it is unnatural is nonsense, so their demand for the equality of all men, women and slaves as well as free men is also rubbish. Economic and social inequalities are not due to the injustice of the ruling class. On the contrary, they arise out of the very nature of man. True equality, says Aristotle, does not consist as the Sophists believe in every man counting for one and no more than one. Equality does not mean the levelling of all social distinctions or depriving the rich of their wealth. For true equality is not numerical at all but something proportional. It is not the equality of unit to unit but of ratio to ratio. Equality means not that the recognition of the better man is equal to the recognition of the worse but that the ratio between the recognition and the merit in one case is equal to the ratio in the other. True equality will therefore preserve rather than obliterate the distinctions between men. As Barker puts it:

A liberty which is subjection to a moral end, and an equality which consists in inequality are the guiding concepts of Aristotle.<sup>56</sup>

It is this assumption of the natural inequality of human beings which underlies both Plato’s and Aristotle’s anthropology and attendant sociology. Upon this idea turns their theories of human government and society. For both

thinkers the production of capital and consumer goods in a civilized society should be carried on by slaves because, it is claimed, slaves lack a truly human, that is, a rational nature. In Aristotle's terrible phrase they are "living tools." On the other hand, government and the ownership of property rightly rests in the hands of the ruling class because by the very virtue of their wealth and position they have proved themselves to be superior beings, that is to say, they possess the best intellects and the most self-control. Thus reason constitutes the cornerstone of their social science. Unfortunately, what Plato and Aristotle took to be the right dictates of pure reason were in fact nothing but their own self-righteous rationalizations. What they conceived the absolute values of human existence in general, namely such values as slavery, the inferiority of women and the natural right of the Greek middle classes to rule and exploit the working classes, were in fact nothing but vast generalizations from existing institutions which they were so anxious to justify and preserve.

At the center of their thinking was the idea that the polis exists not only to make men obedient but also to make them virtuous. In other words the city-state was to become both the source and the executor of moral value. The sole and exclusive moral fulfillment of human beings they held to lie in citizenship. Man can only become virtuous as a member of the polis and in obedience to its laws. All education and all morality in consequence becomes politics. As Rommen points out:

The Greeks and the Romans knew only a politico-legal morality. The city-state in their view is the ultimate and absolutely supreme pedagogue, the fulfillment of the moral being of man.<sup>57</sup>

This idea that the individual can only realize his true destiny in the polis presupposes that men are in fact at liberty to choose between such abstract alternatives as "vice" and "virtue." But this presupposition is wholly fallacious, since it implies that human beings stand in no essential relation to social reality which in point of fact they themselves constitute. This defect, of course, is not accidental but springs directly out of the logic which, by ignor-

ing this relationship, grossly misconceives the true nature of the "law" actually operating in human society. The logic in question is that of classical idealism. As Cochrane pointed out:

The radical error of Classicism is to suppose that the history of mankind can properly be apprehended in terms applicable to the study of "objects" in "nature," i.e., in the light of the conventional concepts of form and matter.<sup>58</sup>

Cochrane then showed that such a methodology reduces the individual human being to the dimensions of a "specimen" embodying a type. But he says: "This is to abstract from all those features which give to him his specific character . . . to envisage him in this light involves the assumption that he becomes fully 'intelligible' in terms of structure and function or, as Aristotle had put it, of 'what he was to be.'"<sup>59</sup>

How then can we account for social change and growth? Classical idealism does so by denying that the type does or could possibly change. It merely renews itself incessantly in and through the individual, while the individual for his part achieves fulfillment that is his end by virtue of this incessant renewal of himself in the type. From this schematized picture of human nature certain important implications for the idealist theory of human relationships emerge. According to Cochrane, "It appears to suggest that the sole essential and intrinsic relation of the individual is with the type to which he belongs."<sup>60</sup>

In that case Cochrane asks, "What becomes of the relationships of individuals with one another?" If we relegate them to the realm of merely conventional they are admitted to be unnatural. To avoid such a conclusion classical idealism tried to establish a true principle of integration, and this, as we have seen, it discovered in the notion of justice. As it stands, both Plato's conception and Aristotle's idea of justice are wholly formal. And so they gave it content by identifying it with the "justice" of the city-state, that is, with the existing social relationships. According to Cochrane:

It is precisely at this point that the idealist commits the crime of Prometheus in seeking to appropriate what belongs to Zeus . . . In other words what he does is to treat knowledge not as a means to "wisdom" but as a source of "power." The power to which he thus aspires proves, however, to be quite illusory. For what he has in fact accomplished is to substitute his notion of order for the order which exists in the universe; the fictitious for the actual . . . His problem is thus to give currency to this counterfeit of cosmic order by persuading or compelling men to accept it as genuine. The effort to do so constitutes the history of "politics" in classical antiquity.<sup>61</sup>

Just as Plato's and Aristotle's teleological modes of explanation were to arrest the development of Greek science, so their attempt to explain human nature in terms of substance and form were to hold back the development of a true personalism. In other words, their misguided efforts to justify slavery and the inequality of women and working men by understanding such inequalities as "natural" and required by the nature of ultimate reality allowed such inequalities to continue to exist long after they were dead. Of both it can be truly said that the "evil that men do (and think) lives after them; the good is oft interred with their bones."

#### E. Stoicism and Natural Law

Not even the genius of Aristotle could quench the flame of freedom and the sense of the dignity of man as a human being which was lighted by the insight of the great Greek dramatists and the Sophist critics of existing institutions in the Greek city-state, such as slavery and the degradation of women and boys. In Greek and later Roman Stoicism the idea of humanity and the rights of man as man were recovered and reasserted. Gilbert Murray said of Stoicism that it was "the greatest system of organized thought which the mind of man had built up for itself in the Graeco-Roman world before the coming of Christianity."<sup>62</sup> Like the Roman Empire, with which it is usually associated, Stoicism contained within itself the seeds of its own corruption. In its later and most influential man-

ifestations, it can hardly be considered a philosophy at all. By the time of Epictetus and the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius it had become, to all intents and purposes, little more than a psychological therapeutic, a private bulwark against the ravages of spiritual, moral and political *angst* of a Roman aristocracy under the iron grip of an immutably autocratic orientalized imperial absolutism.

Thus a sharp distinction has to be made between Stoicism properly considered, the philosophy formulated in the Hellenistic era by Zeno of Citium, and the adaptation of Stoic ethics to the requirements of the Roman nobility from the late Roman Republic onwards. Yet even in the beginning Stoicism has the air of emerging to fill an historical vacuum rather than as a genuine new contribution to the history of thought. It is eclectic, makeshift and riddled with contradictions. Behind it lies not the unifying power of a great mind, but the shadow of a tremendous social transition and change in the conditions of human life. The city-state was dead, dragged into the junk room of history by the military genius first of Macedon and then of Rome. While the old forms of life in the polis may have continued under Alexander and his successors, the Antigonidae, the Seleucidae, and later the Caesars of Rome, the old sense of citizenship became more and more bereft of all meaning.<sup>63</sup> A new sense of cosmopolitanism was adrift in a new world without guidance, the prey to conflicting desires and fears. As Bevan strikingly put it in his book *Stoics and Sceptics*:

Some ring-wall must be built against chaos. High over the place where Zeno talked could be described the wall, built generations before, under the terror of a Persian attack, built in haste of the materials which lay to hand, the drums of columns fitted together just as they were with the regular stones. That heroic wall still looks over the roofs of modern Athens. To Zeno it might have been a parable of his own teaching.<sup>64</sup>

In short, Stoicism came to birth at a time when the foundations were being shaken. The conquests of Alexander had disintegrated the whole life of the Greek city-

state. Worse still, Scepticism like modern logical positivism had shaken the foundations of knowledge, and men were left in a situation in which were many voices to tell them that there was nothing certain in this world in which to believe except the one fact that nothing is certain. In such a situation men needed, above all, reassurance, guidance, a scale of values in terms of which the individual could make sense of the bewildering and confusing events of the age. It is a dilemma which we today can at once recognize.

Any philosophy which proposed to give men something to hang onto in a shifting world thus had to begin by proving that certainty is possible. As Bevan writes, "Dogma in our day suggests an unnecessary intellectual garment which trammels and incommodes the mind; we hardly realize the bitter need for dogma felt by minds which have been stripped shivering naked."<sup>65</sup> For the Stoics philosophy was not a pleasant, intellectual pursuit of some speculative truth; it was the desperate search for something firm in an agonizing world. It is for this reason that Stoicism had to start with logic. A theory of knowledge was a primary necessity in a world of universal scepticism. Without that the Stoic philosopher could not even begin.

The Stoic philosopher was faced with a situation in which he was confronted with two principles which cancel each other out. First, there was the principle that all knowledge comes through the senses and through sense impressions. Second, there was the main sceptical position that knowledge which comes through the senses can never be trusted and can never be certain. If the tension between these two principles is allowed to remain, it must mean that there can be no such thing as any certain knowledge of reality. The Stoic began with the simple "common sense" conviction that it is not true that the knowledge which comes through the senses cannot be trusted. In point of fact, we daily act on the assumption that it can be trusted. As Cicero argues, "Those who assert that nothing can be grasped deprive us of these things that are the very tools and equipment of life, or rather actually overthrow the whole of life from its foundations."<sup>66</sup>

As the Stoic saw it, all knowledge comes from sensation. What happens is that from any object, waves proceed from the object and strike upon the organ of sense; this impact is sensation. But equally from the mind, from the ruling part of the soul, there goes out a spirit, a breath, to meet this impact, and this also is sensation. The earliest Stoics took this literally and very materially. Thus Cleanthes taught that when this happens it causes an impression on the soul, exactly like the impression made by a signet ring on wax. Chrysippus denied this as being fantastic and absurd, and argued that what was caused in the mind was an alteration.<sup>67</sup> The result of this imprint or alteration in the mind is a presentation, a mind picture.<sup>68</sup>

Two things follow. For this process to operate correctly it is obvious that the object must be really there, and the organs of sense by which it is perceived must be sound. The second thing is of the utmost importance for the whole Stoic theory of knowledge. Sensation is always true; the sensation of a touch, a flash of lightning, a smell, a pleasure, a pain is always correct. It is when we go on to say something which is really a judgment that the possibility of error enters in, as for example when we say, "This is white, sweet, rough, bitter." This is not strictly a sensation; this is a judgment on sensation or what the Stoics called a mind picture. Hence it follows that sensations are always true but the mind pictures can be either true or false. The whole problem of knowledge, then, is how to distinguish between the true and the false mind pictures. It is not in man's power to control the mind pictures; what man can do is to give or to withhold his assent to them. A man can have any one of four reactions to the mind picture which presents itself to him—assent, quiescence, suspension of judgment, negation.<sup>69</sup> What, then, is the test of a true mind picture?

The test is clarity. A trustworthy presentation to the mind approves itself to the mind by "its own intrinsic nature." As Cicero said, "The mind cannot refrain from giving approval to a clear object when presented to it."<sup>70</sup> The clarity of a mind picture is thus the guarantee of its reality and truth.



The Stoic theory of knowledge is thus that there are certain mental impressions which we reject; there are others which we accept, as it were, without emphasis one way or the other; there are others whose clarity makes them certainly true; and there are some few which we seize, or which seize us with such power that we cannot possibly doubt their truth; and these last are the criterion of truth.

In point of fact, the Stoics themselves were well aware that things were not so simple and so clear-cut as this theory of knowledge makes them sound. There were times when a man could not be sure, and there were times when a man, like the Sceptics, could do no other than to suspend judgment.<sup>71</sup> When certainty was not attainable, when no self-evidencing, arresting mind picture presented itself to a man, the Stoics argued that he had still certain guides to action.

First, he had the general consent of mankind. There are certain things in which there is a general agreement amongst mankind, as for example, there is a universal belief in the gods.<sup>72</sup> A man may find his own certainty in that of which all men are sure.

Second, he had the standard of probability which in many of the day-to-day activities of life was enough to act by. Antipater of Tarsus said, "The essence of virtue lies in the choice of natural ends upon probable grounds."<sup>73</sup>

Third, he had right reason. It was here, certain Stoics held, that there lay the criterion which decided between the true and the false.

Finally, the Stoics advanced the theory of innate ideas. There are certain matters which are common property and which it can be assumed that both teacher and the hearer already know without further explanation. Take, for example, a simple statement such as "The teacher entered the classroom of the school in Rome in the morning." The words *teacher*, *classroom*, *school*, *Rome*, *morning*—none of these words or ideas needs to be explained or identified. Such matters of common knowledge the Stoics termed pre-conceptions. Such a preconception is "a general notion which comes by the gift of nature," it is "the innate con-

ception of the universals or general concepts.”<sup>74</sup> “There are certain things,” says Epictetus, “which men who are not altogether perverted see by the common notions which all possess. Such a constitution of the mind is called common sense.”<sup>75</sup> These, as Cicero said, are the basis “without which all understanding and all investigations and discussion are impossible.”<sup>76</sup>

Such a common knowledge cannot be the knowledge of individual things; it is a common knowledge shared by all men and by the gods. Rudimentary it may be, but it is inborn in man because of man’s connection with the divine.<sup>77</sup> And what were these inborn common notions which were implanted in the minds of men? They were above all, the idea of good and evil and right and wrong and the belief in the gods. Thus Epictetus taught, “We come into being without any innate conception of a right-angled triangle, or a half-tone musical interval. . . . But on the other hand who has come into being without an innate conception of what is good and evil, honorable and base, appropriate and inappropriate, and happiness, and of what is proper and falls to our lot, and what we ought to do and what we ought not to do?”<sup>78</sup> It is these innate conceptions which enable us to pass a moral judgment on any action or on any man, and which act as a conscience to ourselves. To the question “Where can man find the grounds for certainty in life?” the Stoic, then, answered that the ground for certainty does not lie in any object external to man nor in a world of Platonic metaphysical essences or ideal forms but right in man’s thinking mind itself (The Nous). In giving such an answer the Stoics had discovered the theory of the *a priori*, a theory of knowledge which was to play a tremendous part in the shaping of medieval and modern culture. From the time of the great Roman Stoics the theory of the *a priori* entered into many aspects of the work of the church fathers, medieval scholastic philosophers and church canonists, and it finally experienced a tremendous resurgence in the great revival of Stoical ideas in the seventeenth century, when it became the mainspring of modern political and social action. Of

this discovery by the Stoics of the *a priori* Evan Runner well says:

The Law of God is the firm foundation of the creation, the Director of our ways. As the Word that faithfully establishes His covenant with us, the Law is also our only Comfort. The earlier pagans lacked this central religious certainty. But as religious creatures they need and seek something that can take the place of this Law-word of God. They had sought this basis and director of life in nature, in the object, in a separate world of law-essences (Plato's ideas). But now in this new theme of the *a priori*, they seek it within their own subjective knowledge possession. The Law is no longer looked upon as something extra-mental, about which intra-mental knowledge can be acquired in the form of concepts, judgments, etc., but as something that itself is a concept, thus knowledge. Of course, it is not a concept like other concepts; it is not only a universal concept but also a binding concept (one having the force of law). Such a concept is not, like other concepts, due to experience (i.e., it does not arise out of experience) but precedes every possible experience and constitutes experience as to its lawful structure. It is a concept *a priori*. It is knowledge *a priori*; it is innate ideas.

The illustration has been used of the "sensitive jelly glass." Here was a jelly glass just like other jelly glasses in most respects, only this one was "sensitive." Each year, this sensitive jelly glass once mused to itself, the housewife prepared various sorts of jellies, and finally placed these in the various jelly glasses. But at this point the sensitive jelly glass was confronted with a problem. One year its contents had been green and thin; another year, thicker and red, and so on. But every year the shape, the form of the contents had been the very same. And now this sensitive jelly glass, after some further "musing," came up with the solution: the color and consistency of the contents had been poured in; the form or shape of the contents, however, must be due to the nature of the jelly glass itself. The jelly glass's own nature determined, as the *a priori* the possibility of the form. So our minds, possessed of the *a priori* law (The Truth), determine the possibilities of our life.

Here is the origin of that concept of "Reason" that looms so large and exercises so fundamental and

pervasive an influence in the modern rationalistic philosophy of western Europe from the seventeenth century through the nineteenth century. "Reason" does not exist; there is no such thing. That is why we may never give an answer to the question, What is the relation of faith and reason? The question is not properly formulated. God endowed us at the creation with understanding. "Reason" is that understanding distorted in apostate theory by being enlarged to include the Law as *a priori* knowledge content (the Truth). In the distortion "Reason," instead of the Word of God, becomes the Principle, the Director, the Guide of Life, the Source of Truth. Already in this Stoic theory of the *a priori* you begin to discern the modern chant: Reason, the only oracle of man. Arriving at this point we can see ahead to the *lumen naturale* of Descartes, the "natural light." That "natural light," instead of being the Light which the creation-order is as revelation, has turned into an inner light of each man's deepest self, a light capable of directing him through to final salvation, and that apart from the efficacious application to him by God's spirit of the redemption purchased by Christ.<sup>79</sup>

Upon the basis of this faith in "reason" the Stoics proceeded to erect their "physics" and "ethics." Under the heading of "physics" the Stoics included not only physics as the Ionian philosophers had understood the term—that is, as a consistent account of the universe—but also metaphysics, psychology, physiology, anthropology and theology.

According to Stoic doctrine corporeal objects constitute the only reality, because only what acts or endures is real. They declared, therefore, that not only were the gods and men substances but also all qualities of such gods and men were substantial in character too. Matter, however, taken by itself is without qualities. All qualities or things are derived from the rational force, the Logos, which permeates it. Like all that is real, this one force must also be corporeal. And yet the perfection of the universe revealed in its structure and in the rationality of human nature shows that this final world-cause must be not only corporeal but the most perfect reason, in a word, God. Sometimes the Stoics spoke rather of Nature than of God.

Nature is a force moving of itself, preserving in being its offspring, in accordance with the principles divinely implanted in it.<sup>80</sup> Nature is a rational and ordered force, proceeding methodically to achieve its results. Nature is the power which upholds and governs all things. Nature and God to the Stoic are thus identical.<sup>81</sup> Nature or God bears the same relation to the universe as the human soul does to our body. God or nature as world reason permeates all things as the spirit or artificial fire which animates them. As Zeller explains it, "It is the soul, mind and reason of the world, providence, fate, nature, universal law, etc; for all these ideas denote the same object from different aspects."<sup>82</sup>

In other words, the universe was conceived of by the Stoics in hylozoic terms as a living organism, harmonious in all its parts, of which man was the microcosm and "nature" (physis) the guiding principle. By identifying physis or substance with God the Stoics may thus be considered as pantheists. God is diffused throughout the universe as Reason, or the *Logos Spermatikos*. He is the Logos, the reason which is in and through everything and by which everything is as it is. Things are as they are by the degree of tension, a force that radiates out from the center and then comes back to the center.<sup>83</sup> The very essence of Stoic cosmology and of the Stoic doctrine of creation is that God is *both* the substance out of which all things are created and the power which creates them. Thus the Stoics were pantheists in the most literal sense, since they taught that in the most literal sense everything is God. They expressed this identity of God and the universe in two ways.

First, they spoke of the intermingling of all things. There are different kinds of mixtures. There is a simple juxtaposition, as in the mixture of different grains of sand.<sup>84</sup> There is the mixture in which fluids interpenetrate, as when water is poured into wine. Then there is the mixture when two separate elements disappear into one new whole as in a chemical compound. But in this intermingling every part of the one body intermingles with every part of the other body, and yet each retains its own

proper nature. It is that way in which God is intermingled with the universe. Thus God extends through all being.<sup>85</sup>

But quite often the Stoics said quite simply that God is the world and the world is God. As Zeno had put it, "The substance of God is the whole world and the heavens. The world is God."<sup>86</sup>

In their cosmology the Stoics had thus denaturalized Aristotle's doctrine of essences to a naturalist and nominalist *logoi spermatikoi*, the material germinal forms originating from the divine world-logos. The Aristotelian transcendent divine Mind, the unmoved mover of the cosmos had been replaced by an immanent world-logos who permeates matter and binds the cosmos into a unity.

In his theory of entelechies Aristotle had conceived of the cosmos as a hierarchical structure of materially realizable forms, which through the teleological and metaphysical order reveal a striving towards the highest form of perfection. The Stoics now transformed this metaphysical tendency into a naturalistic material coherence. As Dooyeweerd describes it:

The levels of cosmic being are now reduced to mere evolutionary modalities of the world-logos, of the cosmic spirit which with a peculiar tension (*tonos*) permeates matter internally and limits it externally into individual things. This *pneuma* expresses itself in inorganic nature as cohesive power, in the vegetable kingdom as growth and in the animal and human sphere as soul, which in man includes the *logos* (reason).<sup>87</sup>

For the Stoics the human reason is no longer the metaphysical essential form of man as it was understood by Aristotle. It is only the product of a progressive development which is gradually concentrated out of perceptions and representations.

For the Stoics the humanity of man consists in the fact that through his reason man has affinities with the world reason. Unlike Plato and Aristotle they were prepared to concede that all men share reason in this world and partake of its nature. All men are interrelated, all have the same origin and destiny, all stand under the same law, and all are citizens of the world-state. Each

individual man or woman is a spark, a fragment, a splinter of the divine reason. In other words the *humanum* does not consist so much in a personal relation to the divine reason as in a nature that is a rational nature. As Seneca puts it:

The reason is the divinity which lodges within a man, in the slave as well as the nobleman.<sup>88</sup>

All that you behold, that which comprises both god and man is one. We are parts of one great body. Nature produced us related to one another since she created us from the same source and to the same end. She engendered in us mutual affection and made us prone to friendships.<sup>89</sup>

In this Stoic idea of man we may detect the origin of the definition of man as a rational substance, a definition which was to have such a disastrous influence upon Christian anthropology in the Middle Ages beginning with the definition of personality given by Boethius: *persona est naturae rationalis individual substantia*<sup>90</sup> (A person is an individual substance of a rational nature).

Being divine is ascribed to man by Stoicism as an innate quality, simply by virtue of his rational nature. If man is already divine by nature then there is no room for any further moral improvement. Hence it follows that the divine is always potentially present in man; all that is needed is to make the knowledge of his divinity actual. Man must become conscious of his rational origin in the world reason by reflection. Correct knowledge thus becomes the basis of Stoic ethics. Although everything obeys world-wide laws, it is given to man alone by virtue of his reason to know these laws and to follow them consciously. To live according to these laws is to live according to nature. Thus Diogenes of Babylon said that virtue consisted in "taking a reasonable course in choosing or refusing things in accordance with nature."<sup>91</sup> Antipater said that virtue is to live "with preference for what is natural and aversion to what is against nature."<sup>92</sup>

This life which is lived in accordance with the dictates of nature is not the life of a thing or of an automation or of a slave; it is the life of a reasonable and thinking crea-

ture. The Stoics therefore defined the good as "the natural perfection of a rational being qua rational."<sup>93</sup> Thus this virtue is based on knowledge and can be taught. Chrysippus defined virtue thus:

To live virtuously is to live according to scientific knowledge of the phenomena of nature, doing nothing which the universal law forbids, which is the right reason, which pervades all things, and is the same as Zeus, the lord of the ordering of this world.<sup>94</sup>

The Stoic is one who lives "consistently with nature." Hence the Stoic ideal of the sage. The sage is the man who carries his happiness within himself and is therefore not disturbed by external events. Knowledge and conduct are not dependent upon the ups and downs of international events. The sage is one who is calm and unmoved by passion. It is owing to the passions and their excesses that clearness of perception and right judgment becomes impossible. For this reason most men do not attain to what is a clear knowledge of what is truly worth living for. Such men are fools. Wise men on the other hand conform to the rational nature of their being. Virtue for the Stoic then consists in the positive determination of conduct through one's will power in accordance with rational insight into one's essential nature. Virtue is right reason. Vice is ignorance and false judgment.

The Stoic believed that virtue is entirely and completely self-sufficient; it needs nothing beyond itself. Virtue requires nothing beyond itself to enable a man to live happily. Further, virtue can neither accept nor require any possible addition. Nothing can be straighter than straight, truer than the truth, more temperate than temperance. It follows that virtue alone is good; nothing in this world matters but virtue. In the Stoic terminology everything else in the world is indifferent. Health, wealth, poverty, sickness, honor, disgrace, life itself are all indifferent. Only virtue is good. As Seneca says, "Virtue is nothing else than a soul in a certain condition." Again, "Virtue is an equable and harmonious disposition of the soul."<sup>95</sup> What is this disposition of the soul? The Stoic made a division of things into two classes, the things under



your control, and the things not under your control. Now in this world there is only one thing in the world which is absolutely in a man's control and that is his *assent* to any event, any circumstance, any situation, any happening. He cannot control what happens to him or any one else—but he can control his assent to it. He cannot control what he may gain and still less what he may lose—but he can control his assent to any gain or loss. Virtue lies in a stoical acceptance and assent of whatever happens to one as being sent by providence. It is the condition of the mind which is master of its assent, and which accepts everything as the will of God, or as the working out of the reason immanent in the universe. Nature and reason are one, just as right reason and the universal law of nature which holds undisputed sway throughout the universe are one. The wise man accepts what happens to him as part of the rational ordering of things. Rommen well sums up the Stoical ethical idea:

Obedience to the eternal world-law in a life lived according to reason, such embraced with religious fervour is the ethical principle of Stoicism. It thus means to live in harmony with one's self, to live in accordance with one's rational nature; for the latter manifests the world law.<sup>96</sup>

If then one's essential humanity consists in thus sharing in a common reason and living in accordance with the recognition of freedom as knowledge of necessity, it is hard to see what place there can be in Stoicism for a proper recognition of the value of the individual. All that is essential about me according to Stoic teaching is solely that which belongs to the species as a whole, viz., reason, that which is universal in all other men and in accordance with the laws of the universe. The relation to other men which results from such an idea of myself and others can only be one of respect. All human beings may be related to each other by virtue of their reason and should, as such, love each other. In Stoicism such is in fact the teaching.

For the Stoics the sense of humanity is reflected on the one hand as philanthropy and on the other as a sense of world citizenship.

Unfortunately Stoic rationalism does not really admit anything more than a recognition of the other person in terms of respect on the basis of equality. The Stoic does not love what is particular about me but only what is universal in me, namely my reason. Hence the Stoic is more enthusiastic about humanity as a whole than he has love for his immediate neighbor. Seneca's famous saying, "*Homo sacra res homini*," sums up beautifully just what Stoic humanism is capable of, as does his other remark: "Each enjoys my favor because he bears the name of man."<sup>97</sup> Both sayings recognize the divine origin of every other man, but neither contains a trace of the idea of love as self-sacrifice nor of living for others. Love for Man should be accorded to each individual particular man only insofar as he is worthy of it, not according to his need for love. As Brunner so exactly puts it:

The idea of universal cosmic sympathy may indeed produce something which resembles what Paul expresses in his parable of the "body of Christ" but this cosmic sympathy has no sense of sacred obligation. Just as the idea of God oscillates between the pantheistic idea of the All-one and the rational world-law, so also our relation to our fellow-man oscillates between mere respect, in rigid accordance with law, and love in a rather aesthetic sense, *eros*. The Stoic cannot really be united with the other man because he is sufficient unto himself; he is independent. He recognizes, it is true, that the other also possesses reason; but he has no need for the other, since in his own reason he has access to the highest good, and because to him the supreme good is the preservation of his independence and his freedom. As ancient humanism is rationalistic, it is also liberalistic, and therefore also individualistic.<sup>98</sup>

As Stoic humanism results in a sense of philanthropy, so it leads to a sense of being a member of the world state, a true cosmopolitan. As Marcus Aurelius expressed it, "My city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome; but so far as I am a man, it is the world."<sup>99</sup> Unfortunately this world-citizenship never seems to entail any concrete political responsibilities. Marcus Aurelius is too much of a Roman to take such an idea seriously. Like modern forms of rationalism, Stoicism had a twofold standard, and

a marked discrepancy soon appeared between Stoic theory and practice. In theory the Stoic ideal society "calls for a revolt against nationalism, antiquity, custom, pride and prejudice and a new construction based upon universal reason and cosmopolitanism."<sup>100</sup> Yet in practice men were advised to take part in religious festivals and to make themselves useful members of their existing society. In the *Republic* of Zeno women were to be used in common; yet the practicing Stoic was recommended to marry one woman and bring up children. Thus a dual standard of allegiance developed in Stoicism, which meant in turn that its doctrines were slowly modified to suit changing conditions. Its steady decay as a philosophy was matched by its increasing spread at a lower level of society as a guide to conduct.

As the Stoics tried to recover the individualism of the Sophists, so they attempted to restore the Sophistic distinctions between natural and positive law and the law of custom and the law of reason. Rommen has shown that the Stoics did not discover such distinctions but merely restated them. According to Rommen it was Heraclitus and not Zeno who first enunciated the idea of an eternal law of nature. Thus he quotes Heraclitus as saying, "Wisdom is the foremost and consists in speaking the truth. . . . They who would speak with intelligence must hold fast to the wisdom that is common to all, as a city holds fast to its laws. For all human laws are fed by the one divine law."<sup>101</sup>

"Thus in the diversity of human laws," comments Rommen, "there flashed upon Heraclitus the idea of an eternal law of nature that corresponds to man's reason as sharing in the eternal logos. With Heraclitus the idea of the natural law for the first time emerged as a natural unchangeable law from which all human laws draw their force."<sup>102</sup>

In his statement of the doctrine of natural law as recorded for us by Plutarch, Zeno "taught that we should not live in cities and demes, each distinguished by separate rules of justice, but should regard all men as fellow-demesmen and fellow-citizens; and there should be one life and order as of a single flock feeding together on a common pasture."<sup>103</sup>

For the Stoics, then, just as for the Sophists there are for every man two laws, the law of the city and the law of the world-state, the law of custom and the law of right reason. Of the two the second must have the greater authority and must provide the standard to which the positive laws and customs of human society should conform. Customs may vary but reason is one, and therefore law which has its basis in nature and reason should be one.

Does this Stoic law of nature and of reason as understood by the Stoics correspond to the facts of the universe as they are or as they ought to be? It seems it should correspond to both, and yet to neither. The law of nature for the Stoics is related to facts, insofar as they supposed that the divine law effectively determines and orders the world, quite apart from the will of man. At the same time in Stoic thought it appears to be related to the moral order, "to what ought to be" insofar as man ought to live "consistently with nature." Yet the Stoic law of nature is *not* a law related to facts in the sense in which we today use the phrase "law of nature"; nor is it a law related to the moral order in the sense in which we within the Christian and biblical tradition are aware of moral "obligation." Brunner rightly points out:

This oscillation between what is and what ought to be in the idea of law is a characteristic expression of the ancient idea of the cosmos, in which God and the world, what ought to be and what is, are *one*—a unity which has been destroyed by Christianity. The fact that for us the law of nature and the law of the moral order have been separated so widely from one another . . . is the effect of the Christian idea of God and of creation.<sup>104</sup>

By failing to recognize this ambiguity in the Stoic doctrine of natural law, George H. Sabine was led to state:

The fundamental teaching of the Stoics was a religious conviction of the oneness and perfection of nature or a true moral order. There is a fundamental moral fitness between human nature and nature at large.<sup>105</sup>

Far from this being the case, such a conception of a *moral* order was utterly beyond the reach of either Stoic

or of any other thinker in antiquity outside the men of the Bible to whom God had revealed his Law-order, for the simple reason that all ancient thinkers were still confusing the divine and the natural and discussing matters of morals and ideas of divinity in pantheistic or polytheistic terms. As long as men "physicalized" theology by defining theology in terms of categories derived from physics, e.g., motion, substance, form, cause, etc., they were precluded from reaching a true notion of God. As a result of this false theological methodology all ancient thinkers outside the Hebrew thinkers of the Old Testament speak about the divine in a manner which is scarcely intelligible to our modern ideas about God, influenced as they have been by Christian monotheism. This, however, is no accident but rests in the very nature of the case, namely in the rationalistic attempt to comprehend God. What is disclosed to such rationalism in ancient thought is not the living God of Israel, but only the abstract notion of the Logos which permeates the all. Until modern humanist scholars realize this fact they would do well to stop describing such ancient thinkers as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Zeno, and Seneca as monotheists. A truly "historical" approach to classical studies requires that we accept these ancient thinkers for what they were and not for what we would like them to be; that is, we must admit that they were sophisticated heathen who were dimly searching for the one true God.<sup>106</sup>

As a corollary to their doctrine of natural law the Stoics postulated the original freedom and equality of all men in the "golden age of innocence," which they considered as the natural condition of mankind.<sup>107</sup>

According to the Stoics the state is not grounded in nature but it is only a remedy for the restraint of the evil inclinations of human nature. For them the state, founded on the power of the sword, is not based on nature but upon convention. For this reason Stoic political theory was favored by the Church Fathers.

After contrasting this Stoic conception of the state as the product of convention with Aristotle's theory of man as a political animal, and of the relation of authority and subordination as being implied in the social nature of man,

because it is grounded in his substantial essential form, Dooyeweerd writes:

In Stoicism on the contrary, the relation of subordinate to ruler can have no other basis than a functional juridical one. This explains the particular emphasis in Cicero's definition of the state, that the tie binding the multiplicity of individuals into a unity is in essence the legal order.

To Cicero and all antiquity the positive legal order is the same as that sanctioned by the state. And to the Stoics it is precisely the positive laws which serve to restrain human dissoluteness, while natural law does not permit essential subordination.

This Stoical theory of organized communities is easily joined with the later nominalistic theory of a contract as the only natural-law ground for authority in the state and in general for the inequality in human society. The nominalistic trend of late scholasticism prepared the way for a fusion of the theory of the social impulse of human nature with the individualistic construction of a contract, as the only basis of the civil state.<sup>108</sup>

At first sight, Stoicism might appear to be a most unpromising creed for the Roman nobility of the second century B.C. to accept with such eagerness as the record tells us it did. Politically conservative to the point of chauvinism, attached by strong emotional bonds to traditional observances in religion and social conduct, they could hardly have been expected to embrace a doctrine founded on the notions of internationalism, inner tranquillity and disregard for social status.

On the other hand, there was a great deal in Stoicism which could, without too much difficulty, be adapted to Roman needs, and in the hands of Panaetius and Posidonius, Zeno's philosophy was transformed into a moral stiffener for a spiritually bankrupt Roman aristocracy. As E. V. Arnold put it in his book *Roman Stoicism*:

Thus strong will and assured conviction are no longer required; the door is thrown open for convention, opportunism and respectability. The daring moral theories and bold paradoxes of the founders of Stoicism tend to disappear from sight, and are replaced by shrewd good sense, and worldly wisdom; in short, by

the doctrine of making the best of both worlds. It was from this standpoint that Stoicism so rapidly won its way with the Roman nobility of the last century of the Republic.<sup>109</sup>

What did these Romans find in Stoicism that proved so congenial to them? In the first place, that indefinable quality which they called "humanitas," the civilized ethic of classical idealism which through internal corruption and rapid acquisition of foreign wealth and booty and Oriental mystery religions they were in danger of losing altogether. In an age of civil strife, class warfare, slave revolts and simmering revolution, too, there was a subtle appeal in the Stoic doctrine of the end of the world by a great conflagration which would wipe the slate clean and a new start be made. By a certain amount of Polybian casuistry they also convinced themselves that the Stoic's "mixed constitution" vindicated their own republican system. To Polybius the achievement of the Roman people was unique. On the one hand, by overcoming the plague of inward dissension, they had implemented to the full the promise of civic virtue in the concept of the "free and legal man." On the other hand, the virtue of the Roman citizens had proved equal to the accomplishments of Alexander himself, for it had enabled them, by an adroit combination of military pressure and political art, to impose a Roman peace upon the Mediterranean world. It thus appeared to Polybius that, with Rome, two hitherto incompatible ideals of the Greeks had finally been reconciled in the concept of the *imperiosa civitas*. Above all, the Roman nobility were quick to find in their own history examples of rugged virtue which they could square with Stoic principles.

The Romans were also attracted by the Stoic emphasis upon emotional self-restraint, and their doctrine that virtue is its own sufficiency. "The wise man," as Arnold writes, "even though he gain no advantage at all but suffers dishonor, captivity, mutilation, and death, still possesses the supreme good, still is as completely happy as though he enjoyed all things."<sup>110</sup>

It follows that courage displays itself most laudably in the face of tyranny and death; life is never worth pre-

serving at the cost of dishonor, and under certain conditions the Stoic may without fear put an end to his existence. Hence Zeno and Cleanthes had both died by voluntary starvation. Such was the outcome of Stoicism—suicide.

The Republican nobility of Rome seized upon Stoicism to restore their damaged moral probity during the century of revolution from 146 B.C. to 30 B.C. The post-Augustan Romans like Cicero, Cato, and Seneca used it as a drug which enabled them to live with the oppressive regime of the Caesars they were powerless to change or to destroy. It saved their spiritual dignity and gave them an inner self-assurance. They could now die either at their own hand or at a mad emperor's whim with their faith in reason and the natural law still intact. But such hardy souls were in a minority; all too often Stoicism was perverted by time-servers and place-seekers to justify their own despicable conduct. In the odious Seneca we can see just how far casuistry and compromise can go in an intelligentsia that has lost all moral self-respect. In this progressive corruption of Roman Stoicism is revealed the inner spiritual life of those terrible centuries between the brothers Gracchi and the Antonines<sup>11</sup> which emptied the ideal of citizenship of all meaningful content and filled it instead with odious obsequiousness to an Orientalized Roman monarchy of which the world had already seen enough examples in the Pharaohs of Egypt and the semi-divine monarchs of Babylon, Assyria, and Persia.

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<sup>1</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. I, p. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought*, p. 59.

<sup>3</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. I, p. 61.

<sup>4</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought*, p. 60.

<sup>5</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. I, p. 60.

<sup>6</sup> H. Evan Runner, *Christian Perspectives, 1961* (Association for Reformed Scientific Studies, Guardian Publishing Co., Hamilton, Canada), pp. 64ff.

<sup>7</sup> Charles Morris, *Signs, Language and Behavior* (Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1950), pp. 123-152; cf. Wilbur Marshall Urban, *Language and Reality* (Macmillan, New York, 1939), pp. 401ff.



<sup>8</sup> Hans Werner Bartsch and Reginald Fuller, eds., *Kerygma and Myth*, containing an English translation of Rudolf Bultmann's wartime essay on "The New Testament and Mythology" (SPCK, London, 1953), pp. 1ff.; for a reply to Bultmann, consult P. E. Hughes, *Scripture and Myth* (The Tyndale Press, London, 1956); also Giovanni, *Gospel and Myth in the Thought of Rudolf Bultmann*, translated by Stephen Neil (Lutterworth Press, 1961); and L. Malevez, *The Christian Message and Myth* (London, 1958).

<sup>9</sup> John Wren-Lewis, *Return to Roots* (Modern Churchmen's Union, 1956), p. 8.

<sup>10</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. I, p. 63.

<sup>11</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought*, p. 61.

<sup>12</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Reformatie en Scholastiek*, Vol. I, pp. 47-49.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46. For a brilliant exposure of modern historicism, consult Karl R. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (Routledge, Kegan & Paul, London, 1957); Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Routledge, Kegan & Paul, London, 1957). Also Michael Oakeshott, *Experience and Its Modes* (Cambridge University Press, 1933) and R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford, 1946) which gives a history of historiography in the Western world.

<sup>14</sup> Dooyeweerd, *In The Twilight of Western Thought*, p. 61.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40. Consult M. P. Nilsson, *Greek Piety*, translated by H. J. Ross; H. W. Parke and D. E. Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle*, Vol. I, II (Blackwell, Oxford, 1957); W. Jaeger, *Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*. Still a useful introduction is Lowes Dickinson, *The Greek View of Life*, as well as the Pelican paperback *Before Philosophy*, edited by Henri Frankfort (London, 1949). Dobbs, *The Greeks and The Irrational*, broke new ground in classical studies by showing the great influence played by passion in Greek life. Older works still useful are F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy* (London, 1912), and Gilbert Murray, *Five Stages of Greek Religion*.

<sup>16</sup> R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1945) pp. 29-40. For a criticism of Collingwood, consult G. S. Kirk's article in *The Cambridge Journal of 1947*, titled "A Problem in Historical Technique: Collingwood and Ionian Physics." D. H. Vollenhoven has also dealt with these early Greek speculations in his first volume of *Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte* (Franeker T. Wever, 1950). Cf. P.E. Hughes, "Christianity and the Problem of Origins," *Phil. Reformation*, Nos. 1 and 3, 1961.

<sup>17</sup> Henri Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods*, A Study of Ancient Near Eastern Religion as the Integration of Society and Nature (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958), pp. 215-250 and pp. 251-280.

<sup>18</sup> G. Glotz, *The Greek City and its Institutions* (Kegan Paul, London, 1939); Sir Alfred Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1931); M.L.W. Laistner, *A History of the*

*Greek World* (Methuen, 1947); M. Rostovtzeff, *A History of the Ancient World* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1930), Vol. I. The Orient and Greece; J. B. Bury, *A History of Greece* (Macmillan, London, 1909); Victor Ehrenberg, *The Greek State* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1960); A. H. M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1960).

<sup>19</sup> H. Frankfort, *Before Philosophy* (Pelican Books, London, 1949), pp. 237-262.

<sup>20</sup> Herodotus, *The Histories*, translated by Aubrey de Selincourt (Penguin Books, London, 1954).

<sup>21</sup> R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1948), p. 19.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>23</sup> Herodotus, Preface to *Histories*, p. 2.

<sup>24</sup> Sophocles, *The Theban Plays*, translated by E. F. Watling (Penguin Books, London, 1947), p. 148.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 151. Every Christian should read these great Greek dramatists, whose plays have been collected together in *The Complete Greek Drama* edited by Whitney J. Oates and Eugene O'Neill, Jr., (Random House, New York, 1938) Vols. I, II. The Church still awaits an analysis of these Greek dramatists in the light of the Christian doctrines of sin and redeeming grace and an interpretation of their work in the light of Christ's work on the Cross.

<sup>26</sup> Euripides, *The Ion*.

<sup>27</sup> Euripides, *Women of Troy*.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Euripides, *The Bacchae*. For further study of the influence of Euripides, consult F. Lucas, *Euripides and His Influence* (Cambridge University Press).

<sup>30</sup> Quoted by Eduard Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy* (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1948), p. 81, Fragment 1.

<sup>31</sup> Quoted by H. A. Rommen, *Natural Law*, trans. from the German edition by T. Hanley (Herder Book Company, 1949), p. 9.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>33</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. III, p. 199.

<sup>34</sup> A. E. Taylor, *Plato* (Methuen, London, 1948), pp. 194ff.

<sup>35</sup> Zeller, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

<sup>36</sup> G. Lowes Dickinson, *The Greek View of Life* (Methuen, London, 1947) pp. 88ff.

<sup>37</sup> Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, translated by Rex Warner (Penguin Books, London, 1954), Book III, p. 82.

<sup>38</sup> Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, abridged by D. C. Somervell, (Oxford University Press, London, 1947), p. 262.

<sup>39</sup> M. Cary, *A History of Rome* (Macmillan, London, 1938); R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939); A. N. Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship* (Oxford, 1939).

<sup>40</sup> F. A. Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science* (The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1952) Part Two, The Source of Scientific Hubris, L'Eccle Polytechnique, pp. 105-116.

<sup>41</sup> B. Farrington, *Greek Science* (Pelican Books, London, 1949) Vol. I, p. 142.

<sup>42</sup> Charles Norris Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture* (Oxford University Press, London, 1944), p. 103. This book should be read by every Christian student wishing to understand the origin of our own Western civilization. It is now available in a paperback edition published by Oxford University Press in their Galaxy series of important reprints. I myself gratefully acknowledge my debt to this great work for my understanding of Plato's thought.

<sup>43</sup> Evan Runner, *Christian Perspectives, 1960* (Pella Pub. Co., Pella, Iowa, 1960) pp. 132ff.; cf. W. H. V. Reade, *The Christian Challenge to Philosophy* (SPCK, London, 1951), pp. 70-90. Both these chapters should be closely studied by all so-called Christian Platonists.

<sup>44</sup> H. Wheeler Robinson, *Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1946), pp. 1-16 (*italics mine*).

<sup>45</sup> *Timmaeus*, 48 E; cf. 29 D, 30 B, 48 A, 69 B-D.

<sup>46</sup> G. M. A. Grube, *Plato's Thought* (Methuen, London, 1935), p. 164.

<sup>47</sup> B. Farrington, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 146.

<sup>49</sup> C. N. Cochrane, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

<sup>50</sup> Ernest Barker, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle* (Methuen, London, 1906), p. 125.

<sup>51</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, translated by F. M. Cornford (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1946), pp. 136ff.; cf. C. E. M. Joad's *Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics* (Gollancz, London, 1947), pp. 67ff.

<sup>52</sup> Aristotle, *The Politics*, translated by Ernest Barker (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1946), p. 12.

<sup>53</sup> W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (Methuen, London, 1937), pp. 62-75.

<sup>54</sup> Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy* (Sheed & Ward, London, 1950) p. 191 (*italics mine*).

<sup>55</sup> E. Barker's "Introduction," *op. cit.*, p. xlvii.

<sup>56</sup> E. Barker, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle* (Methuen, London, 1910), p. 245. For a useful discussion of the idea of equality consult David Thompson's little book *Equality* (Cambridge University Press, 1949).

<sup>57</sup> H. Rommen, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.

<sup>58</sup> C. N. Cochrane, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 98.

<sup>62</sup> Gilbert Murray, *Stoic, Christian and Humanist* (London, 1935), p. 89.

<sup>63</sup> W. W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilization* (London, 1941).

<sup>64</sup> Edwyn Bevan, *Stoics and Sceptics* (Oxford, 1935), chapters 1, 2.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>66</sup> Cicero, *Academics*, II, x. 31. (Loeb Classical Library).

<sup>67</sup> Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians*, vii, 228, 230.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, vii, 227, 372.

<sup>69</sup> Epictetus, *Discourses*, I, xviii, i.

<sup>70</sup> Cicero, I. xi. 41, and *Academics*, II. xii. 38.

<sup>71</sup> Cicero, *Academics*, II, xvii. 53.

<sup>72</sup> Seneca, *Letters*, cxvii. 6.

<sup>73</sup> Plutarch, *Com. Nôt.*, xxvii. 9.

<sup>74</sup> Aetius, *Placita*, IV. xi. 3.

<sup>75</sup> Epictetus, *Discourses*, III. vi. 8.

<sup>76</sup> Cicero, *Academics*, II. vii. 21.

<sup>77</sup> Cicero, *Laws*, I. ix. 26; I. x. 30.

<sup>78</sup> Epictetus, *Discourses*, II. xi. 2, 3.

<sup>79</sup> H. Evan Runner, *Christian Perspectives, 1960*, pp. 144-145.

<sup>80</sup> Diogenes Laertius, vii. 148, 149.

<sup>81</sup> Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II. xxxii. 81, xxxiv. 86.

<sup>82</sup> E. Zeller, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

<sup>83</sup> Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, ix. II; Seneca, *Letters*, lxxv, 2, 23.

<sup>84</sup> Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Mixt.* 2. 16. 14.

<sup>85</sup> Hippolytus, *Refut. Haer.*, i, 21.

<sup>86</sup> Diogenes Laertius, vii. 148. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II. viii.

22. Lactantius, *Instit.*, II, ix, 23; Origen. *Contra Celsus*, v. 7. With these ideas we may compare the sophisticated pantheism of A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (Cambridge, 1929), pp. 484ff.

<sup>87</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, III, p. 225.

<sup>88</sup> Seneca, *Epist.*, xxxi, II, R. M. Gummere, editor (Loeb Classical Library).

<sup>89</sup> Seneca, *Epist.*, xcv. II.

<sup>90</sup> E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1955), pp. 101-106.

<sup>91</sup> Diogenes Laertius, vii, 88.

<sup>92</sup> Stobaeus, *Eclogues*, ii, 7. 6a.

<sup>93</sup> Diogenes Laertius, vii, 94.

<sup>94</sup> Diogenes Laertius, vii, 87, 88.

<sup>95</sup> Seneca, *Letters*, cxiii. 2; Cicero, *Tusc. Dis.*, IV. xv. 34.

<sup>96</sup> Rommen, *Natural Law*, p. 23.

<sup>97</sup> Seneca, *Epist.*, xcv. 33. *De Clen.*, I, i. 3.

<sup>98</sup> E. Brunner, *Man in Revolt*, translated by Olive Wyon (London, 1947), p. 553.

<sup>99</sup> Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, VI, 44.

<sup>100</sup> Zeller, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

<sup>101</sup> Heraclitus, quoted by Rommen, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>102</sup> Rommen, *ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>103</sup> Plutarch, *de Alex. Fort.*, I, f. The word *nomos* means both law and pasture, hence the pun.

<sup>104</sup> Brunner, *Man in Revolt*, p. 556.

<sup>105</sup> G. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (London, 1938), p. 149.

<sup>106</sup> To my knowledge the only modern scholar who thus approaches the philosophers of antiquity is T. H. Vollenhoven of the Free University: *Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte*, Vols. I, II, III, IV (Franeker, T. Wever, 1950). It is hoped that an English translation will soon be available.

<sup>107</sup> Seneca, *Epist.*, XLV.

<sup>108</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, III, p. 231.

<sup>109</sup> E. V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism* (London, 1958), pp. 260ff.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 220.

<sup>111</sup> R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939); C. N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*; Leon Homo, *Roman Political Institutions* (London, 1929); Edward Salmon, *A History of the Roman World 30 B.C.—A.D. 138* (London, 1944); Edward Gibbon; *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, edited by J. B. Bury (London, 1935).

## CHAPTER IV

### THE MEDIEVAL MOTIVE OF NATURE AND GRACE

The great rhetorical question posed by Tertullian — “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem, what the Academy with the Church?”—sums up in succinct form the problem of the relation of the Church of God to the world of unredeemed human culture and science. The practical necessity of relating herself and the Gospel to the world around her pressed upon the Church from the very beginnings of her birth on the Day of Pentecost. If the early Christians were to spread the Gospel message effectively, they would have no option but to borrow wholesale from the philosophy, literature, science and rhetorical techniques of a pagan culture which they could not possibly approve. While normally condemning the classical heritage out of hand, they found its accumulated fund of knowledge an indispensable cloak for their own cultural and philosophical nakedness. Besides, in order to make a real missionary break-through they had to beat the pagan free-thinkers on their own grounds with their own weapons.

In his recent book *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia*, Werner Jaeger draws a neat picture of those elements in the Graeco-Roman world which proved apt material for Christian apologists. First and foremost comes the common language of the Mediterranean trade-routes, the Greek *koiné*. Then there are the literary models, the Epistle, the Acts, Didache, Apocalypse and Sermon. Then there is the use made by Christian apologists for their own ends of the techniques and arguments perfected by the

Sophists. Persecution merely served to put them deeper in their opponents' debt; being forced upon the defensive, they found themselves compelled to enter the field of apologetics—and where else could they find enlightenment on this subject but in the handbooks of the pagan rhetoricians?<sup>1</sup>

A. The Patristic Solution of the Problem of the Relation Between Christ and Classical Culture

It is clear from Jaeger's examples just how difficult the position of the early Christian apologist was, and just how oblique temptations assailed him. In order to achieve his declared aim—the world-wide establishment of the Kingdom of God—he was compelled to fight on enemy grounds, with weapons borrowed from his adversary. How tremendously difficult the early Christians found the problem of determining the problem of the relation of the Church and her Gospel to the surrounding Graeco-Roman world may be seen in the variety of the answers given to it by the second-century Apologists, by the anti-Gnostic Fathers and by the Church Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries. At one extreme there stood the independent spirits such as Tertullian and Tatian who saw Christianity and Classical culture in opposition to each other and were all for jettisoning the classical heritage in its entirety. In his address *To The Greeks* Tatian contemptuously and in strong and even abusive language rejects the Hellenic culture for the Old Testament, which he describes as the barbarians' *dogmata*, and even desires that Christianity remain a virile and barbarous faith. With him may be classed the great father of Christian Latin literature, Tertullian. Of him Pierre de Labriolle says:

He scarcely ever passes over an opportunity to dig still deeper the ditch separating the world from the Church. He proclaims that all the *doctrina saecularis litteraturae* is foolishness in the eyes of God, and that the Christian must reject it. "What is there in common," he cries, "between Athens and Jerusalem and what has the Academy to do with the Church?"<sup>2</sup>

Labriolle analyzes the motivations of these men and of others who felt like them as follows:

Under this train of reasoning more or less unfavorable to the Graeco-Roman learning there lay an element of rough but formidable logic. What good to make an endeavour at conciliation, or pretence of coquetting with a civilization wherein the true faith found so few points of contact, and so many occasions for becoming impaired or broken up? To live uprightly, to expiate one's faults, to keep oneself on the road to the eternal Fatherland without too many deviations—was not this the essential duty of the Christian? Why aggravate a task already so difficult by mingling with it a study of writers brought up on polytheism, with no care for any moral law, who welcome all undisciplined curiosities of the spirit, all carnal weakness, and whose contradictory speculations disclosed uncertainties deadly to the stability of the established faith? By reading the Scriptures were there not revealed therein more than one counsel susceptible of justifying the energetic prejudices already suggested by experience and even by good sense. The question then was no other than resolutely to take no account of that "wisdom of the world" which the Apostle Paul had called "foolishness," in order to attach oneself to that which was the whole duty of man during his terrestrial pilgrimage.<sup>3</sup>

This radical approach at least has the merit of ruthless logic behind it; but like so many ruthlessly logical propositions, it was very soon seen to be a practical impossibility. Is it wholly coincidental that both Tatian and Tertullian finally fell away from the Orthodox and Catholic Church to end their days in heretical movements, Tatian in Encratism and Tertullian in Montanism?<sup>4</sup> To have achieved the absolute break with the world of Graeco-Roman culture which they professed to want, these intransigents, as Labriolle well calls them, would have had to press their rigorist principles to the utmost and to have applied them in all their vigor. Yet, as Labriolle keenly observes:

Life has its necessary requirements and reactions, wherein our preconceived notions, however ardently held they may have been, are brought up against our own limitations, with which they are constrained to make some attempt at composition. To have entirely rejected Graeco-Roman learning might have been a bold



and imposing attitude to have taken, but we can truly imagine that it could only have been brought about by making a complete breach and by destroying all culture.<sup>5</sup>

Does the nature of reality as constituted by the Creator allow the absolute break with the world which these men's standpoint seemed to encourage? That is, is not their theory of the Christian's relation to the world in conflict with the nature of existing reality and thus a false theory for the true Christian to adopt? Jaeger has pointed out that "Tatian's elaborate style is not in agreement with his antipathy to Greek culture and also his language shows the strong influence of Greek rhetoric in every line and proves that his practice was not quite as uncompromising as his theory."<sup>6</sup> Tertullian himself was by no means as immune as he supposed from the pagan *Zeitgeist* of his times. Indeed, as Labriolle points out, Tertullian when it came right down to it "recognized that to forbid Christians to become acquainted with profane learning was to reduce them to an intellectual and practical helplessness well nigh complete."

But if pagan culture is *not* to be rejected *in toto*, how can its manifestly pernicious ideology best be immunized? That was the great question confronting the Early Fathers, and an agonizing one it proved. There are two main lines of thought on the matter, the eclectic and the allegorical, or better defined perhaps as the method of accommodation and the method of synthesis.

The attempt to accommodate Christ to culture is best exemplified in the writings of such men as Justin Martyr. Reared in the world of thought of Stoicism, with its World Reason or World Light and its logos spermatikos or seed-reason in man, this wandering Hellenistic philosopher, after his conversion to Christianity, sought how he might bring his newly-found faith to the old associates of his unbelieving years. By an illegitimate appeal to St. John 1:9, "That was the true light which lighteth every man that comes into the world," he would say, in effect, to his old comrades in concupiscence. "See here, you talk abstractly of your own World-Logos, and of the logos spermatikos in each individual; now it is just that which my new religion

teaches. Christ is the World Logos and the logos spermatikos in the individual is what St. John means when he says that it is the light that lighteth every man." What is Justin doing here? He is reducing the meaning of Scripture to that of the pagan philosophers in order to ease the transition of his friends from their paganism to the Christian faith. For Justin, Christianity makes explicit that which the Greek philosophers said only implicitly. The emphasis here is on the unity, the concordat between Christ and the human values of secular culture. Since the English Deists of the eighteenth century this tendency to accommodate the Christ of the Scriptures to the values of secular Western humanism has risen to a flood. In the nineteenth century Ritschl set a fashion which in the hands of Adolf von Harnack, for example, condensed the whole of Christianity into the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man, and the word Christ became an honorific and emotional term for current social ideals. Of this tendency of thought Labriolle says:

There were some who went so far as to admit that very nearly all of the truth was scattered throughout pagan philosophical systems, but that no thoughtful mind had embraced it in its integrity, because none of them knew the master idea which dominates life and which gives it sense and purpose. It was only necessary then to reconstitute again by the light of revelation these scattered morsels of truth and bring them into unity.<sup>8</sup>

Towards the end of the fourth century a kind of compromise came to be accepted which rejects the two extreme viewpoints of withdrawal from the world and accommodation with the world. It offers to devise a synthesis between Christianity and classical culture in terms of the Natural Law. This practical eclectic approach finds its most forthright exposition in Basil of Caesarea's famous oration on the study of Greek poetry and literature, and its educative value for the young Christians—a work which as Jaeger, says "always remained the supreme authority on the question of the value of classical studies for the church."<sup>9</sup>

The problem facing Basil the Great was how to educate young Christians in a country whose culture was wholly

Greek, that is, pagan, in letters, as well as in ethics and philosophy. Basil solved the problem by giving the model of a well-written treatise, adorned with quotations from pagan writers and yet inspired by a wholly Christian spirit. Labriolle summarizes Basil's argument as follows:

Basil considers that all was not tainted from the moral point of view even in this profane literature so much decried at the time; that the poets, orators and historians knew how to give praise to what is good, and that they provide an abundance of precepts and examples capable of bringing an ennobling influence into the soul of the young man. Only he insists on a proper selection in order that the suspect portions may be eliminated. Under reserve of this preliminary expurgation in young people dealing with profane letters, they will supply them with the beginnings of a formation of a character which they will later complete by the study of the Holy Books; they will accustom their eyes while still young, the better to support the dazzling splendor of the teachings of Scripture. They are, in short, for the young Christian of the fourth century, what has been in former days the learning of the Egyptians to Moses, and to Daniel that of the Chaldeans. Their value consists in being a preparation and setting out on a still higher task which is in its special bearing the understanding of the Old and New Testaments.<sup>10</sup>

St. Augustine, speaks in a similar vein in his *De Doctrina Christiana*. According to him, as summarized by Labriolle:

In profane learning there are elements so evidently sullied by superstition that no upright man should think of making experiments in it: astrology, for example. There are others, such as history, natural history, astronomy, dialectics, rhetoric, etc., which, provided they be guarded against the depravities and abuses to which they give rise, are worthy of study and should render the greatest service in connection with exegesis and oral commentary on the Scriptures.<sup>11</sup>

With these men we have reached what we may call the typical traditional Christian solution to our problem. The identity of their viewpoint is indicated by their use of the same allegorical simile. Like the Jews in their flight from

Egypt, these Church Fathers argued, the Church must carry away the gold and the silver vessels of her enemies and employ them for her own uses.

The standpoint here adopted is not really a theoretical accounting of the Christian's relation to the world of unredeemed human culture and science. Nor is it the result of any such theory. It is rather immediate reaction, pressed from these Christians by the exigencies of their life in the Roman Empire. To these men it must have seemed a correct standpoint, because it was felt as a necessary one. But that is not yet to render an account of its "necessity"; indeed, the lack of an adequate theory of the Christian's relation to unredeemed human culture and science is recognized in effect by Labriolle, who says of Basil's discourse:

Truth to tell, we do not see the subject developed with the fulness and precision we might have hoped from it. Basil brings to his discussion less of method than of agreeable bonhomie and of abounding humanism.<sup>12</sup>

To which we may add, that a theoretical account would have to explain how there could be precious jewels in Egypt at all, and just what in Egypt were jewels and what something less valuable, how great the relative purity of the jewels was, and again, how it was possible to gather up the jewels from Egypt without becoming contaminated and corrupted in the process. The city of Cecrops is not, and cannot be, the City of God no matter how enticing she makes herself appear. Such a critical reflection was conspicuously absent from the thinking of the Church Fathers.

It is this essentially uncritical *modus vivendi* of the Church Fathers which forms the basis of medieval scholastic thought upon the problem of the Christian's relation to the world of unredeemed human culture and science. Two of the chief distinguishing features of scholasticism are already foreshadowed in the patristic approach.

First to be noted is the ancillary position assigned by these men to cultural pursuits. These are to be, it would seem, but the handmaid of theological studies—the *ancilla*

*theologiae* of scholastic conception. Does this conception not carry with it the implication that the possibility of an independent service of God in the cultural fields of study, e.g., law, politics, history, and natural science, is denied? And may it not be that such a conclusion is but the direct consequence of a lack of adequate reflection upon the cultural problem itself?

In the second place, as in medieval scholasticism, so in the thought of the Church Fathers, the body of the cultural product is accepted as it stands, and only certain obvious conflicts with Christian doctrine and a Christian sense of piety are to be excluded. Again, these Christians of the Later Roman Empire make no demand for a radical reformation of Classical Culture, but they merely seek to trim it of its worst pagan excesses. Not even Augustine of Hippo was able to free himself completely from the influences of pagan Greek philosophy. Dooyeweerd maintains that especially Augustine's view of philosophy as *ancilla theologiae* was derived from the Aristotelian conception of metaphysical theology (based upon pure theory) as *regina scientiarum* (queen of the sciences). In spite of this, Augustine showed an increasing reserve toward Greek culture and science as his understanding grew of the radical character of the Christian religion. He never consciously strove after a religious synthesis between the Greek view of nature and man and the doctrines of the Christian faith.<sup>13</sup> Yet Augustine did not attempt any radical reforms of the Graeco-Roman culture into which he was born. Although he does take a more critical position of the Roman Empire in his great work *The City of God*, in general the Church Fathers accepted the political status quo, and they tried to devise a synthesis between Christianity and classical culture in terms of the theory of the Natural Law. In general it may be said that in respect to human equality, property rights, and the necessity of justice in the state, the Church Fathers were substantially in agreement with Cicero and Seneca.

In their great *History of Medieval Political Theory in the West* the brothers R. W. and A. J. Carlyle have shown

how the theory of natural law became one of the common places of Christian thought. Thus they write:

The fathers came to identify the Law of Nature with the Law of God. This is found in Origen, Tertulian, Lactantius. All agree that there is a law written by nature in men's hearts which is the true rule of human life and conduct. Ambrose says that law is twofold, natural and written (Moses). The natural law is in men's hearts and the written found in the Bible. Jerome declares that the Mosaic Law was given because the natural law was neglected. St. Isidore defines law as Ulpinian does: *Jus aut naturale est aut civile aut gentium*. With his definition this conception of a tripartite law passes into the common stock of the medieval tradition on political theory . . . .

The conception of the state of nature of the Stoics is in the Fathers identified with the condition of mankind before the Fall of Adam. Men as God made them were free; the condition of slavery is very largely determined by fortune, and this condition does not extend beyond the body. Slavery is the result of sin and masters must treat their slaves with consideration . . . . The Fathers conceive of the state of man before the Fall as Seneca thought of the Golden Age and they account for its disappearance by the theory of the Fall. By the Fall man passed out of the state of nature into the state in which the conventional institutions of society are necessary. The Fall brought with it the new conditions of a new discipline by which the new and evil tendencies of human nature should be corrected.

Slavery is the consequence of sin and is the system by which the sinful nature of man is corrected. This conception is developed by Augustine, Ambrose and Isidore. . . . Slavery in the judgement of the Fathers is a legitimate and useful institution. Yet on its practical side Christianity was ameliorating the hardships of slavery by exhorting masters to kindness and by promoting legislation for the protection of the slave. The practical influence of the Church was in favour of manumission . . . .

The Fathers believe that man is made for society. Augustine says human nature is sociable, but that it is not by nature that man is in subjection to man. The primitive state of man was a state without coercive government. Coercive government has been made necessary through sin and is the divinely appointed remedy for sin. This teaching is found contained in the

writings of Irenaeus, Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory and Isidore. To all of them government is a divine institution since by it man will be restrained from sinning . . . .

The Fathers insist that the Christian man is bound to use his property to relieve the wants of his fellow men. . . . They think that in the primitive state all things were held in common and that it is the law of the state which gives this thing to one man and that to another. God meant the world to be in the common possession of all men and to produce its fruits for all; it was avarice which produced the rights of property according to Ambrose. According to Gregory the rights of property are not absolute. If a man uses it only for himself it is unjust. Property is conventional and is not unlawful and yet it is not an unrestricted right. Augustine maintains that the right of property is limited by the use to which it is put; the man who abuses his property has no right to it . . . .

Patristic political theory turns upon the distinction between the primitive or natural state with its natural law or institutions and the actual state with its conventional institutions adapted to the sinful characteristics and circumstances of human life . . . .

With regard to the theory of human equality and the institutions of slavery, of government and of property none existed in the above state of nature. Out of the state of innocence men passed into the state of sin. Their nature was changed and corrupted. New institutions founded in some measure upon the vices of avarice, lust and hate were needed to correct them. Thus slavery, government and private property are institutions arising from the vicious tendencies of human nature but they are also the instruments by which these vices are corrected.<sup>14</sup>

For the Church Fathers thus to accept the greater part of the values, institutions and legal system of the Roman Empire was equivalent to affirming that Graeco-Roman culture was fundamentally good and therefore could be incorporated mechanically, as it were, into the larger Christian framework.

#### B. The Thomistic Solution of the Problem of the Relation Between Christ and Medieval Culture

In general, subsequent developments in the history of the Church worked to bolster this attitude of the Fathers to-

wards unredeemed human culture and science, and only the revival of the radical Christian religious ground motive at the time of the Reformation would make possible a more critical consideration of the problem of the Christian's relation to culture. Until the Reformation the tendency towards the synthesis of Christ and culture became ever more apparent.

According to Dooyeweerd such a synthesis was in fact achieved in medieval scholasticism, especially as this was reflected in the great system of thought built up by Thomas Aquinas. Here, he says, a new religious ground-motive makes its entry into Western culture, thought and science. Nature, conceived as form and matter in the Greek sense, becomes the autonomous basis of supernatural grace. By means of his doctrine of the eternal law, with its subjective counterpart in the natural law, Thomas Aquinas sought to accommodate the Greek form-matter motive with the biblical ground-motive of creation, the fall into sin, and redemption in and through Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Spirit. Through the natural law the creation, in its essential nature, has a subjective part in the eternal law of God's world plan. This synthesis of the biblical and Greek religious motives implied a distinction between a natural and a supernatural sphere of thought and action. Within the sphere of nature a relative autonomy was ascribed to human reason, which was now supposed by Thomas to be capable by its own unaided light of discovering the natural truths about the universe and of man's social life within it. As David Knowles writes in his book *The Evolution of Medieval Thought*:

As a follower of Albert who outran his master Aquinas accepted human reason as an adequate and self-sufficient instrument for attaining truth within the realm of man's natural experience, and in so doing gave, not only to abstract thought but to all scientific knowledge, rights of citizenship in a Christian world. He accepted in its main lines the system of Aristotle as a basis for his own interpretation of the visible universe, and this acceptance did not exclude the ethical and political teaching of the Philosopher. By so doing, and without a full realization of all the consequences,



Thomas admitted into the Christian purview all the natural values of human social activity.<sup>15</sup>

As a good example of this synthesizing method of Aquinas we may cite his natural theology where creation was now understood as a natural truth which could be proved by the argument from motion. It could be proved in a purely theoretical way from the logical necessity of an unmoved Mover as first Cause and final end of all movement. This had been the demonstration for God's existence furnished by Aristotle's metaphysics. The logical consequence of this argument is that God is opposed as pure form to matter which is the principle of imperfection, a doctrine which cannot be accepted from the Christian point of view.

To escape this contradiction, the Greek religious motive was accommodated to the biblical motive of creation. God was said to have created both form and matter. Yet this applied only to the form and matter of concrete creatures. The *principles* of form and matter could not be conceived of as results of creation, since Aquinas viewed God himself as pure form, opposed to matter as a principle of imperfection. Thus Thomas agrees here with Aristotle in deifying the form and undeifying the matter. Dooyeweerd concludes that the religious dialectic of the Greek motive is not overcome in the Thomistic idea of creation, and that the latter loses its integral character. In this scholastic way of synthesis required by the Roman Catholic ground-motives of nature and grace, the form-matter motive of Greek philosophy had lost its original religious sense. But at the same time the biblical creation-motive was deprived of its original integral and radical character. As a result of this synthesis, Dooyeweerd says, creation was now proclaimed to be a natural truth which can be seen and proved by human reason independent of all divine revelation, thus eliminating the doctrine of creation understood in its biblical sense as the religious motive of all theoretical thought. As Dooyeweerd points out:

The Greek form-matter motive in all its different conceptions excludes in principle the Idea of creation in its biblical sense. The sum total of Greek wisdom concerning the origin of the cosmos is: "ex nihilo nihil

fit" (from nothing nothing can originate). At the utmost, Greek metaphysical theology could arrive at the idea of a divine demiurge, who gives form to an original matter as the supreme architect and artist. Therefore, the scholastic doctrine of creation could never lead to a real reconciliation with the biblical ground-motive. The unmoved Mover of Aristotelian metaphysics, who, as the absolute theoretical nous, only has himself as the object of his thought in blessed self-contemplation is the radical opposite of the living God who revealed Himself as Creator. Thomas may teach that God has brought forth natural things according both to their form and matter, but the *principle* of matter as the principle of metaphysical and religious imperfection cannot find its origin in a pure form.<sup>16</sup>

The biblical doctrine of creation not only thus lost its integral character but it was also deprived of its radical character, since within the context of form and matter there is no place for a radical unity of nature in the religious center or heart of human existence.

Man is considered by Thomas Aquinas to be a combination of a material body with a rational soul as its formal complement. This combination provides the *natural* substructure (matter) for a higher form, viz., the *donum superadditum* which is provided by supernatural grace. Similarly, the motives of sin and redemption are deprived of their radical and integral character, as neither is said to affect human nature in a radical and integral manner. The former (sin) primarily deprives man of the supernatural gratuity, which is again restored by redemption. As Dooyeweerd writes:

The Aristotelian conception of human nature could not be reconciled to the biblical conception concerning the creation of man in the image of God. According to Thomas, human nature is a composition of a material body and a rational soul as a substantial form, which, in contradistinction to Aristotle's conception, is conceived of as an immortal substance. This scholastic view has no room for the biblical conception of the radical religious unity of human existence. Instead of this unity a natural and a supranatural aspect is distinguished in the creation of man. The supranatural side was the original gift of grace, which as a *donum superadditum* was ascribed to the rational nature.

In accordance with this conception of creation, the view of the fall was also deprived of its radical meaning. Sin merely caused the loss of the supranatural gift of grace, and did not lead to a corruption of human nature. The latter was simply injured by its loss of the *superadditum*. Redemption in Jesus Christ can no longer have a relation to the very religious root of the temporal cosmos, but it can only bring nature to its supranatural perfection.<sup>17</sup>

Thomas Aquinas' tremendous significance in the history of Western thought lies precisely in his synthesis of the Greek basic motive with the Christian motive in terms of which he sought to justify the medieval papal attempt to create a Christian civilization. Whereas Augustine of Hippo had considered such an attempt impossible, now Thomas claimed to show that it was possible. In his *City of God* Augustine had contrasted the City of God with the City of the Devil. In this great work Augustine undertook to describe the nature and history of these two cities that "have been formed by two loves; the earthly by the love of self, even to contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God even to contempt of self."<sup>18</sup> In the fifth book of the *City of God* Augustine discusses the virtues of the ancient Romans. They had been great and beneficent and the Romans had given the world a measure of peace with justice. They had set the love of a country above their own interest and welfare. Virgil is quoted at length to provide evidence of the greatness of Rome. It was thanks to their virtues that the Romans had achieved "so many wonderful deeds, worthy of praise and of glory according to the judgment of men." God had rewarded those virtues by giving them "the worldly glory of the most excellent Empire."<sup>19</sup>

In such passages mention is made of the goodness, the long-suffering, patience and condescension of God. And yet no conscious effort is made to come to grips with the subject. Augustine does not seem to be interested in the theory of the Christian's relation to the world. Much of the biblical material that later was to be put to such good use is cited by him, but he does not himself claim it for a theory of Christian politics. He does not tell us by what standard he judges Roman justice and virtue. These are to him, con-

sidered from the point of view of God's revelation of the heavenly kingdom, to be no more than vices. "What were such virtues other than illusions?" he asks. "What but smoke and vanity is the glory of the Earthly City compared to the glory of the Heavenly? What does it matter to man in this brief mortal, under whose rule he lives, provided the rulers do not force him to do evil?"<sup>20</sup> In such words all political interest seems to have come to a standstill. Unfortunately, Augustine does not go on to ask how it is possible that the ungodly can have an earthly city at all. In short, Augustine failed to provide the church with an adequate theory of human culture. With respect to the problem of culture, Augustine is still on the same naïve level of the other church fathers; yet he does represent the moment in the history of thought corresponding to that moment in the thought of an individual which precedes the breaking forth of a new insight.

It is the claim of modern Roman Catholic apologists that such a new insight into the relations of Christianity and Western culture was provided by Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas, they claim, has provided the Church of God with the theory of the Christian's relation to the world of culture and politics which it had so long lacked.

By the time Thomas appeared upon the human scene the old pessimism and lack of interest on the part of Christians in the mundane secular political and social order had gone. Whereas Paul had taught that the Christian's true citizenship is in heaven, and Augustine had taught that the City of God was an unattainable ideal on earth, now Popes such as Gregory VII and Innocent III declared that it is in this world that man is called to achieve the City of God.

The bleak alternative suggested by Augustine has now given way to an entirely new view of man's perfectibility on earth. Christianity has ceased to be hostile to the world of human culture and politics, because it has conquered the world of feudal kinglets and barons. The power to appoint and control kings is now lodged in the Pope of Rome as a result of the triumphant papal victory won over the Holy Roman Emperor King Henry II of Germany during the Great Investiture contest.<sup>21</sup> Under the leadership of the

Papacy the Western Church now claimed the right to order the affairs of men. Transformed into a hierarchical sacramental authority over the souls of its members, it arrogated to itself absolute authority over the souls of its members, and by the time of Aquinas had come to identify itself with the "invisible Church" in its central religious sense as the "body of Christ."

Add to these claims the disorganized condition of medieval feudal society and it is not hard to realize that the Church institution was indeed the only integrating factor of Western culture. The feudal system caused a close interlacement of spiritual and secular authority with monasteries and bishops holding large areas of land in fief from the kings and in many cases acting as the king's administrators. In the period of what Troeltsch called the ecclesiastically unified culture of the Middle Ages this whole complex of historical causes had by the time of Thomas Aquinas resulted in a factual supremacy of the hierarchical ecclesiastic authority led by the Popes over the entire political and social life. Once such an ecclesiastically controlled *respublica Christiana* had been established, the problem arose, not merely of incorporating the secular orderings and institutions of Western society within the bosom of the Western Church by legal and diplomatic methods, but also of justifying this incorporation intellectually, and thus of creating a Roman Catholic ideology of power.<sup>22</sup>

It was to this task of providing Latin Catholicism with an adequate ideology of power that Thomas Aquinas devoted his career. He sought with all the genius at his command to justify the papal attempt to build the City of God along feudal lines within this world and to vindicate the papal claim to hegemony and sovereignty over Western society. He tried to prove to the sceptics and critics of the church of his day that the Roman Catholic Church, under the direction of the Roman Pontiffs, alone could make the world safe for civilization, because it was in fact the actual embodiment of the Kingdom of God in history.

Accordingly, Thomas had to show that the existing feudal ordering of political and social relationships, so far from being the product of sin and lust for power, were

*natural* and therefore just. Just as Aristotle had tried to answer his Sophist critics by trying to prove that the existing institutions of the Greek city-state, such as slavery and the exploitation of women and the working classes, were natural and reflected the very order of the universe, so now Aquinas tried to show that such feudal institutions as serfdom, the monarchy and papal theocracy were also natural, and arose out of the very nature of things. Aquinas in fact borrowed much of his argument from Aristotle because he discovered in the *Politics* a conception of man in society that could easily be adapted to implement the papal program to build up a Christian society and to provide a rational justification for it. With Aristotle's help he tried to prove that the feudal state was grounded in nature rather than in sin, as Paul and Augustine had supposed.

According to Thomas the revealed truths of Christianity are not in contradiction to the testimony of reason. The practice of the Christian life does not exact from man a renunciation of what is essential to him as man. Reason and revelation, human nature and the supernatural values revealed in the Holy Scriptures are fundamentally in harmony. In short, "grace does not abolish nature but perfects it."<sup>23</sup> Such a formula expresses not only an entirely new interpretation of the relationship between reason and revelation, but also a completely new conception of the capacities of human nature and the effect of sin upon it. As A. P. d'Entreves points out:

The formula expresses an entirely different attitude to life from the diffidence and hostility of earlier Christian thought. St. Thomas's assertion that grace does not abolish nature but perfects it implies that human values and truths are not necessarily obliterated by the revelation of higher ones; however modest and low, they deserve to be considered as possible tools for the great task of building up a Christian civilization. It also implies the recognition of the existence and dignity of a purely "natural" sphere of rational and ethical values.<sup>24</sup>

For Thomas, sin has not invalidated "the essential principles of nature." Its consequences, therefore, concern only the possibilities of man's fulfilling the dictates of

natural reason, not his capacity of attaining to their knowledge. That is, sin has not impaired the existence of a sphere of purely natural, ethical values, and it is in this sphere that the state and political relations find their *raison d'être*. In other words, sin merely removed certain supernatural gifts from man, but left his human nature and reason intact. Before the Fall man was endowed with such supernatural gifts whereby he was not merely righteous, pure and untempted, but also enjoyed a measure of God's own divine nature and goodness. It was this super-added gift of grace which Adam lost by his sin, and in so doing reverted back to being a "natural man." Thus for Aquinas, man after the Fall retained the image of God, which consists in his freedom and rationality of his nature, but lost his likeness to God, which consists in his self-determination according to his divine destiny. By means of this distinction, based upon a faulty exegesis of the Hebrew words translated by *imago* and *similitudo*, Aquinas had very adroitly circumvented the Pauline and Augustinian teaching that through sin man has not just lost a so-called supernature, but his God-given nature, and has therefore become unnatural, inhuman and demoniac. As Brunner points out:

To begin the understanding of man with a neutral concept—*animale rationale*—means a hopeless misunderstanding of the being of man from the very outset. Man is not a two-story creature, but, even if now corrupted—a unity. His relation to God is not something which is added to his human nature; it is the core and ground of his *humanitas*.<sup>25</sup>

Upon this sub-biblical doctrine of human nature, called by Berkouwer "heroic humanism,"<sup>26</sup> Thomas now proceeded to erect not only his theology and anthropology but also his sociology and doctrine of the state and theory of culture. And because his basic presupposition about human nature is biblically false everything else he builds upon it is false and shot through with error, no matter how eloquently and logically argued. If human nature is really such as Thomas supposes, what need had man for God's grace and help at all? Why bother bringing God into the

human picture at all, if man is already perfectly rational and capable of achieving his own destiny and realizing his own potentialities in this world? If man can bring in, or build, or otherwise provide a kingdom for God, why bother bringing God into the human picture at all?

Instead of conceiving of the state and its various organs as God's method of restraining human sinfulness, as Paul and Augustine had thought of the Roman Empire, Thomas and other Scholastic thinkers now proceeded to give a purely natural, that is, rational, explanation of man's social institutions. As d'Entreves writes:

It was a momentous discovery for it made it possible to accept the Aristotelian conception of the ethics and politics and to graft it, as it were, on the Christian interpretation of life.<sup>27</sup>

As a direct and tragic result there was no longer felt any need for a distinctive Christian philosophy of law, politics and the state. The social sciences were, in fact, abandoned to the influence of the Greek pagan religious ground motive in its external accommodation to Christian doctrine. From this point of view Thomas may well be considered the first modern liberal humanist in respect to his political and sociological thought. If human reason can, in fact, elucidate the first principles of social science and political and legal thought without any reference whatsoever to the principles of God's Word and Divine norms, why bother bringing revelation into the picture at all? If man can of his own rational faculties and by means of his scientific method build a successful social order, why bring his religion into life?

While Thomas Aquinas himself never drew such un-Christian conclusions, it did not take his successors at French, German, Italian and British universities long to do so. Such a process of the secularization of the social sciences and humanities inevitably developed out of the distinction drawn by Aquinas between the order of faith and the order of natural reason. For Thomas faith implies the assent of the intellect, under the compulsion of the will, to something which is not evident in the light of reason, but which is revealed by God, where the authority



of God is itself the motive of assent. Theology, then, is the knowledge of those things which are received by faith from divine revelation. Scientific knowledge, on the other hand, implies assent of the intellect to something which we perceive as true in the natural light of reason, the assent being here motivated or determined by its object, namely essences. Thus we have two distinct species of knowledge, which causes Aquinas to conclude that the same thing cannot be known and believed at the same time.<sup>28</sup>

After Aquinas the absolute distinction between nature and grace was openly proclaimed by Occam; on the one hand, and the Averroists, on the other hand, leading to the doctrine of a twofold truth. In medieval nominalism the Thomistic synthesis of nature and grace was here replaced by a sharp antithesis. Any point of connection between the natural and the supernatural was denied. Writing of the historical significance of William of Occam, David Knowles of Cambridge University says:

Though not himself a philosophical sceptic, he gave powerful assistance in the work of shattering the already trembling fabric raised by the Christian Aristotelians, and to disperse the conception, of an ordered, interlocking universe which in its turn was permeated by, and dovetailed into, the economy of supernatural grace.<sup>29</sup>

If Occam thus prompted the beginnings of the secularization of Western philosophy, Marsilius of Padua laid the foundations of the modern secular doctrine of the omnicompetence and self-sufficiency of the state, the natural organization of human society, endowed with a natural and therefore right and necessary evolution, structure and functions.

Walter Ullmann points out that the impact of Aristotle was not only of importance to philosophical enquiries, but also and "we venture to say, of greater importance in the field of political science." He continues:

Aristotle provided what the anti-hierocratic thinkers (imperial apologists) had been groping for so long to find. He had shown . . . that there was a *societas humana*, the aim of which was the satisfaction of human needs. This *societas humana* is something

fundamentally different from the *societas Christiana*. It grows from below, from the household, the village and larger entities into a self-sufficing community formed by the natural impulse of men to live in it; it is therefore a creation of nature.

The *societas humana* aims at providing human, earthly felicity; it aims at a perfect, honourable, and self-sufficing life. This is an end in itself. The values, criteria and functions of this human society are determined by its character and aim. It is a worldly community . . . Hence all social, political and cultural activity within this human society is to be orientated by this and which alone is the directive or regulative principle. Wedded to the already formidable awareness of nationhood, this Aristotelian conception of the *societas humana* provided the framework out of which the modern nation state could arise. Aristotle supplied the roof under which anti-hierocratic thought found a shelter.<sup>30</sup>

In the light of this devastating comment it is hard to see how the Roman Catholic scholar d'Entreves can so boldly acclaim Thomas Aquinas' attempt to synthesize Aristotle with Christianity. Does d'Entreves worship Aristotle or does he worship Christ? By what manner of thinking does he think it is possible to reconcile the pagan teachings of Aristotle with those of the living God of the Bible? The Thomistic attempt to synthesize the wine of the Gospel with the oil of Aristotelianism has been the most misguided effort in the history of human thought. Far from baptizing Aristotle into Christ, as he thought, Aquinas merely succeeded in opening the flood gates to modern humanistic apostasy, and the Leviathan godless state.

Having thus shattered the biblical and Christian ground motive in the interests of justifying papal power politics, Thomas proceeded to build up a radically new view of man in society in terms of his theory of Natural Law. For Aquinas the sphere of natural and human values finds its best expression in the idea of natural law, which becomes for him the proper ground upon which social and political relations can be secured and comprehended. Natural law for Aquinas is laid down as an interpretation of man's nature and of his relation to God and to the universe. Natural law is unintelligible unless we realize its close link

with the eternal divine order on which the whole creation ultimately rests. Thus Aquinas writes:

Supposing the world to be governed by divine Providence . . . it is clear that the whole community of the universe is governed by the divine reason. This rational guidance of created things on the part of God . . . we can call the Eternal Law.

(Now) since all things which are subject to divine Providence are measured and regulated by the Eternal Law . . . it is clear that all things participate to some degree in the Eternal Law, in so far as they derive from it certain inclinations to those actions and aims which are proper to them.

But, of all others, rational creatures are subject to divine Providence in a very special way; being themselves made participators in Providence itself, in that they control their actions and the actions of others. So they have a certain share in the divine reason itself, deriving therefrom a natural inclination to such actions and ends as are fitting. This participation in the Eternal Law by rational creatures is called the Natural Law . . . The Natural Law is nothing else than the participation of the Eternal Law in rational creatures.<sup>31</sup>

This doctrine of Natural Law is the pivot of Thomas's understanding of man in society and by means of it he was able to fuse Aristotle's doctrine of virtue and of purposive conduct in terms of rational ends with the Stoic doctrine of the Law of Nature and of Reason. At the same time we must be clear that, as understood by Aquinas, natural law has nothing to do with the doctrine of the natural rights of the individual. It is not from the individual that Thomas would have us make our start but from the Universe and from the notion of a world well ordered and graded, of which law is the highest expression. Natural Law for Aquinas is like a bridge, thrown as it were across the gulf which divides man from his divine Creator. It expresses man's dignity and power in so far as he alone has been called upon to share intellectually and actively in the rational order of the world. That is to say, man's relation to God is no longer personal and direct as the New Testament had supposed, but legal and indirect.

Whereas Paul and Augustine had maintained that all our knowledge of God is the result of God's own gracious self-disclosure, Thomas now supposed that in addition to the revealed truth given in Holy Scripture and organized in the structure of dogmatic theology, there was another source of the knowledge of God, namely man's natural reason. Aquinas held that it was possible to discover by the unaided powers of the human reason that God exists through an inference of his effects in the world of nature. As E. Gilson says:

The only road which can lead us to a knowledge of the Creator must be cut through the things of sense. The immediate access to the Cause being barred to us, it remains for us to divine it with the help of its effects.<sup>32</sup>

At the same time, Aquinas admitted that the human reason as such could only give us negative knowledge of God's nature and being. We can know that God *is* but not *what* he is. Once we have established that he is real, it is only by the *via negationis* that we can proceed to determine what he is like. Thus for example we can prove that he is not plural, that he is not corporeal, that he is not space, that he is not ignorant, and that he is not evil. In addition to this negative method Aquinas believed that natural reason could obtain knowledge of God's nature by the method of analogy, since the nature of God has been revealed to some extent in man's nature. God indeed infinitely surpasses all human attributes and, because of this, no quality can be applied univocally both to man and to God. Yet Aquinas thought that these qualities, even as we know them in man and as we are accordingly able to conceive them in our minds, do provide a certain analogy to something that is in God. God is thus more than good in the human sense, but human goodness does bring us nearer to him than human badness. Although, therefore, the word goodness, when applied to God as well as to man, must not be used univocally but only equivocally, that, says Thomas, is much better than not being able to use it at all. A single passage may be quoted to illustrate Aquinas's conception of natural theology.

Our natural knowledge takes its beginning from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can reach as far as it can be led by the things of sense. But starting from sensible things, our intellect cannot reach so far as to see the divine essence; because sensible things which are created by God, are not equal to the power of God which is their Cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; from which it follows that His essence cannot be seen. But because they are His effects and dependent on Him as their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know that God exists, and to know concerning Him those things which must necessarily appertain to Him in virtue of His being the first cause of all things, exceeding all that He has caused.<sup>33</sup>

According to Thomas this "natural" kind of knowledge of God was accessible to pagans as well as to Christians, and indeed Aristotle was the great master of this rational type of knowledge of God. At this point we might comment that what Aquinas has done is to read back into natural theology the Christian idea of God. As we saw, neither Aristotle nor Plato came anywhere near a true knowledge of God but oscillated between pantheism and monotheism. Because all men could thus come to natural knowledge of God they could also come to a knowledge of the Law of Nature. Aquinas, however, admitted that such a natural knowledge of God does not give to man all that he needs to know; it is not saving knowledge. The full Christian knowledge of God and of his redemptive activity on man's behalf, as expressed in such doctrines as those of the Incarnation and the Trinity, can be learned only from revelation and is not ascertainable by the natural reason.

Man is an "ens incompletum" and, therefore, according to Thomas, stands in need of divine grace. This divine saving truth, which was beyond the possibility of discovery by the unaided human reason, is contained in the Bible. According to Thomas this supernaturally revealed knowledge of God is provided with an amply sufficient authentication in those exhibitions of miraculous powers and those miraculous fulfilments of prophecy which accompanied its original communication. He claims that this authentication possesses in itself full logical cogency such as to com-

pel belief in all reasonable minds. It is thus plain that Aquinas regards the nature of revelation as consisting of divine truths supernaturally communicated to men in propositional form. Faith thus becomes not a matter of right relations with God in the Spirit of Christ, but of correct beliefs *about* God contained in the infallible doctrines at the disposal of the Church in two forms: in the Holy Scriptures and in the dogma created by the Church. Catholic Truth henceforth becomes viewed as correct beliefs imposed from above by the teaching clergy, rather than something which dwells in the Body of Christ and all its members, themselves the shrine of Truth. Whereas in the Early Church faith had been the *relation* between person and person, the obedient trust of man in the God who graciously stoops to meet him in Jesus Christ, now revelation and truth, as encounter with Christ in his Body, becomes doctrine, and faith becomes doctrinal belief. As Brunner says:

A believer is now no longer, as in the New Testament, a person who has been claimed and transformed by Jesus Christ, but a person who accepts what the Church offers him as divinely revealed doctrine, since he is aware that either the Bible or the doctrinal authority of the Church constitutes an authority to which he must submit without question.<sup>34</sup>

Amongst the new saving truth revealed in Holy Writ Thomas gave a great deal of attention to the new revelation of the Natural Law contained in the Decalogue, which illuminated the natural reason afresh about its first principles. As a result, such secular institutions as the state, private property, slavery, marriage and coercive government in general were shown to be fully rational because they were in accord with God's revealed will. Whereas in the Early Church such institutions had been conceived as a remedy and punishment for sin, now such institutions are declared to be natural. As Gratian had put it:

Mankind is ruled by two laws: Natural Law and Custom. Natural Law is that which is contained in the Scriptures and the Gospel.<sup>35</sup>

In particular, Thomas held the Decalogue to be directly the logically developed compendium of the Natural Law. As Troeltsch says:

The binding power of the Decalogue consists in its derivation from the logical necessity of Natural Law. . . . So it became possible to regard natural social institutions as though they had been directly derived from the Christian moral law, and thus it seemed as though the tension of the Early Church between the world and that which transcends the world, between social life and the Church, had been directly overcome. Since the actual conditions are supposed to have arisen out of the Natural Law, the Decalogue, and examples from the Old Testament . . . they dovetail into the Bible idea of revelation in so far as the conditions of the fallen state do not cause a painful but irrevocable loss of the ideal. Thus Society in general and in theory is subordinated to the Christian standard of life, and reason becomes the complement of revelation.<sup>36</sup>

This Thomist attempt to accommodate Aristotle's theory that social institutions and political life are natural and therefore just with the Christian teaching that they are the result of human sinfulness may be seen in Thomas's attempt to justify existing inequalities amongst men. According to Augustine, God had made the rational man to be the master of animals, not of his fellowmen, thus showing by visible signs what is the proper order of nature and what are the consequences of sin. Aquinas resolves the contradiction between these two opposing points of view in typical scholastic fashion. He admits that, had men remained in the state of innocence, the more jarring inequalities between them, such as the distinction between masters and slaves, would not have existed. Yet he claims even in the state of innocence the fundamental difference between man and man would have been apparent; for, as Aristotle points out, men are not equal, but unequal. Everything is clear if we distinguish between two different sorts of subjection. Slavery—the *subiectio servilis* in which man is degraded to a tool—is contrary to nature, and can therefore only be explained as a consequence of sin. But political relationship—the *subiectio civilis* of man to man which is

necessary for the common good—is not a consequence of sin, for it is founded upon the very nature of man. Authority and obedience would still have been required, even if the state of innocence had been preserved, because, as Aristotle said, man is a social and political animal. Society would not be possible without those who are more wise and righteous having command over the rest. Thus does Aquinas get over the difficulty posited by sin, confining it to narrow limits, merely to explain such hardships of social life as serfdom and the harsh character of the penal law with its attendant torture. Sin for Thomas can have no part in the rational justification of the State, because political obligation is inherent in man's nature. Man is unthinkable without the State, because it is only in the State that he can fulfil his end.

Political institutions are, then, according to Thomas, an aspect or part of "natural" morality. As such they can be considered and justified on a purely human plane, independently of religious values. The pagan state is accordingly given a positive value as against Augustine's view of the pagan state as a "band of robbers." Aquinas writes:

It must be granted that government and authority are derived from human law, while the distinction between believers and unbelievers is introduced by divine law. Now the divine law, which is founded on grace, does not abolish human law, which derives from natural reason. Hence the distinction between believers and unbelievers, considered in itself, does not abolish the government and authority of unbelievers over believers. Such a right of government or authority can, however, be justly abolished by the decision of the Church; for unbelievers, on account of their unbelief, deserve to lose their power over believers who are the sons of God.<sup>37</sup>

The idea of the social and political nature of man leads Aquinas to assert the necessity of the full and harmonious integration of the individual in the community.

The goodness of any part is to be considered with reference to the whole of which it forms a part. So, all men being a part of the city, they cannot truly be good unless they adapt themselves to the common good. Nor can the whole be well constituted if its parts be not properly adapted to it.<sup>38</sup>



At this point it becomes necessary to consider Thomas's conception of the individual. What is the Thomist doctrine of the person? Instead of basing himself in the biblical tradition, as we might suppose, Aquinas looked for his definition of personality to classical idealism. Following Aristotle, Thomas speaks of the soul as the form of the body. To thus call the soul the "form" of the body is for Aquinas to say that the soul is what makes the body a human body and that the soul and body are together one substance. According to F. C. Copleston, "the body without the soul is not strictly a body at all . . . and though the human soul survives death, it is not strictly speaking a human person when it is in a state of separation from the body. For the word 'person' signifies a complete substance of rational nature."<sup>39</sup> Aquinas further applied to the soul Aristotle's theory of matter as the principle of individuation within the species. According to Aristotle an individual is a concrete being, made up of a form analogous in all the individuals of the same species, and of a matter individualizing this form. Thus, in the case of men, none of them could be considered as different from others as man, since *all* share in the common form of man in the same degree and in the same manner. Just because the form is specific, it is of the same nature in all the individuals of the same species. Thus substance for Aristotle was not an abstract concept, but a term designating the most concrete, individual particularity, involving not merely the stuff or material cause which prime matter contributes and the universal form which the final cause contributes, but also the life history within which the final form becomes more and more actualized in the otherwise raw matter. This conception of the nature of any individual thing or substance as being the actualization in matter of the potentially present final cause enabled Aristotle to draw a distinction between plants, animals, and men. All have form, and since Aristotle identifies the word "soul" with "the form of a natural body having life potentially within it" (*De Anima*, 412a, 20), all living creatures have souls. That is, the word "soul" means the final form of the organism conceived as

a causal principle determining its growth and characteristics.

What distinguishes human beings from all other animals is that their final form and the final form of other things is sufficiently actualized in them, so that they can grasp the sensed form of other things in its logical, universal character as form by privation, as well as a mere particular in its status of positive form. It is this ability to grasp the sensed forms of things in their universal logical character which, according to Aquinas, following Aristotle, distinguishes human beings from all other creatures in the universe with the exception of God. It is this unique capacity of man to grasp his world in terms of law in its aspect of generality, as well as a mere aggregation and succession of particulars, that both Aristotle and Aquinas have in mind when they define man as a "rational animal." Now according to Aristotle the individual substance possesses significance only, so to speak, as the "carrier" of a type. Further, while everything else in man belongs to the ephemeral world of becoming the "typical" alone is essential and intelligible, and requires for its realization that he live the life of the polis. Aquinas and all subsequent Roman Catholic theologians have placed themselves in the invidious position of trying to square such a conception of the individual with the full Christian doctrine. Just how can the individual person be granted any significance and worth if he is but the bearer of a type? Writing of Thomas's attempts to solve the inherent contradictions thus involved, Etienne Gilson has the honesty to admit:

At first sight it would seem that the Thomist solution of the problem (of the individual person) is altogether indistinguishable from the Aristotelian. Their principles are the same and their conclusions formulated in identical terms. The formal distinction is that whereby one species is distinguished from another species, the material distinction is that whereby one individual is distinguished from another individual. Now since matter is inferior to form as potency is to act, the material distinction must of necessity be there for the sake of the formal distinction, and that amounts to saying that the individuals are there for the sake

of the species. When the species is realizable in a single individual, as in the case of the pure Intelligences, there is no need to distribute it into a plurality of numerically distinct individuals; and that is why in the Thomist system, every angel constitutes a distinct species in himself. Where the specific form cannot subsist by itself in its fullness, as in the case of man, it endures and is perpetuated by means of the generation and corruption of a series of numerically distinct individuals individuated by matter. It would seem impossible to imagine two philosophies in more complete accord. . . . They are but one and that between the philosophy of Aristotle and that of St. Thomas there is only a numerical distinction.<sup>40</sup>

Gilson then tried to rescue Thomas from the pitfalls into which his attempt to understand the human self in abstract ontological modes of thought rather than biblical dramatic had landed him. The mystery of human selfhood can never be truly comprehended in such abstract terms as "form" and "matter," but only in terms of the encounter of the self with other selves. Personality is only constituted by relation with other persons. It is not something we possess by nature but achieve through sharing in the Spirit of Christ, who restores our true humanity.

As a result of his Aristotelian understanding of man, Thomas inevitably landed himself in the so-called organic conception of the State which invariably swallows up the individual in the greater whole. According to this organic theory of the state the collective whole is always prior to its parts and the individual is subordinated to the community. In fact, the individual as such has no independent meaning nor value apart from the whole of which it is a part. According to d'Entreves:

There is no doubt that Aquinas conceives of the State as an organism, and of the individual as subordinate to the community, and of the common good as the supreme value to which all others are instrumental.<sup>41</sup>

Thus he repeats and endorses Aristotle's statement that the family and all other groups differ from the city not only in size but specifically and derives from this difference the conclusion that "the common welfare is differ-

ent in nature from that of the individual."<sup>42</sup> At the same time Thomas did point out that the prince has authority only so long as he governs according to the moral law. He is "under God and law." As a result the individual has something in him reserved for a higher end than total absorption in the state. "Man is not formed for political fellowship in his entirety, and in all that he has . . . but all that a man is, and can do, and has, must be directed to God."<sup>43</sup> Thus the action of the State is delimited by objective rules of justice which ensure that the individual will obey God.

In the last analysis, then, everything turned for Thomas on God's will. But how are we to know God's will? As we have seen there is natural law and there is revealed truth, but of both of them God's voice on earth is the interpreter—natural law only differing from revealed truth in that Man could have come to know it even without revelation. But, things being as they are, the Church stands to uphold it. Therefore it follows that though Man has indeed rights against the State, he has no rights at all against the Church. As St. Thomas argues in the *De Regimine* and elsewhere, behind the "humanum regimen" there is always a "divinum regimen." In this world the two powers of the *rex* and *sacerdos* are committed separately, the one to earthly kings, the other to priests, and principally to the Roman Pontiff, "so that temporal affairs may remain distinct from those spiritual." But the different value of the ends necessarily implies a subordination of the one power to the other, of the regnum to the sacerdotium. Hence it follows that to the Supreme Priest, the successor of Peter and Vicar of Christ, "all kings in Christendom should be subject, as to the Lord Jesus Christ himself." For Thomas the Church had an inherent right to declare when the prince's rule was in violation of the moral law, and when such a declaration had been made, then not only deposition but even tyrannicide was permitted. "Qui ad liberationem patriae tyrannum accidit, laudateur et praemium accipit."<sup>44</sup>

Thus in the end did Thomas's theory of politics lead him back to papal theocracy. As a result he had no conception of the modern secular state consisting of men and women of a variety of religious opinions. The relationship

which he sought to justify was a relationship between a Christian state and the Papal Monarchy. The non-Catholic could not properly be a member of such a church-state. The duty of the Christian towards the non-Christian was dictated by different principles. The Jew must be tolerated because his faith was an essential part of the Christian evidence. On the other hand, Thomas's assertion of the right to persecute the apostate or the heretic was quite uncompromising. Such a person, according to him, had received the gift of faith and out of his wickedness refused to cooperate with grace. He therefore deserves death. He must be "constrained, even physically, to fulfil what he has promised." His sin is one for which there can be no pardon. "If it be just that forgers and other malefactors are put to death without mercy by the secular authority, with how much greater reason may heretics not only be excommunicated, but also put to death, when once they are convicted of heresy." Being merciful, the Catholic Church grants first an opportunity for repentance, but that it has not only a right but a duty to exterminate those who persist in heresy, Thomas does not doubt. By sentence of excommunication the heretic is not only separated from the Church. He is passed on "to the secular judgment to be exterminated from the world by death."<sup>45</sup> Thomas, of course, meant by a heretic a person brought up in the Church who made a personal choice to leave that body. In what respect does the Thomist society differ from the modern totalitarian society which also demands such ideological conformity? It differs only in one respect. Under Thomism there are not one but two authorities—Church and State—each to some extent a protector of liberty against the other. As a matter of historical fact it is precisely owing to this dualism that liberty has flourished in Western culture as it has not flourished elsewhere on earth. Von Ranke states:

The Caliphate may unite ecclesiastical and political power in one hand; but the whole life and character of Western Christendom consists of the incessant action and reaction of Church and State. Hence arises the freer more comprehensive, more profound activity of mind which has characterized that portion of the globe.<sup>46</sup>

Yet Thomas conceives of both as Christian societies and therefore in the last resort the Church has the final authority over the State and must be its master. Yet, even with these reservations, d'Entreves is surely justified in his judgement:

It is hardly possible for the modern man to accept the system which St. Thomas coherently founded upon it without renouncing that notion of civil and religious liberty which we have some right to consider the most precious possession of the West.<sup>47</sup>

While we may have fallen below the level of Thomas in many other respects, we have perhaps a right to think that we have come not only to a less mechanical but also to a truer conception of grace than he had. To Thomas all men had natural reason, and as an addition to nature, the Jews had a semi-revelation, and the Christian through the gift of faith had the full revelation. There were no shades or half-tones in God's gift of faith. One either had or one did not have it. There were no Virgils waiting in the "noble castle," just outside the gates. Thomas may be the most rational mind the Church has ever produced, but he lacks the one thing without which everything else is as nothing. Thomas lacks in Christ-like love. He failed to realize that the sacraments are the covenanted rather than the *only* channels of grace. The Spirit blew where it listed and God could and does give his grace through other channels if he wishes. "Facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam." If that is true, then, we can never be justified in pronouncing as unhesitatingly as Thomas on the degree of guilt even of the heretic. "Let him that is without sin throw the first stone." Again, has not Thomas underrated the psychological corruption that must necessarily come to the orthodox should their faith be defended by the weapon of persecution and the unholy Inquisition? Does Thomas seriously believe that Christ would have burnt his Samaritan neighbor at the stake? By justifying the cruel and wicked policy of the medieval papacy in putting down its critics and opponents by means of the sword Thomas fell behind St. Augustine in his attitude to heretics. It was not clear to him, as it was to Augustine,

that, even on the orthodox thesis, heretics performed an essential function in the strengthening of the faith of the orthodox. Again we must question Thomas's assertion of the absolute validity of rational norms.

Thomas assumed that the requirements of natural law are absolute and inflexible, being contained in the reason which the creature has from God. In actual fact much of the content which Thomas ascribed to natural law simply reflected existing social institutions and conventions. By absolutizing such relative institutions as feudal serfdom, the Inquisition and papal theocracy he was in very grave danger of demonizing them. Worse still, he closed the door to eschatology and shut God out of the historical process. The Early Church had never lost sight of the fact of God as the living God of history. Thomas Aquinas was tempted to do so by substituting the hypothesis of a radically un-historical and static order of being in which every entity and every relation has its established and meaningful place. As a result Thomas and subsequent Roman Catholic philosophers and theologians have placed themselves in the position of appearing at times to represent the political and economic status quo and so to identify their church too closely with reactionary forces and classes. As Dooyeweerd has pointed out, the natural law school absolutizes the legal principle, so that it cannot do justice to the values which emerge in human culture. As we shall be dealing with Dooyeweerd's criticism of the natural law school we shall not say anything further at this point.

Again within the cadre of his teleological and metaphysical view of human society, Thomas was no more in a position than was Aristotle to investigate the internal structural principles, which grounded in the divine world-order, and to prescribe its own typical law to each societal relationship. He had no room for the principle of sphere sovereignty of each typical structural relationship of human society after its own inner nature. While Aristotle absolutized the state, Thomas now absolutized the ecclesiastical institution, since for him the final judgment concerning the question of which affairs pertain to the natural sphere, over which he allowed the state competence, and

which to the supranatural sphere, belonged to the Church. Since in the Thomistic view the autonomy of natural reason is in need of its supernatural aid, it is the supranatural institution which alone can establish the Christian principles of government. And as the infallible interpreter of natural ethical law, this Church alone is in a position to pass judgment concerning the limits of the competence of the State.<sup>48</sup>

By thus conceiving of the church as a second society, superior to civil society, and by failing to distinguish the Church as the Body of Christ from the church as a cultic and ecclesiastical institution, Thomas Aquinas only furthered the ambitions of the medieval popes to achieve a totalitarian control over Western society. The Rule of Jesus Christ is *total*. The Kingdom of God is the total renewal, in Christ, of life in all its structures. Yet the office-bearers within the church, including the bishops of Rome, possess no such total authority, as Pope Boniface VIII claimed in his *Bull Unam Sanctam*:

And we learn from the words of the Gospel that in this Church and in her power are two swords, the spiritual and the temporal. . . . But the latter is to be used for the Church, the former by her; the spiritual by the priest, the temporal by kings and captains but by the assent and permission of the priest. The one sword, then, should be under the other, and temporal authority subject to spiritual power. . . . If, therefore, the earthly power shall err, it shall be judged by the spiritual power. . . . But if the supreme power err, it can only be judged by God, not by man. For this authority, although given to a man and exercised by a man is not human but divine, given at God's mouth to Peter and established as a rock for him and his successors. . . . We declare, state, define and pronounce that it is altogether necessary to salvation for every human creature to be subject to the Roman pontiff.<sup>49</sup>

By understanding the idea of unity in terms of government, rather than of unity in terms of a common allegiance to Jesus Christ, the Popes were able to cross the Christian conception of sovereignty with pagan Roman conceptions. According to Arthur Michael Ramsey, present Archbishop of Canterbury:



The papal claim to sovereignty in both church and state involved the church in a dilemma. Either it means a supremacy inherently destructive of the sovereignty of kings and rulers or else it means that their sovereignty has over against it the church as a rival state, politically strong enough to hold the balance of power. In either case the view of church sovereignty has travelled far both from the New Testament and from Augustine's City of God.<sup>50</sup>

Bertrand de Jouvenel has pointed out that the absolutist monarchies of later times such as Louis XIV, Frederick the Great and Charles V all found their inspiration in this revived Roman conception of absolute sovereignty thus brought back by the medieval popes. Thus he writes:

It was not in the temporal order that the idea of a single, concentrated authority . . . first carried the day. Its first victory was in the Church and the beneficiary was the pontifical power. The way in which the bishops of Rome transformed a mere pre-eminence in the Church into a plenitude of power over it is a great transformation. . . . This concentration of authority served as a model for those which came about in the temporal realm. The notion of a majesty, full and entire, was brought back by the popes.<sup>51</sup>

Writing of this new conception of papal power about 1280 A.D., Aegidius Romanus Colonna uses these terms: "Tanta potestatis plenitudo, quod ejus posses est sine pondere numero et mensura." He then enlarges upon this idea of a power which cannot be weighed, counted or measured and he affirms that it knows no exception, embraces everything, and is the basis of every authority, is sovereign, unlimited and immediate.<sup>52</sup>

The medieval Roman papacy, not only by its example, but also because its claims to hegemony over the kings of Western Europe constituted a direct threat to their own rule, drove the royal authority to adopt the same totalitarian ambitions. As de Jouvenel says in his classic work on *Sovereignty*, "The plenitude *potestatis* became the goal towards which the kings of Europe moved consciously."<sup>53</sup> To reach it the kings of Western Europe had first to destroy all existing authorities other than their own, and that meant the complete subversion of the existing social order as it

had developed in Western Europe. As a result there emerged the New Monarchy of such Kings as Philip the Fair of France and Charles V of Spain, and of the Tudors of England. This in turn developed into the absolutist monarchies of King Louis XIV of France in the seventeenth century and of the Prussian King Frederick the Great in the eighteenth century. Thanks to the Puritan revolution England was spared this fate. Exasperated by its excesses, Frenchmen in 1789 rose up in revolution to overthrow the *Ancien Regime*.<sup>54</sup>

Unfortunately, instead of providing "liberty, equality and fraternity" as it promised, the French Revolution in its turn continued the tendency towards the ever greater centralization of power revived in Western Europe by the medieval papacy.<sup>55</sup>

The medieval pontiffs of the Church of Rome may thus claim the distinction of having revived those pagan conceptions of Oriental despotic monarchy which the German barbarians supposed they had disposed of once and for all when they overthrew the Roman Caesars. In the papal program for supremacy in the fullness of power we may therefore rightly detect the seed thoughts of the modern pagan totalitarian state. Totalitarian Communism thus merely marks the final stage in the process of the secularization of the medieval papal program to bring in Utopia by brute force. In both its religious and political forms individual freedom is destroyed.<sup>56</sup>

Judged by the biblical religious motive of creation, fall into sin, and redemption by Christ in the communion of the Holy Spirit, the medieval Roman Catholic attempt to synthesize Christianity and classical culture stands condemned as a misguided fiasco. The Kingdom of God cannot be advanced by adopting the weapons and methods of apostate men. The medieval attempt to do so almost destroyed the glorious Gospel of God by perverting its essential nature and promise. By causing a revolution in the Western Church's constitution, and in the Church's liturgical and doctrinal heritage, the Bishops of Rome invited the judgment of the Lord of the Church. That judgment occurred in the Reformation when Christian men became protestors

against such medieval perversions, in order that they might be more truly and purely Catholic and in order that they might divest Western Christianity of its pagan accretions and corruptions. Let the evil consequences of the medieval attempt to synthesize Christianity with classical humanism be a warning to Christians not to try to synthesize their Christian life- and world-view with that of apostate scientific humanism.

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<sup>1</sup> Werner Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia* (Oxford University Press, London, 1963). The reader should also consult H. Richard Niebuhr's *Christ and Culture* (Harper, New York, 1951) for a brilliant treatment of this problem.

<sup>2</sup> Pierre Labriolle, *History and Literature of Christianity from Tertullian to Boethius*, translated from the French by H. Wilson (London and New York, 1924), p. 18.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>4</sup> Hans Lietzmann, *The Founding of the Church Universal*, trans. B. L. Woolf (Lutterworth Press, London, 1950), pp. 218-225, 186-187.

<sup>5</sup> Labriolle, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

<sup>6</sup> Werner Jaeger, *Humanism and Theology* (The Aquinas Lecture) (Milwaukee, 1953), p. 70, note 16.

<sup>7</sup> Labriolle, *op. cit.*, p. 24; also Louis Duchesne, *Early History of the Christian Church*, Vol. I, II, III. Rendered into English from the Fourth Edition (John Murray, London, 1947), it is still the best history of the early Church in spite of its age.

<sup>8</sup> Labriolle, *op. cit.*, p. 24; also Lietzmann, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

<sup>9</sup> Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia*, p. 89.

For further study of the Greek Apologists and of early Christian speculation, the reader should consult Etienne Gilson's *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (Random House, New York, 1955), pp. 9-67.

<sup>10</sup> Labriolle, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>13</sup> Dooyeweerd, *In The Twilight of Western Thought*, pp. 114ff.

<sup>14</sup> R. W. Carlyle and A. J. Carlyle, *A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West*, Vol. I (New York, 1903), Part III, pp. 93ff. The reader should also consult Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, trans. Olive Wyon (Allen & Unwin, London, 1949), Vol. I, 112f.

<sup>15</sup> D. Knowles, *The Evolution of Medieval Thought* (Longmans, 1962), p. 257.

<sup>16</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. I, p. 180. For a detailed discussion of this nature-grace motive cf. Dooyeweerd, *Reformatie en*

*Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte*, II; also Dooyeweerd, "La base Religieuse de la Philosophie Scholastique," *La Revue Reformee*, X (1959), no. 3, pp. 35-47.

<sup>17</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. I, p. 181.

<sup>18</sup> Augustine, *City of God*, (Everyman's Library, London, 1945). Book XIV, ch. 28. For further study of Augustine of Hippo, the reader should consult Gerald Bonner, *St. Augustine of Hippo* (S.C.M. Press, London, 1963); H. A. Deane, *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine* (Columbia University Press, 1962); A. D. R. Polman, *The Word of God According to St. Augustine* (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1963).

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, Bk. 1, ch. 8; v. 18; VIX, 17.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, Bk. V, ch. XVII.

<sup>21</sup> Gerd Tellenbach, *Church, State and Christian Society*, trans. R. F. Bennett (Blackwell, Oxford, 1940); Z. N. Brooke, *The English Church and the Papacy* (Cambridge, 1952); J. P. Whitney, *Hildebrandine Essays* (Cambridge, 1932).

<sup>22</sup> Walter Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages* (Methuen, London, 1955); also *Principles of Government and Politics In The Middle Ages* (Methuen, 1961). R. W. Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages* (Hutchinson's University Library, London, 1956). This book is by far the best introduction yet written on medieval history during its formative period from about 970 to 1215. Chapter II on The Bonds of Society and Chapter III on The Ordering of the Christian Life should be read by anyone wishing to understand the spirit and ethos of medieval Christian civilization. He should then read C. W. Previte-Orton, *The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History*, Vols. I, II, edited by P. Grierson (Cambridge University Press, 1952).

<sup>23</sup> "Gratia non tollit sed perficit naturam" (*Summa Theologica*, 1, 8, 2).

<sup>24</sup> A. P. d'Entreves, *Natural Law* (London, 1957), pp. 33ff.; quotation from A. P. d'Entreves, *Aquinas* (Oxford, 1948), introduction, p. XIII.

<sup>25</sup> Emil Brunner, *Man in Revolt*, trans. O. Wyon (London, 1947), p. 94.

<sup>26</sup> Gerrit C. Berkouwer, *Conflict with Rome*, trans. by D. Freeman (Philadelphia, 1958), p. 95; C. F. Jacques Maritain, *True Humanism* (Bles, London, 1946); David Cairns, *The Image of God in Man* (SCM Press, London, 1953), pp. 114ff.

<sup>27</sup> A. P. d'Entreves, *Natural Law* (London, 1957), p. 42; see also Ernest Troeltsch, *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, trans. by Olive Wyon (London, 1949), Vol. II, pp. 257-328, for a summary of Thomist social teachings.

<sup>28</sup> H. Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, edited F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, Vols. I, II, and III (Oxford, 1936); also H. Van Riessen, *The University and Its Basis*, pp. 28ff.

- <sup>29</sup> Knowles, *op. cit.*, pp. 325ff.
- <sup>30</sup> W. Ullmann, *op. cit.*, p. 455.
- <sup>31</sup> Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1, a; 2, ae, quae 91, art. 1 and 2.
- <sup>32</sup> E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Thomas* (Second edition, London, 1929), p. 64.
- <sup>33</sup> Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1, 12, XII as quoted by H. O. Taylor, *The Mediaeval Mind*, Vol. II, (Fifth ed., Harvard Press, 1949), p. 455. Cf. also Gilson's brilliant chapter on Thomas Aquinas in *The History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, pp. 361-383.
- <sup>34</sup> Emil Brunner, *Revelation and Reason*, translated by Olive Wyon (Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1946), p. 9.
- <sup>35</sup> *Decretum Gratiani*, ca. 1140 in *Corpus Iuris Canonici*.
- <sup>36</sup> Ernst Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 261ff.
- <sup>37</sup> Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 2a, 2ae, quae a, 10.
- <sup>38</sup> Aquinas, as quoted by d'Entreves, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
- <sup>39</sup> F. C. Copleston, *Aquinas* (Pelican Books, London, 1955), pp. 155ff.
- <sup>40</sup> E. Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy* (Sheed & Ward, London, 1950), pp. 197ff.
- <sup>41</sup> A. P. d'Entreves, *Aquinas' Selected Political Writing*, p. xviii; contrast with d'Entreves' *Medieval Contribution to Political Thought* (Oxford, 1939), pp. 27-30. Also consult Thomas Gilby's excellent account of the political doctrine of Thomas Aquinas in his book, *Principality and Polity* (Longmans, London, 1958).
- <sup>42</sup> A. P. d'Entreves, *ibid.*, p. xix.
- <sup>43</sup> D'Entreves, *Medieval Contribution to Political Thought*, pp. 29ff.
- <sup>44</sup> D'Entreves, *Selected Writings of Aquinas*, pp. xx-xxi.
- <sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xxii.
- <sup>46</sup> Von Ranke, *History of the Reformation in Germany* (London, 1905), p. 46. Every lover of liberty should read Henry Charles Lea, *The Inquisition of the Middle Ages* (Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1962) and S. A. Russell, *History of the Inquisition* (New York, 1955 and 1956).
- <sup>47</sup> D'Entreves, *Selected Political Writings of Aquinas*, p. xxxiii.
- <sup>48</sup> Cf. Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. III, pp. 218ff. for his treatment of Aquinas' social and political theories.
- <sup>49</sup> Quoted by R. G. D. Laffan, *Select Documents of European History* (Methuen, London, 1930), Vol. I, pp. 116ff.
- <sup>50</sup> A. M. Ramsey, *The Gospel and the Catholic Church* (Longmans, Green, London, 1956), p. 163ff.
- <sup>51</sup> Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Sovereignty* (Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 174.
- <sup>52</sup> Quoted by de Jouvenel, *ibid.*, p. 174.
- <sup>53</sup> De Jouvenel, *ibid.*, p. 174.

<sup>54</sup> The best study of the *Ancien Regime* is still that by the great French writer De Tocqueville, *L'Ancien Regime*, translated by M. W. Patterson (Blackwell, Oxford, 1947).

<sup>55</sup> For a brilliant study of the tendency of power to expand, the reader is referred to Bertrand de Jouvenel's other great book called *Power: Its Nature and the History of its Growth* (Beacon Press, Boston, 1950).

<sup>56</sup> P. Blanshard, *American Freedom and Catholic Power* (Beacon Press, 1950), who writes on page 259:

The kinship between Catholic and communist political policy has been noted by Europe's leading Protestant theologian, Karl Barth, in an acid comment he made to a Jesuit journalist in 1948. To be honest, he said, I see some connection between them (Roman Catholicism and Communism). Both are totalitarian; both claim man as a whole. Communism uses about the same methods of organization (learned from the Jesuits). Both lay great stress on all that is visible. But Roman Catholicism is the more dangerous of the two for Protestantism. Communism will pass; Roman Catholicism is lasting.

The reader should also consult James Hastings Nichol's brilliant Chapter IX of his masterpiece *Democracy and the Churches* (Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1951) pp. 245-266 dealing with the subject, Anglo-American Democracy and Roman Catholicism.

CHAPTER V  
THE MODERN MOTIVE OF NATURE  
AND FREE PERSONALITY

With the disruption of the Scholastic synthesis of "nature" and "grace" in the rise of late medieval nominalism and as a result of the revolt of Western men against the authoritarian enslavement of their minds by the medieval papacy and inquisition, a third governing concept or religious ground motive made its appearance in the history of Western culture. This new motive has been defined by Herman Dooyeweerd as the ground motive of "nature" or the ideal of science and the ground motive of "freedom" or the ideal of free autonomous personality. While the watchword of the Reformation was *solī Deo gloria* and man's liberty was defined in terms of his willing obedience to the all-wise and loving will of Almighty God, the new humanistic nature-freedom motive proclaimed the independence of man and the sovereignty of the human spirit. Man now came to be regarded as independent of the God of the Scriptures and absolute in himself and he was henceforth considered to be the only ruler of his own destiny and that of the world. He is now regarded as creative of the world in which he is placed, not, of course, in any originating sense, but in the sense that his mind and his rational will impress their character upon the universe and give it its distinctive character, especially in the realms of intellectual political, artistic and scientific activity. Such a humanistic confidence in man's natural powers and abilities meant a revolution with respect to the old biblical basic motive of

creation, fall into sin, and redemption by Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Spirit. The biblical revelation of the creation of man in God's image was now subverted into the idea of the creation of God in the idealized image of man. Henceforth, unbelieving Western men will be subject to none but themselves. They seek to become autonomous and to become the source of their own light, making their own reason the final reference point in all human predication. Instead of the Bible being the final point of reference for man's understanding of his own nature and destiny, the new humanistic principle of interpretation is that the human reason is both autonomous and the final reference point. As the French philosopher Descartes was to put it in his famous *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences*:

Because in this case I wished to give myself entirely to the search after Truth, I thought it was necessary for me to take an apparently opposite course, and to reject as absolutely false everything as to which I could imagine the least ground of doubt, in order to see if afterwards there remained anything in my belief that was entirely certain. Thus, because our senses sometimes deceive us, I wished to suppose that nothing is just as they cause us to imagine it to be; and because there are men who deceive themselves in their reasoning . . . and judging that I was as subject to error as was any other, I rejected as false all the reasons formerly accepted by me as demonstrations. And since all the same thoughts and conceptions which we have while we are awake may also come to us in sleep, without any of them being at that time true, I resolved to assume that everything that ever entered into my mind was no more true than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately afterwards I noticed that whilst I thus wished to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that this "I" who thought this should be somewhat, and remarking that this truth "I think therefore I am" was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I came to the conclusion that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the Philosophy for which I was seeking.<sup>1</sup>



For Descartes certain knowledge can spring only from a personal investigation; the technique of true thinking begins with an intellectual purge of all previously held opinions and beliefs. His first principle he tells us was "to accept nothing as true which I did not clearly recognize to be so; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitation and prejudice in judgment, and to accept in them nothing more than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I could have no occasion to doubt it." No longer willing to find certainty and truth in the Word of God, this founder of modern rationalism was forced to find it in his own unaided reason. Instead of God's Word providing him with the ordering principle of his life, Descartes states he will make his own rational mind the final reference point for all his thinking and doing.

For Francis Bacon no less than for Descartes the aim was certainty. He therefore tried to equip the intellect with what appeared to him necessary and demonstrable knowledge of the world in which man lives. Such knowledge is not possible for the "natural reason" which is capable of only "petty and probable conjectures,"<sup>2</sup> not of certainty. And this imperfection is reflected in the want of prosperity of the state of knowledge. The *Novum Organum* begins with a diagnosis of the intellectual situation. What is lacking is a clear perception of the nature of certainty and an adequate means of achieving it. "There remains," says Bacon, "but one course for the recovery of a sound and healthy condition—namely, that the entire work of understanding be commenced afresh, and the mind itself be from the very outset not left to take its own course, but guided at every step."<sup>3</sup> What is required is a "sure plan," a new "way" of understanding, an "art" or "method" of inquiry; in short what is required is a consciously formulated technique of research.<sup>4</sup>

The art of research which Bacon recommends has three main characteristics. First, it is a set of rules; it is a true technique in that it can be formulated as a precise set of directions which can be learned by heart. Secondly, it is a set of rules whose application is purely mechanical. Thirdly, it is a set of rules of universal application; it is a true

technique in that it is an instrument of inquiry indifferent to the subject-matter of the inquiry.<sup>5</sup>

What Bacon is proposing is nothing less than infallible rules of discovery by means of which modern men will be able to remake the world. For Bacon genuine knowledge can only begin with a purge of the mind, because it must begin as well as end in certainty. The doctrine of the *Novum Organum* may thus be summed up as the sovereignty of man's scientific technique and scientific method. Scientific knowledge is the only kind worth possessing. Man must find certainty in his technique and he must use his technique to remake himself and his world. In this way the biblical conception of man's need for redemption by Christ is replaced by Bacon with the idea of man's regeneration by means of his scientific method. In this rationalist ideal of human independence from God the biblical motive of freedom through regeneration by God's grace became secularized to form a new religious motive of humanistic freedom understood as independence from God.<sup>6</sup>

In his Ford Lectures delivered on the Third Program of the BBC in 1962, Christopher Hill showed the enormous influence Bacon exerted on the men of his own generation and of succeeding ages. He quotes Bacon's own astonishing aspiration that his scientific method would even liberate mankind from the consequences of the Fall.

For man by the Fall fell at the same time from his state of innocence and from his dominion over created things. Both these losses can even in this life be partially repaired; the former by religion and faith, the latter by arts and sciences.

For now, thanks to science, man can again command nature. For the future "we may hand over to men their fortunes, the understanding having been emancipated—having come so to speak of age." Hence, there must necessarily ensue an improvement in man's estate, and an increase of his power over nature. Hill comments that "this breath-taking utopian vision proposes to reverse the whole course of human history as previously understood."<sup>7</sup>

In this way the biblical motive of creation became humanized. The divine Creator became the deified image

of the creative urge worked in man by the new freedom motive.

Thus Leibniz's "Great Mathematician" was merely the deified image of the free creative intellect of man, which created the differential calculus, and which would eventually be able to carry through the mathematical analysis of the cosmos to such an extent that even contingencies could be accurately calculated.

The motive of freedom in fact called up a new image of nature as the macrocosmic sphere within which the human personality could henceforth exercise its autonomy. Nature was now to be interpreted along the lines of an analogy of a machine to be controlled by autonomous mathematical thought.<sup>8</sup>

Meanwhile, both the freedom motive and its correlate, the new science ideal, showed an inner multiplicity of meaning. Although it began in the secularizing of the biblical ground-motive, the humanistic ideal of free independent personality missed the radical character of the biblical motive which reaches to the root of human existence in the heart of man. Autonomous personality turned away from this radical unity of existence to be found alone in Jesus Christ and sought itself again within the temporal horizon of experience with its various aspects.<sup>9</sup> Thus in men such as Kant it sought the central seat of its freedom in, for example, the moral function; or in men such as Herder, Schiller, Schelling and Goethe in the aesthetic function; or in the Romantics in the function of feeling; or in men such as Marx in the economic function; or in men such as Comte, Spencer and J. S. Mill in man's logical faculty, i.e., his rational powers.<sup>10</sup>

Similarly, the motive of nature or the science ideal took on a variety of meanings depending upon the specific modal qualification it received. Thus, when for example Galileo and Newton laid the foundation of mechanics and dynamics, nature was interpreted as a mathematical material reality to be ruled by scientists. Since this new conception of the world brought about a revolution in Western scientific, political, legal and philosophic thought it is im-

perative that all Christians should understand its nature and results.

#### A. The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century

As a direct consequence of the birth of experimental modern science, the medieval and classical conception of reality broke down and it was replaced by the world-view underlying modern humanistic mental processes. This revolution in Western thought overturned the authority not only of the Middle Ages but also of Classical Antiquity since its repercussions led not only to the destruction of Scholastic philosophy but also to the total eclipse of Aristotelian physics and the end of a long subservience to the thought patterns of ancient Greece. According to Sir Herbert Butterfield in his important study, *The Origins of Modern Science*:

It outshines everything else since the rise of Christianity and reduces the Renaissance and Reformation to the rank of mere episodes, mere internal displacements, with the system of medieval Christendom. Since it changed the character of men's habitual mental operations even in the conduct of the non-physical sciences, while transforming the whole diagram of the physical universe and the very existence of human life itself, it looms so large as the real origin both of the modern world and of the modern mentality that our customary periodisation of European history has become an anachronism.<sup>11</sup>

From this intellectual revolution there has flowed all the main currents which have shaped the modern mind and produced its distinctive characteristics, the modern mind defined by A. N. Whitehead in *Science and The Modern World* as a "vehement and passionate interest in the relation of general principles to irreducible and stubborn facts . . . it is this union of passionate interest in the detailed facts with equal devotion to abstract generalisation which forms the novelty in our present society. Previously it had appeared sporadically and as if by chance."<sup>12</sup>

At the same time, historians of the scientific revolution in the seventeenth century recognized that the roots of this revolution lay deep in the Middle Ages. In his work on the history of science in the Middle Ages, A. C. Crombie

has proved that Galileo was widely read in the science of earlier times and found therein numerous rational conclusions from man's common knowledge of the world. The work of his genius was to select from these medieval and classical conclusions concepts which were fundamental for mechanics and cosmology, and to establish these concepts by showing their consistency with natural phenomena experimentally demonstrated and mathematically analyzed.<sup>13</sup>

While the Church of Rome and the "Holy" Inquisition at first opposed the advance of modern science by burning Giordano Bruno at the stake on the 17th of February, 1600,<sup>14</sup> Reformed Christians welcomed the attempt to apply God's creation-mandate to man to "subdue the earth and have dominion over it." In his lectures on Calvinism, Abraham Kuyper rightly drew attention to the fact that Calvinism "fostered and could not help but foster love for science." H. Van Riessen points out in his lectures on *The University and its Basis* delivered at Unionville, Ontario in 1962 "that all the universities of the Netherlands of that time were founded as Calvinistic universities; Leiden, Utrecht, Groningen, Franeker and Harderwijk."<sup>15</sup> In Calvinist Holland there was invented the telescope, the microscope and the thermometer, thus making empirical science possible. As Lewis Mumford says in his history of technology, *Technics and Civilization*:

It was a Dutch optician, Johann Lippersheim, who in 1605 invented the telescope and thus suggested to Galileo the efficient means he needed for making astronomical observations. In 1590 another Hollander, the optician Zacharias Jansen, invented the compound microscope; possibly also the telescope. One invention increased the scope of the macrocosm; the other revealed the microcosm; between them the naive conceptions of space that the ordinary man carried around were completely upset.<sup>16</sup>

According to Kuyper, love for science was fostered and motivated amongst Calvinists by their doctrine of God's foreordination of all events within space and time. He writes:

As a Calvinist looks upon God's decree as the foundation and origin of the natural laws, in the same

manner also he finds in it the firm foundation and origin of every moral and spiritual law; both of these, the natural as well as the spiritual laws, forming together one high order, which exists according to God's command and wherein God's counsel will be accomplished.

Faith in such an unity, stability and order of things, personally as predestination, cosmically as the counsel of God's decree, could not but awaken as with a loud voice, and vigorously foster love for science. Without a deep conviction of this unity, this stability and this order science is unable to go beyond mere conjectures, and only when there is faith in the organic interconnection of the Universe, will there also be a possibility for science to ascend from the empirical investigation of the special phenomena to the general, and from the general to the law which rules over it, and from that law to the principle which is dominant over all.<sup>17</sup>

Kuyper then refers to the Calvinistic Confessions which speak of the two means whereby we know God, viz., the Scriptures and Nature, and he points out that Calvin, instead of simply treating Nature as an accessorial item as so many previous theologians had been inclined to do, was accustomed to compare the Scriptures to a pair of spectacles enabling us to decipher again the divine thoughts, written by God's hand in the book of Nature which had become obliterated because of the curse. "Thus vanquished every dread possibility that he who occupied himself with nature was wasting his capacities in pursuit of vain and idle things."<sup>18</sup> On the contrary, Kuyper adds, Calvinists realized "that for God's sake our attention may not be withdrawn from the life of nature and creation." As a direct result of this revived Calvinist interest in the wonders of God's creation the study of the human body regained its place of honor beside the study of the soul; and the social organization of mankind on this earth was again regarded as being well worthy of human study. For Kuyper it is this new interest in the Father's world which accounts for the close relation existing between Calvinism and Humanism. "In as far as Humanism endeavoured to substitute life in this world for the eternal," he writes, "every Calvinist opposed the Humanist. But in as much

as the Humanist contented himself with a plea for a proper acknowledgement of secular life, the Calvinist was his ally."<sup>19</sup> It is interesting to notice that Christopher Hill has also recognized this relation between the men of the new scientific movement and the Protestants. After referring to the founding of Gresham College in 1598 in London by Sir Thomas Gresham who endowed no less than seven professorships in Divinity, Law, Rhetoric, Music, Physic, Geometry and Astronomy, Hill says that:

In addition to their scientific activities, some of the Gresham professors had Puritan connections. Gellibrand had to appear before the High Commission for approving publication of an almanac in which many of the traditional saints were omitted, and replaced by the names of victims of persecution under Bloody Mary. . . . Gellibrand also "suffered conventicles . . . to be held in his lodgings at Gresham"; his successor Samuel Foster was ejected from his chair in 1636 for refusing to kneel at the communion table; he was restored only after the Long Parliament had met. Other Gresham professors had Puritan connections which caused the government considerable alarm. It was thus no accident, but the result of half a century of history, that in 1645, the year of the Royalist defeat, it was in Foster's chambers at Gresham College, after his weekly astronomy lecture, that the group which later formed the Royal Society first began to meet.<sup>20</sup>

In 1648-49 the leading figures of this group—Wilkins, Wallis and Goddard—were imported into Oxford University by the Parliamentary Commissioners and the higher scientific achievements of London were imposed upon the reluctant university from outside, and Oxford became for a few years a center of scientific studies. The restoration of King Charles II ended all this. It was only natural that when the scientists were ejected from Oxford in 1660 they should regroup around their old home, Gresham College, and that four of the twelve founding members of the Royal Society should be Gresham professors. The Royal Society held its meetings in Gresham College. In 1662 the Royal Society received a royal charter formally incorporating it as a society for promoting natural knowledge. The influence of the Royal Society in securing adequate discussion

of new ideas, in focussing scientific opinion, and in making known the researches of scientists has been incalculable in furthering the advance of science in the English-speaking world.<sup>21</sup> Thus the Puritans played a most notable part in the cause of the scientific revolution. As a witness that intellectual life in England was freer after and because of the Puritan Revolution than it had been before, consider the judgment of the Marquis of Halifax:

The liberty of the late times gave men so much light, and diffused it so universally among the people, that they are not now to be dealt with as they might have been in the ages of less inquiry. . . . In former times . . . the men in black had made learning such a sin in the laity that for fear of offending they made a conscience of being able to read. But now the world is grown saucy, and expecteth reasons, and good ones too, before they give up their own opinions to other men's dictates.<sup>22</sup>

In a lecture delivered before the Free University of Amsterdam in 1957 on *Greek and Christian Ideas of Nature*, Michael Foster, Fellow of Christ Church, Oxford, pointed out that the modern scientific attempt first to understand and then to master nature, "an attitude of modern men so characteristic of modern science," has a biblical source. In Genesis 1:28 man is commanded to "replenish the earth and subdue it." In Psalm 8 the psalmist says, "Thou madest him [man] to have dominion over the works of thy hands, thou hast put all things under his feet."<sup>23</sup> John MacMurray, former professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburg, declared in his famous BBC lectures on *Freedom in the Modern World*:

Science is useless to us unless we have a faith that can use it. . . . The faith of Europe, by which it has lived and achieved, is Christianity. It is Christianity which has unified and directed our emotional life, determined our nobler purposes, created our societies. Also—mark this well—it was Christianity which gave us science by its insistence on the spirit of truth. It is still the Christian impulse that sustains all that is really fine and inspiring in our modern life, including science. . . .

To insist that science is the work of Christianity is not to overlook the legacy of Greece. The Greek



spirit of free rational enquiry was speculative and intuitive—philosophical rather than scientific. . . . Science, in the proper sense, did not exist until the end of the Middle Ages, and it was the Christian impulse, working in the medieval world, which provided the element essential for the transformation of rational speculation into scientific enquiry.<sup>24</sup>

For all these varied reasons, then, modern Christians need have no fear of the modern scientific investigation of nature and of scientific research and its various methods, provided always that the methods used in such investigation and research are not absolutized and false conclusions derived from it regarding the nature of man in society. The greatest proof we can adduce as to the possibility of cooperation between the Gospel and modern science is simply to refer to all the Christian men and women throughout the world engaged in worshipping their Creator in their laboratories and universities, thinking God's thoughts after him as they penetrate ever deeper into the mysteries of his creation.

The seventeenth century is a watershed in the history of Western thought for it saw the development of those ideas which distinguish the modern treatment of nature from that customary in the ancient and medieval worlds. Whereas ancient and medieval science had tended to be based upon a qualitative and teleological explanation of natural phenomena, the new science which arose in the early years of the seventeenth century was based upon an empirical, quantitative and mathematical analysis. Thus nature presents herself to Galileo as a simple orderly system whose every proceeding is thoroughly regular and inexorably necessary. This rigorous necessity in nature results from her fundamental character and structure. Further this rigorous necessity in nature results from her fundamentally mathematical character—nature is the domain of mathematics. As Galileo himself puts it:

Philosophy is written in that great book which ever lies before our eyes—I mean the universe, but we cannot understand it if we do not first learn the language and grasp the symbols in which it is written. This book is written in the mathematical language and

the symbols are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, without whose help it is impossible to comprehend a single word of it.<sup>25</sup>

Mathematical demonstrations then, rather than scholastic logic, furnish the key to unlock the secrets of the universe. The truth of nature consists in mathematical facts rather than in Aristotelian qualities; what is real and intelligible in nature is that which is measurable and quantitative.

Galileo was greatly assisted in this revolutionary approach to the study of nature by the tremendous advances in mathematical technique which began to take place during the seventeenth century. The power of arithmetic in dealing with numerical calculations involving multiplication and division was greatly increased by Napier's invention of logarithms which he published in 1614. The decimal notation for fractions was introduced about the same time as logarithms. The introduction of these discoveries brought arithmetic into its modern form. At the close of the sixteenth century algebra also began to assume its modern and symbolic form. In this it has a language of its own and a system of notation which has no obvious connection with the things represented. The credit for introducing this was mainly due to Francis Vieta of Paris. Descartes also made a contribution to algebra by fixing the custom of employing the letters at the beginning of the alphabet to denote known quantities and those at the end to denote unknown quantities. His greatest contribution to mathematics, however, was his introduction of the idea of motion into geometry. He drew attention not merely to the properties of figures but to those of curves, lines of which the relation to two fixed lines at right angles to one another may be expressed by equations, so that every point on the curve has the geometrical property expressed in the equation of that curve. This idea, coupled with the previous application of algebra to geometry, gave rise to coordinate geometry to which belong the graphs used in scientific and statistical writings. By the time these and other contemporary improvements had been reached, the ground was ready for the great achievement, the calculus, invented in-

dependently by Newton and Leibniz. The calculus deals with the relations between variable quantities. Combined with the Cartesian system of analytical geometry it provided an almost universal method for all difficult calculations and a better theoretical framework for previously acquired knowledge about mathematical relations of all kinds. Thus the advances in mathematical technique provided scientists with the indispensable basis for the geometrization of physics.<sup>26</sup>

The keystone of seventeenth century science proved to be Galileo's new theory of motion which he was able to verify experimentally before men's eyes, thus showing that some, at least, of Aristotle's notions were demonstrably false. The authority of the "Philosopher" was profoundly shaken when people were forced to admit that all bodies fall with uniform acceleration and that the sun's face is spotted. In thus appealing to factual evidence rather than to a preconceived notion of motion "as the act of that which is in potentiality, as such," (8 Phys. v. 8), Galileo stands out as the prophet of the experimental method in modern science. This method consists in putting definite questions to Nature and obtaining answers from the results of experiment or observations without starting with preconceived hypotheses. It is this approach to Nature with an open mind content to learn by strict observation and experimental loyalty to fact that is the essence of the modern scientific spirit.

Viewed as a whole Galileo's method consists of three steps; (1) intuition, (2), demonstration, and (3) experiment. Facing the world of sensible experience we isolate and examine as fully as possible a certain typical phenomenon in order to intuit those simply absolute elements in terms of which the phenomenon can be most easily and completely translated into mathematical form, which amounts to a resolution of the sensed fact into such elements as can be best treated in quantitative combination. Galileo seems to have been the first scientist to put this method systematically and consciously into practice in his study of dynamics.

Nothing reveals the revolution which took place in European scientific thought better than Galileo's analysis of a problem left by Aristotelian physics. This analysis not only solved the problem but also in doing so provided the fundamental postulates of "classical" Newtonian physics.

The problem appeared in the motion of a projectile such as a shot from a cannon. It became evident to Galileo that the projectile does not move the way it should were Aristotle's theory of motion true. This difficulty arose because Aristotle supposed that force is that which exhibits itself as the motion or velocity of the body upon which it acts, that is to say, force is that which produces velocity. From this it followed that when a force ceases to act upon a body the body should cease to move. In most instances this definition of force is apparently confirmed. When I push the table on which I am now typing the table moves and when I cease to exert any force the table ceases to move. Yet in the projectile fired from a cannon and its motion, this consequence of the Aristotelian definition of force is not confirmed. The force has ceased to act the moment the explosion takes place. Yet the projectile continues to move over great distances of space and over a considerable interval of time, following upon the cessation of the explosion. To Galileo it became clear that the difficulty centered not only in the motion of the projectile but in Aristotle's definition of force in general. Obviously a new conception of force was required. Galileo's problem was therefore to find a new and correct definition of force in terms of the motion of any object whatsoever. This allowed him to choose the simplest case of a force acting on a moving body which he could find, namely, a body falling freely under the force of gravitation.

He then experimented with inclined planes and found that the results of his measurements agreed with those calculated from his hypothesis that the speed is proportional to the time of the fall and its mathematical consequence that the space described increases as the square of time. From these and other experiments Galileo was enabled to suggest the modern definition of force. Force is that which produces not motion or velocity as Aristotle supposed but

change of velocity or acceleration. According to this new scientific definition of force it follows that when a force ceases to act on a body it will not cease to move but it will merely cease to change its velocity.

Galileo's new definition of force entailed a rejection of the whole of the Aristotelian physics. And since there is not a major concept in Aristotle's metaphysics which does not appear in his physics this change had the additional consequence of requiring the rejection of the Aristotelian view of the world as well as the whole scholastic philosophy which had been built upon it. The modern world, once it was forced by Galileo's analysis and experiments to replace Aristotelian physics and its attendant philosophy, was required thereby to rear its philosophy also upon new foundations. As Sir Herbert Butterfield well says in his fascinating discussion of "The Historical Importance of a Theory of Impetus" in his book *The Origins of Modern Science*:

From the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, the Aristotelian doctrine of motion persisted in the face of recurrent controversy, and it was only in the later stages of that period that the satisfactory alternative emerged . . . . Once this question was solved in the modern manner, it altered much of one's ordinary way of thinking about the world and opened the way for a flood of further re-interpretations and discoveries. . . . We might say that a change in one's attitude to the movement of things that move was bound to result in so many new analyses of various kinds that it constituted a scientific revolution in itself. . . . The modern law of inertia, the modern theory of motion, is the great factor which in the seventeenth century helped to drive the spirits out of the world and opened the way to a universe that ran like clock-work.<sup>27</sup>

The attempt to build up a new life- and world-view upon the new theory of impetus was done first by Descartes in France and later by John Locke in England. Furthermore, when Newton began to look at celestial as well as terrestrial motions from the standpoint of the requirements of Galileo's new theory of impetus and doctrine of motion, the modern science of Mechanics as we find it developed

in Newton's *Principia*, *The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* was founded; and Kepler's previously verified three laws of planetary motion came out as logical consequences. Thus the previously separated sciences of astronomy and mechanics were shown to be one science rather than two. The heavenly bodies, considered by Aristotle to be divine, incorruptible, and different in kind from our own imperfect world, were thus brought into the range of man's enquiry, and were proved by Newton to work in one gigantic mathematical harmony in accordance with the dynamical principles established by the terrestrial experiments and inductions of Galileo and Newton.

One of the great tragedies of history is that this revolution in man's ways of thinking about the world in which he lives should have been resisted by so many Western Christians, because it was supposed that Newton's physics overthrew the authority of the Word of God. By allowing the glorious Gospel of Jesus Christ to become synthesized with Aristotle's pagan philosophy during the Middle Ages, the Western Church paid the price by losing the support of millions of modern men. As Alan Richardson suggests in his book *The Bible in the Age of Science*:

So well had Aquinas succeeded in Christianizing Aristotle that when the authority of Aristotle in the sphere of astronomy or physics was called in question, it seemed as though Christian truth itself was being impiously assailed. So completely had Aristotle and the Bible been harmonized in the medieval synthesis of natural and revealed theology that the overthrow of Aristotelian philosophy by the rise of modern science seemed to the Aristotelian philosophers, though not to the new scientists themselves, to involve the rejection of the biblical revelation as well. The one indubitable truth which we learn from a study of the history of philosophy is that of the impermanence of philosophical points of view. The world-view which the new scientific movement had to destroy before it could come to maturity was that based on Aristotle and Ptolemy; it was not derived from the Bible, and in the event, the Bible has continued to exercise authority over the minds of men long after Aristotle had been deposed.<sup>28</sup>

If this observation does not support Dooyeweerd's demand for a truly Christian and biblically-oriented philoso-

phy, this writer does not know what else would. Let the fate of our Christian forebears who tried to synthesize the Word of God with Aristotle's pagan world-view be always a warning to modern Christians not to fall into the same trap and attempt to synthesize the Word of God with the vain imaginings of apostate secular humanists. If the Church of God is to survive in the modern world it is imperative that she stop cohabiting with secular humanists and stand fast by the Word of God.

To be forewarned is said to be the condition of being forearmed. We shall therefore examine the secular humanist deductions drawn from the scientific revolution, always bearing in mind that however plausible such conclusions may appear, they are not necessarily and inevitably the only deductions and conclusions which can be drawn from the "facts." As Christians we take our point of departure for all our thinking in the Word of God written in the Holy Scriptures and thus we differ radically from all secular humanists who take their point of departure in their own reason. Our ordering principle in terms of which we see the "facts" revealed by modern scientific discovery differs radically from the ordering principles of apostate humanists.

#### B. Locke's Conception of Man and the State

John Locke and Rene Descartes were the first humanists to develop systematically the supposed philosophical consequences of modern science. Both men conceived of the nature of things as made up of the material objects of physical science which they termed material substances, and they conceived of human beings as mental substances, the remainder of experience being regarded as the product of the interaction of these two types of substances. Henceforth Western humanists would tend to conceive of the universe on the analogy of a gigantic machine and no longer on the medieval analogy of an organism.<sup>29</sup> In other words, modern thinkers suppose that nature's changes and processes are produced and directed not by final causes as Aristotle imagined but by efficient ones. Nature to these modern humanists appears as a system of physical objects

located in a public infinitely-extending absolute space. In order to carry this theory through in detail and to bring it into accord with the factual evidence, they found it necessary to identify the material substances of the new physics not merely with gross objects but also with the unobservable small particles termed atoms.

For these first "scientific humanists" the immediately apprehended colors, sounds, orders, and warmth experienced in normal life do not belong to the material objects of nature at all, but they are mere appearances projected back upon the material object by the observer. Newton carried this distinction between the "primary" and the "secondary" qualities of natural objects a step further. Not only are sensed heat, sensed colors, and sensed sounds mere appearances but also so are sensed time and sensed space. At the beginning of his *Principia* Newton states that the space in which the postulates of his physics locate the colorless, odorless, physical particles which make up the physical world is not the immediately sensed spatial extension and relation between sensed data which is a purely private space. Instead it is a single *public* space of nature which has the same mathematical geometrical properties always and everywhere regardless of the varying distorted sensed spaces which appear to different observers. Newton termed this public space absolute, true and mathematical space in contrast to the relative and apparent space of private individuals. Similarly, in Newton's physics time became postulated as being a *public* time which flows equally without relation to anything external.

From this teaching of Newton modern humanists have developed their religion of scientism, according to which the only reality which exists is this physical reality described by Newton's physics, because they assumed that the new physics revealed not a truth, but the complete and final and only real truth about the world.<sup>30</sup> What was the reality thus revealed? The answer that these humanists such as Locke and Descartes gave was that it was matter. Matter was the name given to what the physicists believed they were measuring. For Locke and Descartes the new physics suggested that the warmth we sense in the stove



and the fragrance which we smell in the rose do not belong to the material objects at all independently of the observer. In fact, the sensed qualities in sensed space and sensed time are not constituents of nature at all. For these devotees of scientism nature is composed of dead inert matter and of colorless, odorless, physical atoms located in public mathematical space and time which is quite different from the relative space and time which one immediately apprehends in experience. In this way the modern apostate view arose that the world of matter which the physicists studied is the *real* world in the true, full, and final sense of the word "world." Over against this real world stands the ordinary world of everyday experience—the world of concrete persons and things, events and institutions we daily come into contact with at work and at play. This latter world now came to be regarded as the world only of appearance, as opposed to the scientist's world of reality. The world of appearance soon became the "pre-scientific" way of viewing the world, while "logical" came to denote the methods of the scientists. According to Bertrand Russell the pre-scientific world is also the pre-logical world, the world as the "pre-scientific" mind viewed it, a primitive, undeveloped world of mere opinion and therefore unworthy of the modern humanist's support.<sup>31</sup> For the scientific humanist the real world is a world of matter in motion located in a public mathematical space and time which is quite different from the relative space and time which the ordinary man apprehends in his daily experience.

The effects of these ideas and especially of the Cartesian and Lockean doctrine of primary and secondary qualities upon modern secular humanistic "scientistic" thought have been of incalculable importance. They marked the particular step in that process of banishing man from the supposed "real" world of nature and his treatment as an effect of what happens in the latter which has been a constant feature of most modern humanistic philosophy.

Till the time of Galileo it had always been taken for granted that man and nature were both integral parts of a larger whole in which man's place was the more fundamental. Whatever distinctions might be made between

being and non-being, between primary and secondary, man was regarded as fundamentally allied with the positive and the primary. To all important ancient thinkers and medieval philosophers man was a genuine microcosm; in him was exemplified such a union of things primary and secondary as truly typified their relations in the vast macrocosm. Now it is proclaimed by Locke and Descartes that man is really outside the "real" world. Man is hardly more than a bundle of secondary qualities. For the first time in the history of Western thought man begins to appear as an irrelevant spectator and insignificant effect of the great mathematical system which is the substance of reality.

Given such a "scientistic" view of reality, it is not surprising that humanists have banished not only man from the place he formerly occupied but also God from his position as sovereign Creator of the universe. Medieval philosophy, attempting to solve the ultimate "why" of events instead of their immediate "how" and thus stressing the principle of final causality, had conceived of God as the Final Cause. God, as it were, headed up the whole teleological hierarchy of the Aristotelian forms as Pure Form while man was conceived as intermediate in reality and importance between God and the world. The final why of events in the latter could be explained mainly in terms of their use to man, the final why of human activities in terms of the eternal quest for union with God. Now with the superstructure from man up banished from the "real" world, the how of events being the sole object of exact study, there no longer appeared any place for final causality. The "real" world is simply succession of atomic motions in mathematical continuity. Under these circumstances, causality could, it was supposed by these apostate humanists, be lodged only in the motions of the atoms themselves, everything that happens being regarded as the effect solely of mathematical changes in these material elements. With final causality banished, God as Aristotelianism had conceived him was quite lost. The only way to keep him in the universe was to invert the Aristotelian-scholastic metaphysics and regard him as the first Efficient Cause or Creator of the atoms. God thus ceases to be the

supreme good in any important sense. He is appealed to merely to account for the first appearance of the atoms, the tendency becoming more and more irresistible as humanistic philosophy developed to lodge all further causality for every effect in the atoms themselves.

The English philosopher John Locke was the first modern humanist to work out the cultural consequences for politics and law of this new scientific religious ground-motive. According to this science ideal the whole of reality is nothing but material substances in public space and time acting upon mental substances to cause the latter to project sensed qualities in sensed space and sensed time as appearances. Consequently, Locke maintained that no alternative remained but to identify the soul of man and the political person with the mental substance since these are the only substances which have consciousness. The person's body on the other hand is an aggregate of material particles moving under the mechanistic laws of Newton's physics. Thus the individual person in his moral, religious, and political nature as a conscious being and in his subjective scientific status as an observer of nature is a single mental substance, whereas in his bodily nature he is an aggregate of many atoms of material substances. In Locke's legal theory this group of material substances which is the person's body is his property just as much as are the aggregates of material substances which are his house and land and clothes.<sup>32</sup>

Since a mental substance is an elementary entity without parts and quite independent of the material substances, it follows that the soul of man is quite unaffected by the dissolution of the body at its death. It is clear also that it is with one's mental substance, since it alone has consciousness, that religion must be concerned. Since any individual mental substance is a completely self-sufficient independent thing in no way requiring the existence of any other mental substances for its own conscious spiritual being and life, religion for Locke and succeeding liberal modernists tends to become a purely introspective private thing with respect to which the individual person is far better informed than any priest or church and hence the

only person who is a competent religious guide. Upon this basis the individual man alone, consulting his own mental substance introspectively, is the sole criterion of the correctness of his religion, and the religion of one man cannot be shown to be incorrect by an appeal to any other man's doctrine whether it be that of Thomas Aquinas or John Calvin. This conception of religion as being what a man does with his own solitariness differs as much from Reformed doctrine as it does from Roman Catholic doctrine. However, Locke's view of religion gave a new and revolutionary egocentric form to the emphasis upon individual conscience. It also provided humanists with a philosophical basis for their doctrine of complete religious toleration. Since each man is believed to be his own criterion of the truth, obviously it is useless to believe any longer that one particular church or body of persons has access to the truth any more than any other church or group of persons.

Because Locke's philosophical theory of a person as a mental substance prescribes no relation between the persons making up a society, he also taught that there are no social laws prescribed either by God or by nature. Hence no alternative remained for Locke but to regard the laws of ecclesiastical and civil government as mere conventions having their sole authority in the private introspectively-given opinions of the independent mental substances and their joint majority consent. Locke spoke of all people in the state of nature as subject to the law of reason. But this law of reason was given a new content quite different from the organic social principle of Scholasticism. For Aristotle and Aquinas man is by his very nature as an individual a social animal. He is in his essential nature and not merely as a result of his free consent expressed through a majority vote a political animal. For Locke on the other hand the basis for ecclesiastical or civil laws is quite different. Nature is made of material substances which, instead of entering into the teleological hierarchical order of medieval science, obey the purely mechanistic laws of Newton's physics; thus there is no basis for social laws in nature. As far as Locke is concerned the individual person is absolutely free and independent, and no principle

grounded in the nature of the mental substances and joining them to each other exists to give the state anything more than a conventional status. Thus for Locke and succeeding liberal rationalists all men are born free and equal and the origin and basis of government lies in the consent of the governed. In Locke's opinion man does not enter into the state because organic relations with other men enable one to express more fully one's moral, religious, and political nature as was the case in the classical and scholastic concept of the state. Instead the state is a necessary evil forcing one to give up part of the ideal good which is the complete independence and freedom of the individual in order the better to preserve one's property. As Locke and succeeding individualists conceive of it the state is the result of an "original compact" between sovereign free individuals who together conclude a compact in order the better to secure their rights and property. In the original compact men do not give up all their rights. They surrender only so much of their natural liberty as is necessary for the preservation of society; they give up the right they had in the state of nature of individually judging and punishing those who do them wrong, but they retain the remainder of their rights under the protection of the government they have agreed to establish.<sup>33</sup>

In this theory of the origin and nature of government Locke has replaced the medieval organic and functional theory of the state with an individualistic and mechanistic conception. For Locke what leads men to enter community and social life is nothing essential but merely outward economic and political convenience. Society is not organically necessary as supposed by Aristotle and Aquinas but only comes about through a social contract whereby each individual hopes to better safeguard his "natural" rights to "life, liberty and property."<sup>34</sup> For such individualistic rationalists the tie uniting individuals in society is thus merely external. As Dooyeweerd well says of this Lockean conception of the state:

Just as he resolved all complex Ideas into simple ones, so to him the free individual remained the central point of the civil state. Just as the entire preceding

Humanistic doctrine of natural law, Locke construed the transition from the natural state to the civil state by means of the social contract. The citizens had already possessed their inalienable rights of freedom and private property in the natural state, but they needed the social contract to guarantee them by an organized power. And this was the sole intention of this contract in the system of Locke. The civil state is no more than a company with a limited liability, designed for the continuation of the natural state under the protection of an authority. It is the constitutional state of the old liberalism, the state which has as its only goal the maintenance of the innate human rights of the individual.<sup>35</sup>

A society formed on such a basis is of course not a real community at all, but only a combination (and a selfish one at that) of a contractual character. It did not take long for other rationalists to extend this principle of a "social contract" to other forms of human community. Thus the marriage relationship in the English-speaking world came to be regarded in the course of the next two centuries as resting on a contract which could be broken at the pleasure of one or both parties. Why should one enter into a fundamental interdependence with another human being if every individual has the divine spark of reason already in himself. With this new rationalistic and individualistic frame of reference, community can never be on the same level of importance as autonomous individuality, but only something subordinate and casual.

However, such a view of the state well suited the needs of the rising class of industrial capitalists, merchant adventurers and business entrepreneurs who were seeking to overthrow the restrictions imposed upon them by the old medieval control of industry, trade and commerce as well as the more recent mercantilist policies of the Tudor and Stuart monarchs.<sup>36</sup> Locke's philosophy of the state as a "limited liability company" provided these new classes in British society with an ideology in terms of which they could justify their selfish business enterprises. In this way Locke may rightly be considered the father of the "laissez-faire, laissez aller" school of "classical" economics as well as of modern Anglo-Saxon secular individualistic liberalism.

Locke's individualistic conception of the role of the state as a night-watchman was soon allied with the political program of the classical school of economists which advocated the unrestricted free play of social forces in business and economic life. In this economic individualism, economic life became strongly rationalized and the mercantilist control of industry by the state was allowed to wither away.

This rationalistic liberal individualism inevitably led to anarchical consequences for man's life in society as outraged human nature took its revenge on the capitalist's and financier's callousness, indifference and irresponsibility to other men's sufferings and poverty. It is largely because of Locke's apostate teachings about the nature of man in society that Anglo-Saxon society, insofar as it has relinquished its Christian basis, appears to be in a state of latent anarchy and collapse.

By the middle of the nineteenth century a fierce reaction set in against this rationalistic individualism. Yet this collectivist reaction in its turn was worked out logically from a naturalistic presupposition. The apostate secular humanist alternative to rationalistic individualism is not a free community but primitive tribal collectivism. It is the depersonalized mass man, the man forming a mere particle of the social structure. Likewise, it is the centralized impersonal bureaucratic state which succeeds the decaying "limited liability" watchman state of so-called liberal democracy. Only where a strong federal system of government together with a strong Christian tradition had prevailed was it found possible to avoid this fatal alternative of individualism or collectivism and thus to avoid that sudden transition from a half anarchic individualism into a tyrannical tyranny. The American, British, and Canadian societies of the English-speaking world, which abhor the way taken by totalitarian Communist Russia and Red China do not yet seem to have grasped the lesson that if the process of de-Christianization and neutralizing of their culture goes on much longer within their societies, then they too will inevitably go the same way.

## C. Rousseau's Romantic Reaction to the Science Ideal

As we have just shown, the mechanistic picture of the universe constructed under the primacy of the nature-motive, aiming at man's scientific domination and control of his natural and social environment, created intolerable tensions within modern Western societies and reduced human beings to the narrowed-down view of man of Lockean anthropology. Thus the dialectical tension within the modern humanistic ground motive revealed itself in its true light. The science ideal, which had been evoked by the ideal of creative free personality, had led Western unbelievers in the course of only two hundred years to a deterministic image of nature which left no room for free autonomous personality. The ideal of science had gained the primacy over that of personality which had brought it forth at the time of the Renaissance. As Dooyeweerd points out:

The dialectical character of this humanist motive is clear. "Liberty" and "nature" are opposite motives, which, in their religious roots, cannot be reconciled. When all reality is conceived according to the motive of "nature," that is, within the cadre of the "image of the world" created by natural science, there remains in all reality no place for "autonomous and free personality." In Kant's "dualism" between "nature" and "liberty," science and belief, theoretic and practical Reason, this polarity of the humanist motive is clearly seen.<sup>37</sup>

In fact, Dooyeweerd interprets the whole history of modern apostate Western thought as the story of an incessant conflict between the two poles of this motive, as they are concretized in the humanist ideal of free individual personality emphasizing the religious ground motive of autonomous freedom of modern man from Almighty God on the one hand and the scientific ideal of scientific method and the sovereignty of technique emphasizing the motive of nature on the other. The pendulum of modern philosophy swings back and forth between the poles of these two religious ground motives.<sup>38</sup>

The tremendous development of the mathematical and physical sciences during the seventeenth and eighteenth



centuries led to such a crisis for modern post-Christian Western culture that in Rousseau and the Romanticists one witnesses a tremendous swinging back of the pendulum to the ideal of free personality. Thus Rousseau tried with all the eloquence at his command to transfer the seat of primacy from Nature back to the ideal of human freedom and he sought to locate the seat of such freedom in the modal aspect of feeling.

Since in Rousseau's world of thought this tension between the ideal of science and the ideal of free personality reached the proportions of religious crisis, we shall examine his teachings of man in society as epitomizing the dialectical tensions underlying the development of Western thought as a whole.

In 1750, in answer to the question posed by the Academy of Dijon, which offered a prize for the best response, Rousseau sent in his essay, *Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts*. This work at once established his European reputation. It marked the most passionate attack yet delivered upon Western rationalism, dominated as it had become by the sovereignty of technique and scientific method, and by its inevitable tendency towards the mechanization of all social relationships. From the beginning the humanistic ideal of science had implied a fundamental problem with respect to the relationship between scientific thought, stimulated by its Faustian passion for power and the autonomous freedom and value of man as a free individual person.

As Dooyeweerd says:

In the soul of Rousseau this problem attained such a tension, that he openly proclaimed the antinomy between the two polar motives of Humanistic thought. He did not eschew the consequences of disavowing the science ideal, in order to make possible the recognition of human personality as a moral aim in itself.<sup>39</sup>

Rousseau first made vocal the newly awakened fear that rational criticism, having demolished the more inconvenient pieties, dogmas, and disciplines of the Church, might not be able to stop before their criticism brought down the whole social order. Thus he writes:

If our sciences are futile in the objects they propose, they are no less dangerous in the effects they produce. Being the effect of idleness, they generate idleness in their turn; and an irreparable loss of time is the first prejudice which they must necessarily cause to society. . . .

These vain and futile declaimers go forth on all sides, armed with their fatal paradoxes, to sap the foundations of our faith, and nullify virtue. They smile contemptuously at such old names as patriotism and religion, and consecrate their talents and philosophy to the destruction and defamation of all that men hold sacred.<sup>40</sup>

In short, Rousseau believed that science unfettered from religious and moral values is dangerous because it undermines reverence and is destructive of faith and morality. The tremendous significance of Rousseau in the history of Western thought lies in the fact that he carried one wing of modern humanism with him. Kant acknowledged that Rousseau had first revealed to him the surpassing value of the moral will and the categorical imperative as compared with scientific inquiry; and Kant's philosophy, if not the beginning of a new age of faith, at least began a new division between natural science on the one hand and religion and morals on the other. Kant's critical philosophy led him to make a sharp separation between the realms of nature and freedom, the sphere of natural science and the sphere of autonomous personality. He tried to confine natural science to the phenomenal world, where it could not harm the verities of the human heart, religion, and the moral law. Thanks to Rousseau the distrust of intelligence was written large over the philosophy of the nineteenth century.<sup>41</sup>

In his recent study of Rousseau, Pierre Burgelin has advanced the interesting thesis that Rousseau spent his life in search of a new form of Christianity. Thus he writes:

What must be found is a new Christianity in a form adapted to our times, and that will lead man to his ends: happiness and wisdom. But what can man do? To that question Rousseau's answer remained ambiguous: it is the educational and political task of making a new man beyond us.<sup>42</sup>

Elsewhere Burgelin points his question by adding that Rousseau "a senti la necessite d'une miracle et d'une grace." Rousseau's message is intensely personal; it is the faith of an outsider, of a man self-absorbed, morbidly jealous of his independence, and yet eager for friendship and for love. While such men have no doubt always been common Rousseau was the first to produce a philosophy to suit his own needs. His philosophy is inspired, not by curiosity and by the need to understand and to put into good order, but by a need for self-justification and also for an ideal world where his troubled spirit could find peace. It is not, like other philosophies before it in Western civilization, an adjunct or support of Christianity, nor is it a revolt against Christianity in the name of reason; it is a personal philosophy which is a substitute for religion and the first of its kind. It uses reason more to attack other positions than to establish its own. Rousseau was seldom a close reasoner about religion and morals, except when his purpose was destructive; and his purpose was by no means always to destroy. He had many positive beliefs, moral and religious, which he was more concerned to proclaim and to exhibit than to justify on rational grounds.

*The Savoyard Vicar*, whose most intimate convictions are Rousseau's own, in his *Profession of Faith* "cannot understand how anyone can be a sceptic sincerely and on principle," for "doubt about what it behooves us to know is a condition too violent for the human mind, and cannot be long endured, so that the mind necessarily decides one way or another, preferring to be deceived than to believe nothing." The Vicar's method, in laying the foundation of his philosophy of life, though it looks on the surface something like the Cartesian method, is at bottom quite unlike it. He says that he will admit as "self-evident" what he cannot "honestly refuse to believe"; but he soon makes clear that he will take for certain whatever he strongly desires to be true, provided there are no good arguments against it. He uses reason less to support his faith than to clear the ground for it.<sup>43</sup>

The Vicar speaking in his author's name speaks with aversion of materialism and atheism, as if they were forms

more of vice than doctrines different from his own; or as if he could not bring himself to believe that anyone could honestly doubt what it seems to him so important should be true. He knows from experience that doubt about some things is oppressive and intolerable, and therefore takes it for granted that anyone who professes such doubts must be an impostor, if not worse. He believes that atheists are either frivolous or unnatural. At the same time, and with equal sincerity, he preaches a wide tolerance.

As a result of this ambiguity of a philosophy so personal and peculiar as Rousseau's, which rejects tradition and makes only a limited use of reason, which deliberately treats man's consolation as the final measure of truth, his message was paradoxically divided up among his heirs in the nineteenth century, to each according to his own spiritual need. Thus it appeared as traditional and revolutionary in the Gospel according to Chateaubriand and in the Gospel according to Michelet; in Mme. de Stael and Comte, in Hegel and Tolstoy.

Rousseau's search for a new form of Christianity or a new religion must be understood in the context in which that search was conducted at a period in history when the whole tradition of the West seemed on the point of disintegrating under the acid criticisms of modernity. He possessed an acute sense of the coming change in the relation between church and state, between religion and culture and the state. Thus he once said, "Religion, pure and undefiled, leads to a mysticism which is disinterested in the city. Politics unalloyed, and without a religious foundation, leads to slavery." With these words Rousseau puts both the Roman Catholic priests and the atheistic materialists out of court. For Rousseau the great question facing all Europe is to find a new religion or a new form of Christianity which should be at once pure, independent of the state, and yet its foundation.

According to Burgelin, this basic question is dealt with in *Emile* and *La Nouvelle Heloise* in the context of a discussion on education or, if one prefers, of Rousseau's anthropology. His bitterest attacks were directed against the rationalistic view of religion of the so-called "Enlighten-

ment." In this attack he correctly saw an attack upon the religious kernel of the humanistic ideal and worship of free personality. Thus his proclamation of the natural religion of sentiment was directed as much against the materialism of the French Encyclopedists as against the deism of the English Deists. He never wearied of telling his contemporaries that religion is not seated in man's head, but in his "heart." Abstract science may not encroach upon the holy contents of human feeling. He therefore combated the rationalistic associational psychology of Hume which had excluded the soul from its sphere of investigation. And his opposition was marked by a passion which can only be understood in terms of an ultimate religious reaction of the humanistic ideal of free personality over against the impersonal tyranny of the science ideal. As Rousseau saw it, the scientific attitude towards life had robbed Western life of all its poetry, romance, and meaning. Man was born free, but everywhere in Europe he was being reduced to the level of an insignificant slave of technology and production. The freedom of every sovereign individual personality ought to be recognized equally in all individuals, yet Western culture was coming to be dominated by sovereign science in all spheres of life. It had not made good its promise to redeem humanity proclaimed by Francis Bacon, Descartes, and Voltaire. Science had not brought freedom but slavery, inequality, and exploitation. Man's conquest of Nature had in effect meant some men's conquest of all other men.

In Rousseau's doctrine of man human nature is inherently good; if its expressions are perverted, the reason lies in the artificiality of existing social structures which prevent it from expressing itself freely. He argued that men's minds were split and tormented by the pressures of society upon them and they could only be made whole again if the community was more perfectly united, and where a common faith and loyalty that would hold men together would also make them self-reliant and free. Now, in principle, what is artificial is the product of artifice, that is to say, of reason conceived as the capacity for constructing artifacts. Consequently, Rousseau finds the bond of society in

man's animal nature and the source of hostility and conflict between men in reason. The way of salvation therefore lies in getting back to "Nature" and allowing the natural goodness of human impulses to determine the form of society. He therefore looked to a change in social conditions for the abolition of all forms of evil and exploitation and proposed "to take men as they are and states as they ought to be," proclaiming thereby that there is no need for men to repent of their sins but only for a radical re-organization of political and social conditions.

In his famous work *Du Contrat Social ou Principes du Droit Politique* he formulated the problem which this new program involved as follows:

The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.<sup>44</sup>

Rousseau attempted to solve this problem by means of his theory of the "social contract" which in order to be valid must include precisely the clause that each individual delivers himself with all his natural rights to all, collectively, and thus through becoming subject to the whole by his participation in the "general will" gets back all his natural rights in a higher juridical form. He says of this social contract:

These clauses, properly understood, may be reduced to one—the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community; for, in the first place, as each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all; and, this being so, no one has any interest in making them burdensome to others.<sup>45</sup>

According to Rousseau, the inalienable right of freedom maintains itself in the inalienable sovereignty of the people, which can never be transferred to the magistrate. The sovereign will of the ordinary common people he terms "the general will," which expresses itself in legislation. As such it must be sharply distinguished from the will of all. For the "general will" should be directed exclusively toward the general interest; it is therefore incompatible with the exist-

ence of private associations which stand between the individual and the state, because they foster particularism. At this point Rousseau expressly appeals to Plato's ideal state.

The "general will" is, by Rousseau's definition, always right. It is the common will of the people. If man himself is the only criterion for moral and political behavior, then the benefit of the majority of men in a given community becomes irresistible. Instead of our doing good to others, it is they who do good to us by allowing us to exist. He says:

In order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures him against all personal dependence.<sup>46</sup>

This quotation not merely states clearly Rousseau's doctrine that the general will confers freedom on individuals by constraining them; it explains the grounds on which he maintained it. The general will is my own free will. Hence, in obeying it, I realize my own real nature understood in Aristotle's teleological terms, and I am truly free, even though this entails my consenting to my own execution. It is important to notice that what I consent to is the operation of a general law. There is nothing personal about it, and that is why it should cause me no resentment. Rousseau's ideal was that life in society should approximate as closely as possible to what he conceived to be a "natural" condition of existence under knowable laws of nature. The laws of the state should, in theory, be fixed and unalterable like the law of gravitation. If they are this, they may be held to enlarge and not to restrict freedom, since they can be taken into account and turned to advantage as gravitation can be, in the planning of a rational life. Dependence on things is not servitude; dependence on human beings is. According to Rousseau the state is a "moral person whose life is in the union of its members, and if the most important of its cares is the care for its own preservation,

it must have a universal and compelling force, in order to move and dispose each part as may be most advantageous to the whole. As nature gives each man absolute power over all his members, the social compact gives the body politic absolute power over all its members also; and it is this power which, under the direction of the general will, bears . . . the name of Sovereignty."<sup>47</sup> It is, therefore, not surprising to find that in Rousseau's doctrine the state cannot be in any way restricted by its own laws. The general will remains always sovereign. Hence the right of the state to modify its own constitution must remain unquestioned. As he claims: "the most general will is always the most just also, and *the voice of the people is in fact the voice of God*."<sup>48</sup>

With these ominous words, Rousseau, the so-called apostle of human freedom, ushered in the age of apostate totalitarian democracy. His religion stands revealed as the deification of society in opposition to the liberal individualistic deification of the individual. Rousseau invented modern democracy. He invented first the dogma that every man has an equal right to a say in government, and secondly, that democracy alone has the right to silence its critics or opponents—a doctrine applied by the one-party state of the so-called Russian and Chinese "peoples' democracies" and with less ruthlessness in the two-party state of the Anglo-Saxon democracies.

By means of this doctrine of the universal or general will, Rousseau provided the French intelligentsia of his day with what they most badly wanted, a means of translating their dreams of a Heavenly City constructed out of their own rationalistic humanist dreams into practical politics. During the second half of the eighteenth century the French intelligentsia had become obsessed with a search for a single principle of existence, a principle which would explain the functioning of the universe and establish a criterion for the judgment of all moralities. In short, they wanted to discover the naturalistic and scientific equivalent for the Christian revelation they had discarded. As Carl Becker neatly puts it in his important study of *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*, "The Philosophes



demolished the Heavenly City of St. Augustine only to rebuild it with more up-to-date materials.”<sup>49</sup>

This passion to rebuild the City of Man along the lines suggested by Bacon and Locke was satisfied temporarily in the idea of utility, which explained human actions in terms of the operation of a single urge towards happiness and postulated that goodness consisted not in obeying the will of God revealed in the Holy Scriptures but in the promotion of all men's happiness by obeying the dictates of right reason.

The immediate practical difficulty which this theory encountered when first advocated by Holbach and Helvetius—the most important of the French *philosophes*—was the incompatibility between what some men regarded as their happiness and what others regarded as theirs. The theory started with the belief that all men's selfish interests could be reconciled, and indeed that the universe was so constituted as to make them fundamentally harmonious. All conflicts of interest and desire had therefore to be explained away as the consequence of sin. If the universe could be reduced to ordered rules by Newton's science, then they believed that human nature too could be brought within a single pattern, and they sought a universal law of political gravitation by which they could restore the order of human society to its original purity.

When this theory broke down, the need for the deliberate or, as it was called, artificial “identification of interests” became apparent. The search for a scientific morality developed into the search for a scientific scheme of legislation. Some thinkers put their faith in legal or economic reform requiring the removal of all impediments to individual initiative, and the sweeping away of all social, legal, and religious privileges. Others looked to education to teach men to see through superstition and convention to where their true interests lay, in the belief that once they had discovered this, harmony between men would ensue. All these liberal rationalists held in common the conviction that somewhere or other a discoverable panacea for all human evils existed. The function of the legislator and

the moralist was simply to unfold and apply the reconciling principle embedded in the constitution of the universe.

The great achievement of J. L. Talmon in his crucial work *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* was to have revealed the decisive part played by Rousseau in this process of French political thought. His great contribution, according to Talmon, was to add to this faith in a universal pattern of order his idea of the universal will with the result that order was no longer thought of as an abstract idea but as a principle *immanent* in society. Henceforth, the natural order was not conceived as a thing external to man, as a model or a guide to human action, but as a thing inanimate in man. Utopia was not something for the philosopher to construct and the statesman to impose, but something which was already being willed by the people of Europe and which would come about once their "general will" was allowed to be effected. Thus Rousseau gave to his century and the Enlightenment the dynamic quality which transformed it into a revolutionary faith. Once the mystical idea of the general will was born, once society was credited with the common will, superior to the will of its individual members, eighteenth century rationalism became an instrument of revolutionary violence instead of benevolent despotism. Thus Talmon, writes:

A vital shift of emphasis from cognition to the categorial imperative takes place. The sole, all-explaining and all-determining principle of the philosophes, from which all ideas may be deduced, is transformed into the Sovereign, who cannot by definition err or hurt any of its citizens. Man has no other standards than those laid down by the social contract. He receives his personality and all his ideas from it. The State takes the place of the absolute point of reference embodied in the universal principle.<sup>50</sup>

Talmon maintains that the most important characteristic of Rousseau's political theory was that it treated the will of the people, not as something to be ascertained by discussion and consent, but as something which already exists, which can be discussed by reason, and which it is the business of government to translate into practice. The popular will was not something arbitrary to be elicited by

voting, a compromise or amalgam of individual wills, but a mystical force. All legitimate government was the servant and executor of this general will. Talmon shows that there was considerable disagreement among Rousseau's disciples and much confusion in Rousseau's mind about what political machinery should be used for discovering the general will of the people, but they agreed on one thing: it was not to be discovered by the machinery of parliamentary government. All parliaments were held to be naturally predisposed to a sectional or sectarian view of policy. Any settled institution or corporation, national or local, would necessarily acquire traditions, prejudices, and interests which would blind it to the interests of man conceived as a universal abstraction. Accordingly, Rousseau favored, wherever possible, direct democracy, or what is today called the principle of the mandate. Suspicious of everything which stands between the people and the execution of their general will, Rousseau was therefore hostile to all representative institutions. The people, Rousseau maintained, could never be adequately represented, since parliaments inevitably became vested interests and their members inevitably usurped the sovereignty of the electorate. True democracy was plebiscitary. It must aim at getting popular sanction for a detailed program and establishing an executive strong enough to carry that program out with the least possible delay. Yet the popular will must not be identified with the will of the majority. Only when the people voted with disinterested purity, only when their minds were fixed on their interests as citizens, not as members of particular constituencies or corporations, could the real will be elicited by counting votes. The popular will was in fact the old natural order endowed with a soul and dressed up for the barricades. It was a purpose held to be supported by a mystical driving force. Popular measures were not essentially measures approved by the people, but measures which it was the people's interest to approve and which therefore could be forced down their throats without diminishing their liberty.

Talmon next proves beyond any further dispute that these ideas of Rousseau provided direct inspiration for the

French Revolution, working themselves out in the Jacobin clubs which conceived of themselves as repositories of the people's will, in the revolutionary suspicion of the French *parlements* as mere vested interests masquerading under the fiction of representation, and in Robespierre's Self-Denying Ordinance forbidding members of the Constituent Assembly to stand for re-election lest they should acquire the characteristics of a close corporation. To keep the people's will effective, the French revolutionaries discouraged the formation of settled institutions. Only when society was kept in a state of perpetual ferment and upheaval would popular direct government be possible. Finally, Talmon shows how war and famine made the Jacobins take Rousseau's theory a stage further, adding to it the theory of the revolutionary vanguard. Since a strong executive was needed, the Committee of Public Safety had to justify its existence by presenting itself as a provisional dictatorship acting as ward and steward of the people's interests until the people should be educated into a proper sense of what their interests were, and until the enemies of the Revolution had been extinguished. What later came to be called in Marxist theory the dictatorship of the proletariat had thus already become elaborated in detail in the course of the French Revolution. Until the Revolution should be secure against its enemies, government should be conceived as an emergency measure. No limit could be placed on their competence, because in an emergency everything necessary to the safety of the state is right. In order to keep the revolutionary spirit alive and to achieve that degree of social cohesion necessary to the victory of the Revolution, the people must be made constantly to feel that they were living in a besieged fortress. They must be taught the inevitability and naturalness of civil conflict. They must understand that peace and stability are boons reserved for Utopia and that in the meantime the order of the day must be strife and suspicion. They must never be allowed to forget the enemy within the gates or to lose sight of the truth that they are engaged in a battle *a outrance*. Only perfect victory can save them from complete defeat. Talmon's quotations from the speeches of the rev-

olutionary leaders provide striking anticipations of contemporary communist utterances and prove conclusively his thesis that all the essential elements in Marxism were already visible and explicit in the French Revolution. Rousseau rather than Karl Marx must thus be awarded the title of father of modern totalitarian democracy.

Talmon's thesis was bound to shock all those modern liberals and humanists who had regarded the French Revolution as the beginning of modern liberalism.<sup>51</sup> In his discussion of its economic doctrines, Talmon shows how this impression was given. Many of the revolutionary thinkers, including Rousseau, believed in property, and of course the most lasting achievement of the Revolution was the creation of a powerful class of peasant proprietors. Many revolutionaries held what today would be called a philosophy of Chestertonian distributism. Revolutionary economic theory, however, was in fact a mixture of economic individualism and mercantilist restrictionism. Those who upheld the right to private property did so for essentially socialistic reasons, not on grounds of prescriptive right, but as a concession from the state which the state could withdraw. Even when property was defended by the revolutionaries they did so against the background of their philosophy of political messianism. Property was a useful or necessary institution to be preserved for social reasons and subject to conditions to be enforced by the state. Thus the spirit of revolutionary theory regarding property was in the last analysis socialistic. According to Talmon the centralizing tendencies of the Revolution operated as powerfully against property as against all other institutions resting on prescription, and its internal logic eventually led to Babeuf and his conspiracy to establish a communist state. In the process, the struggle between revolution and reaction became converted into class war and the foundations for Marxism were thus fully laid by the year 1798. Babeuf's plot failed, but the road, which modern apostate liberalism and humanism were to travel towards Communist and Nazi totalitarianism in the twentieth century, had already been mapped out.<sup>52</sup>

Talmon's moral is that all these consequences flowed directly if not inevitably from the eighteenth-century preoccupation with the idea of natural order. The attempt to build out of a body of initial assumptions about the nature of man a universal code of political conduct led inevitably to totalitarianism. Nothing which fell short of rational perfection in politics could be tolerated. There must be no unresolved conflicts and no loose ends. Once it became apparent that these results could not be achieved simply by the removal of all barriers to individual effort, once the state became accepted as the reconciler of interests, and once the conception of a natural harmonious order of things was translated into the language of the real will, the way was cleared for the development of a complete doctrine of totalitarian democracy.

#### D. The Religious Significance of the French Revolution

##### 1. Edmund Burke's Interpretation

As the translation into political action of the rationalist doctrine of man and society, the French Revolution can only be properly understood as an apostate *religious* movement bent on overturning the moral order of God's Law-Order for man in the name of the goddess Reason. Inspired by the new rationalist religion of faith in reason, the men of the French Revolution were determined to apply the theories of the previous two hundred years of European rationalism. Of the Age of Reason Charles Frankel once wrote:

In the view of historians, the general pattern of the Age of Reason can now be identified. Its unity of purpose had a decisive effect on the course of subsequent historical development. The special effort of the Enlightenment was to find a foundation in every field, from the profane sciences to revelation, from music to morals, and theology to commerce, such that thinking and action could be made independent of speculative metaphysics and supernatural revelation. Religion was treated mainly as an appendage to morals and discussed as though it were a part of physics. History was written to place European life in balanced perspective among other ways of life, none of which

enjoyed the special sanction of God. In politics the conception of divine right and supernatural providence were replaced by the "social contract," so that governments could be evaluated as instruments of human desire. In moral philosophy the effort was made to base moral codes on Natural Law or the well established facts of human psychology.<sup>53</sup>

As we have already seen in our study of Rousseau's political theory, this program was developed in his theory of the general will by means of which he hoped that governments could be used as the instruments of human desire. This writer thinks that Talmon has conclusively proved that Rousseau gave to the French Revolution its definitive character, that is, its tendency to the abstract organization of an abstractly conceived morality and politics. As such, Rousseau is considered by liberal humanists as the writer par excellence of liberal democracy. Yet Ernst Cassirer has shown that the basic ideas of his political philosophy are largely to be found in the writings of Locke, Grotius and Pufendorf. He writes:

In Rousseau's conception of the aim and method of political philosophy, in his doctrine of the indefeasible and inalienable rights of men, there is hardly anything that has not its parallel and model in the books of Locke, Grotius or Pufendorf. The merit of Rousseau and his contemporaries lies in a different field. They were much more concerned about political *life* than political doctrine. They did not want to prove, but to affirm and apply the first principles of man's social life.<sup>54</sup>

Where might these first principles of social life be found? The answer is in the great rationalistic movement of thought of the seventeenth century known as Rationalism. According to Cassirer:

The political rationalism of the seventeenth century was a rejuvenation of Stoic ideas. This process began in Italy, but after a short time it spread over the whole of European culture. In rapid progress Neo-Stoicism passed from Italy to France; from France to the Netherlands; to England, to the American colonies. . . . When Thomas Jefferson, in 1776, was asked by his friends to prepare a draft of the American *Declaration of Independence* he began it by the famous

words: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." When Jefferson wrote these words he was scarcely aware that he was speaking the language of Stoic philosophy. This language could be taken for granted; for since the times of Lipsius and Grotius it had a common place with all the great political thinkers. The ideas were regarded as fundamental axioms that were not capable of further analysis and in no need of demonstration. For they expressed the essence of man and the very character of human reason. The American *Declaration of Independence* had been preceded and prepared by an even greater event: by the intellectual Declaration of Independence that we find in the theoreticians of the seventeenth century. It was here that reason had first declared its power and its claim to rule the social life of man. It had emancipated itself from the guardianship of theological thought; it could stand on its own ground.<sup>55</sup>

In what sense was "reason" here understood. The answer is in the sense given to it by Descartes. As we saw, according to Descartes, geometry is the true pattern of reasoning. In geometry all successive steps of reasoning can be proved by logical deduction; the starting points are certain innate ideas, bearing in themselves the light of truth. This body of innate ideas Descartes had called the ratio or *lumen naturale* or light of nature, nature here being understood in the sense of man's rational nature. According to Evan Runner we find in this Cartesian appeal to ratio or reason the key to the religious and revolutionary character of the Age of Enlightenment and the Age of Revolution. He writes:

This *ratio* is not just our human power of understanding. It is the understanding, directed by supposed *a priori* or innate ideas, considered as the original Light and Truth that shows us how to "go," how to conduct our lives. The ratio or Reason of the Rationalist is more than mere rational thinking; in this concept rational thought contains within itself the Principium of our life which directs all our ways. This concept is



the result of apostate religion; it is a repressing substitute for the Word of God, the true Principium, which leads us into ways of salvation. It is thus an idol. . . . In this modern rationalism . . . men have replaced God's own sovereign and gracious word of redemption with their own deepest, rational self as the Light, the Law-word, the directing Principle of our entire life. This was true not only of the "world" of physical things, but also of the "worlds" that aesthetics and ethics deal with, and also with the "world" of political life.<sup>56</sup>

Of this rationalism in politics Michael Oakeshott has well said that it today has come to color the ideas not merely of one, but of all political persuasions and to overflow every party line. Of the general character and cast of mind of the rationalist in politics Oakeshott writes:

At bottom he stands for independence of mind on all occasions, for thought free from obligation to any authority save the authority of reason . . . he is the enemy of authority, of prejudice, of the merely traditional, customary or habitual. His mental attitude is at once sceptical and optimistic; sceptical, because there is no opinion, no habit, no belief, nothing so firmly rooted or so widely held that he hesitates to question it and to judge it by what he calls his reason; optimistic, because the Rationalist never doubts the power of his reason (when properly applied) to determine the value of a thing or the truth of an opinion. Moreover, he is fortified by a belief in a reason common to mankind, a common power of rational consideration, which is the ground and inspiration of argument; set up on his door is the precept of Parmenides, "Judge by rational argument." He does not neglect experience, but he often appears to do so because he insists always upon a personal investigation (wanting to begin everything *de novo*), and because of the rapidity with which he reduces the tangle and variety of experience to a set of principles which he will then defend only upon rational grounds. If we except religion, the greatest apparent victories of Rationalism have been in politics; it is not to be expected that whoever is prepared to carry his rationalism into the conduct of life will hesitate to carry it into the conduct of affairs.<sup>57</sup>

Oakeshott then suggests three main characteristics of rationalist politics. In the first place, the conduct of affairs

for the Rationalist becomes a matter of solving problems. In this respect he likes to think of himself in the capacity of an engineer, whose mind supposedly is controlled throughout by the appropriate technique. "This assimilation of politics to engineering is, indeed, what may be called this myth of rationalist politics. . . . The politics it inspires may be called the politics of the felt need; for the Rationalist, politics are always charged with the feeling of the moment. He waits upon circumstance to provide him with his problems, but rejects its aid in their solution."<sup>58</sup>

Secondly, rationalist politics are the politics of perfection. The rationalist just cannot imagine a problem which would remain impervious to attack by his own reason. "What he cannot imagine is politics which do not consist in solving problems, or a political problem of which there is no rational solution. Such a problem must be counterfeit. And the rational solution of any problem is, in its nature, the perfect solution."<sup>59</sup>

From the politics of perfection there inevitably springs the politics of uniformity. For the rationalist "the remedy for any particular ill is as universal in its application as it is rational in its conception." According to Oakeshott the modern history of Europe is littered with the projects of the politics of Rationalism, and he suggests as good examples Robert Owen's scheme for a "world convention to emancipate the human race from ignorance, poverty, division, sin and misery" and the projects of the so-called Reunion of the Christian Churches, of open diplomacy, of a single tax, of a civil service whose members have no qualifications other than their personal abilities, of a self-consciously planned society, the Beveridge Report, Federalism, Votes for Women, and the World State of H. G. Wells or anyone else.<sup>60</sup>

Oakeshott rightly believes that modern rationalism springs from the Cartesianism and Baconian doctrine that the only valid knowledge is technical knowledge, that is, knowledge that is susceptible of formulation in rules, principles, directions, maxims, and propositions of the geometrical sort. "Rationalism is the assertion that . . . practical knowledge is not knowledge at all, the assertion that, prop-

erly speaking, there is no knowledge which is not technical knowledge . . . . The sovereignty of reason, for the Rationalist, means the sovereignty of technique."<sup>61</sup> Oakeshott thinks that the deeper motivations which encouraged and developed this faith in rationalism are embedded in the recesses of European society. Among its other connections he suggests that "it is closely allied with a decline in the belief in Providence; a beneficent and infallible technique replaced a beneficent and infallible God; and where Providence was not available to correct the mistakes of man it was all the more necessary to prevent such mistakes."<sup>62</sup>

Refusing to be directed by the Word of God in their political and social life, Western men for three hundred years have instead acted upon the assumption that their rational faculties can produce a common conception of law and social order which possesses a universal validity. This natural law or law of human rational nature is a rational order of human society "in the sense that all men, when they are sincerely and lucidly rational, will regard as self evident."<sup>63</sup>

Part of the responsibility for this development must be ascribed to the divisions within European society caused by the conflict between the Church of Rome and the Churches of the Reformation. No longer able to find an order of universal agreement based on a common confession of Christian dogma, many leading thinkers instead tried to build a stable European society upon such principles as could readily be acknowledged by every nation, creed and sect. The ancient Stoic theory of universal and necessary truths of reason, a secularized form of natural law theory, offered itself as the only hope of salvation. The foundation for European culture was now asserted to rest in the *a priori* ideas of every man in his capacity as a rational rather than a religious being. Of this development, Evan Runner writes:

It is possible for us to see how fundamental a thing this theory of rationalism is in the history of modern Western man. It is so fundamental an "idea" that it leads to a reconstruction (revolution) of European society in its entirety. In the concept of Reason man assures himself with respect to the two basic (and re-

lated) needs of *certainty* and *community*. Conceived as having his most essential roots in this Ratio, man is the sovereign possessor of Truth. . . . He is basically at home in a world that yields up its secrets to rational penetration. There is no need of salvation; man is right with his world. And, as to the future, he is wholly confident of his gradually increasing control of his environment by means of rational technical techniques. It is just a question of working out the details. There is no *revelatory* light of a Creation-order. There is no Order to which he was created. Reason, as original Light, can ignore any question as to a Light of Creation. It generates its own Order out of itself as *creative thought*. It *makes* its world. Being always and everywhere the same, it will ultimately produce One World. The kingdom of blessed souls, i.e., the kingdom of good or right-thinking men, is assured if only we act in accordance with reason. Proceeding by its light, men will progress onwards and upwards until they achieve a *natural*, earthly and common City of Man. . . . The possibility of community resides not in a conversion and common obedience to Christ, but in a working out of our commonly shared rationality. . . .

If all this is involved in the new "mind" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we can well understand the enthusiastic processions to the "shrine" of the goddess of Reason that characterized the hey-day of the French Revolution. And we can see why this Revolution can serve, not only as a point of orientation, but also as a kind of *norm* for fixing the meanings of the political movements of the last two centuries. For then the French Revolution is indeed fundamentally the breaking out into the open, everyday, practical life of mankind of man's religious abandonment in his heart of the Law of God and his substitution for that of the law of his own creative rational thought. Then Burke and Groen van Prinsterer are right that the Revolution has crucially to do with the radical religious direction of man's life on earth.<sup>64</sup>

In 1796 Edmund Burke warned his generation that the French Revolution was not just a change of dynasty such as history had repeatedly given us to see, but a new kind of political event in the history of mankind. It was obviously a reaction against the injustices of the Ancien Regime, but it went much deeper than that. It was nothing less than a revolt of men against a moral order that they had not

themselves put there, a revolt against the divine order of God's creation. "It is not France extending a foreign empire over other nations; it is a *sect* aiming at universal empire, and beginning with the conquest of France."

For two generations apostate Western liberal humanists have tried to persuade Christians that Burke was simply the exponent of practical politics opposed to the intrusion of moral principles into political affairs and decisions. They have presented Burke as a practical conservative statesman, sceptical of utopias, dedicated to the view that politics is the art of the possible, contemptuous of "*starry-eyed idealism*."<sup>65</sup>

In his important book *The Moral Basis of Burke's Political Thought*, Charles Parkin has proved that Burke is more than just a man of the world with an empirical conservative political bent. According to Parkin, Burke's objection to the French Revolution was moral and religious, not merely prudential; he denounced the French revolutionaries not as impractical men but as wicked men; his whole theory of politics rested not simply on the assertion that it is unwise to try to be perfect but on the proposition that the pursuit of political perfection and the salvation of man by political methods is immoral, unchristian and a subverting of God's creation. Burke offered, in short, not merely a series of clever conservative maxims about the proper way to conduct the affairs of states but a moral basis for political thought and action. In Burke's opinion, "The principles of true politics are those of morality enlarged."<sup>66</sup>

Superficially considered, Burke has been described as a theorist of natural law, of prescription, and of utility. According to Parkin, Burke's political thought does indeed contain elements of these doctrines but they are all expressed within the context of his Christian morality. Thus he believed that there were rights which men have purely by virtue of their humanity and he deduced those rights by the method of presupposing a divinely-ordained harmony in which each God-given capacity will fulfill a necessary function in relation to the rest and in which all will be subordinated to a common end. The revolutionaries whom he attacked based their beliefs precisely on these notions,

though their concept of natural order was formulated in a way which gave more emphasis to rights than duties. Yet Burke is to be found attacking them, so the liberal humanist textbooks have taught, in the name of prescription or tradition; that is to say, he is to be found opposing history to reason, the arbitrary to the rational. In his speeches on the American colonies, on the other hand, it is prescription which is under fire; it is condemned not in the name of reason but in the name of utility. Burke will have nothing to do with arguments either for empire or for independence which rest simply on the ground of legality or inherited custom, nor will he have anything to do with such of the arguments of either side as are founded on abstract conceptions of natural right.

Taking these three apparent inconsistencies in turn, Parkin shows that Burke's conception of the natural order differs radically from that of the revolutionaries in three essential ways. (1) It is infinitely more complex, compatible with the recognition of the intrinsic value of peculiarities of character and tradition. (2) It is regarded not as an ideal to be aimed at but as a source of actually valid law determining not merely the proper objects of political action but also the limits within which political action must be contained. The nature of man is complicated and the just order of human affairs which is to be deduced from it will be equally so; particular men and nations are not merely integral parts in a universal order to be entirely explained by the ends which they serve, but rather they have characteristics peculiar to themselves and valuable in themselves, so that to perceive the principle of order without at the same time understanding and respecting these characteristics is to be guilty of a fatal half-truth. (3) Finally, the principles of behavior to be inferred from this order are actually binding, in the sense that they immediately command obedience irrespective of speculations about the consequences. If a particular course of action may with certainty be known to be a breach of the law of nature, no calculation of future advantage will justify it according to Burke, whereas according to the revolutionaries the natural order will not become fully operative until history has

reached its consummation, and until then the criterion of political action must be the calculation of how the consummation of history can be most speedily achieved.

How, then, do prescription and utility fit into this formula? The key is to be found, as Parkin emphasizes, in Burke's distinction between divine and human reason. It is one thing to assert that there is a rational order immanent in creation; it is another to assert that the nature of that order is immediately accessible to the particular reasoning power of a man or a body of men standing at a particular point in history and encumbered by all the prejudices which that implies. In making political judgments men should not depend solely on their own private stock of wisdom but should compare its contents with the wisdom of their forefathers.

It is not, of course, that ancestral wisdom has infallibility; the views of past generations will have as much of selfishness and irrationality in them as those of contemporaries. But human presumption is such that it is almost always more pertinent to point out that contemporary fashion is as liable to error as past fashion. Sometimes, beneath the surface, a valuable consensus may be found, and this on purely arithmetical grounds may claim some authority; sometimes the bias of our own age may be corrected by checking our novelties against our inheritance. Always—and this is the most important factor in Burke's belief in tradition—we shall learn more of what we are by studying the process of our becoming, and it is what we are that indicates not only what we can become but also what we are intended to become, since history in Burke's view is the arena in which, by the operation of nemesis, the judgments of God are administered. Explaining Burke's view of history, Parkin says:

History is the record of Nature, the known march of the ordinary Providence of God. Men attain to the moral reason in their collective experience, they realize and embody it in their stable social relations and organization. The higher reason is not grasped in an abstract vision or a formula, but in a way of life, a communal wisdom . . . . An understanding of the science of government requires more experience than any per-

son can gain in the whole of his life, however sagacious or observing he may be. The social order is the cumulative result of many individual reasons in their search for the higher moral reason, of the thoughts of many minds in many ages. This does not mean that it is the product of mere animal evolution of instinctive or unconscious forces which override men's moral choices and conscious deliberations; it rests on a unified action of mind and feeling participating in the Providential Order. It is the prerogative of man to be in a great degree a creature of his own making.<sup>67</sup>

In Burke's mind, the function of a proper reverence for the past is to protect human reason against error and partiality in its attempt to approximate to the divine reason. He is not a rigid reactionary and he recognizes that our respect for the past must not stand in the way of change in the present. The statesman must be aware that he stands in an arena of change and that he cannot stem the flux by an unthinking defence of the traditional order. According to Burke, change is the essence of political life, as of all nature. There is bound to be change; a state without the means of change is without the means of conservation. Burke therefore teaches that the statesman must be prepared to undertake political reformation; yet such reform must not be arbitrary or total or destructive change; it should be reform designed to reembody unchanging moral principles in new circumstances, the preservation of the principles of continuity and differentiation and of a balance between what is permanent in the structures of society with what is merely contingent. According to Parkin's exposition:

It is therefore a fundamental requirement of political reformation that it should combine the two principles of conservation and correction. Those who set out to reform the state must assume something to be reformed. Genuine reformation will accept the unchanging moral foundations of society and seek to recover and reestablish them in the temporal process; it will preserve the substance of the object, the institution in question, not altering its essential nature . . . . The reform of the state must make use of existing materials . . . . Such reform is dictated by felt needs; it is an application of remedies to specific grievances. In this, it is a natural renovation because it is a response to



the demands of the moral order in the existing situation . . . . It is the opposite of that false violent reformation which so far from being a response to the pressure of the Providential order is a revolt against it. This revolt is a craving for a change in itself, as novelty, springing not from genuine grievance, but from a perverse discontent with the conditions of human life . . . .

This dual capacity, a disposition to preserve and an ability to improve, taken together are the standard of a statesman. A genuine sense of the moral achievement of our ancestors, in statesmen and in communities, must be inseparable from the awareness of the moral challenge of the present. The reason for our respect for the wisdom of antiquity must preclude us from surrendering ourselves wholly to its tutelage. What is venerated in the past is not just a human wisdom whose operation has ceased with the disappearance of its possessors . . . . It is the evidence of a superhuman wisdom, and this does not languish or fail. Belief in the embodiment of the Providential order in the past is inseparable from belief in its latent presence in the present; the two convictions stand or fall together. The moral order is not only visible in the achievement of the past; it is immanent in our own lives and we are called upon to discern it and to cooperate with it.<sup>68</sup>

What then of Burke's doctrine of utility? Since human reason and prescription both stand under judgment, mere experiment, the observation of effects, must have its place in forming political beliefs. Reason may say that kings have a right to tax their subjects and custom may fortify the conclusion, but if it is apparent that as a result of applying the conclusion an empire will be disrupted, there is at least a pressing case for reviewing the arguments by which it was reached.

Failure is a formidable argument against a policy. But in Burke's opinion it is not a decisive argument; a failure may be merely apparent; a disaster may be an inevitable part of the process by which history or Providence is seeking to drive men to a knowledge of where their true peace lies. Above all, it will be manifestly wrong to suffer what looks like a breach of morality in the interests, not of preserving a known good, but of achieving a hypothetical gain. There are times when an apparently unshakable

argument of expediency may have to bow to a moral dogma. Confronted by a choice of this kind, Burke's first reaction is to assert that it must be illusory; when morality and utility are in conflict the human interpretation of one of them must be at fault, and the function of political thinking is to discover where the fault lies.

In his profound analysis of Burke's Christian political thought, Parkin also gives due weight to its strong element of what is loosely called romanticism. No English political thinker has appealed more freely to the affections, yet none was ever readier to charge his opponents with sentimentality. Here again Burke is preaching a hard but consistent doctrine. The counsels of the heart must not be stifled, but like those of the reason they are deceitful. To feel profoundly is not to liberate but to command the emotions; it is to detach oneself as best one may from one's own particular situation, to learn to laugh and to weep with mankind, to act and at the same time to suffer, and to interpret with the mind the inclinations of the heart. If both our reasons and our feelings are thus directed, they will not, Burke believes, lead us in contrary directions.

In these ways Parkin shows that Burke appeals to a variety of authorities—reason, tradition, experiment, and natural sensibility, and he also shows how Burke reconciles them. They are reconciled by reference to Burke's doctrine of Providence. God is the author of a rational creation, the principles of which are in part accessible to the human mind. Those principles are exhibited in history, which is constantly checking and correcting attempts to defeat the operations of Providence. Though corrupted by sin, the human heart is by its nature disposed to respond to the divine purposes in history. The process of discovering and pursuing those purposes engages every human faculty and demands that they shall all be held in subjection to an acknowledged outward truth. Since that truth will never be more than partially perceived, a sense of the inevitable limitation on all human judgments is the beginning of wisdom. Assuredly Burke is a moralist whose philosophy of politics is built upon his Christian religion.

In terms of this Christian political philosophy, Burke reacted with every fiber in his being against the French revolutionaries as men who were inverting God's moral order by setting up their own puny reasons in judgment upon God. Parkin truly says:

The heaviest article of Burke's charge against the Revolutionary movement is that its "new morality" is an attempt to erect human ideals as absolute values. It is a fabricated morality, detaching moral conceptions from their ultimate implications and ignoring the dependence of moral values upon a higher source.

According to this false moralism, knowledge of the moral law is conceived of as a possession, an intrinsic quality, of the individual, which he can prescribe to himself by a spontaneous impulse to virtue. He can find within himself an image of perfected human nature, which he recognizes as that of his own best self, and to which he is therefore bound to aspire.

The source of moral enlightenment in the individual, according to this morality, is the voice of conscience. Conscience is an "inner light," which discerns moral truth, an innate principle of justice and virtue in our hearts by which we can judge our own actions or those of others to be good or evil. The presence of conscience in men makes them morally self-sufficing, their own judges; it puts them, in this respect, on an equality with their creator. Conscience, in Rousseau's words, is an infallible judge, a sure guide, a Divine instinct; it makes man like to God. This impious assumption of a moral autonomy in man which denies the source of morality itself, explicit in Rousseau's *Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar*, is in Burke's eyes the motive power behind the whole Revolutionary movement and constitutes its chief crime. The reliance on conscience as a final court of appeal accepts human moral valuations as ultimate. But the voice of conscience must remain subjective, and to that degree a potential cause of error in moral perception. It is much more than this, however. It is the means for a complete inversion of standards, because it creates a moral self-consciousness within which virtuous behaviour nourishes an impulse of self-approbation. The highest point of happiness becomes, as Rousseau puts it, the pride of virtue and the witness of a good conscience. In this way, the very acknowledgment of good provides the incitement to a new subtle deadly

species of pride. This moral alchemy is plainly evident in the Revolutionary morality. It has totally discarded humility, the basis of the Christian system, the low but deep and firm foundation of all real virtue, and has substituted vanity as the ruling natural and social sentiment. The new educational scheme fomented pride and self-conceit in the young, and forms them into springs of action. This is a moral revolution; vanity reverses the train of the natural feelings; it makes the whole man false, perverting his best qualities so that they operate exactly as the worst. In canonising this "new invented virtue," the French Assembly turn for their model to Rousseau himself, the "professor and founder of the philosophy of vanity." Since the new moralism is founded on a rejection of the source of moral value, it is essentially and actively atheistic. Rousseau acknowledges his creator only to brave him. The French rulers are atheists; indeed fanatical atheism is the principal feature of the French Revolution. The main object of Jacobin hostility is religion. The Revolutionaries treat established religion with active scorn, uniting the opposite evils of intolerance and indifference. But atheism breaks off the connection of observance, affections, hopes and fears "which bind us to the Divinity, and constitute the glorious and distinguished prerogative of humanity, that of being a religious creature."<sup>69</sup>

And again:

Burke's belief is that the attempt to realize abstract schemes of government and social rearrangement is founded on a morality, and it is against this moral code that he takes his stand. He consistently regards the Revolution as essentially a revolution in moral notions; the model of the Revolutionary Assembly, Rousseau is "a moralist, or he is nothing." . . . it is a new conception of morality which Burke is rejecting. The abstract moral idealism of the Revolution is not just one of those fluctuations of taste or manners which are always taking place in the lapse of time; it is a total inversion of moral values. Therefore, the Revolution is not merely an unfortunate or misconceived political venture; it is a revolt against the whole order of things, a sin, a moral deformity, "a foul, impious, monstrous thing, wholly out of the course of moral nature." Burke's opposition to the Revolution is far more than just an assertion of the superiority of experience to

theory as a guide in politics; it is the opposition of one conception of morality to another.

The repudiation of its moral absolutism forms the deepest impulse in Burke's hatred of the Revolution, and constitutes the ground of his condemnation of the movement in its entirety, irrespective of minor evils which it may remove or minor goods which it may produce. The abstract idealism to which it appeals is itself the worst offence against morality, that is, against the real moral order. Morality is something to be perceived and acknowledged by human beings, not conceived by them as an image of their best selves. Abstract idealism reduces itself to an assertion of will, and will is not a creative moral force; on the contrary, its dominance is a breach of the moral order. Such ideals are generated by individuals out of conscience and personal feeling; they are subjective and are a revolt against the real moral order in which the individual is held. As this is the objective law of his being, the individual is not at liberty to try to change or improve it; that is simply to break loose from morality altogether. The moral order of the temporal world and of the created being, man, must include imperfection and evil, and that imperfection and evil is within each individual. Good and evil are mixed in mortal institutions as in mortal men; but we must not reject the good that is to be found in the world, because of the mixture of evil that will always be in it.

Men therefore have no right, are not morally at liberty, to revolt against the order of things, to tear apart the state on their speculations of some contingent improvement. There are, and must be, abuses in all governments; this amounts to no more than a nugatory proposition. The question is not concerning *absolute* discontent or *perfect* satisfaction in government, neither of which can be pure or unmixed at any time, or upon any system.<sup>70</sup>

What Burke thus enjoins is not opportunism or even empiricism but humility—a humble recognition that this world and human society are subjected to God's purpose and plan. What Burke detested about the French Revolution was the blasphemous impiety and pride of its perpetrators and organizers in thinking they could wipe the social slate clean and begin everything *de novo*. As a Christian statesman, he accepted both natural and historical reality

as things given by the Creator, not as "objects" for man's conquest and destruction.

## 2. Groen van Prinsterer's Interpretation

In his profound work *Ongeloof en Revolutie*<sup>71</sup> (*Unbelief and Revolution*), Groen van Prinsterer, like Edmund Burke, found the origin of the French Revolution to lie in men's apostasy from the living God. Through his work as historian at the Royal Court and his observations of the revolt of the Belgians in 1830, Groen came to realize the real meaning of the French Revolution. It had marked nothing less than a full scale religious revolt against Almighty God and an "*overturning of the divinely ordained Order.*" He set out to prove that Europe's apostasy from God had led directly to the breakdown of true community between Western men and if such apostasy were allowed to continue it would ultimately result in the emergence of the society of the Antichrist, a totalitarian enslavement of the whole population by a godless scientific and political elite who recognized only their own reason and will to power as absolute.

According to Groen the Revolution is the consequence, application, and outcome of the rationalistic philosophy of the eighteenth century in spite of all the diversity of theoretical and practical trends to which it had given rise. This liberal rationalism of the eighteenth century was formed and developed by theoretical and practical unbelief, and from this fact a whole series of erroneous ideas and social upheavals inevitably followed. It was not a mere concatenation of circumstances that had led Europe to revolution in 1789, but the direct working out of a spiritual law of nemesis which holds in the realm of spiritual and moral being just as Newton's laws of motion hold in the realm of the physical creation. As Prinsterer sees it, the whole subsequent course of events that took place in 1789 was irresistible after apostasy had ascended to the throne of men's minds.

Groen believes that in the Europe of the eighteenth century authority had become confounded with absolutism, freedom with arbitrariness. He welcomes de Tocqueville's

thesis that the Revolution was "a political revolution, which followed the lines of a religious revolution." According to de Tocqueville in his classic work, *L'Ancien Regime*:

It is to religious revolutions that the French Revolution must be compared if it is to be understood by the aid of analogy. Notice the features in which it resembled a religious revolution. Not only did it spread like the latter into distance lands, but also like the latter it made its way by preaching and propaganda. A political revolution which inspires proselytism! Preached as ardently to foreigners as it is conducted with passion at home! What a novel spectacle! The French Revolution operated in reference to this world in exactly the same manner as religious revolutions acted in view of the other world. It considered the citizen as an abstract proposition, apart from any particular society, in the same way as religions considered man as man, independent of country and time. It did not seek to determine what was the particular right of the French citizen, but what were the general rights and duties of man in the political sphere. It was in going back always to the Universal and, so to speak, to the Natural in point of social structure and government, that it rendered itself intelligible to all and could be imitated in a hundred places at once.

As it had the air of tending to the regeneration of the human race even more than to the reform of France, it kindled a passion which the most violent political revolutions had never hitherto been able to arouse. It inspired proselytism and gave birth to propaganda. Hence, in short, it took that appearance of a religious revolution which caused such terror to contemporaries; or rather, it became itself a kind of new religion, an imperfect religion it is true, without God, without worship, and without another life, but which, nevertheless, like Islam, has flooded the whole world with its soldiers, its apostles, its martyrs.<sup>72</sup>

Groen also agrees with de Tocqueville that morals in French high society during the eighteenth century had become corrupted and that Christianity had turned into either pharisaism or superstition. Given such a degeneration of the Holy Catholic Faith, what else could be expected but the collapse of the Ancien Regime?

Groen, however, does not think that de Tocqueville really understood the essential meaning of the Revolution as a revolt against God. He says:

Although a great admirer of 1789, Mr. de Tocqueville carefully distinguished two directions in the eighteenth century philosophy: "One direction contains all the newly revived views which concern the state of society and the principles of civil and political laws. These, so to speak, form the substance of the Revolution. The other contains the purely accidental irreligious tendency which, being born of conditions which the Revolution itself destroyed, found death in the triumph of the latter. The warfare against religious convictions from this point of view, was but incidental to the great revolution. It was a salient and yet passing trait of its physiognomy, a passing product of its ideas, of its passions, and of the particular events which preceded and prepared it—and *not* its essential characteristic." Thus he considers as accidental in the Revolution what is its essential nature. Mr. de Tocqueville did not yet see what Burke saw in 1793:

"We cannot conceal from ourselves the true character of that terrible struggle. It is a religious war. That is its dominant feature. At the same time, undoubtedly, all social interests are threatened."<sup>73</sup>

In the eighth and ninth chapters of *Unbelief and Revolution*, Groen sets out to demonstrate that the determining power of the Revolution lay in atheism—man living without God. Groen wants to prove that the revolutionary social upheavals of Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century had unbelief and apostasy as their cause and in these consequences he claims to find traces of this godless and apostate origin.

While crediting the Enlightenment for its sincere and principal striving after improvement in various spheres of European culture, Groen could not forgive it for its capital error of taking man to be sovereign instead of God and for putting reason upon the throne formerly occupied in European culture by revelation. He compares this concern for cultural progress and political and social reformation aided only by human sagacity with jumping from the top floor of a high building aided by artificial wings like Daedalus of old. The labor of mind and intellectual genius in the



proclamation and production of ideas and in the construction of systems of thought is futile if one withdraws oneself from the rays of wisdom from above, and when one ignores in the field of philosophy the difference between freedom and independence. As Groen understood it, freedom means the status of a moral creature obeying God's law. It belongs to very nature of man as a creature of the Creator to be subject to God's law and only in obedience to such a moral order and law could man be free.

The eighteenth century, Groen continued, still employed sweet-sounding terms such as justice, freedom, toleration, morality, etc., but the *philosophes* of the century used these words without accepting the ultimate Christian transcendental principles upon which these virtues were based and in reference to which they alone derived any meaning. Inevitably then, they lost their true meaning, and thus, in their humanistic frame of reference, "justice" became "injustice," "freedom" became "slavery," and "toleration" became "persecution." This semantic inversion of the meaning of words is the verbal nemesis of those who reject God. Thus, the eighteenth century displays, on the one hand, how much, on the other, how little human wisdom by itself can accomplish. Outward physical progress was followed by inward spiritual corruption. Knowing the spirit of the age of reason we shall thus not judge the main personalities of the French Revolution too harshly. Men such as Voltaire, Rousseau, and Robespierre, were, Groen claims, only products of the spirit of the age reflecting in their actions in an explicit fashion what was already implicit in the minds of most educated Europeans. They were teachers in that they were one step ahead of the rest of the European horde of liberal humanists, deists, and rationalists on the road towards nihilism on which a stop is impossible. A knowledge of these ideas of the European Enlightenment will thus warn us of the destructive power of false principles and of the erroneous concepts involved in the age of reason and will enable us to estimate the responsibility of others, who, accepting the rationalist principles of the leaders of apostate thought, are too afraid to draw the practical and political conclusions. As Groen well puts it:

I do not wish to pass by . . . neither do I want to leave unused the profits which a hurricane in the world of morals has brought through destruction; but concession is to be made concerning the deceitful foundation for the restoration. The well-being of the future does not lie in the modification, moderation, and regulation of pestiferous principles, neither in a state of indolence and deadly resignation; on the contrary, it lies solely in the promotion of the highest truth, the acceptance of which is the necessary condition for reaching the only road to the well-being of the nations.

As the revolutionary errors worked out their inevitable consequences in the fields of politics and religion it will be desirable to understand exactly what this basic philosophical presupposition of the Enlightenment is and what its effects are upon religion. According to Groen, the philosophical presupposition of rationalism is the concept of the sovereignty of reason and its outcome in religion is a general forsaking of God resulting in sheer materialism and loss of all sense of the sacred and the sublime in human life. The divine revelation written in the Holy Scriptures is accommodated to what the mere rational mind of man can comprehend. This rejection of the power and spirit of the Holy Gospel and its truths for human life leads to a form of deism which still looks for evidences of God in nature. Alas, this is not the end of the spiritual development. The God of nature of the Deists is soon himself reduced to an abstraction in the human mind and the end result is stark materialism and atheism. With the denial of God, morality and the doctrine of the immortality of the soul also go by the board. All this, be it noted, is the inevitable outcome of the basic principle of unbelief; namely, the sovereignty of man's reason. It is only possible to retain some truths of the biblical revelation, abandoning others at the expense of consistency and coherence. As Groen points out:

Where everything has become a matter of mere opinion, of one's own intellectual viewpoint, and where every opinion is equally valid, that view wins the day which in addition to the corruption of the unbelieving heart, also has logical coherence and necessary inference as its allies.

Thus once the basic presupposition and principle of the Revolution has been adopted it follows as night the day that morality, faith, justice, and the rule of law will all be jettisoned in favor of their humanistic counterfeits. Therefore, it is no use blaming the French revolutionaries for their excesses while applauding their principles. Instead, we should question the correctness of their premises. Is man's reason, in fact, sovereign in this universe?

Groen next shows how this development of unbelief leads to a persecution of Christian believers. Revealed truth and faith are not only ridiculous but even harmful from the standpoint of the revolutionary philosopher and politician. Truth and untruth are mutually exclusive. "Hatred of the Gospel is characteristic of the Revolution; not when it goes to extremes, i.e., when it leaves the tracks, but, on the contrary, when staying within its own paths it reaches the goal of its development." It belongs to the very essence of the revolutionary mentality to hate Jesus Christ. Groen, in fact, quotes Vinet, who says: "A l'incrédulité négative et sardonique a succède une incrédulité qui croit, un athéisme fervente, un matérialisme enthousiaste. L'Impiété de nos jours est une religion."

The reign of reason in the realm of religion, therefore, results in atheism, and there can be no resting point until that abyss is reached. Groen is next concerned to show how in the sphere of politics radicalism is the logical consequence of the revolutionary concept of freedom as independence from God. There is an obvious analogy here between the religious and the political problem in this respect. In religion all authority is overthrown and every man's own reason becomes autonomous. Why not do the same in political affairs ridding men of all authority here, too? It is one step which is sure to be taken sooner or later. The freedom of man's *reason* is followed by the proclamation of the freedom of man's *will*. If reason is intact and not blinded by sin original or actual why should not the human will be good also? Man is therefore proclaimed to be essentially good, and the undeniable existence of evil is ascribed by these rationalists to bad institutions and wicked social en-

vironment. Change these social institutions and man's good will can then freely express itself.

Groen then contrasts this humanistic faith in one's own reason and good will with the Christian's philosophy. All truth for the Christian finds its ground and reference point in God. Similarly for the Christian the sovereignty of God constitutes the only real and lasting basis for human justice and duty. As soon as God's sovereignty is denied, one at once loses sight of the origin of authority and justice as well as of any lawful relationships in state, society, and family.

In rationalism all these are soon reduced to mere conventions. Thus, it becomes argued that in the original state of nature, all individual men are free and equal. The state is simply the accidental aggregate of just so many individual wills atomistically conceived. The construction of a new ideal state and society after man has destroyed presently existing evil conditions therefore becomes the object of the political ambitions and policies of the rationalists in politics. Having abolished the natural relations of human society, the rationalist deems himself able to construct his own ideal state and society.

How then do these rationalists suppose the state to be instituted? The reply is "through voluntary agreement." Freedom and equality form the basis of the building; so, authority and justice are just conventions. The origin of the state is found in a postulated "social contract."

What the consequences of this doctrine are for practical politics, Groen shows by citing a few passages from Rousseau, whom he calls an honest believer in unbelief so far as his application of his theories are concerned. Social order does not originate from nature in Rousseau's view; it is merely founded upon social conventions. A democratic form of government is for him the only legitimate form of government since it is based upon the freedom and equality of all individuals. Law is merely the general will of the people and it is always right, true, and good, because it is the people's sovereign will. The people are the sovereign and enter, as it were, into a contract with themselves in making laws and establishing a government. In this con-

tract every individual surrenders all his rights to the community, which in turn exercises absolute authority over its subjects. The power of the general will is what we call sovereignty. According to Rousseau, the government is only a function, temporarily established by the people's will to maintain civil and political liberty and to administer the laws. Its authority is really only a nominal authority entrusted to it by the sovereign people.

Groen points out that Rousseau had no use for representative institutions. Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be transferred. For sovereignty is the common will and thus it is obvious it cannot be transferred. Representatives in reality are only commissaries who cannot make any definitive laws by themselves.

To the objection that under such a democratic system the minority might well be swamped by the majority constituting the general will, Rousseau replies that this subjection of the minority's opinion to the will of the majority is the very condition of the minority's freedom. The individual and the minority can be truly free only when he or it acts or is forced to act in accordance with the general will, i.e., the will of the majority. It is evident that in this way freedom has become a chimera. Groen refuses to accept this rationalist explanation of the ground of political obligation and authority. As Groen thinks laws can only depend upon a transcendent law-giver for their ultimate validity and acceptance, he thus refuses to accept the modern democratic doctrine that laws are simply the good pleasure of the majority. He rejects as immoral the theory that majority votes can determine principles or should interfere with the God-given rights and freedoms of Christian citizens.

In the family, too, Groen says we can see the destructive outworking of the principle of unbelief. The only tie between children and parents for the rationalists and the modern humanist becomes that of natural biological dependence, not moral considerations of respect for parental authority. Parental authority instead is transferred to the government which henceforth demands the right to educate

the children of Christian parents in terms of its own humanistic unbelieving philosophy of life and to train them for its own military and economic purposes.

What will happen to Christianity and religion in this revolutionary paradise of the humanist's concoction? Groen answers there will be none. All religions will be tolerated on the one condition that they do not try to exercise any decisive influence upon society. Religion will be kept to instill a sense of duty for service to the state. Dogma, on the other hand, interests the new apostate democratic state of Europe only in so far as it is concerned with the moral conduct and duties of its adherents over against their neighbors. There is, to be sure, a certain civil confession of faith determined by the state and made up of certain social sentiments, without which it is impossible to be a good citizen; in short, the new religion of the age of democracy will become the religion of good citizenship, and social clubs such as free masonry and rotary will take the place formerly occupied by churches and chapel. Revelation in Rousseau's eyes is a disease the gradual extirpation of which is incumbent upon the state. Thus Prinsterer considers he has proved his thesis that unbelief and religious apostasy have not only led Western civilization to revolution but have also destroyed all Europe's historic freedoms won for her by Christian men and women over the previous thousand years.

After Burke and Prinsterer, a reaction set in against this moral and religious interpretation of the French Revolution. Thus, liberal humanist historians such as Michelet, Aulard, and Albert Mathiez have tried to explain it as an effort to solve a peculiarly French, though unusually deep rooted, social and economic crisis.<sup>74</sup> According to Mathiez's Marxist economic interpretation, the Revolution resulted from the divorce between social facts and institutions, between the letter of the law and the spirit of society. Such a divorce, he wrote, had grown up in eighteenth century France.

Since the end of the 1939-1945 World War a remarkable change of opinion amongst historians regarding the real nature of the French Revolution has taken place. Again

they are returning to the view of Burke that the French Revolution was essentially the practical and political reflection of the intellectual revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Revolution is again being described as the breaking out in a violent manner in modern society of the revolutionary ideas of modern men. Some even venture to speak of these revolutionary ideas as a living faith. Even Burke's theory that it was a world-wide conspiracy has been revived. For instance, in his most recent edition of the classic study *The Coming of the French Revolution*, Georges Lefebvre, of the University of the Sorbonne, has recast the original work to show the supra-national implications of the French Revolution. The view gains ground that the revolutions in Belgium and in Switzerland, the revolutions of 1830, of 1848, the South American Revolutions, in 1917, and much of the revolutionary spirit in Asia, Africa, and China since the end of the last World War, all belong to one continuing movement of the same revolutionary mentality which first made its appearance in Paris in 1789. The whole period of modern history since 1789 is being called the Age of Violence or the Age of Revolution, and men now speak of a "permanent revolution."<sup>75</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Descartes, *Discourse on Method*; edited by Ralph Eaton (Scribners, New York, 1927) p. 16 and pp. 28ff.

<sup>2</sup> Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, edited by Fowler (London, 1936), p. 184.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 182.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 157.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 168, 182, 233.

<sup>6</sup> For a detailed discussion of the modern humanistic motive, see Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol I, Part Two. Also Dooyeweerd, "La Base Religieuse de la Philosophie Humaniste" in *La Revue Reforme* x, 1959, no. 111.

<sup>7</sup> Christopher Hill, *The Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution*, originally broadcast over BBC and published in the *Listener* on June 7th, 1962, p. 983, and now published by University of Oxford Press.

<sup>8</sup> R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1945), pp. 100ff.

<sup>9</sup> Emil Brunner, *Christianity and Civilization*, Vol. I (Nisbet, London, 1948), pp. 75ff. and p. 91ff. Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny of Man*, Vol. II, (Nisbet, London, 1948).

<sup>10</sup> Harald Høffding, *A History of Modern Philosophy*, Vols. I and II (Dover Publications, New York, 1955). Cf. F. A. Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science* (The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1952).

<sup>11</sup> Sir Herbert Butterfield, *The Origins of Modern Science* (G. Bell, London, 1949), p. viii. Cf. Sir William Cecil Dampier, *A History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy and Religion* (Cambridge, 1946), pp. 106ff.

<sup>12</sup> A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (Cambridge, 1946), p. 3.

<sup>13</sup> A. C. Crombie, *Augustine to Galileo* (Mercury Books, London, 1961), Vols. I and II.

<sup>14</sup> Harald Høffding, *A History of Modern Philosophy* (Dover Publications), Vol. I, p. 122.

For a good account of Galileo's trial by the Roman Inquisition, consult Giorgio De Santillana, *The Crime of Galileo* (Heinemann, London, 1959).

<sup>15</sup> H. Van Riessen, *The University and its Basis* (Association for Reformed Scientific Studies, 139 Geneva St., St. Catharines, Ontario, 1962), p. 37.

<sup>16</sup> Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization* (Routledge & Sons Ltd., London, 1947), p. 126; cf. *A History of Technology*, Vol. III, edited by C. Singer.

<sup>17</sup> Abraham Kuyper, *Lectures on Calvinism* (Eerdmans, 1961), pp. 115ff. The reader should also consult John Baillie, *Natural Science and the Spiritual Life* (Oxford, 1951), pp. 20ff.

<sup>18</sup> Abraham Kuyper, *ibid.*, p. 120.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 121.

<sup>20</sup> Christopher Hill, *Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution*, Lecture One given over BBC and published in the *Listener* on May 31st, 1962, p. 945.

<sup>21</sup> T. Birch, *History of the Royal Society of London*, 4 vols.; C. R. Weld, *History of the Royal Society*, 2 vols. (London, 1848).

<sup>22</sup> Quoted by Christopher Hill in his second lecture "Emergence of Scientific Method" of his course of lectures, *Listener*, June 7th, 1962, p. 985.

<sup>23</sup> Michael Foster, *Greek and Christian Ideas of Nature* (Free University Quarterly, Amsterdam), Vol. VI, no. 2, May, 1959. Cf. Foster's articles in *Mind*, 1934-1936, under the heading "The Christian Doctrine of Creation" and the "Rise of Modern Science," XLIII, N. S. 446f.; XLIV, 439f.; XLV, 1f.

<sup>24</sup> John MacMurray, *Freedom in the Modern World* (Faber & Faber, London, 1948), pp. 37 and 41. Cf. also E. L. Mascall, *Christian Theology and Natural Science* (Longmans, London, 1956), pp. 94ff.

<sup>25</sup> Galileo, quoted in E. A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science* (Routledge, Kegan & Paul, London, 1949), p. 64. The reader should also study Basil Willey's work,



*The Seventeenth Century Background* (Chatto and Windus, London, 1949), pp. 1-23. Cf. also A. Rupert Hall, *From Galileo to Newton. The Rise of Modern Science*; Vol. III. (Collins, London, 1961).

<sup>26</sup> Dirk J. Struik, *A Concise History of Mathematics* (Bell, London, 1954), pp. 110ff.

<sup>27</sup> Sir Herbert Butterfield, *op. cit.*, pp. 7ff.

<sup>28</sup> Alan Richardson, *The Bible in the Age of Science* (SCM Paperback, London, 1961), Chapter One, The Scientific Revolution, pp. 11-12.

<sup>29</sup> R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature*, pp. 103ff. Also Susan Stebbing, *Philosophy and the Physicists* (London, 1937).

<sup>30</sup> For a brilliant exposure of this new religion of scientism, the reader should consult D.R.G. Owen's book *Scientism, Man and Religion* (Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1952).

<sup>31</sup> Bertrand Russell, *Problems of Philosophy* (London, 1948). Bertrand Russell, *Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1948). For Russell "knowledge" in this book means "knowledge of the physical world," and man the knower becomes man the experimental scientist. As a result there is no mention of history, religion or ethics.

<sup>32</sup> John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford, 1947).

<sup>33</sup> John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Civil Government* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1946), Chapter VIII. Of the Beginning of Political Societies, pp. 48ff.

<sup>34</sup> John Locke, *ibid.*, p. 62, "The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property."

<sup>35</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. I, p. 318.

<sup>36</sup> Eric Lipson, *The Economic History of England*, Vol. I, The Middle Ages (Adam and Charles Black, London, 1945), Chapter VII, The Guild Merchant; Chapter VIII, Craft Guilds; Vol. III (Adam and Charles Black, London, 1943), Chapter V, The Control of Industry. Cf. also C. R. Fay, *Great Britain from Adam Smith to the Present Day* (Longmans, 1946); Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, (Routledge, London, 1880); G. N. Clark, *The Wealth of England* (Oxford, 1946); T. S. Ashton, *An Economic History of England: The 18th Century* (Methuen, London, 1955).

<sup>37</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Transcendental Problems*, p. 73.

<sup>38</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. I, Chapter II, pp. 216ff., Chapter III, pp. 262ff., Chapter IV, pp. 325ff., Chapter V, pp. 403ff., Chapter VI, pp. 451ff.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 314.

<sup>40</sup> J. J. Rousseau, *The Arts and Sciences*, translated by G. D. H. Cole in *The Social Contract* (Everyman's Library, J. M. Dent, London, 1961), p. 131.

<sup>41</sup> Harald Höffding, *A History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 29-109 for a good summary of Kant's philosophy. Also Kant's

*Critique of Pure Reason*, translated from the German by J. M. Meiklejohn (Bell, London, 1930). For Dooyeweerd's criticism of Kant, consult *A New Critique*, Vol. I, Chapter V. The Line of Demarcation between the Ideals of Science and of Personality in Kant, pp. 325-402.

<sup>42</sup> Pierre Burgelin, *Jean Jacques Rousseau et la religion de Geneve* (Geneva, 1962). For a useful study of Rousseau the reader should consult F. C. Green, *Jean Jacques Rousseau. A Critical Study of his Life and Writings* (Cambridge University Press, 1955).

<sup>43</sup> Rousseau, *Emile ou de l'Education* (Paris, 1951), p. 323.

<sup>44</sup> J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, translated by G. D. H. Cole (J. Dent, London, 1961), p. 12.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>48</sup> J. Rousseau, *A Discourse on Political Economy*, found in *Social Contract*, p. 238 (italics mine).

<sup>49</sup> Carl L. Becker, *The Heavenly City of the 18th Century Philosophers* (Yale Paperbound, New Haven, 1959), p. 31. Cf. also Kingsley Martin, *French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century* (Turnstile Press, London, 1953). Also Basil Willey, *The Eighteenth Century Background* (London, 1949, pp. 155-252).

<sup>50</sup> J. L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (Secker & Warburg, London, 1952), p. 19.

<sup>51</sup> As an example, we give G. P. Gooch's famous essay on "The French Revolution as a World Force" in his book *Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft* (Longmans, London, 1946), pp. 291ff.

<sup>52</sup> Talmon, *op. cit.*, pp. 196ff. Talmon's second work *Political Messianism* (Secker and Warburg, London, 1960) should also be consulted. Also Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (Cape, London, 1952); R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution* (Princeton University Press, 1960).

<sup>53</sup> Quoted by Evan Runner, *Christian Perspectives*, 1962, p. 199.

<sup>54</sup> Ernest Cassirer, *The Myth of the State*, p. 176.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 166-167.

<sup>56</sup> Evan Runner, *ibid.*, p. 202.

<sup>57</sup> Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics* (Cambridge Journal, Nov., 1947, p. 81).

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 90.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 96.

<sup>63</sup> Walter Lippman, *The Public Philosophy* (Mentor Book, New York, 1956), pp. 81ff.

<sup>64</sup> Runner, *ibid.*, pp. 208ff.

<sup>65</sup> Alfred Cobban, *Edmund Burke and the Revolt against the 18th Century* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1958).

<sup>66</sup> Edmund Burke, quoted in Parkin, *The Moral Basis of Burke's Political Thought* (Cambridge University Press, 1956), p. 1.

<sup>67</sup> Parkin, *ibid.*, p. 118.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 126. The reader should compare Burke's conception of the providential order in history with M. C. Smit's excellent inaugural address at the Free University on *The Divine Mystery in History*, delivered on September 27th, 1955 (Kok, Kampen, 1955).

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 132ff.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 94ff.

<sup>71</sup> G. Groen van Prinsterer, *Ogeloof en Revolutie* (T. Wever, Franeker, 1951).

<sup>72</sup> De Tocqueville, *L'Ancien Regime*, translated by M. W. Patterson (Blackwell, Oxford, 1947), p. 13-15.

<sup>73</sup> G. Groen van Prinsterer, *The Anti-Revolutionary Principle*, p. 177.

<sup>74</sup> Alfred Cobban, *The Causes of the French Revolution* (Historical Association, London, 1947), summarizes the main interpretations since Burke. Cf. Georges Lefebvre, *The Coming of the French Revolution* (Princeton, 1958); Alfred Cobban, *A History of Modern France*, Vol. I, *Old Regime and Revolution, 1715-1799* (Penguin Books, 1957).

<sup>75</sup> U. S. A. The Permanent Revolution, *Fortune*, (Heinenmann, 1952). Cf. E. L. Woodward, *French Revolutions* (Oxford University Press, 1939). R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution* (Princeton University Press, 1960). Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (Faber, London, 1963). Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (Cape, London, 1952). Alan Moorhead, *The Russian Revolution* (Collins, London, 1958), popular. Francois Fejto, *The Opening of an Era, 1948* (London, 1952). Edward Hallett Carr, *A History of Soviet Russia* Vols. I, II, III, IV. These volumes give by far the most detailed account available in English. Malcolm D. Kennedy, *A Short History of Communism in Asia* (London, 1957). Karl M. Schmitt and David D. Burks, *Evolution or Chaos, Dynamics of Latin American Government and Politics* (Pall Mall Press, 1963). Tad Szulac, *The Winds of Revolution* (Thames and Hudson, London, 1963). W. Cleon Skousen, *The Naked Communist* (Ensign, Salt Lake City, 1961) gives a conservative humanist's evaluation. He does give a good bibliography. The best Christian evaluation of Communism I know of is that of Lester De Koster, *Communism and Christian Faith* (Eerdmans, 1962). R. Crossman, *The God that Failed* (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1950). Fred Schwarz, *You Can Trust the Communists* (Prentice Hall, 1962), useful as an introduction to the revolutionary mentality. Nicolas Zernov, *The Russian Religious Revival of the Twentieth Century* (Darton, Longmans and Todd, London, 1963), is a brilliant religious interpretation of Russian Communism.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF THE COSMONOMIC LAW-IDEA

According to Dooyeweerd the only way out of the predicament of the humanist motive of nature and freedom and its revolutionary consequences for man's life in modern society is to rebuild modern society upon a new intellectual basis. It is to this great task that he has devoted his life. In the light of the downfall of humanism apparent in both its intellectual and social manifestations, Dooyeweerd considers that two developments in modern thought are extremely significant, namely, the renaissance of scholastic thought following the encyclical *Aeterni Patris* by Pope Leo XIII (1879) and the rise of independent philosophical reflection on the basis of the biblical motive as it was maintained by the Reformation.

Since the last decades of the nineteenth century, Dooyeweerd writes, three phenomena have appeared in Western thought: in the first place, the decay of the humanistic thought which since the Renaissance had dominated Western thought and which reached its apostate climax in historicism, logical positivism and existentialism; secondly, the great revival of Scholastic philosophy, especially that of Thomism, initiated by the papal encyclical *Aeterni Patris* in 1879; and lastly, the new philosophy in the Calvinistic world, which has remained true to the basic motives of the Reformation, and thus to the Christian faith itself. In the general disruption and decay of Western culture, he continues, the older and spiritually consolidated cultural powers

of the West, Roman Catholicism and the Reformation, have arisen anew to fight with modern weapons for supremacy in the struggle for the future of the West.<sup>1</sup>

It is the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Law-Idea as developed by Dooyeweerd in this struggle to which we shall thus turn in this chapter, and we shall try to outline its basic tenets since it is only in the light of these that we shall be able to understand Dooyeweerd's legal and political thought.

For Dooyeweerd Christian philosophy is determined by the motive or absolute presuppositions of the creation of the universe by Almighty God, the radical fall due to sin, and redemption in Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Spirit. Thus he writes:

This motive attests its absolute truth by its integral and radical character. As Creator, God reveals himself as the absolute and integral Origin of all relative existence. He has no original antagonist over against himself. God has created man according to the divine image; here man is revealed to himself in the radical unity, in the religious centre of his existence. He is not "composed" of a "rational form-soul" and a "material body" as Greek anthropology pretended according to its dualistic religious motive of "matter and form." Man's soul or spirit or heart is the integral and radical unity of all his temporal existence. This fundamental motive in its Scriptural sense cannot have a "dialectical" character.<sup>2</sup>

Dooyeweerd says that the Christian philosopher must start with the revealed truth that the sovereign Creator has placed his entire creation under law. The term "cosmic law order" as used by Dooyeweerd expresses the fact that everything created is subject to the laws of God. He speaks of a law-order because he recognizes a multiplicity of divine laws established by God in a specific regular order. Law is the boundary dividing God and the cosmos. God is above the law; everything else is subject to law. The idea of law can thus never be separated from the idea of the source of law and the idea of the subject of law. Law and subject are correlative terms.<sup>3</sup> Dooyeweerd does not conceive of the notion of law in a juridical or moral sense. God's laws are not confined to the Decalogue. They must be seen

primarily as universal ordinances and uniformities encompassing creation in all its aspects as constant structural principles making possible individual things and events. Their ontological character is guaranteed by the fact that they are not founded in the subjective consciousness but are created by God.

For Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven this drawing of a boundary between God and the cosmos does not involve the rejection of the immanence of God. They are only concerned with making clear the distinction between the mode of being of God and creation, not with separating each in its own spheres.<sup>4</sup> Vollenhoven explains that nothing spatial is intended by drawing this boundary. He writes:

All spatial boundaries separate things within the cosmos. If God stood outside the cosmos in a spatial sense, justice could not be done to the confession of his immanence. But the word "boundary" has another meaning, which is non-spatial. In this case it signifies that which makes possible a clear distinction, so that of the two things that are distinguished the one lies totally on the one side, and the other totally on the other side.<sup>5</sup>

Dooyeweerd is also careful to point out that this does not mean that his conception of the sovereignty of God is in any way related to that of Occam. Calvin's *Deus legibus solutus* is indeed far removed from Occam's *Deus ex lex*.<sup>6</sup> According to Dooyeweerd, Occam's conception of the sovereignty of God is not Scriptural, but a voluntaristic construction, in an attempt to measure God's sovereign will in human terms, which he contrasts with Calvin's judgment that human reason can never penetrate to the *essentia Dei*.<sup>7</sup> That Calvin's conception of the absolute authority and sovereignty of God does not imply voluntarism is also declared by Zuidema in his great study of Occam.<sup>8</sup>

#### A. The Theory of the Modal Spheres

For Dooyeweerd every part of creation belongs to a different law sphere, and so creation exhibits as many aspects as there are law spheres. In this way Dooyeweerd leads us into his theory of the modal spheres, which is

developed from his doctrine of the sovereignty of God by means of his theory of cosmic time, which "constitutes the basis of the philosophical theory of reality."<sup>9</sup> In order to explain his meaning more fully, Dooyeweerd makes use of a figure:

The light of the sun is refracted through a prism, and this refraction is perceived by the eye of sense in the seven well-known colors of the spectrum. In themselves all colors are dependent refractions of the unrefracted light, and none of them can be regarded as an integral of the color differentiation. Further not one of the seven colors is capable of existing in the spectrum apart from the coherence with the rest, and by the interception of the unrefracted light the entire play of colors vanishes into nothing.

The unrefracted light is the time-transcending totality of meaning of our cosmos with respect to its cosmonomic side and its subject-side. As this light has its origin in the source of light, so the totality of meaning of our cosmos has its origin in its *arche* through whom and to whom it has been created.

The prism that achieves the refraction of color is *cosmic time*, through which the religious fulness of meaning is broken up into its temporal modal aspects of meaning.

As the seven colors do not owe their origin to one another, so the temporal aspects of meaning in the face of each other have *sphere sovereignty* or modal irreducibility.

In the religious fulness of meaning there is but one law of God, just as there is but one sin against God, and one mankind which has sinned in Adam. But under the boundary line of time, this fulness of meaning with reference to its cosmonomic side as well as to its subject-side separates, like the sunlight through the prism, into a rich variation of modal aspects of meaning. Each modal aspect is sovereign in its own sphere, and each aspect in its modal structure reflects the fulness of meaning in its own modality.<sup>10</sup>

For Dooyeweerd, then, time is the medium through which God's creative will is broken up into different modal spheres or the diversity of meaning. He distinguishes between time-order and time-duration as the law and subject aspects of time. Only the indissoluble correlation of order and duration can be called cosmic time. "Cosmic time over-

arches the different aspects as order," Dooyeweerd writes, "and streams through their boundaries as duration." He thus rejects the ultra-realist as well as the subjectivist account of time. As an illustration of the former view, Gas-sendi holds that time is neither substance nor accident, but is eternal and uncreated. In similar fashion Samuel Alexander posits that time is presupposed by space time, from which emerge life, mind and deity. To this Dooyeweerd would reply, first, that space cannot be associated with time, as space is one modal sphere amongst others, while time is a precondition of space. It is further, a creation of Deity, not a condition of Deity. Similarly, he rejects Kant's view of time as an *a priori* intuition of sensibility, because it is founded in the subject and not in the *objective and transcendental* order.

In every aspect, however, cosmic time appears in a different functional guise, revealing a different temporal structure. A philosophy which proceeds from a dialectical religious motive, tends to elevate one type of time order to the status of cosmic time itself. Modern humanistic thought, for example, is driven consecutively towards a mechanistic, irrationalistic, vitalistic, psychological, and historical view of time.

Now while we can grasp the different functional orders of time in the theoretical concept, the notion of cosmic time itself can be approached only in the transcendental idea. Only in the religious center of our existence do the different aspects of time converge, and only there do we experience cosmic time. Dooyeweerd here refers to the Scholastic distinction between three kinds of duration: eternity, *aevum* and time. The first is the duration of a thing which is altogether unchangeable, the second that duration of a thing which is subject to accidental change though it remains immutable in essence, the third that duration of a thing which is subject both to substantial and accidental change. Dooyeweerd, however, rejects the notion of substance and accident as it appears in the above definitions and redefines *aevum* as "the concentration on the part of the creature on eternity, in religious transcending of the boundary of time."<sup>11</sup>



According to the Christian philosophers of the Cosmonomic Law-Idea it is wrong in principle to look upon the Bible as a sort of source book for geological, biological and zoological data. The Word of God clarifies our view of the world at the outset. It provides us with our Archimedean point of departure for all our theoretical thought by revealing to us that we did not arrive here by chance as apostate evolutionists seem to suppose but that God created the universe.<sup>12</sup>

Thus John Calvin taught in answering the question whether the Bible is the final authority on matters scientific that when the Spirit of God speaks through the Law and the Prophets he does so not with rigorous exactness, "but in a style suited to the common capacities of man." In his famous commentary on the Book of Genesis Calvin states that for the knowledge of all normal natural happenings the study of the phenomena, not of the Scriptures, brings man true scientific knowledge. Such an attitude toward the Bible and nature meant that Calvin flatly rejected any form of biblicistic rationalism or mysticism. As Calvin himself put it, "He who would learn astronomy and other recondite arts, let him go elsewhere" (Comment on Genesis 1:16). It is through the facts of nature that one learns about nature. In his tractate on astrology and in his pamphlet advocating the creation of an inventory of all religious relics in Europe, Calvin continually pointed to the need for ascertaining the facts. Unlike the medieval schoolmen Calvin believed that one must begin with the facts of God's creation if one would discover and understand the works of God's hands. Stanford Reid has shown how this empirical and experimental approach to God's world played a considerable part and exercised a formative influence upon the development of physical science.<sup>13</sup>

Both the modernists and the fundamentalists, according to Dooyeweerd, have missed the truth. Our Lord once said of the experts in the Jewish law, "Ye have taken away the key of knowledge" (Luke 11:52). It is thus possible to be very much at home in the details of the Scriptures and to believe that every word in the Bible is inspired by God and yet not know the Word of God.

The Word of God is one. Underlying all the diversity of the Scriptures as we have them in this temporal life is the unity of the Word of God. The Word of God is the ordering principle which provides the believer with the frame of reference and point of departure for all his thought, theoretical as well as practical, by working in him a true knowledge of God, of himself and of the law-order of God. The Word of God is the *power* by which the Creator opens a man's heart to "see" things as they really are.

But this revelation of the true knowledge of God, of one's self and of the world must never be identified with the findings of natural science. It is at this point that the modernist Christian goes astray. For him reason and revelation are to be equated. Also, the Bible as the Word of God does not provide us with the data of science but only with the proper frame of reference in terms of which that data can alone cohere in a meaningful pattern. As Augustine said, "I believe in order that I may understand." Apart from this revealed framework of creation, fall into sin and redemption by Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Spirit, science or human reason only uncovers a meaningless universe. The Word of God, that is to say, does not provide us with the data for our scientific theories of the nature of reality but with the central norm for human thought about reality and the true religious ground motive or absolute presuppositions upon which all truly rational human thought is based and which alone can put shape and meaning into the facts uncovered by science. Without this revealed ground motive of creation, fall into sin and redemption by Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Spirit the data provided by scientific investigation would be meaningless.<sup>14</sup>

The fundamentalist equates the *datum* of creation as the presupposition of all theoretical thought revealed in the Book of Genesis with the *data* of science concerning the unfolding of that creation within the temporal process and the method and manner of such becoming.<sup>15</sup> Yet the Book of Genesis, according to Dooyeweerd, does not reveal to us the truth that we are created beings in order that we may speculate about the time or manner or method of creation,

because God created time along with creation. For this reason Dooyeweerd feels that the manner and method by which God created the universe must lie for ever beyond human scientific investigation. As Paul says, "Now we see through a glass darkly." When the Word of God speaks of creation, it does so to reveal to us the central origin, the ultimate source of all reality; and thus it tells us something about reality that man could not discover by means of his unaided reason. The biblical revelation of creation thus gives us an insight into the "being" or the *Dasein of reality*, namely, its ultimate dependence upon Almighty God. That revelation may never be put as it is put by fundamentalists and modernists upon the same mundane level as the data discovered by the scientific researches of the scholar, for in the Christian mind that revelation is the very given, the very condition and presupposition of any scientific theories about reality whatsoever. The condition of human knowledge about reality stands on a different level than the effect. According to Dooyeweerd, this revelatory condition of all human thought and science is surely what Christians should understand when they claim that the Bible is the Word of God. It is the Word of God because it brings us into touch with the Creator of the world and because it makes us aware of our "place" in God's creation. It is God's Word of Truth about the ultimate nature of things; who we men are (our "heredity"), in what kind of location we have been put by God (our "environment"), what, in the light of the previous two, we now have to do, namely, to become reconciled to God through Christ. As such the Word of God is the only true statement by which the nature of our life in this universe can be elucidated and its way thus properly directed. "Thy Word is a lamp unto my feet (Psalm 119:105).

We degrade the Word of God when we place it on the same mundane level with the data arrived at by the natural sciences. Thus according to Dooyeweerd all such problems as the relationship between "evolution and the Bible," and "modern science and the Word of God" are the off-spring of a false dilemma. The apostate biologist degrades the Word of God by claiming to show that God is a liar and that he cannot be trusted as the source and norm of all

truth. Such an apostate biologist forgets that he does not read his evolutionary naturalism out of the facts of biological and zoological and geological data. *He reads his pre-conceived notions of blind chance being capable of bringing order out of chaos into the facts.* The literal fundamentalist also degrades the Word of God by making it appear that the Book of Genesis is a most unreliable textbook for biological and geological data by his various attempts to harmonize the Creation account of the Bible with modern scientific theories of evolution.<sup>16</sup> Dooyeweerd believes that only when we distinguish between creation and becoming and realize that the process of becoming within the temporal order of the cosmos *presupposes* God's creation shall we begin to see the matter in a clearer light.

The Bible does not teach about the facts of science but it does provide us with the ordering principle in terms of which the data of science may be understood. The Word of God indicates to us the why of our creation, not the how. It provides us with the indispensable background and sense of purpose of this mysterious universe and of our own position, role and destination within it.<sup>17</sup>

Finally according to Dooyeweerd it is imperative that Christian people at least, if not all modern people, come to realize that since our blessed Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ has come into our world that we have now been given by God a much more complete revelation of his purposes. This means that in discussing such matters as man's origin and destiny we must start with the New Testament revelation of God in Christ. In Christ is summed up the full wisdom of God by which man is now called to live. As Paul says, "He [Jesus Christ] is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation; for in him all things were created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers; all things were created by him, and for him; and he is before all things, and by him all things consist" (Col. 1:15-17).

Because reality has been created by God its basic mode of being is meaning, for reality constantly refers to its religious root and its divine origin. This is possible because reality is related to its Creator by the law-structures

which God has posited for it. The idea of structure is basic to Dooyeweerd's philosophy. The structure of created reality is the expression of the divine will. It is constant and unchanging. It is *a priori*, i.e., it is the cadre within which all of reality is realized and is thus not a generalization of phenomena within reality. The existence of reality is founded in the validity of the structure which obtains for reality. By being valid for creation the structure makes the existence of all reality possible. The structure is thus the condition of all phenomena.

Through cosmic time God's sovereign, undivided law-structure of creation is broken up or refracted into a number of modes of time, modes of meaning or modal spheres. The structure for creation has these various "moments" which makes possible the various aspects of reality, the different ways in which reality exists and functions. Thus every one is immediately aware of the difference between an economic act, such as the purchase of a book, and an act of thought, such as reading the book's contents. Science does not create these law-spheres or moments or modalities nor are they first distinguished by science. Non-scientific thought is also aware of them and Dooyeweerd, as we saw in chapter two of this book, unlike non-Christian philosophers, makes proper allowance in his philosophy for naïve experience. While all aspects of reality are intuitively encountered in direct experience, in philosophy this encounter is deepened into a theoretical insight into the various law spheres.

God's creation subject to his divinely-established structure thus exists in various law spheres which we have described diagrammatically at the end of this chapter, and the reader should now refer to it.

As we have explained these law spheres are the ways in which reality exists, and so they are called by Dooyeweerd modes or modalities. Since these never appear as separate entities but are always only sides of individual things, he calls them *aspects*. Since they appear only with things existing in time, he calls them functions.<sup>18</sup> These aspects are embedded in reality, since they are part of the total structure that makes reality possible.

These must not be confused with Kant's categories of thought, Kant's so-called transcendental postulates. These modes are irreducible and thus they cannot be brought back to more basic modes, as is done for example in rationalism, in which the aspects which are higher than the logical are considered as mere constructions postulated by the abstracting human mind. Similar reductions can be found in historicism in which all reality is subsumed under the category of historical modes of thought,<sup>19</sup> or in Marx's economic man.

Dooyeweerd puts it that the modal independence or sovereignty of each sphere is *founded* in cosmic time and at the same time made *relative* by it.<sup>20</sup> It is made *relative*, for the modal spheres have no independent existence but are interwoven with all others in the temporal coherence of meaning; it is *founded*, for specific modal sovereignty is possible only in the temporal splitting up of the fulness of meaning. Since the aspects are "ontic" and cannot be reduced to each other, we can speak of the relationship of these aspects as *sovereign within their own spheres*. Each sphere possesses its own laws independently of the other spheres. Each sphere of existence has received from God its own peculiar nature. The capacities of one sphere may not be transferred or appropriated by another sphere.

Dooyeweerd here acknowledges his debt to Kuyper's application of the Scriptural principle of God's universal sovereignty to philosophy. Each sphere has a status, rooted in its divinely-instituted nature, which cannot be infringed upon by any other sphere. This constitutes its modal sovereignty or sovereignty in its own orbit, and in virtue of which each modal sphere is equal. This does not, however, mean that each modal sphere is self-sufficient. As Calvin had clearly distinguished between the sovereignty of God, rooted in his aseity, and the derived sovereignty of creatures and institutions, Dooyeweerd also distinguishes between the sovereignty of God the Creator and the derived sovereignty of the modal spheres.

The sovereignty in its own orbit of each sphere is preserved by the *principium exclusae antinomiae*. This must be distinguished from the logical principle of contradiction,

which is founded in the principle of the excluded antinomy as its cosmological foundation.<sup>21</sup> It has a twofold task. First, it settles and safeguards the specific modal meaning of each sphere and thus ensures its modal sovereignty. Secondly, as a transcendent criticism, it fulfils the function of the *reductio ad absurdum* by revealing the antinomies which arise in immanentist philosophy when the boundaries between spheres are obliterated, or when the modal sovereignty of the spheres is transgressed through the influence of a dialectically broken religious *a priori*. This is always caused by an attempt to press the nexus of meaning into a theoretical continuity.

As examples of such antinomies, Dooyeweerd cites the notion of the causality of God of speculative theology. Because the category of causality is extended beyond its meaning in the physical and modal spheres, God's causality now stands in absolute contradiction to man's personal freedom and responsibility.<sup>22</sup>

Dooyeweerd also cites the famous antinomies of Zeno (Achilles and the tortoise and the flying arrow) which he says are founded in the attempt to reduce the modal meaning of motion to that of space.<sup>23</sup> The antinomy between retributive justice and love which befuddles the thought of Reinhold Niebuhr, Emil Brunner and Paul Tillich, to take another example, arises from the eradication of the modal boundaries of the juridical and moral spheres.<sup>24</sup>

Antinomy must not be confused with relations of contrariety. Contraries like logical-illogical, moral-immoral, polite-impolite, and so forth, present themselves within the same modal aspect and do not contain a real antinomy in its intermodal sense.

The modal spheres do not, however, exist only in horizontal independence of each other and vertical dependence on God. They reveal an architectonic and hierarchical structure and relationship. They exhibit, Dooyeweerd says, an order of increasing complication in accordance with the order of the succession of the spheres in the temporal coherence of meaning. Because immanentist philosophy could not grasp the idea of a cosmic order of modal spheres, and thus necessarily eliminated the temporal order and inter-

modal coherence of spheres, it could not offer a satisfactory account of the relation between the different aspects of reality and tends to see it merely as one of increasing *logical* complexity. But the modal spheres may never be identified with "categories of thought" or with any arbitrary theoretical delimitation.

Before proceeding to the relations between the modal spheres, the scheme presented at the end of this chapter should be kept in mind. It gives the order of the spheres, their modal moments which guarantee their sovereignty, the functional time of each, and the corresponding science. One further distinction which Dooyeweerd draws has not been indicated in this scheme, namely, that between the normative and the anormative spheres. By this Dooyeweerd means that the subjects of the first five modal spheres have no option but to obey the correlative laws for their spheres, for example, a stone *must* obey the law of gravitation when thrown up in the air; that is, it must fall down again. From the analytical-logical sphere onwards, however, the laws become *norms*. Although these norms have been laid by God in principle in the structure of each sphere they must be *discovered, explicated, applied* and *positivized*. The laws of justice or love, for example, do not contain a precise formulation of their meaning in each concrete instance.

A first important notion employed to explain the relation between the modal spheres is that of *universality in each orbit*. Each modal sphere, according to Dooyeweerd, is a refraction of the religious fulness of meaning; consequently, the temporal order of the modal spheres must be expressed in each sphere. Each sphere has a modal moment, irreducible to that of any other, which safeguards its sovereignty. But surrounding the modal moment are a number of analogical moments, some of which refer back to the modal moments of preceding or substratum spheres, others to the modal moments of superstratum spheres.<sup>25</sup> The first are modal retroceptions, the second modal anticipations. Both analogical moments are qualified by the modal moment of their sphere. The following is an example



of modal moment, modal retrocipations and anticipations, as exemplified in the analytical logical sphere.<sup>26</sup>

- Modal Moment: rational distinction  
*Retrocipations*: logical apperception  
                     logical thought life  
                     logical movement of thought  
                     logical thought-space  
                     logical unity and multiplicity  
  
*Anticipations*: logical domination (ruling by systematic theoretical concepts of logical forms)  
                     logical symbolics  
                     logical commerce  
                     logical economy of thought  
                     logical harmony  
                     logical right  
                     logical eros (Platonic love)  
                     logical certitude.

This intrinsic relation between the modal moments of each sphere Dooyeweerd calls the *universality in its own sphere*; that is, the totality of meaning of our temporal cosmos is principle refracted in every law sphere or modality.

All of reality is in principle characterized by these modes of being—every individual thing, institution or event. This does not mean that these are characterized by the modes in the same way. A tree does not feel, and so it exists in the first four aspects in a subjective way and in the rest in an objective way. For example, a tree exists in the historical mode objectively, thus a cultural object can be made from it.

Dooyeweerd has distinguished between the law and subject aspects of the cosmos, and in his general theory of the modal spheres he has described this law aspect as it is differentiated into specific modal laws. The subjects of these laws are the things, structures and events which come into being, endure and decay within the constant unchangeable modal horizon, and which are experienced in naïve experience as totalities and unities.

### B. The Theory of the Structures of Individuality

In his theory of the typical structures of individuality and the encaptic intertwinements of the cosmos, Dooyeweerd attempts to give a theoretical account of the things of naïve experience. The ability to do so, he states in his epistemology, is one of the criteria of truth of a philosophical theory.<sup>27</sup> The structures of individuality must, however, be distinguished from the individual things of naïve experience themselves.<sup>28</sup> The latter are subjects; the structures of individuality signify the cosmonomic principle of the subjects, the "structural type."

As a foil to his own theory, Dooyeweerd examines the Aristotelian doctrine of substance.<sup>29</sup> According to this theory, substance is the first and primary category, indicating *what* a thing is; the accidental categories only enjoy a relative being, orientated to substance, which has being *per se* and is the bearer of all the accidental qualities. In terms of this doctrine the Roman Catholic Church tries to explain its doctrine of transubstantiation; after consecration, the bread of the Mass literally becomes changed substantially into the precious Body of our Lord, but the outward visible qualities remain unchanged.

According to Dooyeweerd, the experience of the identity of things in naïve experience gives no ground for supposing there are supratemporal substances beneath the accidental categories. He admits that the theory of substance has some contact with our naïve experience of the duration of things, which Greek metaphysics tries to account for by its distinction between being and becoming. But this being has no metaphysical priority over the diversity. Only in the religious center of the cosmos do the modal aspects converge. When we abstract from any individual thing its modalities, nothing remains. Moreover, the Aristotelian theory does not grasp the universal cosmic nature of time and considers it as an accidental determination of being. In this theory, according to Dooyeweerd, we have a typical distortion of the evidence of naïve experience, which can only be corrected in the light of the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Law-Idea. The concept of substance is a direct result of an apostate way of "seeing" things. Christian

philosophy, Dooyeweerd believes, must recognize that nothing within the cosmos exists and subsists in itself. The concept of substance rests upon a hypostatization or deification of one or more temporal functions which it deprives of all meaning.<sup>30</sup>

To be truly meaningful, a temporal function must be directive in character and must point away from itself to Christ from whom it derives its significance.

In the structures of individuality, Dooyeweerd writes, the modal aspects are grouped to form an individual totality which as a unity overarches the modal aspects. A structure of individuality functions in all fifteen spheres of law, either as a subject or as an object. In Dooyeweerd's terminology a thing has a *function* of subjectivity in all the spheres to which it is subject, but in a later sphere it has a *function of objectivity*. The bird's nest has a function of subjectivity in the first four spheres but a function of objectivity in, for example, the psychological sphere in so far as it is an object of concern to the bird, or in the aesthetic sphere, if it forms part of the structure of a painting or a poem. The tree, again, has a function of subjectivity in the juridical sphere, if it is the cause of a lawsuit, or in the sphere of faith if it becomes the object of worship of some religious cult.

Unlike the modern apostate use of the word "object" which is used in the sense of some idea which is universally valid, according to Dooyeweerd, an object is the recurrence of an earlier function of individuality in a later modality. This recurrence is not mere repetition. When an earlier function recurs in a later modality it has a new modal meaning. And the subject function which recurs in a later modality as an object function is subject to the laws of the new modality in which it functions. That is to say, the object is relegated to the subject side of the sphere in which it functions as object. The spatial modality is the first sphere in which objects in this sense can arise. A point in the spatial sphere is an objectivation of number. A point exists only in spatial figures such as a line, a triangle or a cube. A point is said to be qualified by the spatial modality, but it does not occupy space and it does not have a

subject function in the spatial aspect. A point is thus an object, being the recurrence of number in the spatial modality. A plant cannot live without a regular movement of chemical elements such as water and carbohydrates. These chemical elements have an object function in the biotic modality, and they are related to plants, which are in this case organic or biotic subjects. If I form a concept of a horse, then it becomes for me an analytical logical object. An animal does not thus cogitate, but it can be the object of my subjective thinking. The horse ridden by Napoleon during his famous retreat from Moscow had an object function in the historical modal aspect. For as an object it was related to the historical subject function of the Emperor. The furniture of a home is an object in the social sphere as it is used in human social intercourse. A piece of ground, whose ownership is the question of a lawsuit, is a legal object. A wedding ring or love letter is an object in the ethical modality. The Cup and Bread possess pistical object functions and in so far as they are sacraments of God's grace and love, they belong to the law side of the sphere of faith because they serve to seal God's promise and the comfort of his grace.

A structure of individuality is not simply a sum of different modal spheres in which it has a function of subjectivity. It has an original modal individuality, Dooyeweerd states, situated in its last sphere of subjectivity, which is termed the *qualifying* function of the structure. This function discloses the anticipatory moments of the structure. So complete is the control of the organic function of the tree, for example, that the whole tree reveals an individual structure and internal unity. These are structures of individuality of the first order. But there is a second order of structures. As examples of these secondary structures of individuality, Dooyeweerd analyzes the structure of a work of art, objects of use, the family, state and church.<sup>31</sup>

The qualifying or disclosing function determines what Dooyeweerd terms the *radical* type to which any structure belongs. He distinguishes between three basic radical types of structural "kingdoms": that of the inorganic, qualified by the physical and chemical modalities; that of plant life,

qualified by the biotic sphere, and that of animal life, qualified by the psychical modality. Each structural type encompasses sub-types and variation types.

Certain structures of individuality together form a larger structure, in which the identity of each is preserved. The term *enkapsis* signifies, according to Dooyeweerd, the interrelation between structures of individuality, each retaining its own sovereignty, and the whole being qualified by the higher structure of individuality in the encaptic whole. He gives five different types of encaptic intertwinements:

- (1) Foundational intertwinement (the statue founded in the marble),
- (2) Correlative intertwinement (the tree and its surroundings),
- (3) Symbiotic intertwinement (the bee and the bee colony),
- (4) Intertwinement of subject and object (bird, nest, parish and church building),
- (5) Territorial intertwinement (of state and social structure within the same territory).<sup>32</sup>

Dooyeweerd teaches that in naïve experience we meet only such structures of individuality as things, events, societal relations and their mutual connections. But yet every individual thing is experienced by us concretely as a unit. This is possible because every individual thing is subject to a structural principle which gives it unity and coherence. Thus a tree differs from an animal, an animal from a rock, a rock from a human being; and an industry differs from a government, a government from a church.

This, he claims, is not the case arbitrarily, but because each of these is the expression of a different structural principle which makes the existence of individual things possible and gives them their nature. Since one individual thing or societal relation is an identity, we can here speak of the second level of the "sovereignty of the spheres," the significance of which will become apparent when we discuss Dooyeweerd's theory of the state.

## C. The Christian Doctrine of Man

Dooyeweerd considers the human being as a structure of individuality. He tells us that his doctrine of man will be more fully treated in his expected great work on the subject of anthropology. In the meantime he has given us some indications of his doctrine of man. He states that only man functions subjectively in all aspects as a subject, and it therefore depends upon human activity whether the object functions of natural things are disclosed. Man thus differs from all other typical structures of individuality in that he has no temporal qualifying function. Even the function of faith does not qualify a man. Instead of such a qualifying function, man has a soul, the *heart* as his religious center in which all temporal functions are transcended and concentrated. *Man alone of all created reality transcends time, since he alone is created in the image of God.* He rejects the Scholastic idea that man is a compositum of two substances—an “individual substance of a rational form,” for the problem as to what causes the compositum to become one substance remains unanswered.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, in the Scholastic conception, the soul as a rational substance does not transcend the boundary of time. It is a complex of normative spheres abstracted from the temporal nexus of meaning.

The Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Law-Idea, according to Dooyeweerd, does not draw the distinction between soul and body as between two groups of modal functions (the physico-chemical and the normative) but between the whole mantle of functions as the body and its supra-temporal center, the soul or heart.

The human body is a complicated total structure in which different structures of individuality are intertwined. It consists of the following structures. (1) The physically qualified structures of the elements necessary for the building of the body. (2) The biotically qualified structure of the living organism. Here the auto-nervous system regulating the organic functioning plays an important role. (3) The psychically qualified structure of the animal nervous system. (4) The act-structure of the human body which

comprehends the above psychical normative functions as knowledge, imagination and willing. At death the whole body, that is, all man's temporal functions, is destroyed, neither thought nor faith excluded. The body, however, has no existence apart from the heart.

Spier has distinguished between eight different uses of the term "heart" in Scripture, all of which, he claims, point to Dooyeweerd's doctrine of the heart. In Scripture, according to Spier, this term denotes the inner man as opposed to the outer, the source of man's life energy, the background of our thoughts, of our emotional life, of all wisdom and knowledge, of our words and deeds, the source of all sin, and the deepest center of our whole temporal existence, where the renewing activity of the Holy Spirit takes place.<sup>34</sup>

Of the heart, Dooyeweerd writes as follows:

The heart in its pregnant biblical sense as religious root and centre of the whole human existence may never be identified with the function of "feeling" nor that of "faith," neither is it a complex of functions like the metaphysical concept of the soul which is found in Greek and Humanistic metaphysics. It is alien to any dualism between the body (as a complex of natural functions), and the soul (as a complex of psychical and normative functions).

The heart is not a blind nor dumb witness, even though it transcends the boundary of cosmic time with its temporal diversity of modal aspects, and temporal thought within this diversity. For it is the fulness of our selfgood in which all our temporal functions find their religious concentration and consummation of meaning.<sup>35</sup>

Dooyeweerd calls this center of the human personality out of which arise all the various aspects of his life man's heart or ego. *It escapes all theoretical thought and it is only known to man because God has revealed it to us in his Word.* False doctrines of human nature arise whenever thinkers try to define this heart or ego of man, since theoretical thought is limited to temporal things. Whenever man's essential nature is thus theoretically defined, one aspect of that nature is absolutized. Thus idealism has tended to define this essence of man's nature in terms of his so-called

rational or spiritual functions. And scientific naturalism has defined man in terms of his physical and biological functions, stripping him of his specifically human qualities as a person. D. R. G. Owen has pointed out in his book *Body and Soul*, "This kind of materialism, determinism, and relativism, reduces man entirely to the level of nature, regarding him as a mere thing or object, as 'nothing' but a part of nature."<sup>36</sup>

Not even the so-called "religious" definition of man's essential nature in terms of a soul is exempt from Dooyeweerd's strictures. Along with Gilbert Ryle of Oxford University, he would reject this traditional "dichotomy" as the doctrine of "the ghost in the machine" and as a "category mistake."<sup>37</sup>

It is thus clear that Dooyeweerd's doctrine of the heart as the religious center of man's being is not meant as an analogy or substitute for the old dichotomy of substances, nor as a simple substantial dichotomy of center and periphery, which might still have a place for lower and higher elements in any dualistic sense. He specifically does not wish to restore the old dichotomy in any way, and so lay himself open to all the objections raised by modern philosophers regarding the composite of soul and body which he himself has raised against Aquinas and medieval and modern Roman Catholic scholasticism. Just what, then, are we to understand by Dooyeweerd's use of the term *super-temporality* of the heart? Can we say anything more about it, when Dooyeweerd says that it is beyond all conceptual grasp and he pictures it as "the hidden player on the instrument of all theoretical thought"?<sup>38</sup>

It should be noted, to begin with, that the heart is not a reduction of man to some core, from which the periphery—the body—can be easily removed. The "heart" of which Dooyeweerd speaks is not something which could be placed outside of a man's vital functions, as a new substance which then is joined to the body. The heart is much more than man himself in all his functions, but just for that very reason it is inaccessible to scientific analysis. Nor is it accessible to psychological understanding. Dooyeweerd points out:



The ego itself escapes every attempt to grasp it in a psychological view. The human ego expresses itself in the entire temporal human existence, but it recedes as an intangible phantom as soon as we try to localize it in our temporal experience.<sup>39</sup>

In his emphasis on the "supra-temporality of the heart," Dooyeweerd would have us understand the truth that in the heart "the human ego transcends . . . all modal functions and all temporal individuality-structures of human existence referred to it."<sup>40</sup> G. C. Berkouwer warns us that we must not conclude from this use of the term "transcends" that Dooyeweerd has here denied his original teaching of the boundary or difference between the Creator and created reality. He says, "The meaning of the term 'transcend' is indissolubly bound to the modal complex, which is transcended, but there is no thought here of ascribing transcendence to man in the sense in which we speak of God's transcendence."<sup>41</sup>

Dooyeweerd uses the term *transcendence* in conjunction with the term *aevum*. By *aevum* he refers to man's religious relation to God. He describes the *aevum* as an actual situation, as "nothing but the creaturely concentration of the temporal on the eternal through a religious transcendence of the time boundary." Dooyeweerd is not here talking about a deeper "part" of man, but referring to the whole man with all his temporal functions in his religious concentration, that is, in his basic relation to God. In short, he is not trying to place eternity, *aevum*, and time neatly next to each other, much less to allow man to "participate" in God's eternity. He uses the concept as over against assigning autonomy to man. He is concerned not with a part of man, but rather with the whole man in all his temporal functions. Only by means of such an anthropology does Dooyeweerd think we can give due justice to man's place in the cosmos. Man's true nature, that is to say, can be fully understood only in terms of his relation to God, who created him.<sup>42</sup>

SCHEME OF DOOYEWEERD'S COSMOLOGY<sup>43</sup>

Succession of Spheres	Modal Moment	Order of Time	Science
1. The numerical	Discrete quantity	Succession and relation of numbers	Mathematics
2. The spatial	Extension	Spatial simultaneity	Mathematics
3. The kinematic	Movement		Mechanics
4. The physical	Energy	Measured time according to movement of earth around its axis	Physics and chemistry
5. The biological	Organic life	Organic development	Biology, physiology, morphology
6. The psychical	Feeling and sensation	Succession of feelings	Empirical psychology
7. The analytical logical	Theoretical distinction	Logical prior and posterior	Logic
8. The historical	The cultural process of the development of human society	Historical development in the sense of periodicity	History
9. The linguistic	Symbolic signification	Pauses, tenses, declensions, etc.	Philology and Semantics
10. The social	Social intercourse	Social status, fashion and convention	Sociology
11. The economic	Economy	Calculation of interest, investments, etc.	Economics
12. The aesthetic	Harmony	Unity of time, aesthetic duration	Aesthetics
13. The juridical	Retribution	The course of retribution	Jurisprudence
14. The ethical	Love of one's neighbor, etc.	Prudence	Ethics
15. The pistical-faith	Transcendent certainty regarding the Origin	The reference to eternity and God	Theology

- <sup>1</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Reformatie en Scholastiek*, pp. 17-19.
- <sup>2</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Transcendental Problems*, p. 67.
- <sup>3</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. I, p. 96.
- <sup>4</sup> Vollenhoven, *Het Calvinisme en de Reformatie van de Wijsbegeerte* (H. J. Parish, Amsterdam, 1933), p. 21.
- <sup>5</sup> Vollenhoven, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
- <sup>6</sup> J. M. Spier, *An Introduction to Christian Philosophy* (Philadelphia, Pres. and Ref. Pub. Co. 1954), pp. 32ff.
- <sup>7</sup> Dooyeweerd, "Kuyper's Wetenschapsleer," *Phil Ref.*, 4, 1939, p. 216.
- <sup>8</sup> S. U. Zuidema, *De Philosophie van Occam in zijn Commentaar op de Sententien*, Vols. I and II (Schippen, Hilversum, 1948) p. 452.
- <sup>9</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. I, p. 28.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 102.
- <sup>11</sup> Dooyeweerd, "Het Tijdsprobleem en Zijn Antinomieën," part II, *Phil. Ref.*, 4, 1939, p. 5.
- <sup>12</sup> J. J. Duyvene De Wit, "Organic Life and the Evolutionistic World and Life View," *Christian Perspectives*, 1962 (Hamilton, 1962) pp. 12ff.
- <sup>13</sup> W. Stanford Reid, *Natural Science in Sixteenth Century Calvinistic Thought* (Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, Vol. I, Series IV, June, 1963, pp. 312 ff.).
- <sup>14</sup> John Wren Lewis, *Does Science Show us a Meaningless Universe* (The Twentieth Century Quarterly, London, Sept., 1959).
- <sup>15</sup> J. Lever, *Creation and Evolution* (Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1960) For a criticism of Lever's views, see H. Hart, *Can the Bible be an Idol?* (Perspektief, Potchefstroom Quarterly, March, 1964) reprinted in *Sola Fide* (May, 1965); Cf. also J. J. Duyvene de Wit, *The Paleontological Record and the Origin of Man* and Explanatory Supplement. Based on an address given to the Scientific Society of the University of the Orange Free State on August 28th, 1963. The substance of this brilliant lecture has now appeared in *Philosophia Reformata*, Jan., 1964, in two articles by de Wit: *Pierre Teilhard de Chardin* and *The Organic World and the Origin of Man*. With this compare R. Hooykaas, *Teilhardism: A Pseudo-Scientific Delusion* (The Free University Quarterly, Vol. IX, No. 1, May, 1963).
- <sup>16</sup> Russell L. Mixter, *Evolution and Christian Thought Today* (2nd ed., 1960); Robert E. D. Clark, *Darwin: Before and After* (Paternoster, London, 1948); H. M. Morris and J. C. Whitcomb, *The Genesis Flood* (Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1962).
- <sup>17</sup> H. Dooyeweerd, Review of J. Lever's *Creation and Evolution* in *Philosophia Reformata*, 1959 (*Schepping en Evolutie*) 3rd and 4th issues, Kampen). Cf. also R. J. Rushdoony, *The Concept of Evolution as a Cultural Myth* in The International Reformed Bulletin, April, 1960 which gives a good bibliography as well.

In his two articles Dooyeweerd showed the great value of Lever's book for serious Christians wanting to be serious scientists. But he

raised the question whether Lever perhaps did not accommodate his insights too much to the theoretic results of apostate evolutionistic theory, in spite of his earnest attempts, certainly successful in part, to reform rather than to accommodate. Dooyeweerd suggested that Lever's view of the relationship between faith and science was reminiscent of the accommodating attitude of the Roman Catholic Nature-Grace motive. He thus revealed the basic weakness in Lever's approach, a misconception which must sooner or later lead to a withdrawal of all science from the redemptive power of the Word of God. For this reason the writer believes that we urgently need a Christian theory of knowledge and logic. A beginning in this direction has been made by Cornelius Van Til in his syllabus *A Christian Theory of Knowledge* and in *The Defense of the Faith* (Philadelphia, 1955), pp. 48-68.

<sup>18</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. II, p. 3.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature*, p. 177 where he says, "Natural science as a form of thought exists in the context of history."

<sup>20</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. II, p. 3.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 38ff. For a further discussion of Dooyeweerd's doctrine of antinomy, cf. William Young, *Toward a Reformed Philosophy* (Grand Rapids, 1952), pp. 122ff.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 103.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 162.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>26</sup> H. Dooyeweerd, *Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought*, p. 47; cf. Spier, *op. cit.*, p. 62ff.

<sup>27</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. II, p. 579.

<sup>28</sup> H. Dooyeweerd, "Individualiteits-structuur en Thomistisch Substantiebegrip," *Phil. Ref.*, 9-10, 1944/45, p. 22.

<sup>29</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. II, pp. 11ff.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Spier, *op. cit.*, p. 159 for a very good summary of Dooyeweerd's doctrine in this connection.

<sup>31</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. III, p. 121. In volume three Dooyeweerd develops his theory of individuality as a whole.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 111ff.

<sup>33</sup> Dooyeweerd, "Individualiteit-structuur en Thomistisch Substantiebegrip," *Phil. Ref.*, 4, 1939, pp. 201ff.

<sup>34</sup> Spier, *op. cit.*, p. 16; cf. H. Wheeler Robinson, *The Christian Doctrine of Man* (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 3rd ed.; H. Wheeler Robinson, *Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament* (Oxford, 1950), pp. 48-105.

<sup>35</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. I, p. 55.

<sup>36</sup> D. R. G. Owen, *Body and Soul* (Philadelphia, 1956), p. 135.

<sup>37</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London, 1949), pp. 15ff.

<sup>38</sup> Dooyeweerd, quoted by G. C. Berkouwer, *Man, The Image of God*, p. 258.

<sup>39</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. II, p. 115; cf. also Dooyeweerd, *In The Twilight of Western Thought*, pp. 173-195.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> Berkouwer, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

<sup>42</sup> With this doctrine of man the reader should compare Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (London, Nisbet, 1946), Vol. I, *Human Nature*. Also Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Self and the Dramas of History* (New York, 1955) especially Part I, pp. 3-74. His sixth chapter gives us a wonderful example of man's transcendent heart in a brilliant analysis of Charles Lindberg's account of his flight across the Atlantic two decades ago. Also Paul Tournier, *The Meaning of Persons* (London, SCM Press, 1957). His chapter on Psychology and Spirit fully bears out Dooyeweerd's concept of the heart's transcendence over the temporal functions of reality. Tournier is a practising Christian psychoanalyst who has written a beautiful book all Christians should read. See my review of it in the *Canadian Medical Association Journal*, Jan. 15th, 1959, "The Medicine of the Person."

For the best account in English of recent Roman Catholic thought upon the doctrine of man consult G. C. Berkouwer's *The Vatican Council and the New Catholicism* (Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1965).

<sup>43</sup> Adapted from A. L. Conradie's *The Neo-Calvinistic Concept of Philosophy* (Natal, 1960), p. 99.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

#### A. The Modal Moment of Jurisprudence

The question "What is law?" is perennial and has given rise to volumes of literature in books and learned journals. A recent attempt on the part of H. L. A. Hart in his book *The Concept of Law* to answer this question will provide us with a good introduction to the problems with which we are faced in this subject.<sup>1</sup>

Hart begins his analysis by looking behind the perennial question "What is law?" to the prior problem of why it is so difficult to give a clear and precise account of what law is. Both the felt need for a definition of law and the inability of jurists to find it stem from the presence of certain themes, recurrent in the debate but never brought out and examined. One of the most obvious features of any system of law is that, under it, some actions are obligatory in the sense that one is liable to be compelled, under threat of punishment, to do them. The basic notion here is that of the bank clerk who is obliged by the gunman to stand by while the latter robs the bank, and it is from this notion that Austin's definition of the rule of law as a habit of obedience to the commands of an unlimited sovereign starts. According to Austin the essence of law is that it is imposed upon society by a sovereign will. The existence of such a dominating sovereign will is an absolute prerequisite to all law. There may be social observances existing before it or without it, but according to Austin, they are not *law* in any proper sense of that term.<sup>2</sup>

Austin's conception of law as the command of the legal sovereign, if taken by itself, is perilous in the extreme. An unjust law, said Augustine, is no law at all. We may agree that the clerk is *obliged* by the gunman, but we repudiate as monstrous the suggestion that he has an *obligation* to obey him. Austin passed smoothly from the one concept to the other without apparently noticing how large a step has been taken; it is no less than that from the rule of *force* to the rule of *law*. If we eliminate "justice" from our definition of law and identify law with the naked will of the legal sovereign, then there can be no answer to the argument of Thrasymachus in the *Republic* that might is right and justice merely the will of the stronger.

In his book *Law and the Laws*, Nathaniel Micklem points out that this is "no remote academic question." He continues:

Adolf Hitler never acted illegally after he came to power. By the Empowering Act of March 23, 1933, he was given the legal right to alter or suspend certain articles in the German constitution; by a further law of the following year he was given authority to frame new constitutional law. In fact, the will of the Führer became the source of law in Germany. He acted always within the constitution. Yet it is not in dispute that his advent to power marked the end of the reign of law as it had been known in Western Europe. Not the theologian only but every private citizen must protest if the textbooks should assert that law may be defined, without reference to justice, as the will of the contemporary sovereign power.<sup>3</sup>

Anglo-American philosophy has tended for two hundred years to be reductionist in temper. Explanation of the nature and meaning of phenomena is not sought by way of special metaphysical entities inhabiting a Platonic heaven of ideal forms but by reducing the complex to the simple, the mysterious to the patent, the grandiose to the humdrum. Under the motivation of the science ideal Locke and Hume declared that material objects are nothing but sensations, causes nothing but prior events, minds nothing but thoughts and feelings, and the state nothing but an aggregate of persons. From the point of view of this so-called empirical British philosophy, the Absolute is a Teutonic

monstrosity, whose brief reign in Britain and America during the middle years of the nineteenth century is considered to have been nothing but a usurpation; an uneasy coalition of G. E. Moore and the logical positivists has restored the legitimate heirs of William Ockham, David Hume and John Stuart Mill.

To this rule, legal philosophy in the English-speaking world has proved no exception. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote of the idea of law as a "brooding omnipresence in the sky" with as much contempt as any positivist denouncing the Absolute. As long ago as 1897, in a brilliant address entitled the *Path of the Law* he used these famous words:

People want to know under what circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming against what is so much stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this danger is to be feared. The object of our study then is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts . . . . The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by law.<sup>4</sup>

The prevailing school of Anglo-American jurists maintains that the only business of jurisprudence is to observe, to formulate general hypotheses, and to use these hypotheses for prediction; this is to be down-to-earth and "scientific." To attempt more is to wander into the impenetrable thicket of "merely subjective" matters, motives, and feelings with which the law has little or nothing to do, or, what is worse, to get bogged down in metaphysics, ethics, and theology. In fact, jurisprudence is declared by these legal positivists, relativists, and analysts to be completely autonomous of any moral or religious considerations.

This modern repudiation of the Christian-humanist tradition in respect of law is well illustrated by the important work of Hans Kelsen. He stands for a "pure theory of law," that is to say, for a jurisprudence that is uncontaminated by any infusion of sociology or ethics or theology or politics. Whether a law be good or bad, just or unjust, is no concern of the pure science of jurisprudence, for pure



jurisprudence is concerned exclusively with the norms or standards set up in the various legal systems, and these in their turn derive from some basic norm of the constitution, the validity of which is an assumed hypothesis. This basic norm cannot itself be legally valid, but it gives legal validity to the subsidiary norms derived from it. Any number of basic norms is theoretically possible. The King in Council might be one such norm, or a written constitution, or the will of the Führer. So far as the science of jurisprudence is concerned, it would seem that for Kelsen there is nothing to choose between these norms; each is an "hypothesis" which has utility value. Kelsen is concerned with law as a logical system derived from a basic norm, whatever the norm may be. Describing Kelsen's theory, Allen says:

Kelsen finds his starting point in Kant's system of Pure Reason. "Clear frontiers" in the realm of thought was a cardinal doctrine with Kant, and one of the most important of these frontiers was that which he drew between the domain of the *Sein* (the Is) and of the *Sollen* (the Shall Be). Kelsen's first postulate is that law exists solely in the world of *Sollen*, and that every legal principle is, therefore, that kind of rule which Continental jurisprudence has long known as a *norm*. Law, says Kelsen again and again, is essentially a "normative science." . . . In a single sentence Kelsen summarizes his theory of law as a "structural analysis, as exact as possible, of the positive law, an analysis free of all ethical or political judgements of value." Because it is concerned only with the actual and not with the ideal law, it is described as *positivistic*. Because it claims to strip the law of all illusions and distractions, it styles itself *realistic* . . . and because it strives to purge juristic theory of many elements which it believes to be mere adulterants, it claims to be *pure*.<sup>5</sup>

Austin and Kelsen represent the attempt to expound jurisprudence as an abstract science. Over against them stands the sociological school or perhaps better termed the functional school of Roscoe Pound and Julius Stone. This more empirical school of jurisprudence believes that "interests" are the chief subject matter of law, and that the task of law in society is the "satisfaction of human wants and desires." These are ever changing with the flux of circum-

stance, and in the pursuit of its purpose of "social control," law is faced with two problems: first, the maintenance of a balance between stability and change; and second, the ascertainment of those "social desiderata" which it is both possible and desirable that the law should try to satisfy. Law is essentially relative to social interests, to compromise, and its main function is the avoidance of friction in the body politic. It is, therefore, a tentative or experimental science rather than one concerned with logical deduction from first principles. Thus Julius Stone writes:

To treat the results of logical deduction from existing premisses as a substitute for the assessment of all aspects of the given situation and notably for its ethical or sociological aspects is essentially an abuse of logic, leading to legal anomalies and distortions.<sup>6</sup>

For this school the law is simply what the courts decide, and the decision of the courts is not apart from considerations of social interest and the smooth working of the social machine. Writes Roscoe Pound at the conclusion of his brilliant discussion of "The End of Law" in his classic on American jurisprudence:

For the purpose of understanding the law of today, I am content with a picture of satisfying as much of the whole body of human wants as we may with the least sacrifice. I am content to think of law as a social institution to satisfy social wants—the claims and demands and expectations involved in the existence of civilized society—by giving effect to as much as we may with the least sacrifice, so far as such wants may be satisfied or such claims given effect by an ordering of human conduct through politically organized society. For present purposes I am content to see in legal history the record of a continually wider recognizing and satisfying of human wants or claims or desires through social control; a more embracing and more effective securing of social interests, a continually more complete and effective elimination of waste and precluding of friction in human enjoyment of the goods of existence—in short, *a continually more efficacious social engineering*.<sup>7</sup>

Hart's main thesis is that "the law" is a vast and highly complex system in which the judge who applies the law,

the legislator who makes the law, the solicitor or attorney advising a client, and the ordinary man seeking to arrange his affairs—all and each have a special part to play and that the legal system requires a set of concepts more complex than that provided by Holmes, Austin, Kelsen, or Pound in order to make it intelligible.

Hart's first point of attack is on Austin's notion of a general habit of obedience to the commands of a sovereign. There is an important difference between the existence in a society of a general habit and the recognition by that society of a rule, a difference that is obscured by the propriety of saying, in either case, that the members of the society do something "as a rule." If almost everybody in a given society goes to the cinema almost every Saturday night, this by itself entitles one to say that they have a general *habit* of cinema-going on Saturdays; but it is not by itself sufficient to prove that cinema-going is a *rule* in that society. To entitle one to say this, it would have to be the case that cinema-going is regarded as a *standard* for all to aim at, that people are *criticized* for nonconformity, that deviation from the practice is regarded by themselves as well as by others, as *good grounds* for criticism, and that children are taught that they *ought* to go the cinema. The italicized expressions belong to the normative vocabulary of people who practise a rule-governed form of life, and no attempt to describe their behavior without bringing in its rule-governed aspect can hope to succeed.

Moral, social and legal pressures are, to be sure, an essential part of a way of life governed by rules, and Austin and his realist successors were right in drawing attention to the way in which law rests ultimately on coercion. But the step from drawing attention to this fact to an attempted "reduction" of all normative language and values to descriptions and predictions of the application of organized force, though it may seem small, is in reality vast. As Hart well says:

Indeed, until its importance is grasped, we cannot properly understand the whole distinctive style of human thought, speech and action which is involved in

the existence of rules and which constitutes the normative structure of society.<sup>8</sup>

This distinctive style is brought out clearly by Hart in his contrast between the "internal" and the "external" points of view. To draw attention to a rule, to criticize a deviation from it, and to accept such criticism as justified are to make normative statements within the system of rules, a system which can be said to exist if, and only if, most people are in the habit of adhering to its rules. A statement of the form "It is the law that . . ." may be made by a judge declaring what the law is, by a solicitor or attorney advising a client, or by a layman acknowledging that he has a legal duty. All these are internal statements, each having its different function, within the legal game as played by the majority of the population. But a statement of precisely the same form may be made by, for example, a Danish jurist who need not in any way acknowledge English law but whose aim is to describe it. It will then be an external statement and may well amount to no more than a prediction about what the English courts will in fact do. The realist error, Hart maintains, is to suppose that because the English judge and the Danish jurist both use the formula "the law in England is . . .," they must both mean the same thing.<sup>9</sup>

Within the rules of a system Hart draws a distinction between primary and secondary. Primary rules are those that are for the direct guidance of those who live under the system. Among them will be rules telling them to perform or to refrain from certain forms of action (criminal laws) and also rules telling them what they must do if they want to achieve a certain result, for example, to vote in an election or to make a valid will or contract. These are the primary rules. But in every complex society it will be necessary to have means of making authoritative pronouncements whether something is a primary rule or not, how it is to be interpreted, whether or not it has been contravened. For this reason we have a host of secondary rules, of which the most important are "rules of recognition," which lay down what is to be regarded as a primary rule, which describe and circumscribe the powers of courts and inferior

rule-making bodies, and which direct the activities of the officials whose job it is to enforce the primary rules.<sup>10</sup>

According to Hart it is only when we have secondary rules that we can be said to possess a fully mature legal system; indeed, they are so important that Kelsen in his attempt to disclose the true, uniform nature of law latent beneath its variety of forms, seized on the secondary rule as the general form of genuine Laws. A law, whatever it may appear to be, is simply an instruction to an official to apply a sanction in certain circumstances. Thus the law against larceny is not, as we commonly suppose, a law addressed to *us* to guide our conduct; it is an instruction to various legal officials to take certain steps when someone steals.

It is obvious that Kelsen's attempt to wrench all laws into this common form will involve him in many contortions, but there is no need to follow him through these if it can be shown that the attempt is mistaken from the start. To show this, Hart introduces an illuminating analogy with another form of rule-governed behavior—the playing of a game. A game of cricket or baseball can be played without either umpire or scorer. Each player applies the common rules in the sense that he allows them to regulate his conduct, draws attention to deviations, and admits applications of the rules by other players. Such a happy state of affairs will last, no doubt, only so long as there is little disagreement among the players about whether or not a run has been scored or a batter has struck out. But the first point to be made against Kelsen is that the game *can* be played and *will* be a rule-governed activity in spite of the fact that there are as yet no officials to whom instructions to apply sanctions can be given.

Still, the human predicament in general and the conditions of playing cricket or baseball in particular being what they are, there will come a time when it is convenient to introduce an umpire or referee to decide what has happened and a scorer to record it. With these new persons we introduce into the system a new set of rules, parasitic on the old, and we have an analogue of a developed legal system. To follow Kelsen is to say that the rule of cricket

or baseball which lays down the conditions according to which a run is scored is "really" or "in the last analysis" an instruction to the scorer to make a certain mark in his book when the batters have gone through certain motions. But apart from the fact that there need be no scorer at all, it is surely absurd to suggest that the batter's aim in running around the bases is to empower the scorer to make a mark in his book. To suppose this is to hide from view what we all know to be the whole point of the game.<sup>11</sup>

The same argument will dispose of the view that the law is what the courts decide and that statements of law are predictions of judicial decisions. Seizing on the fact that the scorer's statement of what the score is (by virtue of the secondary rule which defines his role as score keeper) has a special position which a statement made by a mere player or spectator does not have, and mesmerized by the fact that it is in some way unchallengeable, we are inclined to say that the score is simply what the scorer, in his discretion, says it is. But this last statement is ambiguous; in one sense it is a rather obvious truth about the rule that defines the scorer's powers—a statement that would be false if the rules provided that the scorer may be overruled by a declaration signed by both captains—in another it is a false statement of the scoring rule itself. It is false because *that* rule is not of the form, "A run is scored when the scorer makes a mark in his book," but rather of the form, "A run is scored when the batter rounds the bases." The scorer's job is to apply the scoring rule, and the scoring rule is not an instruction to scorers but a statement of what a batter must do if he is to achieve the result which he wishes to achieve, namely, to score runs.<sup>12</sup>

Within a system which contains secondary rules laying down that someone, a scorer or judge of the highest tribunal, is alone empowered to declare in an unchallengeable way what the facts are or what the law is, it will be true that statements on these points made by other people will have no status in the game and will be without legal "effect"; but it by no means follows that, in making statements of fact or law, players and spectators are "really" predicting what the scorer or judge will in fact do, and are not doing

what they obviously are doing, namely, applying to the best of their ability the rules of the system to the particular facts of a case.<sup>13</sup>

Hart maintains that the same is true of the scorers and judges. Their legally unfettered discretion is not thought of *by them* to be a discretion to do anything other than apply the primary rules of the system as best they can. Hart points out that there may be a penumbra of doubt even about the fundamental rules of recognition of the system, and it is then anybody's guess what will be decided. He writes:

Here, at the fringe of these very fundamental things, we should welcome the rule-sceptic, as long as he does not forget that it is at the fringe that he is welcome, and does not blind us to the fact that what makes possible these striking developments by courts of the most fundamental rules is the prestige gathered by courts from their unquestionably rule-governed operations over the vast central areas of the law.<sup>14</sup>

According to Hart, the legal realists have succumbed to a common temptation; fascination with the rare and professionally interesting specimen has led them to construct theories which distort for us the dull but central case.

Dooyeweerd is concerned precisely with these central matters of the law. According to him jurisprudence takes as its object of scientific investigation the study of the juridical modality of meaning. The science of law must discover the meaning of the concept of justice and its implications for man's life in society. Thus it must seek to show what "modal moment" lies at the core of the jural or legal aspect of reality which differentiates it from all other aspects of reality. What is it that distinguishes the judge's activity from the engineer's operations?

Dooyeweerd takes strong exception to the attempt on the part of the sociological school of law to apply to the study of legal phenomena the methods appropriate to the study of the physical and biological and psychological modalities of reality. Such a positivistic approach is to be found as we have seen in the modern school of thought in jurisprudence which defines law simply as what the courts

in fact do, and which proposes, accordingly, to transform the study of law into a so-called scientific observation of the way courts behave in response to cases brought before them. Such legal behaviorism, claims Dooyeweerd, leaves out from the law the function of guiding the judge as to how he ought to decide a case, and therefore deprives the judge also of any grounds on which he could seek such guidance in his efforts to reach a just decision. By thus ignoring the ultimate principle or modal moment of jurisprudence upon which the operation of all courts should be based, this sociological and behaviorist school is in grave danger of destroying men's respect for the law altogether. C. K. Allen rightly points out, "If it is true that precedents are employed only to discover principles, so it is true that principles are employed only to discover justice." He continues:

We speak of the judge's function as "the administration of justice," and we are sometimes apt to forget that we mean or ought to mean, exactly what we say. Popular catch-words are too often fond of distinguishing between the administration of law and the administration of justice, as if they were two different things. Nobody claims that the law always achieves ideal moral justice, but whatever the inevitable technicalities of legal science may be, they exist for the prosecution of one aim only, which is also the aim of the judge's office: to do justice between litigants, not to make interesting contributions to legal theory. This dominant purpose all precedents, all arguments, and all principles must subserve.<sup>15</sup>

Of the weakness of the sociological school of law, Micklem has said:

The valuable emphasis upon the empirical element in jurisprudence and legal justice is dangerous unless it is accompanied by reference to the ultimate principles by which the empirical lawyer should be guided. Justice is more than a device for the avoidance of social friction. The engineer's task is to tinker with the car to make it go, but it will not run far or securely apart from due observation of fundamental principles with which he may not tinker. Jurisprudence may be in large measure an empirical science, but it has transcendental postulates and principles. The avoidance of



reference to the transcendent or spiritual in this theory leads to very great obscurity."<sup>16</sup>

Dooyeweerd finds these transcendental postulates in the modal moment of jurisprudence. What then is the modal moment of jurisprudence? The answer, says Dooyeweerd, is *Vergeltung* or retribution. He tells us that it is very difficult to render the original kernel of the juridical modality of meaning by a satisfactory term:

In the first (Dutch) edition of this work I chose the word "retribution" (Dutch: *vergelding*; German: *Vergeltung*). This term was used in the pregnant sense of an irreducible mode of balancing and harmonizing individual and social interests. This mode implies a standard of proportionality regulating the legal interpretation of social facts and their factual social consequences in order to maintain the juridical balance by a just reaction, viz., the so-called legal consequences of the fact related to a juridical ground. As is easily seen, this provisional explanation of the term appeals to a complex of analogical terms. The modal *meaning-kernel* (modal moment) proper is not explained by this circumscription. In itself this is not surprising. For in every previous analysis of a modal structure we were confronted with the same state of affairs. It is the very nature of the modal nucleus that it cannot be defined, because every circumscription of its meaning must appeal to this central moment of the aspect-structure concerned. The modal meaning-kernel itself can be grasped only in an immediate intuition and never apart from its structural context of analogies.

But the term by which this meaning-kernel is designated must be able immediately to evoke this intuition of the ultimate irreducible nucleus of the modal aspect of experience concerned.<sup>17</sup>

According to Dooyeweerd, in all legal phenomena we are concerned with the expression of this general meaning of "retribution" which makes these phenomena legal; that is, there must be a weighing in the scales of justice of the legal interests involved in litigation so that there is a just resolution of conflict between the private interest of the citizen and the public interest of the state.<sup>18</sup>

This indicates that Dooyeweerd does not want to limit the idea of retribution solely to matters of the criminal

law, but he considers it as a proper expression of the modal moment of the juridical aspect itself. As he himself points out:

In jurisprudence, however, the original modal meaning of the word "retribution" has been often wrongly restricted to criminal law, i.e., to a typical manifestation of its general modal sense. And at the same time this concept has become the subject of a vehement contest between the so-called classical school in the theory of criminal law and the modern criminological trends. According to the latter the idea of retribution is nothing but the residue of the unreasonable instinct of revenge; it impedes a rational treatment of criminality. The classical school, on the other hand, handled a rigid conception of penal retribution which only left room for an abstract delict and eliminated the person of the delinquent and his social environment.

It must be evident that if retribution is to be considered as the nuclear meaning of the juridical aspect, it must be detached from this typical controversy in a special branch of jurisprudence. Retribution is not only exercised *in malam* but also *in bonam partem*. Its modal legal measure of proportionality can be applied to every possible legal consequence (Dutch: *rechtsgevolg*) connected with any juristic fact.<sup>19</sup>

Dooyeweerd then refers to Leo Polak's inquiry into the meaning of the term "retribution" in the Indo-Germanic and Semitic languages in the book *De Zin der Vergelding*. Of this investigation Dooyeweerd writes:

Polak begins with the statement that the term is also used to denote a reaction *in bonam partem*, viz., remuneration or recompense. According to him, the term in its general sense denotes merely a reaction in social life. Only in its strict sense of just retribution or retribution proper, it necessarily implies the standard of proportionality or equivalency. In criminal law this signifies that punishment must be *deserved* pain, that the criminal gets his due. But also with respect to a contractual remuneration or recompense, retribution in its pregnant sense, implies this requirement that it must be deserved. . . .

Dooyeweerd then points out:

The whole Greco-Roman, patristic, and medieval scholastic tradition preserved some intuitive insight into the retributive character of justice in its strict

juridical sense. The characterization of the latter as *suum cuique tribuere* is based upon an older cosmological conception of justice whose retributive character cannot be doubted.

The very earliest reflection on justice in its strict sense has found retribution as its "essence." The old Ionian philosophers of nature, Heraclitus, the Pythagorean thinkers, as well as old Indian philosophy have stressed this meaning.<sup>20</sup>

In our opinion Dooyeweerd rightly considers that this universal human insight into the retributive character of justice stems from men's awareness that God's judgment rests upon evildoers, both individually and corporately. "Mene, mene, tekel, upharsin," can be read not only in the pages of history, but it has also been expressed in the writings of the world's greatest dramatists, poets and novelists. Aeschylus, Shakespeare, Ibsen, Hadry, and Hawthorne have all seen this divine retribution at work in the affairs of men. Dooyeweerd admits that every human execution of retributive justice has been deformed by sin, but he points out:

This fact does not imply that the juridicial aspect *in the retributive kernel of its modal meaning-structure* is of a sinful character. On the contrary . . . in the temporal cosmic order retribution is the irreplaceable foundation of love in its modal moral sense. Only from the modal meaning-structure of the juridical aspect with its indelible retributive nuclear moment can an imperfect and sinful human legal order derive its juridical character and its claim to respect.

A positive legal order is only possible within this structural cadre of meaning. Every attempt to define the juridical nature of positive law by means of external, purely phenomenal characteristics moves in a vicious circle.

The retributive mode of ordering social relations is not restricted to the narrow boundaries of penal law and private contracts.

As has been said, *every* really juridical relation whatever discloses this modal meaning-kernel, which urges itself upon us as soon as we analyze its modal structure.<sup>21</sup>

Accordingly, within the juridical law sphere all the social structures possess their own individual internal spheres of justice which have their own independent validity. An

internal structural diversity is present in juridical life. State-law, family-law, association-law, and church-law are all independent legal structures. While most such structures of law have an historical foundation, law transcends history and has its own sovereignty which cannot be reduced to any other modality without destroying the very nature of law and justice. As an example of one such modern attempt at reductionism we may cite the so-called medical theory of the cause and cure of crime which attempts to reduce legal science to a branch of medical science and so perverts the true ends of law and justice.

#### B. The Relation Between Love and Justice

How can retributive justice ever become the foundation of ethical relationships among men? How can the claims of justice ever be reconciled with the claims of love?

Dooyeweerd answers this question by a profound examination of Emil Brunner's teaching upon the relation between love and law in the latter's famous work *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen* translated into English by Olive Wyon as *The Divine Imperative* as well as in his later work *Die Gerechtigkeit* translated into English as *Justice and the Social Order*.<sup>22</sup>

To begin with, Dooyeweerd rejects Brunner's dualism between God's creation ordinances and the central divine commandment of love. According to Dooyeweerd, love lies at the center of the creation order; it is not something brought in afterwards by God because of man's fall into sin. He therefore rejects Brunner's attempt to build up a theory of law and a jurisprudence upon the basis of a "theology." A theory of law for Dooyeweerd must be based on a renewed biblical religious insight into the divinely established structural principles of human society and not upon theology viewed as the scientific investigation of the modal moment of faith. These dogmatic definitions of Christian faith have been largely ecclesiastically defined, and they can be of little use or help in solving the problems of the jurist, the economist, the sociologist, and the political scientist. For these sciences there must be a *directly biblical* and not an *indirectly theological* reformation of thought and

action. Thus he points out that the question "What is the proper scientific viewpoint of dogmatic theology and what is its proper theoretical object?" cannot be answered by referring to the revelation of God in his Word as the only true source of theological knowledge. "For, as the central principle of knowledge, this Word-revelation must become the foundation of the whole of Christian life, both in its practical and its scientific activity."<sup>23</sup>

As we have seen, Dooyeweerd finds the point of departure for all true Christian theoretical thought in the biblical ground motive of creation, fall into sin, and redemption by Jesus Christ. One of the most important facts which the Scriptures make known to us is that God is the true and original architect of the universe. The world and man owe their continuing existence to God and his law. Without this law they would disintegrate into complete chaos. For the Word of God, that which characterizes the Antichrist, the man of sin, the godless man, is precisely his will to be like God (Gen. 3) and to be without law (II Thess. 2:3-8).

The law of God is revealed to us in the Scriptures both in its central summary, as well as in the variety of the divine commandments. This, however, does not allow us to conclude that we can derive the specific ordinances of "nature" (the inorganic physical, botanical and zoological world) and of the human interrelations directly from the Scriptures.

Dooyeweerd argues that we cannot take the law of God, as it is known by us in faith from the Scriptures, and identify it with these ordinances which are founded in God's will as Creator and which chronologically precede the written Word of God. At the same time, says Dooyeweerd, neither may we absolutize the ordinances of creation over against the Word of God as seems to be done in so-called Thomistic Neo-Orthodoxy of the Maritain type.<sup>24</sup>

According to Dooyeweerd this absolutizing of the ordinances of creation over against the Word of God occurs to a large degree in modern Roman Catholic thought, in so far as it begins with the assumption of a "natural order" which can be known by the "natural understanding" apart from

divine enlightenment and which functions as the substructure of the "supernatural order of the mysteries of grace."

Dooyeweerd considers that Brunner holds to a similar dualistic position. For Brunner, concepts such as the order of creation, justice, and natural law, express the fact that man is born into a complex of ordinances and rules of life, which are not the product of his own will, but which impose themselves independently of his will as a result of their foundation in God's will as Creator.

Nevertheless, it is remarkable, for Brunner's thought, that these ordinances of the creation have no unconditional validity; rather, in certain situations they can be suspended by the so-called *Gebot der Stunde* (the command of the hour or the momentaneous command), which has a completely incidental character. This is even the case with the commands of universal application, as these are revealed to us in the Word of God.

The real will of God cannot be contained in general principles. According to Brunner God always remains completely over against our existence. For this reason the Christian is a "free lord over all things," and also because he stands immediately under the personal command of the free and sovereign God.<sup>25</sup>

According to Dooyeweerd Brunner will have nothing to do with constant laws and ordinances which God in his faithfulness continually maintains. Brunner's thought thus becomes involved in an intrinsic dualism not only between the *Gebot der Stunde* and the order of creation, but also between the *Gebot der Stunde* and the written Word of God. The Bible for Brunner is not simply the Word of God but rather a human witness to this Word. The Bible in us and through us must become a witness.

Dooyeweerd begins with *faith* in the complete stability and complete trustworthiness of both the Word of God, as this has been given to us in the Holy Scriptures, and of the divine ordinances of creation which are distinct from this Word and yet are founded in this Word. Thus for Dooyeweerd any possible contradiction between the divine command of love over against the law of God's ordinances is eliminated at the very outset. For Dooyeweerd such an

antinomy as Brunner finds between the central divine command of love and the human legal principle of retributive justice arises from Brunner's eradication of the modal boundaries of the juridical and moral spheres.

For Brunner, Christian ethics is the science of human conduct determined by divine action. By thus merging the ethical modality of morality with the pistical modality of faith, Brunner is led to a fundamentally erroneous definition of the relations which should exist between love and justice. For Brunner, the love mentioned in the central divine commandment is absolute. It concerns the whole person and is concrete, not legal. Justice, on the contrary, "is general, lawful, deliberate, impersonal, objective, abstract and rational." Therefore, for Brunner, it is a contradiction of terms to speak of a perfect justice, for what is perfect cannot be justice. Even when he speaks of the divine justice, he means nothing concrete and material but only those formal qualities of the idea of justice as implied especially in the idea of reliability of the objective and the active operation of a rule that has been imposed upon us.<sup>26</sup>

Dooyeweerd claims that the fundamental error of Brunner's view is here exposed. Brunner has forgotten that the fulness of the meaning of love, as revealed in Christ's Cross, is at the same time the fulness of justice. "If we assign a higher place to the divine love than to the divine justice," he writes, then "this procedure necessarily detracts from God's holiness."<sup>27</sup> So far from God's love being opposed to God's justice as Brunner, Tillich, and Niebuhr all falsely suppose, it is in fact its necessary pre-supposition.

On the Cross the Lord Christ has in principle and in fact reconciled law and love by his love, vindicating God's moral law. As our great High Priest, he paid homage to the sanctity of the moral order by himself, in his own body on the tree, paying the price of man's sinfulness and immorality. Thereby his love broke through the demands of the moral law of God by satisfying its every requirement.

Dooyeweerd maintains that Brunner's error is that he opposes love, as the exclusive content of the fulness of God's commandment, to the "temporal ordinances," which owing

to man's fall show God's will only in a broken state. He also finds in Brunner's initial methodological distinction between the *Gebot* and the *Ordnungen*, between the divine command of love and the creation ordinances, the reason for the antinomies which arise in this Neo-Orthodox type of Christian ethic.<sup>28</sup>

According to Dooyeweerd Brunner's conception of love as the radical opposite of justice is not really biblical at all but arises from "an absolutization of the temporal modal meaning of love." By so doing, Brunner has violated the religious dimensions of love and called in question the perfection of God's holiness and justice revealed in Christ's death upon the Cross. If God's love were really of such a kind as modernistic and Neo-Orthodox Protestant theologians would have us believe, then the death of Christ would not have been at all necessary. God could have simply declared his forgiveness in an oration delivered by our Lord from the same place as he delivered the Sermon on the Mount. His forgiveness could have been made verbally. Yet the New Testament finds the forgiving love of God perfectly displayed and expressed in the death of his Son upon the cross. Further, the New Testament teaches that this death was necessary and that "Christ died according to the Scriptures" and in accordance with the determinate counsel and decree of God (I Cor. 15:3; Acts 2:23). Our Lord himself often spoke of the coming necessity of his death (Mk. 8:31-33; Luke 17:25). Christ saw his sufferings, death, and rising again as inward and divinely-conditioned necessities. His death upon the cross was no mere martyrdom nor an accident of fate but an essential part of his mission to reconcile sinful man with a holy, righteous, and just Creator: such was God's purpose for his mission in life. He had to suffer and to rise again for the justification of man's sin.

If we ask why such a death, the answer which the Word of God gives is that only by such a sacrifice of God's Son upon the cross could there be made "a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world."<sup>29</sup>



Before we can understand this biblical teaching we must go back to the Old Testament and its teaching about sacrifice. From the earliest times, blood, whether of an animal or of a human being, was believed to be endowed with mysterious powers. A good example is provided by the story of Cain and Abel. After Cain had killed Abel, God said, "The voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto me from the ground" (Gen. 4:10). Even today we still speak of a person's "life blood" and talk about "blood being thicker than water," and we are all quite familiar with the modern practice of blood transfusion which is often the means of saving a person's life. Blood and life are clearly intimately connected. Now the idea that life and blood are bound up with each other should help us to understand a primitive practice which was widespread in the ancient world, that is, the sealing of contracts by blood. When we use the word "contract" we think of a lawyer's office and of parchment and red tape. When the ancients used the word they thought of killing an animal, the blood of which was smeared on the contracting parties, the life of the animal in some way being understood as binding them together. Often the contracting parties would devour the victim before its life had left the still warm flesh and blood, and thus in a most literal way all those who shared in the ceremony absorbed part of the victim's life into themselves. When the contract or agreement was between God and man, the blood was smeared or poured on the altar as well as on the worshipers, thus expressing the establishment or confirmation of a bond of common life between the worshipers and between the worshipers and God. Sometimes, a contract in which God was involved would be settled by a common meal, in which the worshipers shared the carcass, while the blood was given to God, being poured out on the altar.

Perhaps we can now understand why it was that when Christ wished to institute a new covenant between God and man, on the night before his crucifixion he said that he was going to do it with his blood. He solemnly broke the bread and poured out the wine, saying that these were his body and his blood, which was to usher in the New Covenant, the new relationship between Heaven and Earth. That is

why his death upon the cross was from the first regarded by his disciples as a sacrifice for their sins. We are apt today to forget how strange it is that the crucifixion should ever have come to be looked upon as a sacrifice, for a sacrifice is a religious service, and the crucifixion hardly looked like that. But at the last supper Christ had taken means by which the disciples would in time come to understand his death upon the cross as a sacrifice for their sins and the sins of the whole world. The death of Christ thus was interpreted by himself at the last supper as a sacrifice for sin.

Before, however, we can fully understand the biblical teaching about Christ's death as a sacrifice for our sins, we must also clearly grasp another biblical idea, namely, the doctrine of retributive punishment for human sinfulness which, in spite of the objections of C. H. Dodd, C. Grant, and a host of other modernistic theologians to the contrary, is consistently taught throughout the Holy Scriptures. "The soul that sinneth, it shall surely die," says Ezekiel. "The wages of sin is death," teaches Paul. According to the Word of God the punishment for sin is *inherent* in the nature of a holy and just God and in the nature of the universe created by him. Our Lord's own teaching about the dreadful judgment that awaits all men who disobey God's moral law reveals that there *is* such a thing as a sentence of death in the spiritual world comparable to the death penalty inflicted upon murderers in this world. "Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire."<sup>30</sup>

Our Lord himself taught us that his death was a ransom paid for sin to fulfill the requirements of law. Law in the Bible, as we have seen, is a tremendous word. Law is the holiness, the righteousness, and the faithfulness of God as revealed in the orderly working of his creation. All the creation is placed under God's law. The divine law is not limited to the Ten Commandments but includes the so-called laws of nature studied by human science.

When we say that God has placed his entire creation under law, we include under the term *law* all the divine ordinances and norms which have their origin in the sovereign

will of the Creator and which apply to his creation. Law is the expression of God's righteous and holy will. God is the great lawgiver and his laws mark the boundary between himself and the cosmos. No creature can exceed it; all must remain on this side of the boundary. Law, then, means the state of being in harmony and obedience with the nature of the universe and it becomes the judgment of God upon those who transgress it. Thus law is both the gate that leads to Heaven and the barrier that bars any one who is defiled. In its simplest form law manifests its presence at work in the universe as the inevitable sequence of cause and effect. There is no such thing as luck or chance in God's ordered creation. Thus the laws of nature are based on the mathematical certainty of cause and effect. Scientific inquiry would be impossible if scientists could not rely absolutely on the order of nature. Similarly, the moral law for human beings is based on a like sequence of cause and effect. Whatever we think, say, or do produces its due results, whether of God's blessing or God's curse, of good or evil, of happiness or unhappiness. "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap" (Galatians 6:7). Therefore, disobedience and sin against God's moral order inevitably brings its deserved and merited penalty. "The wages of sin is death," the spiritual death of a person created in God's image, and nothing can alter that fact. This explains the despairing cry of the prodigal son, "Father, I have sinned not only in thy sight but also against heaven." He had not only offended against a father's love, which might forgive, but he had violated the moral law, the order of the universe—he had sinned against heaven—where no hope apart from mercy is to be found.

As human creatures, therefore, living in a world inexorably governed by God's law and order, it is part of our existence to know that sin must bring retribution. Indeed, so deep is this conviction within us, that, though in our day the sense of sin is seemingly lacking, psychiatrists attribute the fears and phobias of a neurotic generation almost entirely to a guilt complex in some form or another. The deep-seated instinct is still there, working its ravages upon the unconscious. In such a situation it is futile and

even cruel to point guilty sinners to the love of God or to the Cross of Christ as no more than a demonstration of that love. Such a sentimental Gospel only serves to increase the separation between a holy God and sinful man, because the more we realize the love and the holiness of God the more we know ourselves unworthy to share that love or to survive in the purity of his piercing holiness. Dare we say it? Man can believe in the real and lasting forgiveness of sins only when he knows that the terrible price and cost of sin has been fully paid, and that the moral law of God has been completely satisfied and met.

The very horror of the sacrifice offered up upon the cross, from which the human mind so recoils that it seeks to explain it away, is proportionately the guarantee of that assumed salvation upon which the guilty heart can rest its only hope. Bishop Handley Moule in some striking lines has emphasized the profound truth that because the mystery of the passion of the cross of Christ is unfathomable, the measure of the forgiveness it offers is limitless.<sup>31</sup>

The gloomy Garden, blood-bedewed,  
The midnight scene of shame and scorn  
The scourge, the wreath of rending thorn,  
The tortures of the dreadful Rood;

These were the billows of Thy Death,  
The storm tost surface; but the cry,  
Thy spirit's woe, Sabachthani,  
Rose from the ocean underneath.

Man has no line that sea to sound,  
The abyss of night—whose gulfs within  
Now lies entombed our weight of sin,  
Forgotten never to be found.<sup>32</sup>

So it is that the darkness which veils the sacrifice on Calvary becomes the sepulchre which John Bunyan saw hard by the Cross, into which Christian's burden rolled away, to be seen no more. For as the guilt of sin cannot rest upon more than one, when we behold the Lamb of God taking away the sin of the world, we know, thereby, beyond all question that our sin can no longer be upon ourselves, but that "by his stripes we are healed" for the Lord hath "laid on him the iniquity of us all" (Isaiah 53:5, 6). That is

what Christians believe to have been the meaning of their dear Lord's death upon the cross. Christ reconciled law and love, justice and love, retribution and love by his own love, vindicating law, justice and retribution. As our great High Priest, he paid homage to the sanctity of the moral order by paying the price of sin himself.

It is in terms of this profound religious and biblical understanding of God's justice and God's love as revealed in the death of his Son that we must understand Dooyeweerd's language when he writes that "retribution is the irreplaceable foundation of love in its modal moral sense." He believes that nobody can truly love his neighbor without observing the exigencies of this divine type of retribution. That is why all the moral commandments of the Decalogue make an appeal to the legal order. The commandment "Thou shalt do no murder" has no ethical meaning of love without this juridical foundation in retribution. As Dooyeweerd makes clear, "Anyone who rejects the demands of retribution does harm to his neighbor in the sense condemned by the moral law of love, as it is expressed in the commandment mentioned."<sup>33</sup>

J. Bohatec has proved that John Calvin held a similar view of the relation between justice and love. He writes:

By opposing love and justice, freedom and compulsion, the Anabaptists, as is well known, have forced a problem on the Reformation. Calvin does not try to get around it. Against the one-sided solution of the Anabaptists who reject the state and law, he argues that it is in the interest of love to maintain justice and the ordinances connected with it. A man who is inspired by true love will not think of harming his brother; on the contrary he will strive after preserving everybody's rights and after protecting him from injustice.<sup>34</sup>

According to John Calvin, as well as Herman Dooyeweerd then, justice is the very foundation of love in that it protects the weak against the strong and restores the balance in social interests when these have been disrupted by evildoers.

The schema with which Brunner works seems to be that Christian love obtains only in strictly personal relation-

ships, and justice only within the institutional orders and structures of society; and that these latter are in no sense the creations of Christian love. In the light of the discussion of the biblical teaching, we must point out that these distinctions are too rigidly drawn. Institutions and personal relations are much more necessary to one another than Brunner allows for. There is no institution that can flourish on the basis of legal compulsion alone, dispensing altogether with love; nor is there any personal relationship that is completely independent of institutions and into which there enters no element of justice. Even the love of husband and wife, or of mother and child, finds full expression only within the institution of the family, and without justice no family is properly ordered and governed. Not even the Church can be ordered on the basis of a love that refuses to express itself in terms of justice. The Canon Law of the Church is not just conventionally referred to as law, but it possesses a juridical character to the fullest extent. To get around this difficulty, Brunner is forced to distinguish between "the Church of faith" which "as such possesses no order" and the Church as an institution.<sup>35</sup> We conclude that the true view of the relation of love to justice in Christian jurisprudence is that, while love goes far beyond justice, it uses justice as a necessary instrument of its own expression, congealing itself into the rigidity of law in proportion as relationships become too complicated or too remote to be within the scope of direct personal knowledge and feelings.

### C. The Christian Understanding of Justice and Law

According to Dooyeweerd every modality or law-sphere is an intrinsic part of the total structure of reality, and this fact must be recognized by the specialist in each particular field of human knowledge. For in every special science the fundamental concepts are formulated only when the modal moment of the specific modality which is being studied is seen in its relation and coherence to the other modalities or law-spheres. This aspect of Dooyeweerd's legal philosophy enables him to develop his jurisprudence in close relation to the other sciences and areas of human life, thus avoiding

the pitfalls of rationalistic abstractionism and legal reductionism. He maintains that the fundamental concepts of jurisprudence are formulated by the analogies between the modalities which "precede" the juridical (the numerical through to the aesthetic law-spheres) and the juridical modality itself.

Dooyeweerd thus distinguishes between the *concept* and the *idea* of justice. The former is formulated in the above described manner: by discovering the analogies between the lower modalities and the juridical modal moment of "retribution" or judgment. The latter is formulated by discovering the relation between law and the higher functions, namely, those of ethics, morality, and faith.<sup>36</sup>

In its relation to the lower aspects of reality Dooyeweerd would have us conceive of the legal modality in its restrictive function. If legal life develops only in relation to these aspects, then it remains closed. But as soon as law develops in relation to morality and faith, then he claims we discover a deepening of legal life. Dooyeweerd calls this deepening "the opening-process" of legal life and it is found to have taken place in all the higher cultures of mankind.

But the fundamental concepts of any science are defined in relation to the analogical moments which are the retrocipitations, the reflections of the earlier modalities in a higher. And if so, then before we can gain a clear understanding of the effect of retribution in actual life, we must study the relation between the juridical sphere and the earlier modalities of reality.

### 1. The Aesthetic Analogy

The essence of beauty for Dooyeweerd is harmony, so the first analogy appears to him as harmony in retribution. As we have already seen, every law-sphere, since it is the connecting link between subjective reality and the cosmic structure, has two sides, a subject side and a norm side. The harmony in retribution must appear in both sides. On the *norm side* this is evident when we notice that the jural norm creates a harmony between the legal interests by

reconciling them in the scale of retribution. One-sided legal interests may not be fulfilled at the expense of others so that chaos in social life is avoided. Practical consequences of this analogy are immediate. The periods of time determined by statutes of limitations are not arbitrary, but are fixed so that the best harmonious relation is achieved. The measure of damages similarly must be made reasonable, avoiding excess. Harmony between private and public interests in legislation has become extremely important in modern life since the complexities of an industrial society require a due regard for the protection of private rights. On the *subject side* the parties to a law suit must not expect to receive more than their just desserts, that which is due to them.<sup>37</sup> Beginning with the logical modality of thought, the analytical modality, the cosmic law expresses itself in norms which can be transgressed. Thus there may be a violation in the harmony of retribution on the subject side, that is, in the subjective reality of legal life.<sup>38</sup>

## 2. The Economic Analogy

According to Dooyeweerd the modal moment of the economic law-sphere is "scarcity" or "saving," the sparing use or economical use of scarce goods. The economic analogy of retribution is expressed herein, that in the distribution of economic goods there must be a harmonious balance in the satisfaction of economic needs.<sup>39</sup> In his great work on *Sovereignty*, Bertrand de Jouvenel warned that we must not look to the state to achieve this harmonious balance in the satisfaction of economic need if we would retain our liberty.

Jouvenel maintains that if the state takes upon itself the task of justly apportioning *all* the fruits of economic activity, the result will be the rending of political society by conflict over what is the right standard for determining the distribution of the available wealth and goods. He therefore suggests that the business of justly apportioning material rewards belongs not primarily to the state but to the whole of society. Conflicting criteria must be weighed in the scale of retribution against each other; the process



of adjusting them must in the first place be pursued by the interested parties themselves, with the government standing by to ensure the peaceful conduct of this process, to help it along, and only in the last resort—when absolutely necessary—to weave out of irreconcilable demands an acceptable equation by the use of arbitration boards and so on. By such means the multifarious rules by which society attempts to organize economic relationships between human beings in a manner consistent with the principle of giving to each his proper due can be made effective and upheld. As de Jouvenel well says:

The scrupulous practice of commutative justice by citizens, the backing of public opinion for its observance and its forcible endorsement by the government—these do between them more for the common good than is done by proposals for overall distributive panaceas. It is, moreover, a product of barren and lazy thinking to picture distributive justice as the work of a supreme legislator. Rather it is the duty of each single person, for there are none so free of ties that they do not have to take decisions on share-out to others, even if, as in the case of the mother of a family, what is shared out amongst others—her children—is only work, patience and love. Each of us in his efforts to render the equivalent of what he has received practises commutative justice, and each of us, in making conscientious share-out and in lining up our fellow recipients in the order relevant to the occasion, practises distributive justice.<sup>40</sup>

### 3. The Social Analogy and the Problem of Racial Integration

The modal moment of the social aspect of reality is human inter-relationships. Man is the only creature that possesses a subjective social function; he alone has a subjective function in the normative modalities or law-spheres. In animal life there is collective activity, for example, symbiosis and an instinctive feeling of belonging together, but no instance of true community and spiritual fellowship. The term "social" as used by Dooyeweerd must not be thought of as primarily referring to or being restricted to labor unions, etc. The social modality covers a much broader terrain. Men are united together in various com-

munities, such as the state, church, university and industry. In these communities the members are related in a totality, so that the community forms a unit. In human society there are also the looser associations in which men are in contact with each other without being really tied into a unity. The members of an association are merely coordinated, not subordinated to each other in a relation of authority and obedience; for example, a business deal between buyer and seller would constitute an association rather than a community.

Retribution in the social analogy appears as the balanced harmonizing of the interests and rights of the various communities and associations. This must not be confused with the sociological school of modern legal philosophy which defines law in terms of "social engineering" as expounded, for example, by Pound and Stone. This school of jurisprudence would have all of man's legal relations swallowed up by his social relation. Dooyeweerd expressly states that "the relation of retribution between a community and an association must not be identified with the social relation between these."<sup>41</sup> It is because the Supreme Court of the United States has forgotten that "man's freedom depends upon the silence of the law" and that man's legal relationships are only a small part of his total societal relationships that it has now taken upon itself to forcibly integrate colored and white men into one educational association regardless of the deep historical and social differences existing between these groups. Given the different cultural and historical background of these groups in American society, it is hardly surprising that such social engineering on the part of the executive and judicial branches of American government should create intolerable tensions within the American body politic.<sup>42</sup>

That the standard of justice for social relations is different from the standard required in legal relations is proved by the fact that social contracts do not get very far in the courts. A violation of social norms may but does not necessarily transgress legal norms as well. The social basis of law implies the competence of the legislator, but this competence must be limited by the proper correlation of

the communal and associational functions which may not be infringed by the supposed absolute competence of the state. The individual does not enjoy an absolute legal competence or absolute rights, but neither does the state nor central government enjoy absolute sovereignty over men in deciding, for example, which schools their children shall attend and which they shall not. Such absoluteness is removed if we consider that justice in the social analogy requires a proper balance between the state, the communities and the associations making up a given human society.

Such a claim to decide men's societal relationships in all their manifold variety is typical of the totalitarian state. For the United States Supreme Court and President or for the British Parliament to enact legislation, telling Americans or Britons with whom they shall be educated and where they may or may not eat, play, attend church and work is thus a gross invasion of the American or British citizen's right to choose his own type of education for his children, his own eating habits and restaurants and his own recreational activities.

Racial issues are not settled by legislation nor at the point of bayonets. They are settled by time and a spirit of patience and of Christ-like forgiveness and understanding of the people directly involved. Military force is not a substitute for persuasion.

Liberal humanists have not realized that the basic issue in the present grave racial crisis in America, at least as far as education is concerned, is that the American Federal and State Governments had no business to be involved in the field of education in the first place. Education is solely the God-given responsibility of parents. Children are born by reason of the natural powers of reproduction of their parents, not because of the permission of the government. It is because the Federal and State governments of America have infringed upon this sovereignty of the family and parental sphere by making the education of American children a part of the function of government that the present crisis over the integration of white and colored schools has arisen. It is because the American public school has been used to serve the improper purposes

of providing the basis for the secular humanistic American way of life that all the trouble has arisen. It is unjust and contrary to God's cultural mandate for bringing up one's own children to use the school for such a political purpose.

It is nonsense on the part of educational apostate liberal humanists to claim that all children, regardless of their parents' ideological and religious persuasion, can meet together on the grounds of a supposedly neutral educational field. While the public schools of the Deep South have so far achieved only a token integration, Roman Catholic Christians have achieved a far greater degree of integration in their school system for the reason that such integration takes place on a consciously accepted religious basis. Let the Protestant Christians of America, both colored and white, establish their own Christian day schools, using their common faith in Christ as the basis of harmonious racial relationships. The only power on this earth which can really bring about true community between people is the religious faith which they hold in common. Recent events in America and South Africa have proved that the liberal humanist faith in man's reason, utility and a so-called natural law of equality between men cannot do this.<sup>43</sup>

The great illusion of modern "post-Christian" democrats and humanists is that true community can be created between men without the grace and power of the risen Christ. In the very same year in which James Meredith was forcibly admitted to the University of Mississippi, the Supreme Court prohibited the saying of the Lord's Prayer in the public school system of America. Such apostate humanists apparently expect men to live as brothers without believing in God as their Creator, to found a community of men without any common life of sacraments and creed to bind them together, and to think as one while remaining utterly individualistic and self-seeking. It is tragic to think that Anglican bishops and clergy actually support such humanistic hopes.

May every true Christian in the English-speaking world proclaim from the housetops that it is impossible to enjoy the fruits of Christianity without first accepting Christ's kingship over one's own personal life. Outside

the Body of Christ the world of apostasy from God stands doomed and condemned. The secular humanist values of "liberty," "equality," and "fraternity" are miserable shadows of the Christian experience of the Fatherhood of God, of being adopted children in Christ, of the liberty wherewith Christ makes us free from the power and guilt of sin, and of the fellowship of the Holy Spirit.

It is impossible to expect colored and white people in any part of the world to live together in peace and true community unless both groups come to share in God's forgiveness of their sins and both races find in the risen Christ a common loyalty in terms of which they can alone build up a stable world order. For the same reason, it is equally futile to expect unregenerate apostate white men and women to live in peace with each other or to expect unconverted heathen colored men and women to live in real community with each other, unless and until such men and women, whatever the color of their skins, first repent of their sins and then are willing to be led by the Spirit of Christ in building up separate Christian associations and organizations not contaminated by the evil and wickedness of a rebellious world. It is therefore imperative that Christians throughout the world now establish their own Christian day schools, newspapers, trade and labor unions, credit unions and political parties in which Christ's kingship is taken seriously. Let Christian people in America, Britain and Canada stop relying upon humanist governments to do the work of arousing Americans, Britons and Canadians to repent of their sins. It is utterly beyond the powers of the American, British and Canadian governments to create lasting fellowship and peace between differing classes and races. It is only the risen Christ who can reconcile sinners to a just and holy God. Let us pray that God will give these nations time for amendment of life and repentance of our Church's failure to witness to the glorious power of the gospel of Christ, crucified and risen for the justification and forgiveness of our sins, including the sin of prejudice, and for the reconciliation of races, classes, and nations (II Cor. 5:19).

#### 4. The Lingual Analogy

According to Dooyeweerd, the analogy meant here gives clear expression to the fact that juridical relations are possible only when they are signified. Thus the smashing of a window pane or the getting into a public means of conveyance can only function in the legal aspect of temporal reality because they have a juridical signification as a delict, and as an indirect expression of the intention to make an agreement of conveyance respectively. And these legal significations are necessarily founded in the original meaning of symbolic significations, that is, in language. The latter is by no means restricted to *verbal* language. It may be expressed in all forms of symbolic designation—in the expression of a face, in the waving of a hand, in written symbols, signals, flags, etc.<sup>44</sup>

Of this legal discourse, Charles Morris points out:

The language of law furnishes an example of designative-incitive discourse. Legal discourse designates the punishments which an organized community empowers itself to employ if certain actions are or are not performed, and its aim is to cause individuals to perform or not to perform the actions in question. Legal discourse as such does not appraise these actions nor prescribe them; it does not say that it is good to act legally or that one should so act. It merely designates the steps the community says that it is prepared to take if certain actions are performed or not performed.<sup>45</sup>

Dooyeweerd maintains that the juridical signification as a signified meaning is not qualified by the original modal moment of language but by that of retribution. It is a necessary lingual analogy in the modal structure of the juridical aspect. The question, for example, whether the absence of a so-called "customary stipulation" in a written agreement may be interpreted as a silent acceptance of this stipulation by both parties is a juridical question, not one of language. According to Dooyeweerd, the signified juridical meaning of every juridical fact and of every possible juridical norm must be determined by means of a juridical interpretation.

### 5. The Historical Analogy

This will be discussed at a later stage in connection with Dooyeweerd's idea of law.

### 6. The Logical Analogy

The modal moment of this law-sphere is analytical distinction and the rational and logical observation and classification of diversity. The analytical modality is the first modality in the cosmic order whose laws are normative in character. A law of thought and logic is a norm to which we *ought* to subject our thinking. The person who transgresses a law of thought thinks improperly and is guilty of error. In the pre-logical law-spheres there is no question of a norm or obligation. It is for this reason that Dooyeweerd speaks of the analytical and post-analytical aspects or law-spheres or modalities as the "spiritual" sides of man's life, while the first five are the "natural" aspects. However, he is reluctant to use the adjective "spiritual" over against "natural," since he does not want to be classified with such humanist scholars as Rickert, Litt, Dilthey, Hodges and Hocking, who all tend to make an absolute distinction between the empirical natural sciences which deal with nature and the spiritual or cultural sciences which have as their field of investigation the humanities and cultural sciences.<sup>46</sup> This distinction is but another expression of the basic religious conflict in the ground motive of modern philosophy—that between the science ideal and the personality ideal. Nevertheless, the law for human thought is *normative* and obligatory, since man does not make logical distinctions as automatically as he thinks he does.

The analytical analogy in law is clear, since legal accountability is obviously founded on the ability of the legal subject to make logical distinctions between right and wrong actions. The famous McNaghten Rules which govern British law in cases other than those now excepted by the Homicide Act of 1957 state that a man is held to be responsible for his actions unless he is "labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to

know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing wrong." This formula applies in English law not only to responsibility for criminal acts of every kind but also in civil cases.<sup>47</sup> Because it is presumed in English law that every sane man can think and decide for himself, he is held legally responsible for his actions. Such a doctrine of legal responsibility indicates that we have entered the realm of the "ought" and that a person is no longer considered to be imprisoned in the realm of nature's necessity. In this regard it is highly significant that the modern penological tendency to reduce law to a branch of medicine has resulted in the new fangled legal doctrine of diminished responsibility as well as the theory that crime is caused by sickness rather than sin.

#### 7. The Psychical Analogy

The psychical modality or law-sphere is the first post-biological modality. Its modal moment is feeling. The psychical modality is a separate aspect of reality. It is not identical with the biological or the analytical law-spheres. Every living thing does not possess feeling, nor does every living thing which does possess it have a subjective analytical function. A plant lacks feeling and therefore is biotically qualified. An animal has feeling and is therefore psychically qualified but it is not able to form concepts but only percepts. Dooyeweerd holds that the psychical is limited to feeling and perception. To it belongs all the sensory impressions that man and animals receive through their sense organs. He suggests that there is a "jump" from the level of feeling to that of will, and he claims that there is no juridical liability without this aspect of will. Only beings with a conscious will can be legal subjects. Thus we cannot hold persons fully liable for their actions if this element is lacking. For this reason Dooyeweerd holds that the legal status of the insane and of drunkards differs from that of normal persons in full control of their moral and mental faculties.<sup>48</sup>



## 8. The Biological Analogy and the Death Penalty

The modal moment of the biological law-sphere or modality is life. All living things, whether plants, animals, or man have a subject function in the organic or biological modality. The so-called inanimate things of nature are qualified by the physical modality, since it is the last modality in which they have a subject function. A plant, in contrast to an inanimate thing, functions as a subject in the biological modality, and since the biological modality is the last modality in which it has a subject function, a plant is said by Dooyeweerd to be biologically qualified.

Dooyeweerd suggests that in this organic analogy may be found the origin of the humanistic idea of progress in man's historical life, including his legal life. In primitive society retribution—as expressed in the criminal law of a primitive tribal community—still clings rigidly to its modal substrata without having deepened itself into the anticipatory principle of accountability for guilt. The individual's whole social life is bound up with his kindred group. Under a system of what has been described as a system of "corporate" rather than individual responsibility, individual responsibility was closely circumscribed. The individual was not self-directed but tradition directed. Lacking much opportunity for moral choices it is hard to see how such a primitive individual could develop a mature personality. Only when responsibility breaks through the collective constraints of the tribe and releases the individual from his group, making him rely upon himself as a responsible individual, is it possible for full personal consciousness to awaken.

Perhaps the best illustration we can give of this primitive sense of corporate personality is that of the ancient custom of blood-revenge, the primitive justice by which a near kinsman of the slain man avenges his death. Here we find not only the corporate infliction of vengeance, but also in the earlier forms of the practice, for example, as found amongst the pre-Islamic Arabs, the corporate suffering of vengeance, since any member of the group to which the slayer belongs may be slain in his stead. The wrong of one was thought to be the wrong of all within

the blood brotherhood; therefore, it was considered right and proper to direct vengeance not necessarily against the individual who had done the wrong, but against the whole family, clan or tribe to which he belonged or against any single member of it, however innocent himself. In short the individual in primitive society had no separate legal rights of his own but shared in a corporate responsibility. Dorothy Whitelock points out that Anglo-Saxon law

... regarded homicide as the affair of the kindred, who were entitled to receive the "wergild," i.e., man-price, for any of their member slain. Vengeance was no mere satisfaction of personal feeling, but a duty that had to be carried out even when it ran counter to personal inclination.<sup>49</sup>

In this connection it is interesting to recall that so far from the Christian Church having been opposed to the death penalty for murder, the fact is that it was the Church which introduced capital punishment into the legal codes of the Western nations. As the Church began to exercise more influence in the affairs of the Germanic barbarian nations which succeeded the Roman Empire in the West, so the Christian understanding of personal status and responsibility before God for one's conduct as well as of the sanctity of innocent human life became to an increasing extent the norm both of law and of economic affairs. This may not be equated, however, quite simply with a steady humanizing of justice. Whereas in old Germanic law it was possible to provide *wergild* or man-price as a positive expiation of the crime of murder, thanks to the influence of the Christian Church the premeditated murder of a person came to be regarded as so grave an offence that it could only be expiated by the execution after due process of law of the killer himself. It was no longer possible to get away with murder by making a simple money payment in exchange for the human life destroyed. According to H. Schrey, H. Walz, and W. A. Whitehouse in their book *The Biblical Doctrine of Justice and Law*, "It was the personal worth accorded to a man which accounted for the change, but the effect in this case was to produce a more severe penalty than was envisaged in Germanic law."<sup>50</sup>

It is precisely because the Church takes such a serious view of the sanctity of innocent human life that it demands of the secular power that the punishment inflicted for murder should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by Christian society against murder. The Church assigns a special value to the life of each man, woman and child because each one is a being created in God's holy image. Any indignity or injury inflicted on a fellow human being is thus an act of irreverence towards God. Deliberate destruction of this image of God in man is not only an act of rebellion against God's sovereignty but an assault on the life of God in man, for which no punishment can be too drastic. Hence the divine command given to mankind after the Great Deluge, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God made he man" (Gen. 9:6).

As a violation of the commandment "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," the crime of murder is in a unique category, because as far as this world is concerned, there is no way for the murderer to be reconciled to the victim of his brutal deed, and hence no possibility of securing the victim's forgiveness. That is why in no other crime in biblical jurisprudence do we have the penalty assigned for the reason that man is made in the image of God. The reason assigned for the death penalty is still valid, since man is still created in God's image.<sup>51</sup>

#### 9. The Physical and Kinematic Analogy and Legal Causation

The physical modality or law-aspect of created reality is the origin of the energetic. Its modal moment is energy. The kinematic modality is defined by its modal moment of movement. The science dealing with the latter Dooyeweerd calls kinematics and the one dealing with the former physics. Van Riessen summarizes the matter as follows:

The original view was that the nuclear meaning of the physical aspect consisted in movement and energy. Recently, however, Dooyeweerd has divided the physical law-sphere into a kinematic and a physical law sphere, with movement and energy, respectively, as

their modal moment. This would then increase the number of modalities to fifteen.<sup>52</sup>

Van Riessen then gives reasons for disagreeing with this new teaching. (1) Energy is not typical of all physical phenomena, so there must be a more inclusive modal moment. (2) Movement, in his view, is not an irreducible modal factor, and is thus a qualification of a more inclusive modal moment. Van Riessen's own conclusion is that we can only speak of a physical aspect with "change" as its modal moment as the "common denominator" for movement and energy. The kinematic, he claims, is an abstraction "out of" the physical.

For this reason we too shall only consider the physical analogy with emphasis on its dynamic side. The modal meaning of the physical modality is not intentional motion or change of position or state brought about by animal or human power but by natural motion. Natural motion is due to creation, for example, the motion of the heavenly bodies or the movement within the atoms. Physical cause is of primary significance here, and it is obvious that the very important legal doctrine of cause relates to this analogy. As Dooyeweerd states:

The juridical causality of a legal fact, as the juridical basis for the juridical effect on the law-side, is, e.g., evidently impossible but for the substratum of logical causality which itself has an analogical character. This analogy finds expression on the law side of logical causality in the (legal) principle of sufficient ground. On the basis of the analytical principle juridical causality implies normative imputation . . . to objective legal facts (as fire, storm, and hail in the case of insurance against damage). The legal causal nexus in the last analysis presupposes a physical nexus as its ultimate substratum.<sup>53</sup>

Dooyeweerd holds that the problem of legal cause cannot be solved unless we have a proper insight into the structure of reality. Jurists have experienced much trouble with this doctrine because they have tended to neglect the structural basis of existence. Usually it is argued that we should separate the physical causal aspect of the problem from the

normative aspect, the *is* from the *ought*, and pure factuality from all normative evaluation.<sup>54</sup>

But Dooyeweerd maintains that the juridical causal relation cannot be understood *without legal norms*, so that he would treat the doctrine of cause in the law of contracts alongside of the doctrine of causality in the law of torts, for both are conditioned by positive legal norms. The problem arose when it was thought that the purely physical factual side of legal relations was conditioned by purely physical laws of causation, while the legal side had to be determined by legal norms.<sup>55</sup>

Dooyeweerd thinks that every such attempt to reduce the *factual side* of legal life to the *norm side* as is done by Kelsen "must lead jurisprudence to insoluble antinomies. for without this *factual side* there is nothing which the legal norms should regulate."<sup>56</sup> The factual side of legal life is inseparably bound to the norm side so that we could never consider the existence of a legal fact apart from the legal norms in our daily experience.

It is obvious that Dooyeweerd does not want to abstract the legal aspect of reality from man's full social life. The estimation of the damage caused by an event is always based on a value judgment. He says, "In human society we can never determine the existence of a fact apart from norms. For as soon as we eliminate the normative aspects of empirical reality, we no longer have a human society."<sup>57</sup>

Thus juridical causality must not be determined by physical laws but by legal norms. For a fact only becomes a *legal fact* when it has become the legal ground for a legal effect. And a legal ground comes into existence only when it *causally encroaches upon the harmony of retribution*.<sup>58</sup>

The basic difficulties which Dooyeweerd has revealed to exist within naturalistic theories of causality are, he says, rooted in the ground motive of modern philosophy—the motive or absolute presupposition of nature and freedom. The nature aspect of this motive was the basis of the "classical" ideal of science which was directed to a rational control of nature by discovering general laws which determine phenomena.<sup>59</sup>

John Stuart Mill was influenced by this ideal of science when he defined the cause of a phenomenon as "the antecedent, of the concurrence of antecedents, on which it is invariably unconditionally consequent,"<sup>60</sup> or "every fact or phenomenon which has a beginning invariably arises when some certain combination of positive facts exist, provided certain other positive facts do not exist."<sup>61</sup> Mill understood cause as a merely physical phenomenon, but there is evidence of his elimination of the structure of reality, since this concept of causality in this deterministic form is extended to a theoretical idea of a universal law of causation which controls *all* events, irrespective of their nature and structure. The result of this tendency within modern scientific thought is the attempt to arrive at a continuous view of the world in which the *discontinuity* of the modal aspects and the structures of individuality are thrown overboard.

As a direct result of this reductionism, humanists are led to suppose that there are no normative aspects in the causal process. Causal processes are found only in *real events*, but real events cannot thus be squeezed into one modal aspect—the physical, since they function in every one. Dooyeweerd therefore argues that we must recognize that there is not merely *physical* causation at work in the universe but that "causal relations have various modal aspects which are mutually related in a structural coherence without loss of the irreducible particularity and autonomy of each aspect."<sup>62</sup>

Thus a judge should not talk about physical cause in a case before him. A physical causal relation between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's damage does not yet establish liability. "Only legal facts can be related in a legal causal connection."<sup>63</sup> And a fact is a legal fact when it has affected *legal* relations between persons. For example, in a contract to buy, the seller may not perform. This non-performance is a *legal* ground giving rise to a *legal* effect, that is, award of damages. If the seller can now establish that the buyer had a duty to mitigate, then the lack of mitigation is not merely a physical fact but a *new* legal fact, changing the legal relation between the parties. He writes:

No act of human behaviour can be illegal if it does not causally encroach upon the retributive harmony of the communal and inter-individual interests, thereby yielding a juridical ground for legal consequences on the law-side of the juridical aspect.<sup>64</sup>

The physical analogy thus illustrates Dooyeweerd's concern not to separate reality into two parts, one controlled by physical-natural laws and the other by norms, but rather to maintain the intrinsic unity of God's creation, in which there is no room for apostate humanistic dialectics.

#### 10. The Spatial Analogy and Right to Property

Space has its modal origin in the second aspect of the creation. That is to say, space is here original and not derivative. The modal moment of space consists of extension and unlike the numerical law-sphere confronts us with pure continuity. In terms of the spatial analogy Dooyeweerd discusses such problems as jurisdiction. A legal norm without a territory where it is valid is a contradiction.<sup>65</sup> He deals extensively with personal and territorial jurisdiction and the distinction between real and personal rights. There are no absolute subjective rights, since every subjective right is the correlate of a legal duty. The theory of absolute subjective rights arose in an apostate individualistic view of society during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. An example of this most un-Christian point of view can be seen in William Blackstone's theory of private property. In his famous commentaries on the *Laws of England* he declared that the security of the person was the first, that liberty of the individual was the second, and that property was the third "absolute right inherent in every Englishman."<sup>66</sup>

Dooyeweerd teaches that a proper Christian insight into the communal and associational relations of the individual will reveal that no man is an island unto himself and the absolute legal individual of William Blackstone and John Locke is an abstraction of their own perverted liberal humanist imagination. Legal rights must always be tempered by duties in the communities and associations which constitute human society. He writes, "There are no isolated

legal norms, legal duties or subjective rights. Only in their mutual coherence is the meaning of justice revealed."<sup>67</sup>

This does not mean that Christians should eliminate the idea of subjective rights in private property as the French jurist Duguit has done, who speaks only of functions. His criticism is valid if the subjective rights are absolutized, but this need not be done.<sup>68</sup> Of the importance of this right to property, Brunner well says:

There is no freedom without property: hence property, private property, is a right established by creation. That however implies neither that private property is a purely individual concern in the sense of being absolutely private property, nor that only private property is just. Since this right which is established by creation belongs to everyone, that kind of property which excludes others equally entitled to it, namely the monopoly, is from the outset unjust. There are various kinds of property which are more or less far removed from the right conferred by creation. Hence we must first distinguish between natural and acquired property. In the strict sense of the term, only our bodies and limbs are natural property, but in a wider sense, the term includes everything which is immediately associated with our person. The more closely property is associated with the person, the more necessary it is for the sake of freedom. Not only our clothes and household goods, but a house of our own has a positive significance for the freedom of personality. A house fosters the growth of the person; the huge block of flats checks it . . . . Every substitution of collective property for private property becomes a moral danger when it affects property which is closely bound up with the person . . . . The most natural kind of property is that earned by work . . . . What a man has earned belongs to him, he has a right to it. But from the standpoint of the order of creation, a further principle holds good. Even this property which belongs to him does not belong to him unconditionally, since it is held under God. With respect to other men, man is an owner, he has plenary control over it. With respect to God he is always a steward, a man with an account to render. He is obliged not by justice but by compassion to give to those in need out of what is entirely his property, but those in need have no right to it. It is, however, true that all property, from the standpoint of justice, is held subject to the reservation of



fellowship. For all property is acquired under conditions which the acquirer has not himself created. He acquires property under the protection of the state, in a civilized world which he has not himself created.<sup>69</sup>

Modern socialists, like the Anabaptists of the sixteenth century, have suggested that Christianity is committed to some form of communal ownership of property since they argue that the early Christians practiced a form of communism. But communism in the strict sense of the word it was not.

That the private control of property was not in fact abrogated by the primitive church is proved by the custom described in the Book of Acts of the early Christians meeting in each other's private homes (Acts 12:12). Nevertheless, under the impulse of that love for one another inculcated in their hearts by their risen Lord, holders of real property sold some of it and voluntarily handed over the proceeds to the apostles, who out of it formed a common fund from which the poorer members of the church were helped. In this way there developed the institution of the diaconate (Acts 6:1-6).

It should also be pointed out that the original "capitalist" in Western society at any rate was the owner of property in the form of ready cash, capital and consumer goods. The modern "capitalist" by contrast has become the owner of debts, that is, of money owed to him on credit by others to whom he has granted a loan or mortgage. The owner of property in the former sense never had the absolute right to do what he liked with his own. All lands in Britain and North America originally belonged to the Crown and they could be revoked if mismanaged. Today the owner of debt has been allowed to turn his "debt" into "money" and he has acquired the right not only to do what he likes with his own but also with everyone else's own.

"Buy now on hire purchase terms and pay later" has become the accepted way of life with millions of our citizens in the English-speaking world. The public and the private conscience in regard to indebtedness seems to have degenerated rapidly in our age of affluence and materialism. Our Christian forebears considered that going into debt

was immoral and not compatible with one's dignity as a free man. In fact, to be in debt reflected a character defect in the debtor. Thus Paul the Apostle said, "Owe no man anything" (Romans 13:8), and Calvin insisted that living should be within one's means. In our age, by contrast, indebtedness has gained in respectability. It has become the order of the day, as governments set the example for the individual. As a result of the centralization of financial power in the banks and finance companies in order to create "credit," millions of people now find themselves at the mercy of the loan merchants.

This development of a monopoly of credit raises very grave problems for the Christian doctrine of wealth and property and it has not received the attention it deserves from Christian economists and theologians. For this reason we welcome the recent report, *A Christian Doctrine of Wealth*, accepted by the Congregational Union of Scotland on May 10th, 1962.

This report points out that "nothing has been left out in the Father's care for His human household with its varied needs of body, mind and spirit," and that our Lord's great saying, "I am come that men may have life and have it in all its fullness" (N.E.B.), lights up the gracious purpose of our Creator and Father God for man His child."<sup>70</sup>

If all that is required for human weal of all kinds is provided for in the divine economy, what then stands between God's creatures and his creation? What has become of the promise of life in all its fulness?

The report answers that God's purpose for men has been frustrated and nullified by human sin and folly and that "the sins and follies of men are written into human institutions and systems, and once a system or institution has been generally accepted and approved, a mantle of respectability covers the sin and folly which it contains. It may then even receive the acquiescent patronage of the Church. There is an inescapable obligation resting on Christians, therefore, to direct a searching scrutiny at all systems. The financial system—the most powerful of all—should be no exception."<sup>71</sup>

After a careful investigation of our present Anglo-American-Canadian monetary and financial system, the report finds:

1. That the existing system of debt-finance, whereby practically all money comes into circulation as interest-bearing debt, is prejudicial to human well-being, a drag on the development and distribution of wealth, and finds no justification in the nature of things, and perpetuates a wrong conception of the function of money in human society.
2. That the virtual monopoly of credit enjoyed by the banking system is contrary to reason and justice. When a bank makes a loan, it monetizes the credit of a credit-worthy customer, admittedly a necessary service. But when it has done this, it hands him back his monetized credit as a debt to the bank plus 6, 8 or 9%. There seems to be an anomaly here, masked by use and wont, that calls for examination. The true basis of credit is found in the assets of the nation—men, labor, skills, natural resources and the enormous power for production now in human hands. The creation and function of money ought to bear a strict relation to those physical facts, and to nothing else.
3. That the existing system constitutes a barrier to peace and disarmament. It involves the trade war with resulting international friction. It requires the priming of the financial pump through the colossal expenditure on armaments in the cold war situation. By this means vast sums are put into circulation without a corresponding production of consumer goods. Since we are confident that it is not beyond the wit of man to devise a system from which these features would be absent, we would urge that it is an imperative Christian duty to press for the introduction of such a system.<sup>72</sup>

The conclusions of the report regarding the chief features of a truly Christian economy are summed up as follows:

1. The best possible use of available natural and technical resources for the satisfaction of human needs and the promotion of human well-being.
2. (a) The release of human beings from the economic necessity of being employed in useless, wasteful or degrading tasks.

(b) Parallel with this, education in the use of leisure and the right attitude to work, so that men may develop their God-given talents to the mutual benefit of themselves and the community as a whole.

3. The elimination of insecurity and fear and consequent selfish materialist values, so that the individual human being may be enabled to live with dignity and self-respect.

4. The maintenance of a socially healthy economy with a suitably diversified balance between agriculture and industry with waste eliminated and with the highest possible standard of living for all.

5. The peaceful use of production, by exchange or otherwise, for the benefit of all peoples, particularly those in need of economic advancement, and for the elimination of want, provided that such trade does not lead to dangerous commercial competition and international conflict, nor to the placing of other countries under alien financial and political domination.<sup>73</sup>

Equally important for the development of a Christian doctrine of wealth and property has been the growth of credit unions not only upon the continent of Europe but also in North America. The philosophy behind these credit unions can be summed up as "We would rather help ourselves than receive help from the Government." Credit unions are means of mutual self-help in local communities offering not only loans of money but also engendering mutual encouragement, the exchange of ideas, and often co-operation in the family projects of its members.

In 1846 and 1847 terrible droughts had so affected the living conditions of the rural workers of Germany that they were living in virtual serfdom. It was to this terrible suffering that Friedrich Raiffeisen turned his attention. After establishing a cooperative flour mill and bakery and then at a later date a cooperative cattle purchasing society, he saw that the essential need for the hard-pressed peasants was credit at reasonable rates of interest. To meet this need he established at Flammersfeld in 1849 his first cooperative loan bank with capital obtained from a few concerned Christian philanthropists. Loans were made at low interest with the character of the borrower being the guarantee for repayment. In 1854 Raiffeisen set up an-

other small bank on similar lines but in 1862 he saw that instead of drawing capital from outside sources the peasants themselves should become members of the banks and supply their own funds from which loans could be made. Accordingly, in that same year he founded the Anhausen Credit Society which was the model for what has become known as the "Raiffeisen Bank."

Raiffeisen, a great and deep Christian, saw in these banks not only a means for relieving the economic distress of the farmers but also a way of inculcating Christian principles into their lives and thus of restoring to the peasants a sense of their own dignity as persons created in God's image. In fact, he stressed the moral aspect of his credit union movement and it became a moral obligation to repay the money which the borrower had been loaned. Perhaps this is best explained in the rules of the Raiffeisen loan bank which state in part, "The object of the society is to improve the situation of its members materially and morally; to take the necessary steps for the same; to obtain through the common guarantee the necessary capital for granting loans to members for the development of their business and their household; and to bring idle capital into productive use, for which purpose a savings bank will be attached to the society."

Once Raiffeisen had established the principle that the farmers should supply their own funds for the loan banks and not depend on outside sources the success of the movement was assured. When in 1889 a law was passed which made it necessary for the borrower to be a shareholder in the society, the Raiffeisen banks complied by means of nominal shares with a value of ten marks which could be purchased on the installment plan. Members were urged to purchase more than one share and thus a way of systematic saving of even small amounts tended to encourage thrift.

The societies were democratically run with only one vote per member regardless of the number of shares each member owned. A board of six directors was elected annually and the only paid official was the accountant who twice a week transacted business in some central place with-

in a convenient distance of the homes of the members. Loans had to be passed by the board of directors; they had to be for some productive farm purpose; and they required the signatures of two endorsers. The most important requirement of all, however, was that the character of the borrower had to be above reproach. For example, an intemperate person had no chance of obtaining a loan. The personal knowledge the members had of each other precluded this possibility.

When in 1876 the establishment of the National Central Agricultural Bank took place, it brought great benefits to the individual societies. Surplus funds of one society now became available to other societies that needed additional capital and large amounts were loaned by the bank to build up the cooperative movement in Germany. Bismarck's government looked favorably on this cooperative movement and supplied supervision and auditing of the societies. There is little wonder that when Raiffeisen was borne to his grave in 1888 he had become revered throughout Germany as "the good father Raiffeisen" among the people on whose behalf he had labored so unceasingly.

It is to Alphonse Desjardins that the credit union movement owes its start in North America. A journalist and then debates reporter in the Quebec Legislature and later in the House of Commons at Ottawa, he turned to the study of credit unions as the solution to the credit needs of the small borrower after the newspapers had made startling disclosures about how the loan sharks were preying on these people and exploiting them. For many years Desjardins was in correspondence with leaders of credit union movements in England, Germany and Switzerland. He spent much of his spare time studying the various systems in use and finally came to the conclusion that the Raiffeisen type of loan bank was, with some alterations he considered necessary, ideally suited for implementation in Quebec. In 1900 at his home in Levis, Quebec, Desjardins opened the first *Caisse Populaire* or People's Bank with an initial deposit of ten cents, a total deposit of \$26.40 at the end of the first opening, and with about a dozen subscribers. From this modest beginning, the great Canadian credit union

movement was to grow. When Desjardins died in 1920, there were 113 banks with 31,752 members and loans amounting to \$4,341,544.00. Thanks to Desjardins the working classes of Canada were enabled to stand together and to learn the meaning of mutual self-help and cooperation.

The credit union movement soon spread to the other provinces of Canada. In 1922 the *Cooperative Credit Societies Act* was passed in Ontario, the first province to pass a modern credit union law after Quebec. In Nova Scotia the Extension Department of St. Francis Xavier University began to take an interest in the deplorable working conditions and extreme poverty of the maritime fishermen and miners. Study clubs were founded and cooperative credit introduced. In 1932 the Nova Scotia Legislature passed the *Credit Union Societies Act* which became the model for the other provinces. Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick in 1936, Manitoba and Saskatchewan in 1937, Alberta and British Columbia in 1938 and Ontario in 1940 passed similar acts. At the end of 1951 all ten provinces had credit unions, the total of which was 3,121, made up of 1,137,931 members with total assets of over \$358,646,767. It is doubtful that Desjardins even in his wildest dreams expected such a phenomenal expansion within so short a period of time.

The credit union movement is a practical expression of the Christian doctrine of wealth and of working together for the common good. It provides an opportunity to give tangible expression to the doctrines of the fatherhood of God and true Christian brotherhood in Christ. It proves that Christians really care for one another, not as disembodied spirits but as children of the heavenly Father in the emergencies and distresses of life.<sup>74</sup>

### 11. The Numerical Analogy

Dooyeweerd holds that the atomized abstract individual of liberal humanistic psychology and philosophy does not exist. He is a figment of an apostate rationalistic philosophical individualism. Is the individual then to be defined wholly in terms of community as modern apostate collectiv-

ists and communists would have us suppose? This is a basic legal problem discussed in the light of the numerical analogy.

It is evident that the social analogy with its communities and associations plays a large part here. The unity in the multiplicity of social phenomena can only be seen when neither the individual nor the community is absolutized or deified. Neither collectivism nor individualism recognizes the true structure of societal relationships because both lack the only principle in terms of which they could correctly interpret the facts of social phenomena, namely, the Christian perspective. Collectivism is nearer the truth than individualism as it accepts the reality of social relationships, but it misconstrues the internal structural differences of societal relationships when it thinks it can comprehend human society in a schema of sociological thought which would relate the whole to its parts and deify the highest relationship as the total relationship. On the other hand, individualism denies the reality of societal relationships and considers them to be only the name given to the arbitrary union between sovereign individuals. Individualism deifies one of the human subject-functions. The dilemma of collectivism or individualism which has plagued the history of the Western world for three hundred years arises out of the apostate immanence standpoint of "post-Christian" humanists.

A truly Christian view of societal relationships is based upon the biblical doctrine of the religious root of the human race. The unity of the human race was originally in Adam but it is now being renewed in Christ. In him and through him humanity is held together as the Body of Christ.

Under the numerical analogy Dooyeweerd also discusses the problem of the legal person. The traditional duality exists between legal persons and corporations and natural persons. Dooyeweerd rejects such a distinction because as he sees it natural persons never function fully in legal life, but they function in it only "with their juridical aspect." Thus a legal person is never a concrete person or institution, but only an aspect of human society. In this way, corporations and "natural persons" function as legal



subjects in the same way. A legal person is never a real individual thing but is only a legal function within a real individual thing. In this way Dooyeweerd has avoided falling into the trap of the so-called "fiction theory" of corporations as well as into Otto Gierke's *organic solution*.<sup>75</sup>

#### D. Law and History

If we are to understand Dooyeweerd's *idea* of justice in contrast to his concept of justice which view we have just considered, we must briefly consider his profound philosophy of culture and human history. He views history as the "opening-up" process which discloses the modal aspects of God's creation. In every modal moment of the divine cosmic structure there are given certain principles which should become concretized and emergent in the development of human culture. In a primitive society this is not fully accomplished, since the life of primitive man is bound up with the natural, physical, and biological aspects of reality, as is evident in such primitive institutions as totemism, animism, primitive art, and tribal organization based upon animal life.

As a result of his mythopoeic identification of himself with nature, primitive man had enclosed himself by the natural givenness of reality. That is to say, he did not adequately distinguish between himself and his natural environment. As Henri Frankfort says in his book *Before Philosophy*:

The fundamental difference between the attitudes of modern and ancient man as regards the surrounding world is this: for modern scientific man the phenomenal world is primarily an "it"; for ancient—and also for primitive man—the world is looked upon as a Thou.<sup>76</sup>

As a result, primitive man simply did not know an inanimate world. The world around him appeared neither inanimate nor empty but redundant with life; and for him life has individuality—in man, in beast and in plant, and in every phenomenon which confronts man—the thunder clap, the sudden shadow, the eerie and unknown clearing in the wood—any thing at any time may face him, not as an "it" but as a "Thou." Consequently, progress for primitive man

became next to impossible as he was bound by numerous traditions, customs, tribal mores and gross superstitions. In totemistic societies it was believed that a real blood relationship existed between humans and certain animals. Even in the more advanced and sophisticated civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia the prevailing pagan polytheism presented the problem of human life as something to be seen over against nature and the divine forces which personified nature. The realm of the gods was the realm of nature, and in the latter the life of man and human society was thought to be embedded. The aim of all human endeavor, therefore, was to achieve an integrated harmony with the natural powers of the universe upon which man's life was thought utterly to depend. In his great work *Kingship and the Gods*, Frankfort has shown how in both ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia the office of the monarchy became the institution which served as the basis of all ordered social existence as the mediator between the gods of nature and men, and which harmonized the life of the community with the natural world.<sup>77</sup>

For this ancient type of mythopoeic way of thinking, nature as a whole was somehow thought to be human in the sense of a Thou confronting the human ego. That is to say, in this primitive and ancient world of thought there were no "natural forces" in our present meaning of the word, but only forces which were considered at once personal and which behaved in a way similar to man. One could talk with trees, storms and springs and they could talk with man. As Frankfort puts it, "The mainspring of the acts, thoughts and feelings of early man was the conviction that the divine was immanent in nature, and nature intimately connected with society."<sup>78</sup>

As long as men thus personified natural forces as divine and saw their lives as embedded in nature they could not develop any sense of the dignity and worth of human nature nor conceive of the uniqueness of individuals as persons created in the one true God's image.

The first step therefore for the emergence of both humanism and personalism had to be the emancipation of thought from myth. That is to say, before men could dis-

cover themselves as persons they had to establish a radical discontinuity between themselves and nature; they had to overcome the primitive view which ranged man entirely with nature.

The decisive step in the "opening-up" process of human history by which this mythopoeic tradition was finally broken occurred in two societies, namely in ancient Israel and in Classical Greece. Of this process Brunner says:

The decisive breach within this continuum happened in two distinct places: in Israel and in Greece. Leaving apart for the moment the Biblical concept of man, we may say that it is the unique contribution of the Greek mind to have abolished the animal shape of the deity. In the mythological struggle of the Olympic gods against the semi and totally bestial monsters, against the figures of the dark regions, there comes to the fore something of this unique liberation which takes place within the Greek conception of man. Man rises above the animal world; man becomes conscious of his uniqueness as a spiritual being distinct from the natural world.<sup>79</sup>

Describing this freedom from the mythopoeic thought which identified man and nature as it existed in ancient Israel, Frankfort writes:

When we read in Psalm 19 that "the heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament sheweth his handiwork" we hear a voice which mocks the beliefs of the Egyptians and Babylonians. The heavens, which were to the psalmist but a witness of God's greatness, were to the Mesopotamians the very majesty of god-head, the highest ruler, Anu. To the Egyptians the heavens signified the mystery of the divine mother through whom man was reborn. In Egypt and Mesopotamia the divine was comprehended as immanent; the gods were in nature. The Egyptian saw in the sun all that a man may know of the Creator; the Mesopotamians viewed the sun as the god Shamash, the guarantor of justice. But to the psalmist the sun was God's devoted servant. The God of the psalmists and the prophets was *not* in nature. He transcended nature—and transcended, likewise, the realm of mythopoeic thought. It would seem that the Hebrews, no less than the Greeks, broke with the mode of speculation which had prevailed up to their time.<sup>80</sup>

Unlike the Greeks this break with mythopoeic ways of thought and feeling was not the product of purely speculative thought any more than was the analysis of the divine among the pagan polytheists. God was known to Israel because he had revealed himself, his purpose, and his nature through dramatic historical acts. God was known because he had chosen the people of Israel for himself, because he had humbled Pharaoh and delivered Israel from slavery, and because he had formed a dispirited people into a nation and had given them a law and a land wherein to dwell.

Human progress then began to take place when Greek and Hebrew men became open to the higher norms given in the cosmic structure beginning with the logical modality. Man was to break through the mythopoeic thought barrier into a scientific and moral way of looking at the world before history in the true sense of the word could begin. It is the lasting achievement of the Greeks to have achieved the scientific breakthrough and of the Hebrews the moral and religious breakthrough. But even when such a breakthrough occurs as in Classical Greece human sin may still have the effect of opposing the disclosure of the higher aspects of reality in their full religious depths, so that the religious totality of meaning was never realized by the Greeks throughout their history, while man's rational faculties became absolutized. The conflict is evident in the development of Greek culture where the culture of the Greek city-state was constantly endangered by the recurrence of the old nature worship centered in the worship of Dionysus. The conflict between the old nature gods and the gods of Mount Olympus, the religious symbols of Greek culture, that is, the conflict between matter and form, is vitally portrayed in the tragedies of Aeschylus. In his *Eumenides*, the battle between Zeus, the Olympian "patriarch" and the Furies or Fates of the primitive nature religion is finally reconciled.

Thus Dooyeweerd speaks of a meaningful development of culture only when the historical aspect comes into focus. This aspect is the foundation of the entire opening process of the higher modalities and norms. According to Dooye-

weerd, culture is the core of this function. Culture, he teaches, is characterized by "form-giving to material which is freely controlled," a form-giving according to a free design.<sup>81</sup> Culture is the mode by which reality reveals itself in its historical aspect. Thus Dooyeweerd defines the modal moment of the historical aspect of God's creation as "the controlled formation of a given aptitude, structure or situation to be something which it otherwise would not have been. It is the normative free realization of a thing in the process of culture."<sup>82</sup> By controlled formation Dooyeweerd intends to convey the idea that every individual does not form history to the same degree. History is primarily formed by the possessors of *historical power*. Only by the exercise of such power either over other people or over things can there be a development of culture. However, this power may not be exercised arbitrarily—it is itself subject to divine norms and standards. Dooyeweerd thus does not agree with the historian who conceives of the laws of history as biological laws, so that a civilization once born is bound to flourish, decay and die. Since the historical aspect "follows" the analytical in the cosmic law order, we know that historical laws are also normative in character.

According to Dooyeweerd the norms of history are those of *continuity* and *differentiation*. The norm of continuity demands that cultural form-giving must give due respect to tradition as well as to progress. Progress takes place when the principles contained in the post-historical law-spheres are realized in human society. But this realization must not occur in a revolutionary fashion, destroying what is good in the tradition of the past. The past must serve as the basis for the new advance.<sup>83</sup> The norm of differentiation demands that in the development of civilization from a primitive phase, the new forms of communal and associational relations between individuals must be concretized into new institutions and social forms.

As we have already pointed out, primitive man lived within a single undifferentiated society of clan, sib or tribe where no proper distinction was drawn between religion, morality, politics, law and custom. The unit both of justice

and of religion was the collective. In man's historical development out of such an undifferentiated state of social existence these enclosed primitive societies became broken up to make room for the emergence of the separate cultural spheres, such as Plato's Academy, Israel's school of prophets, the Greek and Roman city-states, schools, medieval universities, modern business houses, theatres, newspapers, etc. All of these separate cultural spheres are valid concretizations within the temporal world order of the structural principles given at the creation. The principle of differentiation thus insures the unfolding of the individual tendency of persons, nations, societal relationships and families. In the historical modality, as a normative sphere, these principles require positivization or specification. In other words, they must be concretely applied in all human relationships which have an historical aspect. It is not possible to determine beforehand what ought to emerge in a particular societal relationship. It is up to the cultural leaders and statesmen who possess historical power to formulate the concrete requirements of culture for their own age, but their power is not to be exercised arbitrarily. As we have just said, they ought to act in accordance with the divinely-established historical norms. But since the historical sphere is normative, violations of historical norms are possible, and leaders and statesmen may fail to act normatively. Conservative "reaction" against necessary social changes brought about by scientific and technological developments within a given society, for example, is anti-normative. Reactionaries praise the "good old days" and if they had their way would roll back the progress of social and cultural development. By the same token, left-wing revolutionaries are also anti-normative. The revolutionary intentionally breaks with the historical past and disavows the continuity of history. The revolutionary and the rationalist dare to sweep the cultural slate clean and start *de novo*, for example, the French Revolution, Hitler's New Order, and Lenin's and Stalin's New Order.

### 1. The Historical Analogy in Law

Since there is an indispensable historical analogy, it is evident, says Dooyeweerd, that norms cannot exist outside of history. If the modal moment of history is cultural form-giving, then this must mean in its relation to the legal aspect of the creation that every law must have an element of positivization about it. The retributive meaning of justice does not exist outside of the development of human culture. This truth was not seen by the natural law thinkers, and the founder of the Historical School in jurisprudence, Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779-1861), was correct in his criticism of these thinkers.<sup>84</sup>

All law must be concretized or made positive and enacted into the legislative system of a given nation or state if it is to cohere meaningfully with human history. But, declares Dooyeweerd, this does not mean that the Historical School itself was correct. By proceeding from the assumption that all forms of law, together with all forms of religion, art, language and the state, are merely the historical expressions of the *volksgeist* or the "spirit of the people," a mere product of "instinct coming to the surface in practical relationships," the Historical School in jurisprudence became guilty of the error common to all brands of modern historicism. It deified or absolutized the historical aspect of reality at the expense of all other aspects of reality, and it is thus guilty of violating the great principle of the sovereignty or independence of the various law-spheres or modalities, which cannot be reduced to one another.<sup>85</sup>

Ever since Savigny in Germany and Austin in England, all discussion of justice as the source and modal moment of law, and of an eternal moral law binding upon all men's consciences, abruptly disappeared from Western Europe and North America. Why? The answer is that these "positive" lawyers, as they were pleased to call themselves, managed to drive a fatal wedge between criminal and constitutional law and the moral law of God, and between the legal systems of the various states of Western Europe and Christian morality as this had come to be understood by Western Christians for over fifteen hundred years.

The thin end of this wedge to detach the idea of justice entirely from its religious Christian roots and biblical frame of reference was the theory that because all human laws appear to vary so much from place to place and from time to time, they must all be relative and the mere product of historical growth and thus changeable by man's will. In the light of such diversity not one of the countless laws past or present could any longer be deemed unquestionably based upon divine and changeless principles of justice. Since such principles were thought to have been proved to have never been operative, justice from that moment ceased to be revered as an end in itself. Instead of a timelessly valid justice for all ages, there now arose the so-called more scientific view of law as the mere product of historical growth and change. Justice now took a rank below any positive system of law, and it became degraded into an instrument which any particular state could wield for the purpose of carrying out its own designs.

When such relativistic ideas of law were combined with other nineteenth-century theories, such as scientific materialism, political messianism, and the liberal doctrine of inevitable progress, it is not surprising that the traditional Western idea of justice and of the state as existing under God was stripped of all its former divine sanction and dignity. Henceforth, the terrible doctrine began to be taught in all the law schools of Europe and North America that, in the words of Austin, "Law is the command of the sovereign power in the state."<sup>86</sup> That is to say, Austin separated ethics from the science of jurisprudence, holding that positive law is not something which derives its ultimate justification from the jural modal moment of retribution; on the contrary, every positive law is "set by a sovereign person or sovereign body of persons to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body is sovereign or superior."<sup>87</sup>

Positive law is valid only by reason of the sovereign's command. The sovereign is the person or persons whose commands are habitually obeyed by the bulk of the population. In plain English this means that justice is no more



than conformity with the rules laid down by the government or social class in power.

By thus identifying law with the naked will of the legal sovereign, Austin had in effect made might into right, and justice became simply the will of the stronger. Given such apostate legal doctrines, it is hardly surprising that the totalitarian state soon made its appearance upon the stage of world history, for such a state is merely the practical application of such a "positivistic," "relativistic," "scientistic," and "historicistic" conception of law. Having abolished the law and justice of God revealed in his Word as the criterion of human law and justice, it is not surprising that such pagan states as Napoleon's France, Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia felt quite justified in assuming that they were absolutely sovereign over their subjects, in the sense of not being limited by any higher power than themselves.

The historical school of law, by personifying the people or nation as the basic denominator of every human society and social activity, had proclaimed a temporal human relation as the whole in which all the other relations of church, art, science, education, law, and economics are but the subservient parts. According to Dooyeweerd, this absolutization of an historically qualified relation is completely at variance with the fundamental motive of the Christian religion. Only God can thus claim to be absolute sovereign. God alone is absolute sovereign of the bodies and consciences of men, and he demands that we obey him against all authorities on earth, whether civil or ecclesiastical, whenever they claim absolute power, especially the power to control men's thinking on questions of right and wrong. No bearer of authority on this earth is the highest power from which other forms of authority are derived. Ultimate sovereignty belongs only to God.

How then should we consider the relation between law and history? Dooyeweerd answers as follows:

In every positive legal norm there is a necessary correlation between the supra-subjective and supra-arbitrary legal principles and the human will which forms the law, by means of which the legal principle

is positivized into valid rules in coherence with the historical development.<sup>88</sup>

Dooyeweerd holds that the Natural Law School absolutizes the legal principle, so that it cannot do justice to the values which emerge in human culture over the course of the centuries; but that the modern legal positivists such as Austin and Kelsen absolutize the human will of the sovereign law-maker in society. Both extremes can only be avoided by basing legal science upon a proper Christian view of the cosmic structure of God's creation. It is for this reason that the Christian Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Law-Idea is so important. It is the only answer to the Western world's desperate need for a legal system that is *both* truly and deeply scientific in the true sense of that word as being based upon reality and not upon an apostate picture of reality *and* truly Christian. Let Christian law schools be established throughout the English-speaking world and associations of Christian lawyers be formed to begin to practice the Christian philosophy of law. Are lawyers somehow exempt from the Lord's ordinances for human society? Have they not been called to one of the most sacred vocations open to men, the administration of God's justice?

## 2. History and the Sources of Law

Given his aversion to the Historical School of Jurisprudence, it is understandable that Dooyeweerd prefers to discuss the question of the sources of law in conjunction with the historical and social analogies. In fact, he would rather not speak of "sources of law" at all since this reminds one of the historicist analysis of the problem. According to Dooyeweerd, history does not provide the *sources* but the *forms* of law in which legal rules originate.<sup>89</sup> In the legal philosophy of the positivists, the source of law is the basis for the validity of law, since they have deified and absolutized the historical aspect of reality embedded in such things as statutes, rules, precedents, and the decisions of judges, but these for the Christian jurist can never be the bases for the validity of legal rules. They are but the means

employed by competent judicial organs to concretize legal principles as required by the dynamic progress of human culture. For example, the ancient legal rule of "no liability without fault" introduced into the Western legal tradition by the *Lex Aquilia* of ancient Rome is no longer applicable in every tort case of modern law. What has happened? Has the new rule of strict liability been created by the whim or caprice of some legislator or judge? Not quite. The change has come about because it is no longer always possible to point out fault and liability when dangerous machines such as automobiles enter the field of human relations. In a multiple collision on a modern six-lane highway it would be most unjust to place all the blame upon one motorist who had had the misfortune to be underneath the pile of cars on top of him. The change in law is thus due to a new historical factor, namely, the coming of the machine, and the modern law of tort reflects this change.<sup>90</sup> As Dooyeweerd puts it, "The principle of the *Lex Aquilia* has lost its historical-social substrate, so that a *new* principle is necessary."<sup>91</sup>

The harmony of retribution thus takes a new tack; for the balance in justice must not be lost. Likewise, the old legal doctrine of governmental immunity has become obsolete, since modern bureaucracy has greatly extended its sphere of operation, in which it is more liable to come into personal contact with the life of a nation's citizens. Many other examples could be adduced to show that what was lawful yesterday is no longer so today as a result of changes in the conditions of human life.

But this does not mean that History is the *source of law*. The validity of positive law does not depend upon one kind of juridical form or another, but upon material legal *principles* which in their dynamic character can only exist in a meaning-coherence with the norms of historical development. The work of forming the law or positivizing it in statutes is therefore not arbitrary. A hundred judges could apply a law which is not based on divine legal principles but on arbitrary despotism. But then these judges have not created positive law or justice. In spite of what Hart maintains to the contrary, a positive law without legal

principles is a contradiction in terms. Thus he says in a note referring to rules of recognition and Kelsen's "basic norm":

One of the central theses of this book is that the foundations of a legal system consist not in a general habit of obedience to a legally unlimited sovereign, but in an ultimate rule of recognition providing authoritative criteria for the identification of valid rules of the system. This thesis resembles in some ways Kelsen's conception of a basic norm. A different terminology from Kelsen's has, however, been adopted in this book because the view taken here differs from Kelsen's in the following major respects.

1. The question whether a rule of recognition exists and what its content is, i.e., *what the criteria of validity in any given legal system are, is regarded throughout this book as an empirical, though complex question of fact.* This is true even though it is also true that normally, when a lawyer operating within the system asserts that some particular rule is valid, he does not *explicitly state* but tacitly presupposes the fact that the rule of recognition . . . exists as the accepted rule of recognition of the system. If challenged, what is thus presupposed but left unstated could be established by appeal to the facts, i.e., to the actual practice of the courts and officials of the system when identifying the laws which they apply. Kelsen's terminology classifying the basic norm as a "juristic hypothesis," "hypothetical," a "postulated ultimate rule," a "rule existing in the juristic consciousness," "an assumption," obscures, if it is not actually inconsistent with, the point stressed in this book, viz., that the question of what the criteria of legal validity in any legal system are is a question of fact. It is a factual question though it is one *about* the existence and content of a rule. No question concerning the validity or invalidity of the generally accepted rule of recognition as distinct from the factual question of its existence can arise.<sup>92</sup>

Kelsen distinguishes between the efficacy of a legal order which is, on the whole, efficacious and the efficacy of a particular norm (*General Theory*, pp. 41-42, 118-22). For him a norm is valid if, and only if, it belongs to a system which is *on the whole* efficacious. The point of this distinction, expressed in the terminology of this book, is as follows. The general efficacy of the system is not a criterion of validity provided by the rule of recognition of a legal system, but is pre-

supposed though not explicitly stated whenever a rule of the system is identified as a valid rule of the system by reference to its criteria of validity, and unless the system is in general efficacious, no meaningful statement of validity can be made.<sup>93</sup>

In these words the Professor of Jurisprudence in the University of Oxford reveals himself to be a legal pragmatist. Law, like truth, for him and all other pragmatists is whatever works. If rules are obeyed by the vast majority of the citizenry, then for Hart they must be considered valid. He regards the question of what the criteria of validity in any given legal system are "*as an empirical, though complex question of fact.*" Legal values for Hart have been thus reduced to facts. Hart is forced to base his doctrine of legal validity in facts because he looks for certainty not in God's Word nor even in reason but in experience. As a typical scientific humanist there exists no certainty except in that which can be sensed and controlled. It is not difficult to see why Hart does not believe in the existence of any real objective legal values and why he has given up any belief in the objectivity of values. From this apostate humanist standpoint, man can find out what he should do only from social practice, the actual practice of society. The difference between values and facts has vanished for Hart, and he is thus forced to ground his doctrine of legal validity in so-called pure facts rather than in values. Some words of criticism directed by Dooyeweerd at Kelsen's so-called pure theory of law would also seem to apply to Hart's theory of rules of recognition.

In the so-called *reine Rechtslehre* (pure theory of law) of the neo-Kantian scholar Hans Kelsen, the legal rule is identified with a logical judgement in the form, "If 'a,' there ought to be 'b'," and the juridical subject and its subjective right are dissolved into a logical complex of legal rules; this juridical concept of law is grounded on a cosmonomic Idea of a dualistic humanistic type; according to this Idea there is an unbridgeable gulf between two kinds of laws, namely natural laws and norms, originating from fundamentally different logical categories of transcendental thought which "create" the scientific fields of research.<sup>94</sup>

## E. The Idea of Justice

### 1. The Christian Influence Upon Western Law and the Common Law

As we have seen, the *concept of justice* is developed by comparing law with the substrate law-spheres of the creation, the "preceding" modalities. According to Dooyeweerd, the *idea of justice* is arrived at by considering the cosmic relation between law and the "following" modalities, those which transcend it in the modal scale of created reality, namely, the ethical and faith aspects. This distinction was first introduced into modern jurisprudence by Rudolph Stammler, who, on the basis of Kant's critical philosophy, developed his *concept* of justice as the concept which creates order in empirical legal phenomena, while the *idea* of justice corresponds to the idea of free personality transcending time and space.<sup>95</sup>

Dooyeweerd defines these distinctions somewhat differently. The concept of law is the logical grasp of the general meaning of justice in its yet "restricted," "rigid" and "closed" function; here law is not yet opened and differentiated.<sup>96</sup> The idea of law arises when the general meaning of justice is grasped in "its deepened anticipatory function in its ultimate relation to the supra-temporal totality of meaning in the righteousness of Jesus Christ."<sup>97</sup> This deepening or opening process is based on cultural development and it is guided by the anticipatory law-spheres of faith and ethics.

For this reason the law of a given society becomes influenced by morality and faith only on a higher level of civilization. In primitive society the law as such has not become distinguished from other aspects of society. According to Dooyeweerd, the Christian faith, by altering man's conception of his nature and destiny, has exerted just such an influence upon the West's cultural development, and it has played a tremendous if unacknowledged part in changing Western man's idea of law and justice. The Church has directed the opening process of Western culture to the totality of meaning to be found in the Kingdom of God, and it has offered a dynamic interpretation of history

as moving towards a mighty climax. Above all, by its new doctrine of man as a *person* created in God's holy image and as redeemed from the power and guilt of sin by Jesus Christ, the Church revolutionized the conceptions of law and justice inherited from Graeco-Roman civilization.

As evidence of this influence Dooyeweerd cites the introduction of the notion of guilt into criminal law and the repudiation of earlier procedural formalisms. J. Westbury-Jones in *Roman and Christian Imperialism* has studied the *Codex Theodosianus* and the *Corpus Iuris* of Justinian with the intention to discover what laws of Constantine and Justinian respectively bear the marks of Christian influence. His list for Constantine includes laws affecting the condition of the poor, the position of women, the treatment of slaves, the gladiatorial games, the treatment of prisoners, marriage and the family, and the taking of usury. His list for Justinian includes laws affecting the treatment of slaves and freedmen, divorce and adultery, the punishment of criminals, the ownership of property, and the succession and inheritance of children.<sup>98</sup> Thanks to influences deriving from Christian faith most Western nations have today abolished slavery, polygamy, and infanticide. In legal practice principles of "good faith" are operative and "contra bonos mores" clauses were adopted into the German Civil Code of 1900.

In regard to the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition we may cite as evidence of the impact which Christ has had upon the Common Law the emphasis upon "equity," and more important the legal security of personal freedom provided by the celebrated writ of *habeas corpus* and the *Habeas Corpus Acts*. In the Great Charter of Liberty which was exacted from King John in 1215 by the English bishops and barons, there was a provision that "no free man shall be taken or imprisoned, or evicted from his land, or outlawed or exiled, or in any way harassed; nor will we go upon him nor will we send upon him save by the lawful judgement of his peers, or by the law of the land."<sup>99</sup> King John made his promise but it was not always kept because there was no court procedure by which a freeman could secure his release from prison when sent there by the king's

orders. Not until the reign of King Charles II in 1679 was the right of the citizen made effective by the passage of the *Habeas Corpus Act*. This Act permitted anyone who felt himself unjustly detained to sue out a writ before the courts.

This privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* has become in England and America one of the great safeguards against the abuse of power. Unfortunately, however, the British authorities developed the practice of persuading Parliament to pass special acts temporarily suspending the privilege of the use of the writ. The framers of the American Constitution were afraid that the Congress might fall into the same habit, hence they inserted the provision that "The privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it."<sup>100</sup>

As a result of this wonderful privilege enjoyed by every citizen of America, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand we can all sleep in our beds at night knowing that we shall not be arrested by any secret police as has happened to so many innocent persons in Nazi Germany and in Communist Russia and Red China during our century. We are apt to consider the writ of *habeas corpus* in terms of the rights of the individual, but a right presupposes a value. According to the Common Law of America and Britain, each American and British citizen must be treated with proper respect, even with a kind of reverence. Our Common Law does not explicitly assert that man is created in God's image, but where systems of law have arisen, as for instance, in Nazi Germany and Communist Russia, which explicitly deny that man is created in God's image, there is no writ of *habeas corpus* and those who are displeasing to the authorities simply disappear into the darkness of the night leaving no trace of their whereabouts. Micklem points out in this regard that "it is a question how long the writ of *habeas corpus* would be available to Great Britain if secularism and moral relativism were to become predominant in the national life."<sup>101</sup> How long could the Christian citizens of America and Britain expect to retain their historic liberties if a different doctrine of man were



to prevail in our societies, a scientific humanist doctrine of man, for example, such as today lies behind most current jurisprudence, sociology, penology and psychology?

All of these illustrations we have cited are but moral refractions on the laws of Western societies. They prove that the legal tradition of the West has up till now taken cognizance of the individual worth of human personality because it has been created in God's holy image.<sup>102</sup>

## 2. Justice and Change in History

Dooyeweerd believes that judges and legislators must be guided by the idea of justice when they deepen the life of the law in meeting new needs and solving new problems in growing societies. They should not make an absolute distinction between the idea of justice and these new situations, as if the idea of justice in law were supra-temporal. For Dooyeweerd, unlike Stammler, the idea of justice must become the connecting link between the dynamic changes within history and the supra-temporal meaning-totality as centered in Jesus Christ. The idea of justice within history must become the temporal reflection of that religious totality of meaning in the field of positive law. It must be concretized in temporal, applicable legal value judgments. In short, earthly justice must provide the legal foundation for the practice of the moral life of man as a being created in the image of God and destined for eternity if the law on this earth is to realize its own true nature. In the field of law there can be no legal neutrality as between differing ideological or religious ground motives, as Hart falsely supposes, any more than there can be any neutrality in any other field of human endeavor. Either the law of the state will attempt to reflect, however feebly, the religious totality of meaning as centered in Christ or it will reflect the antithetical totality of nihilism of the Antichrist. Either the law will serve God or it will serve Satan. The great antithesis between the heavenly and the earthly cities bifurcates the field of law as it divides every other field of history. Lawyers and judges will either seek to apply the justice of God, or they will be forced to apply the injustice of Satan, whether they are conscious of the fact or

not, whether they admit to it or not. According to the Christian philosophy of law the positive law of the earthly state realizes its purpose when it provides security for human life, and when it seeks to reestablish proper relationships among men where these have been disrupted by the criterion of retributive justice.

By means of this doctrine Dooyeweerd seeks to avoid the rigidity associated with the Roman Catholic doctrine of the Natural Law, which does not allow for the endless variations in human situations nor for the dynamic nature of history. Unlike these exponents of Natural Law theory, Dooyeweerd realizes that legal norms can have no significance outside of history. Such norms enter the process of history partly by means of the legal and moral convictions of the people. It is no doubt for this reason that A. V. Dicey once pointed out that "Freedom of discussion is, then, in England little else than the right to say anything which a jury, consisting of twelve shop-keepers, think it expedient should be said or written."<sup>103</sup> These vital legal and moral convictions of the people are the naive, pre-theoretical intuitive experience which they have of justice and morality. It is these convictions which provide the historical basis for legislation and for the formation of new legal rules. Good legislation demands this historical substrate and it is neglected by legislators at their peril. And yet this truth has been ignored time after time by law-makers. The most notable example that comes to mind was the attempt on the part of certain misguided Protestants in the United States after the 1914-1918 War to enforce habits of temperance upon the people of America by means of the Prohibition Amendment to the American Constitution. Lacking any firm basis in the conscience of the majority of Americans, prohibition of the consumption of spirits was doomed to fail from the day it was enacted upon the statute book.<sup>104</sup>

For this reason Christians must realize the necessity for a constant witness and propaganda on their part in winning converts to the Christian philosophy of law, politics and government. The Christian life- and world-view must not be allowed to hang in thin air but it must be brought down to earth in the hearts and consciences of the common

people. It is therefore imperative that Christians recover the right to educate their children in their own Christian day schools and universities. If education is the greatest opinion-forming function in modern society, it is treason to the cause of Christ to allow the children of the New Covenant to be brainwashed by apostate humanistic philosophies of life in so-called neutral state schools.<sup>105</sup> By the same token Christians must operate their own daily newspapers and run their own radio and television stations so that the Christian interpretation of the news and current affairs can be broadcast to the nation at large and so that readers and viewers will learn to evaluate current events in the light of the Christian rather than the humanistic frame of reference. It is nonsensical for Christians in America, Britain and Canada to bemoan the almost complete absence in their countries of a Christian approach to public affairs and problems when they themselves have done next to nothing to create a Christian public opinion.<sup>106</sup>

### 3. Reasons for Dooyeweerd's Rejection of Natural Law Doctrine

As we saw in our study of Thomas Aquinas' exposition of natural law in Chapter Four of this book, the supporters of the doctrine tend to base it upon a metaphysical life- and world-view which separates temporal reality into two component parts: (1) a temporal world of phenomena and (2) an eternal and absolute noumenon. According to Dooyeweerd this separation is false. In regards to the juridical aspect of reality, it leads to an elimination of the very meaning of justice, since the practice of the past so often becomes absolutized as the "natural" and eternal law for the present. In support of this contention we may refer to the enormous changes which have taken place in legal rules of procedure. Of such changes F. R. Bienenfeld asks in *The Recovery of Justice*:

What could be more in contrast to the present conception of the quest for justice by procedure than the ordeals which made defeat in a duel evidence of guilt, injuries suffered in passing through fire evidence of treachery and sinking in a river an irrefutable token of innocence?<sup>107</sup>

Once it was the self-evident duty of the prosecutor to extort confessions by forceful means, whereas today in democratic countries even voluntary confessions are not admitted as sufficient evidence. The law of property amongst primitive peoples bears no resemblance to the complicated rules of property rights in present-day Britain and America.

Further, this separation of temporal reality into two parts, the temporal and the eternal, required by natural law doctrine leads to a dualistic, contradictory concept of law: on the one hand, a metaphysical natural law and on the other hand, a positive law.

As defined by Aquinas, the doctrine of natural law appears as an attempt to find the eternal, unchangeable rule and essence of all things within temporal reality itself. Aquinas supposes that rational creatures somehow participate in divine Providence in a very special way, being themselves made participators in Providence itself, in that they control their own actions and the actions of others. As a result Thomas thinks they have a share in the divine reason itself. This sharing in the eternal law by rational creatures he calls natural law.<sup>108</sup>

Dooyeweerd maintains that such a participation in the eternal law by rational creatures is nothing less than an idolization of things and persons *not* permitted within the purview of a truly Christian philosophy of law—a philosophy which by definition assigns immutability or unchangeableness to God the Creator alone. In Thomas Aquinas the eternal law is based upon the divine reason; natural law upon the human reason. Thomas arrives at the generic definition of law as a rule of right reason. And here, let it be noted carefully, Thomas considers the human reason the analogue of the divine reason. A law for Thomas is a rule which directs men to good conduct. For all voluntary agents this is the sentence of reason. A law then is what reason defines to be the good for man and the state and which therefore must be done. It compels obedience because it is the command of reason.<sup>109</sup> The main principles of reason are apparent in themselves, and natural law consists of those dictates of reason which are thus imposed upon the will. The whole gist of his argument is that rea-

son, because it is the imprint of the divine countenance upon man, can and ought to be relied upon. It is the proper guide to the discovery of that law according to which man must regulate the conduct of his natural life if he wishes to conform to the divinely-ordained order of the universe. By following reason man is ultimately following God.<sup>110</sup> According to Dooyeweerd, in teaching such a doctrine Thomas Aquinas has absolutized or deified the logical aspect within temporal reality.

A theory of law based upon such an absolutization of man's reason and logical capacity is bound to end up in antinomies and contradictions, because it cannot properly define law in connection with the meaning of the whole temporal world. By forgetting the biblical doctrine of creation, Thomas Aquinas proved unable to develop a truly Christian philosophy of law. Where the Christian doctrine of creation is not followed, the problem always arises for humanist thinkers: where is the unity within the multiplicity of visible phenomena? Where is the meaning amidst change? Where is a generally and universally valid basis for the conduct of separate individuals and states? Where is the permanence after decay? In the desperate bid to answer such questions and so to achieve a sense of security and stability in social life, humanist thinkers who do not begin with God's revelation of himself in the Bible as the Creator of all things tend to find something constant within temporal created reality. The basic denominator or ultimate principles of interpretation of reality tend to be found in the deification or absolutization of one or the other modalities, or aspects of law-spheres of reality or in a group of them. According to Dooyeweerd it is this same tendency which operates within the Natural Law School. It absolutizes man's reason or man's social nature as the basis for certain unchanging principles of human conduct to be applied everywhere. Man's reason or his social nature is thus assigned by advocates of Natural Law the place which rightfully and only can belong to Almighty God, Creator of heaven and earth, in whom alone the meaning of reality is to be found.

Dooyeweerd claims to have avoided the dualism implicit in every such metaphysics. He makes an ultimate distinction between the Creator and the creature. But no such distinction is found within the created world. Unless God had chosen to reveal it to man in the Bible we could never have discovered it for ourselves. If then we are to speak of natural law at all, we can do so only in connection with those legal principles which are indeed independent of history, but which are not yet law, since they lack the element of positivization. Dooyeweerd will only speak of natural law as "the legal principles which must be positivized in every legal order for the simple reason that without them there can be only chaos instead of order in the life of law."<sup>111</sup>

But these legal principles of the juridical aspect of reality, though indispensable, are not based on an eternal reason. They, like the modal moments of all the other law-spheres of reality, are of a temporal character, since they too are part of the created structure. And history is part of this structure too. This means that these principles must first be realized in time, and this depends upon a certain level of cultural development. Dooyeweerd holds that absolute principles of justice simply do not exist except in the imaginations of the jurists of the Natural Law School. Change in an historical situation may demand the application of new legal principles. When this is done, we do not logically *deduce* these from the historical givens—as the school of realism and historicism claims—but we do discover them in the meaning-structure of the jural modality. At this point Dooyeweerd reminds us of the concept of law, for the principles underlying jurisprudence are to be discovered in the analogies of law with other aspects of reality.

These analogies also involve the "natural aspects." And within these Dooyeweerd discovers what he calls "natural laws." The "natural law" is the effect of "natural events" and "natural relations" within the legal order; and these include such factors as birth, death, age, insanity, and marriage. These factors play a constant and definite role in legal life, and this role can be correctly called the "natural law." Thus, parental authority is a principle of

natural law. But even this must never be thought of abstractly, since it is but an element within the dynamic principles which receive juridical meaning only when positivized.<sup>112</sup> Contract law is not controlled by such "natural laws" but these may have an effect upon it. This occurs when a party to a contract dies, or the subject of the contract is destroyed.<sup>113</sup>

With Dooyeweerd's teaching may be compared that of Hart. In the second part of *The Concept of Law* Hart tries to sift the truth from the falsehood in Natural Law philosophy. According to Hart the Natural Law tradition of Western jurisprudence tries to show that among possible social institutions and arrangements there are some that may be ranked as "natural," that these can be discovered by reason and that nothing is just that does not conform to them. On this view, an unjust law is no law at all, and the justice or injustice of a law is an objective matter for rational discussion. Following Hobbes and Hume, Hart finds a hard core of truth in this doctrine in the sense that human needs which pertain to survival can be legitimately distinguished, as "natural," from such contingent aims as a man may or may not have, and that rules which cater for these needs may legitimately be called "necessary" in the sense that no society could survive if these rules did not exist, for example, the sixth commandment, Thou shalt do no murder. He writes:

Such universally recognized principles of conduct which have a basis in elementary truths concerning human beings, their natural environment, and aims, may be considered the minimum content of Natural Law, in contrast with the more grandiose and more challengeable constructions which have often been proffered under that name.<sup>114</sup>

These rules are common to morality and law, and the main distinction between the two, according to Hart, is that law is a coercive system, while morality is not. A society in which members had great generosity, understanding of their own long term interests, and strength of will could survive with a moral code but no system of law. Such a legal system, with its attendant sanctions, is

. . . required, not as the normal motive for obedience, but as a *guarantee* that those who would voluntarily obey shall not be sacrificed to those who would not. To obey, without this, would be to risk going to the wall. Given this standing danger, what reason demands, is *voluntary* cooperation in a *coercive* system.<sup>115</sup>

Behind Hart at this point, as behind Austin, we may detect the penetrating influence of Thomas Hobbes. Under the direct inspiration of the science ideal, Hobbes taught in the *Leviathan* that mankind, inspired by fear of death and instructed by reason, could design its own means of deliverance from the predicament caused by the existence of a number of individuals each possessed of a natural right to the free exercise of his will in the pursuit of his own felicity and the consequent frustration of each by every other individual. The general form of this deliverance according to Hobbes in his *Leviathan* is the will not to will, an agreement to lay down the right to freedom in order that the purpose of the right should not be frustrated. Now a right may be laid down either by abolishing it or by transferring it to somebody else. Hobbes suggested that the appropriate method here is transfer, because what is required is not the abolition of the right but the canalizing of its exercise. A mutually agreed transfer of right is normally called a contract; and in this case it will be a contract between each man and every other man in which each transfers his right to a beneficiary who is not himself a party to the social contract. But in a contract there are two stages; there is first the covenant and secondly performance. According to Hobbes, the form of the covenant is "I transfer to X my natural right to the free exercise of my will and authorize him to act on my behalf on condition that he make a similar transfer and give a similar authority."<sup>116</sup> Hobbes points out that this covenant can never be anything more than a state of will, for what each undertakes is to maintain a certain state of will. In short, the deliverance can be achieved only by the perpetual maintenance of a covenant, the daily keeping of a promise, which can never attain the fixed and conclusive character of a contract performed once and for all. It would appear, then, that "it is no wonder if there be something else required (besides the Covenant)



to make their agreement constant and lasting.”<sup>117</sup> Hobbes suggests that what is required to enforce the covenant is a sovereign power. Supreme power must go with supreme authority. “Covenants, without the Sword, are but words.” What, then, is created by this agreement of wills is an artifact, a single sovereign authority and power and a multitude united as subjects under that authority and power, together forming parts of a single whole called a Commonwealth or Civil Society. This is the generation of the great Leviathan, the King of the Proud.<sup>118</sup> And its authority and power are designed not only to create and to maintain the internal peace of a number of men living together and seeking felicity in proximity to one another, but also to protect this society as a whole against attacks of natural men and other societies.

In Hart’s velvety and pragmatic philosophy of law there thus lurks the shadow of the great Leviathan who unbounded by the Word of God since the days of the Renaissance has been seeking to devour all of human life.<sup>119</sup>

The choice is thus plain. Will the English-speaking world continue to base its legal institutions upon an apostate doctrine of man as independent of God the Creator, or will it return to the Word of God as the ordering principle not only of its religious but also of its legal life? Will we find our salvation in the State or in Christ?

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<sup>1</sup> H. L. A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* (Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1961).

<sup>2</sup> C. K. Allen, *Law in the Making* (Oxford Paperbacks, 1961), pp. 2ff.

<sup>3</sup> Nathaniel Micklem, *Law and the Laws* (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1952), pp. 51ff.

<sup>4</sup> O. W. Holmes, “The Path of the Law,” *Harvard Law Review*, 467, 1897.

<sup>5</sup> Allen, *op. cit.*, pp. 49, 52.

<sup>6</sup> Julius Stone, *The Province and Function of Law* (New York, 1946), p. 146.

<sup>7</sup> Roscoe Pound, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law* (Yale Paperbound, Yale University Press, 1954), p. 47 (italics mine).

<sup>8</sup> Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, chapter V: “Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules.”

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 138ff. The whole chapter titled "Formalism and Rule Scepticism" should be read.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 142.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 150.

<sup>15</sup> Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

<sup>16</sup> Micklem, *op. cit.*, pp. 62ff.

<sup>17</sup> Herman Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. II, p. 129.

<sup>18</sup> Herman Dooyeweerd, *Encyclopaedia of Jurisprudence* (Dutch, Amsterdam, 1953), Vol. I, pp. 7-10.

<sup>19</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. II, p. 130.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 132.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 133.

<sup>22</sup> Emil Brunner, *The Divine Imperative* (Lutterworth, London, 1949); *Justice and the Social Order*, translated by Mary Hottinger (Lutterworth, London, 1945).

<sup>23</sup> Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight of Western Thought*, p. 132.

<sup>24</sup> Jacques Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge* (Bless, London, 1939); A. P. d'Entreves, *Natural Law*, Chapter IV, "The Essence of Law."

<sup>25</sup> Brunner, *The Divine Imperative*, pp. 152ff.

<sup>26</sup> Brunner, *ibid.*, p. 450ff.

<sup>27</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, II, p. 157.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 157, 161.

<sup>29</sup> *Book of Common Prayer*, (Canada, 1959), p. 82; cf. Vincent Taylor, *The Cross of Christ* (Macmillan, New York, 1956), pp. 93ff; Vincent Taylor, *Jesus and His Sacrifice* (Macmillan, London, 1948), pp. 307ff.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. A. M. Stibbs, *The Meaning of the Word "Blood" in Scripture* (London, Tyndale Press); John Murray, *The Covenant of Grace* (Tyndale Press, London); F. D. Kidner, *Sacrifice in the Old Testament* (Tyndale Press, London); Leon Morris, *The Wages of Sin* (Tyndale Press), *The Biblical Doctrine of Judgment* (Eerdmans, 1960); F. D. Coggan, *The New Testament Basis of Moral Theology* (Tyndale Press, London); James Denney, *The Death of Christ* (London, 1903), *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation* (London, 1917); Leonard Hodgson, *The Doctrine of the Atonement* (Nisbet, London, 1951).

<sup>31</sup> For the greatest treatment of the passion and death of Christ ever written, cf. K. Schilder, *Christ in His Suffering* (Grand Rapids, 1938), *Christ on Trial*, (Grand Rapids, 1939), *Christ Crucified*, (Grand Rapids, 1940); I know of no work in the history of the Church which can compare with the depth, the beauty, the love and understanding of Schilder's marvellous trilogy.

<sup>32</sup> Handley Moule, *Christus Consulator* (London, 1910).

<sup>33</sup> Dooyeweerd, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

<sup>34</sup> J. Bohatec, quoted by Dooyeweerd, *ibid.*, p. 161.

<sup>35</sup> Brunner, *op. cit.*, pp. 523ff.

- <sup>36</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. II, pp. 129ff.
- <sup>37</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Encr Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, pp. 14ff.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- <sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16; cf. *A New Critique*, Vol. II, p. 66.
- <sup>40</sup> Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Sovereignty* (Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 163.
- <sup>41</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Encr Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, p. 23.
- <sup>42</sup> Rosalie Gordon, *Nine Men Against America* (Devin Adair Co., New York, 1960), pp. 40ff.
- <sup>43</sup> Cf. *Essays on Segregation*, edited by T. Robert Ingram (St. Thomas Press, Houston, Texas, 1960), especially Chapter V, "Integration Denies Grace," by the editor. The reader should also consult Marcellus Kik's book, *The Supreme Court and Prayer in the Public School* (Philadelphia, 1964).
- <sup>44</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. II, p. 137.
- <sup>45</sup> Charles Morris, *Signs, Language and Behavior* (New York, 1950), p. 130.
- <sup>46</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. III, pp. 248 ff; also cf. H. A. Hodges, *The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey* (Routledge, Kegan & Paul, London, 1952), pp. 163ff. for an account of this distinction.
- <sup>47</sup> Barbara Wootton, *Social Science and Social Pathology* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1959), Chapter VIII, "Mental Disorder and the Problem of Moral and Criminal Responsibility." Lady Wootton here gives a summary of the arguments for and against the McNaghten Rules.
- <sup>48</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Encr Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, pp. 40ff.
- <sup>49</sup> D. Whitelock, *The Beginnings of English Society* (Pelican, London, 1952), pp. 39ff; cf. B. Malinowski, *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* (Routledge, Kegan & Paul, London, 1947), "Primitive Crime and Its Punishment," pp. 71-129.
- <sup>50</sup> H. Schrey, H. Walz, and W. A. Whitehouse, *The Biblical Doctrine of Justice and Law* (SCM Press, London, 1955), pp. 155ff.
- <sup>51</sup> *Essays on the Death Penalty*, edited by T. Robert Ingram (St. Thomas Press, Houston, Texas), especially my essay on *The Death Penalty*, pp. 13-43.
- <sup>52</sup> H. Van Riessen, *Op Wijsgerige Wegen* (Wageningen, 1958), p. 82.
- <sup>53</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. II, p. 182.
- <sup>54</sup> Dooyeweerd, *The Modal Structure of the Juridical Relation of Causality* (Amsterdam, 1952), p. 7.
- <sup>55</sup> Kelsen, "On The Basic Norm," *Case and Comment* (Nov.-Dec., 1959), reprinted from the *California Law Review*, March, 1959.
- <sup>56</sup> Dooyeweerd, *The Modal Structure*, p. 12.
- <sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- <sup>58</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Encr Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, p. 46.
- <sup>59</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Renewal and Reflection* (Dutch, Vernieuwing en Bezinning, Zutphen, 1959), p. 171.
- <sup>60</sup> J. S. Mill, *A System of Logic*, Vol. III, Chapter V.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, cf. Dooyeweerd, *The Modal Structure*, p. 2.

<sup>62</sup> Dooyeweerd, *The Modal Structure*, pp. 25ff.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>64</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. II, p. 181.

<sup>65</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Encl Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, p. 49.

<sup>66</sup> William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, Book One, ch. 1.

<sup>67</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Encl Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, p. 66; also consult Pound, *Philosophy of Law*, Chapter 5, "Property," for a brilliant summary of the various theories of property held down the ages.

<sup>68</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Encl Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, p. 68.

<sup>69</sup> Emil Brunner, *Justice and the Social Order*, pp. 133ff.

<sup>70</sup> *A Christian Doctrine of Wealth* (W. Maclellan, 240 Hope St., Glasgow), p. 8.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9; cf. J. Clifford Gill, *The Mastery of Money* (ICF, London).

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39; cf. C. H. Douglas, *The Monopoly of Credit* (K.R.P. Publications, Stratford, England, 1958).

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 10-19; also consult W. G. Peck, *A Christian Economy* (S.P.C.K., London, 1954), and D. L. Munby, *Christianity and Economic Problems* (Macmillan, London, 1957).

<sup>74</sup> *The Credit Union*, Extension Department, St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, N.S., Canada; M. M. Coady, *Masters of their Destiny* (Toronto, 1950); Benson Y. Landis, *The Church and Credit Unions* (New York, 1947); J. E. O'Meara, *Credit Unions in Canada* (Ottawa, 1951); J. M. Best, *What is a Credit Union?* (Toronto, 1948); Richard Y. Giles, *Credit for the Millions* (Toronto, 1944); Robert N. Thompson, *Canadians, It's Time You Knew!* (Ottawa, 1961); D. C. Candy, *Credit Unions and the Church* (Anglican Assoc. for Credit Unions, 135 Adelaide St. East, Toronto, 1962).

<sup>75</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Encl Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, pp. 83 ff.

<sup>76</sup> H. Frankfort, *Before Philosophy* (Penguin Books, London, 1949), p. 12ff.

<sup>77</sup> H. Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods* (University of Chicago Press, 1948).

<sup>78</sup> H. Frankfort, *Before Philosophy*, pp. 237ff.

<sup>79</sup> Emil Brunner, *Christianity and Civilization* (Nisbet, London, 1948), Vol. I, p. 76.

<sup>80</sup> Frankfort, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

<sup>81</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. II, p. 197; *Renewal and Reflection*, p. 61.

<sup>82</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. II, p. 200.

<sup>83</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Renewal and Reflection*, p. 65.

<sup>84</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Encl Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, p. 26.

<sup>85</sup> N. Micklem, *op. cit.*, quoting Savigny, p. 66. His whole chapter, "Historical School in Jurisprudence," is worth close study.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Lord Lochee's article on Austin's theory of law, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th edition (New York, 1911), Vol. I, pp. 571-573.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. Lochee, *ibid.*, quoting Austin's definition of law. Also consult my article, "A Secular Revolution in Christian Disguise," *Canadian Bar Journal*, August, 1958.

<sup>88</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Encr Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, p. 27.

<sup>89</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Encr Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, p. 227.

<sup>90</sup> W. L. Prosser, *The Law of Torts* (New York, 1941), p. 446.

<sup>91</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Encr Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, p. 224.

<sup>92</sup> Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 245 (italics mine).

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 247 (italics mine).

<sup>94</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. I, p. 98.

<sup>95</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Encr Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, p. 126.

<sup>96</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. II, p. 184.

<sup>97</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Encr Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, p. 127.

<sup>98</sup> J. Westbury-Jones, *Roman and Christian Imperialism* (London, 1939), pp. 228ff., 246ff; cf. G. Kitson Clark, *The English Inheritance* (SCM, London, 1950) for a study of the Christian influence on England's laws.

<sup>99</sup> Adams and Stephens, *Select Documents of English Constitutional History* (Macmillan, 1926), p. 47.

<sup>100</sup> W. B. Munro, *The Constitution of the United States* (New York, 1930), p. 57.

<sup>101</sup> N. Micklem, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

<sup>102</sup> For further discussion of the influence of morality on law, consult A. L. Goodhart, *English Law and the Moral Law* (London, 1953); R. Pound, *Law and Morals* (New York, 1926); H. L. A. Hart, *The Concept of Law*.

<sup>103</sup> A. V. Dicey, as quoted by W. Ivor Jennings, *The Law and the Constitution* (University of London Press, 3rd ed., 1947), p. 248.

<sup>104</sup> Robert Moats Miller, *American Protestantism and Social Issues, 1919-1939* (Oxford University Press, 1959).

<sup>105</sup> C. Van Til, *The Dilemma of Education* (Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1956).

<sup>106</sup> Harry Blamires, *The Christian Mind* (S.P.C.K., London, 1963). Blamires contends that there is no longer a Christian mind left in the English-speaking world. "As a thinking being, the modern Christian has succumbed to secularization. He accepts religion . . . but he rejects the religious view of life, the view which sets all earthly issues within the context of eternity."

<sup>107</sup> F. R. Bienenfeld, *The Recovery of Justice* (Allen, London, 1947), p. 46.

<sup>108</sup> A. P. d'Entreves, *Natural Law*, p. 39ff; cf. Rommen, *Natural Law*, which traces the history of the doctrine from a Roman Catholic standpoint. Also cf. J. C. Murray, *We Hold These Truths* (Sneed and Ward, New York, 1960).

<sup>109</sup> *Summa Contra Gentiles* 4:8.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 66, 67, quoted in d'Entreves *Aquinas*, pp. 123ff. With d'Entreves' comments on Aquinas, compare Peter Munz' *The Place*

of Hooker in the *History of Thought* (Routledge, Kegan & Paul, London, 1952), Chapter Two, "Hooker and St. Thomas," pp. 29-67.

<sup>111</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Encr Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, p. 158.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 186.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 191.

<sup>114</sup> Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 193.

<sup>116</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (edited by Michael Oakeshott, Blackwell, 1946), p. 85.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 112.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 112, 209.

<sup>119</sup> R. G. Collingwood, *The New Leviathan* (Oxford, 1947). For a study of the totalitarian implications of such legal pragmatism also consult G. H. Clark, *Dewey* (Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., Philadelphia, 1960), p. 13ff. and 31ff.

"The society on which instrumentalism must rely, whether Dewey admits it or not, is the nation, for of all societies the nation can apply the greatest sanctions. But if morality is to be determined by the nation, what else can our duty be but to obey whatever the state commands. It follows from this that murder and brutality are right whenever the state decides on such a course of action. The state can do no wrong, for right is determined by what the state does" (p. 33).

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE CRISIS IN APOSTATE ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

As far as contemporary Anglo-Saxon political theory is concerned, the former liberal humanist certainties of such thinkers as John Locke and John Stuart Mill as well as their common presuppositions have all disappeared. There is not only a crisis of methodology but also a failure of nerve. Since the late T. D. Weldon wrote his logical positivistic treatise on *The Vocabulary of Politics* in 1953, no agreement exists about where to start and how to proceed. Dooyeweerd writes:

The most recent crisis in political theory, culminating in the "theories of the State without a State-idea," has been prepared for by quite a complex of factors . . . .

In it the decline of the normative Humanist idea of the civic law-State plays a dominant part. This idea was based on the Humanistic science- and personality-ideal, whose metaphysics has been worn away by relativism and historicism. Western man had become aware of a fundamental historical relativity of the supposed self-subsisting ideas of natural and rational law. In the crisis of a regular "Götterdämmerung" [twilight of the gods] of all "absolute" standards, the world of ideas of post-Kantian freedom-idealism had also been unmasked as historically conditioned. Then in political theory, too, relativistic positivism and historicism came to the fore. There was no longer room for an invariable normative structural principle of the State. Richard Schmidt merely formulated the pre-

vailing relativistic conception in his *Allgemeine Staatslehre* when he wrote: "Modern political theory emancipates itself from the speculative view; it leaves alone the metaphysical question about the idea of the State and restricts itself to the empirical world."<sup>1</sup>

Such relativistic and positivistic ideas are certainly well reflected in Weldon's *The Vocabulary of Politics*. He loathes the idea that there is some one special form which all political organization ought to take—whether it be Communism or democracy in our day or the divine right of kings or the Divine Empire in previous ages. On the contrary, as a good positivist and relativist Weldon thinks that political constitutions are merely the product of circumstances and tradition, each in its particular home, and one constitution works in one place, one in another. He is equally severe on those who make their appeal to an abstract "justice" or "rights" or "freedom" or "the rule of law." Given such a positivistic approach to politics, it is hard to see upon what basis Weldon could distinguish between a just government and an unjust government. No government can be considered just unless it guarantees certain fundamental human rights and unless it governs with the consent of the governed. It is the irony of Weldon's position that he is forbidden by his principles to lay down any such tests of this nature for the morality of government, because his principles, of course, as a good logical positivist, are to have no principles. Together with most contemporary social scientists, Weldon supposes that it is possible to conduct a value-free inquiry into the principles of political action and of man's behavior in society.<sup>2</sup>

Such a value-free methodology has created a crisis in modern anthropology and social science of the first magnitude. Today every social scientist thinks he has found the master-spring of human conduct. But as to the character of this master principle all the explanations differ widely from and contradict each other. Each individual sociologist gives us his own picture of human nature. All claim they would show us "the facts and nothing but the facts." Yet Ernst Cassirer points out in his *Essay on Man*:



Their interpretation of the empirical evidence contains from the very start an arbitrary assumption—and this arbitrariness becomes more and more obvious as the theory proceeds and takes on a more elaborate and sophisticated aspect. Nietzsche proclaims the will to power, Freud signalizes the sexual instinct, Marx enthrones the economic instinct. Each theory becomes a Procrustean bed on which the empirical facts are stretched to fit a preconceived pattern.

Owing to this development our modern theory of man lost its intellectual center. We acquired instead a complete anarchy of thought. Even in the former times to be sure there was a great discrepancy of opinions and theories relating to this problem. But there remained at least a general orientation, a frame of reference, to which all individual differences might be referred. Metaphysics, theology, mathematics, and biology successively assumed the guidance for thought on the problem of man and determined the line for investigation. *The real crisis of this problem manifested itself when such a central power capable of directing all individual efforts ceased to exist.* An established authority to which one might appeal no longer existed. Theologians, scientists, politicians, sociologists, biologists, psychologists, ethnologists, economists all approached the problem from their own viewpoints. Every author seems in the last count to be led by his own conception and evaluation of human life.<sup>3</sup>

Nowhere is this confusion more apparent than in contemporary positivistic and relativistic sociology. Becker and Boskoff begin their preface to one more recent symposium upon *Modern Sociological Theory* with the words, which they set out in capital letters, "WE DON'T KNOW WHERE WE'RE GOING BUT WE'RE ON OUR WAY."<sup>4</sup> Most remarkable of all has been Pitirim A. Sorokin's recantation of most of his life's work. Seldom in the history of modern humanism has an eminent professor in a renowned and ancient university, after a long and honorable career which has earned him a world-wide reputation, found it necessary to compose a studied condemnation of a vast range of the contemporary humanist doctrine he himself has helped to create. Yet that is precisely what Sorokin has done in his remarkable *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences*,<sup>5</sup> in which he repudiates

most of what he spent his adult life teaching as head of the Department of Sociology at Harvard University. He has done so because he believes that the social sciences are in a blind alley from which there is no escape until they adopt a radical change of method and approach. They must, he holds, be redeemed from their bankrupt philosophical presuppositions. They must renounce pseudo-scientific methods which have been taken over and applied with little real understanding from the physical sciences which have already abandoned or drastically revised them.

The objects of his criticism abound in the research papers, scientific monographs, "standard works" and sociological text books which are pouring off the American learned presses, often after powerful financial aid has been lavished upon their authors by research foundations and by university endowments. Seldom in the history of Western thought has so much rubbish been written by so few at such great a cost.

In raising an American humanist standard of revolt, Sorokin invites general participation in a kind of civil war in which neutrality is impossible. Let us then answer his call to arms and wage war against ungodly sociological encampments.

#### A. The Practical Consequences of Scientism

First, it should be pointed out that the positivistic attempt to apply the methods of the physical sciences to the understanding of man in society has gathered such momentum that it must be held largely responsible for the growing tension within our Anglo-Saxon culture. In the science of Psychology it has resulted in Behaviorism which proposes to represent all human actions by constructing a robot which could perform all these actions and indeed could appear to live the whole mental life of man without the presence of any sentience in it. The same manner of approach is also being applied to the various social functions of man. Thus we find a new school of thought in jurisprudence which defines law as what the courts in fact do, and which proposes accordingly to transform the study of law into a scientific observation of the way courts behave

in response to cases brought before them. Such legal behaviorism surely leaves out from the law the function of guiding the judge as to how he *ought* to decide a case and accordingly deprives the judge also of any grounds on which he could seek such guidance in his efforts to reach a just decision.

Of all the sinister movements which have plagued us during the past fifty years, none in fact bodes more evil for our future well-being as free men and women than the present campaign now being waged throughout the English-speaking world to place our historic Anglo-American-Canadian legal systems upon this so-called "scientific" doctrine of man and the attempt to substitute medicine for morals as the yardstick of American and British justice. Under cover of the honorable profession of medicine, arrogant social scientists, penologists and psychiatrists are seeking to subvert our most cherished legal, political and moral values.

Whereas a hundred years ago the expert in mental medicine claimed to be able to deal only with violent or deluded patients, or with those who were unmanageably hysterical, depressed to the point of total incapacity, or senile to the point of infantilism, today the psychiatrist and the penologist arrogantly demand the *legal* right to treat and "brainwash" the whole population. Children who steal or have violent tempers or wet their beds, men and women who cannot get on with their spouses, business trainees and service personnel, and above all, vicious criminals convicted of the most brutal crimes—all these are today referred to the psychiatric doctor or the social worker. Because of their insidious propaganda by press, radio and television, millions of people who a generation ago would have had the honesty to admit that they were sinful, disobedient, unfaithful or wicked, as the case might be, now claim that the reason that they behaved as badly as they did is because they are "sick" and in need of treatment by medical rather than moral or perhaps penal methods.

Superficially considered, this change in attitude is acclaimed on both sides of the Atlantic as a step in the direction of progress. Actually, it can only be explained as the

expression of the steady encroachment by medical science upon territory until lately occupied by Christian morality and the Christian life- and world-view. Instead of repenting of their sins as their great grandfathers did, modern Americans, Britons and Canadians now think they can redeem themselves by the application to their personal and social lives of scientific method and the chemical equivalent of grace. In some respects this new struggle, now taking place between the rival empires of apostate humanistic social science and Christian morality based upon the Holy Scriptures, seems to be the contemporary equivalent of the nineteenth-century battle between biological and biblical explanations of man's nature, origin and destiny. True, the modern battle is much more politely conducted than was that which agitated our Victorian great grand-parents—so decorous, indeed, that it is not recognized by many Christians in the English-speaking world as being a battle at all. But the issues are akin and the consequences will be just as serious. Thus psychiatrists and "social scientists" since Freud and Pavlov have been busy doing for man's morals, politics, and laws what Charles Darwin and Thomas Huxley tried to do for his pedigree. For Edward Glover, co-founder of the Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency in London, England, all this is a matter for rejoicing in his secular humanist heart. "When the social historian of the future looks back to the first half of the 20th Century," he writes in *The Roots of Crime*, "it will by then be apparent that amongst the revolutionary changes to be credited to that period, two at least were of vital importance to the development of humanism: the liberation of psychology from the fetters of a conscious rationalism; and the subsequent emancipation of sociology from the more primitive superstitions and moralistic conceptions of crime."<sup>6</sup>

Glover then blithely dismisses such uniquely human reactions as having a guilty conscience after wrongdoing as merely the expression of unconscious fixations imposed by the human ape's so called "Super-Ego" upon his animal "Ego." Instead of man having been created in God's holy image and endowed with a sense of responsibility to God

for his actions, he is really only the product of his animal heredity acting upon his physical and social environment.

In terms of this new so-called "scientific" doctrine of man, criminals cannot possibly be held responsible for their misdeeds because they are psychologically sick rather than morally sinful. No one holds us responsible for the silly things that we may say or do in the delirium of a fever. By the same logic, once it is admitted that the human mind can be sick as well as the body, we must expect those who suffer from mental illness of whatever degree to make the same claim to be relieved of personal responsibility for their actions as do those persons whose incapacity is obviously due to purely physical symptoms. From all sides we are being asked to assimilate mental and physical illness.

As a result of all this psychological talk, we are now being asked to bring in a completely new legal system based upon medical and non-Christian doctrines about man rather than upon the biblical doctrine of man as created in God's image and as a sinner. After all, doctors as doctors are trained to deal with people who are in some sense sick; and the fact that the naughty child, the unhappy lover, and the lawbreaker now pass through the doctor's consulting room implies the belief that people in these predicaments are sick rather than sinful. Thus the medical concept of illness has been rapidly expanding at the expense of the biblical concept of sin and moral failure. Illness, of course, must be treated by medical science—unlike moral failure, for which personal effort and repentance on the part of the sinner himself, perhaps accompanied by exhortation, or punishment administered by parent, teacher magistrate, minister or friend are appropriate. And so "science" having supposedly defeated the Word of God over the riddles of the universe now seeks to usurp the role of Christian morality and law derived from biblical revelation in deciding how we should conduct our lives, organize our legal system, and "treat" our socially maladjusted citizens.

The "new morality" of the apostate humanists is now becoming the yardstick of the courts on both sides of the Atlantic and hence the emergence of the "new legality." There is a good reason for this. All law is inescapably a

reflection of morality, and all morality is an expression of a basic religious faith. Laws against murder, homosexuality, abortion, and prostitution represent moral judgments that these acts are evil in the sight of God, and these judgments in turn are aspects of the Christian belief that man is called to live in obedience to God's moral law rather than in contempt of it. Law is always inescapably religious in its fundamental frame of reference and presuppositions. For this reason when men change their "god" or "gods," they are forced also to change the moral values and legal standards by which they live. Thus Anglo-American-Canadian laws are coming increasingly to reflect the new religion of humanism and scientism, that is, the worship by man of himself and of his planning, science, and sinful lusts and passions.

Such a substitution of medicine for morals as the yardstick of our present Anglo-American system of law and justice will involve nothing less than a fundamental revolution in the existing conception and structure of Anglo-American law and justice, paving the way for the totalitarian enslavement of the whole population by the social conditioners and planners—an enslavement so graphically portrayed by George Orwell in his horror story of the future, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Thus does the living God punish those who try to overthrow the moral order of his universe.

Up until now the main function of the law courts in the English-speaking world has been to determine whether or not persons accused of crime committed the *act* in question. Such psychological considerations as motives are taken into account only when they have a bearing on the probability or improbability of guilt or in murder cases where insanity can be pleaded. Our historic legal system is based upon the following biblical assumptions:

(1) That everybody, except children and lunatics, knows the difference between right and wrong. Because of the operations of God's temporal conserving or common grace upon our consciences, we can still tell the difference between acts of right and acts of wrongdoing.

(2) That everybody apart from children and lunatics is able to choose between doing right and doing wrong. According to Christ man is *not* merely the product of his heredity acting upon his environment. Man's personality or "heart" is the product of the response he makes to his Creator as well as to his heredity and environment (Mark 7:14-23).

Of course no Christian wishes to deny the hindrances to man's freedom caused by both original sin and personal sinfulness and by centuries of accumulating social sin; but the power of these influences to prevent freedom of choice is found only amongst the insane. It is upon this issue that orthodox Christians are bound to take issue with modern social scientists. Today psychiatrists and penologists have for too long been absorbed with the condition of the abnormal and subnormal. The result is that they are forever looking for evidences of the abnormal in us all, and where they do not find it they invent it. In fact, social scientists seem bent on spending their time in a vain attempt to convince men, women, and juveniles that they cannot help doing what they do, that they are in the power of sex-urges, repressions, mother fixations, and a whole host of other unconscious neuroses, inhibitions, and psychoses.

(3) That anyone who chooses to do wrong should be properly punished for it, but that the State must only punish men for the outward acts of crime they commit, not for all the sins for which they may be guilty nor for their inward sinful thoughts. In other words, Christians believe that punishment is the price we pay for our freedom to choose evil deeds in preference to good deeds.

This Christian emphasis upon personal responsibility for one's wrongful actions has become greatly blurred in recent years. A whole profession has grown up whose sole service to society consists in offering pseudo-scientific excuses for human conduct, however base and bestial that conduct may be. Our courts of justice are rapidly becoming platforms where medico-legal experts display their expertise in excusing criminals for their vicious conduct and where any accused, no matter how ghastly the crime he is being tried for, can mitigate his punishment by claiming

that he "saw something nasty in the woodshed when he was a young child."

(4) That no one should be punished unless in actual fact he has committed some definite crime. Punishment is necessarily tied to guilt and wrongdoing. It can only be justified as the expiation and atonement and satisfaction for guilt. Thus guilt is a necessary condition of punishment. Strictly speaking one cannot be punished for something one has not done, though one may be made to suffer unjustly for it. Philosophers and theologians have often discussed how far punishment is a deterrent, how far it is disciplinary or reformatory, and whether it should ever be retributive in character. On this question, punishment is *not* defensible morally as a deterrent because it means using a person as a means to some useful social end. C. S. Lewis says:

When you punish a man to make of him an "example" to others, you are admittedly using him as a means to an end, someone else's end. This, in itself, would be a very wicked thing to do. On the classical theory of punishment it was of course justified on the ground that the man deserved it. That was assumed to be established before any question of "making him an example" arose. You then . . . killed two birds with one stone; in the process of giving him what he deserved you set an example to others. But take away desert and the whole morality of the punishment disappears. Why, in heaven's name, am I to be sacrificed to the good of society in this way—unless, of course I deserve it?<sup>7</sup>

Punishment again is not likely to be remedial or reformatory, unless it is recognized by the person being punished as just and therefore retributive or deserved. Again C. S. Lewis points out:

According to the humanitarian theory, to punish a man because he deserves it, and as much as he deserves it, is mere revenge, and therefore barbarous and immoral. It is maintained that the only legitimate motives for punishing are the desire to deter others by example or to mend the criminal. When this theory is combined, as frequently happens, with the belief that all crime is more or less pathological, the idea of mending tails off into that of healing. Punishment be-



comes therapeutic. Thus it appears at first sight that we have passed from the harsh and self-righteous notion of giving the wicked their just deserts to the charitable and enlightened one of tending the psychologically sick. What could be more amiable? One little point which is taken for granted in this theory needs, however, to be made explicit. The things done to the criminal, even if they are called cures, will be just as compulsory as they were in the old days when they were called punishments. My contention is that this doctrine, merciful though it appears, really means that each one of us, from the moment he breaks the law, is deprived of the rights of a human being. The reason is this. The humanitarian theory removes from punishment the concept of desert. But the concept of desert is the only connecting link between punishment and justice. *It is only as deserved or undeserved that a sentence can be just or unjust.* I do not here contend that the question "Is it deserved?" is the only one we can reasonably ask about a punishment. We may very properly ask whether it is likely to deter others and to reform the criminal. But neither of these last two questions is a question about justice. There is no sense in talking about a "just deterrent" or a "just cure.." We demand of a deterrent not whether it is just but whether it succeeds. Thus when we cease to consider what will cure him or deter others, we have tacitly removed him from the sphere of justice altogether; instead of a person, a subject of rights, we now have a mere object, a patient, a "case" to be treated in a clinic.<sup>8</sup>

Instead of punishing criminals we are now asked to "treat" them. In short, the so-called law reformers want the rest of the population to give them the legal right to play at being God, first over criminals and then over the people as a whole.

Once we discard the biblical doctrine of just desert and individual responsibility for wrongdoing and replace these with treatment, there will be nothing left to stop law-reformers and psychiatrists from imprisoning any citizen they dislike for his political or religious opinions on the grounds that he is in their view "sick." For if crime and disease are to be regarded as the same thing, it follows that any state of mind the "experts" choose to call "disease"

can be treated as crime and compulsorily cured. It will be vain to argue that states of mind which displease the government need not always involve moral wickedness and do not therefore deserve forfeiture of freedom. For the social conditioners will not be using the concepts of desert and punishment but those of disease and treatment.

Once the Christian concepts of responsibility and retribution are discarded from our criminal law and penal system there will be absolutely nothing left to hinder our social scientists from using penal measures against persons who, as matters now stand, would be exempt from such scientific manipulation upon grounds of mental disorder. Thus it could be argued, as indeed it was argued in Nazi Germany, that it is, if anything, more reasonable to execute an *insane* person than a sane person since the sane person might be more likely to respond favorably to some alternative treatment. Once the Christian doctrines of responsibility and retribution are removed from the basic structure of our legal and political system and these Christian principles are replaced with the concept of scientific treatment, then there will be absolutely nothing to hinder the British and American governments from imprisoning any citizen it dislikes for his political opinions. A case in point is Major General Walker's imprisonment in 1962 on grounds of mental sickness because of his political activities in the State of Mississippi during the integration crisis.

The principal danger, in fact, of modern proposals for social "engineering" and of the mental health movement is that it equates the political and legal philosophy of apostate humanistic social science with sanity and "right thinking" and brands all opposition as sickness. For this reason alone it is imperative for the very survival of freedom itself that Christian social science be developed as a countering force against apostate social science.

According to the new legal system which we are being asked to adopt, medical crimes are those that doctors treat and the crimes that doctors treat are medical crimes. It would seem that the medical world is not afraid of such tautologies. They are, for example, of a piece with the astonishing definition of mental illness recommended for

statutory use by the Committee on Psychiatry and Law of the U.S. Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry. According to this definition:

Mental illness shall mean an illness which so lessens the capacity of a person to use (maintain) his judgment, discretion, and control in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to warrant his commitment to a mental institution.<sup>9</sup>

By this formula, commitment to an institution is justified by the presence of mental illness, yet this illness is itself defined only in terms of the need for commitment. Under this definition, wrongful detention in a mental institution becomes impossible, inasmuch as no room is left for any criterion of health and sickness other than the fact of commitment. Far from being disturbed by this gross invasion of the liberties of the subject, however, the same Committee which drafted it would go even further and would revise the American criminal codes in such a way that no person could be "convicted of any criminal charge when at the time he committed the act with which he is charged he was suffering with mental illness" as thus defined, "and in consequence thereof, he committed the act." Those who decide fitness for commitment by a criterion which makes their judgment infallible would thus be empowered by statute to determine with supposed equal infallibility the question of moral responsibility. No Communist dictator could ask for more. For example, suppose an individual became obnoxious to the government in power. Upon being accused on a trumped-up charge of a felony, he could be held at Her Majesty's or the President's good pleasure for an indeterminate period in a mental institution on the grounds that he was mentally sick.

Once we have surrendered all objective standards of morality and justice as revealed in the Word of God as well as all principles of individual accountability, we shall then find we have placed ourselves entirely at the mercy of so-called "expert" social scientists. Merciful though the methods of treatment might appear at first sight to be, their adoption would mean that every citizen of the land from the moment he breaks the law would find himself deprived

of the rights of a human being, of a person created in God's image. By removing the concept of retribution and just desert in punishment, the social scientists have in fact reduced the offender from the status of a moral subject to that of an object for scientific manipulation. As Lewis reminds us, *it is only as deserved or undeserved that sentence can be just or unjust*. After the new "scientific" method of treating criminals has replaced our present system of punishing them, it will be useless for the Christian body of citizens to object that such scientific treatment is "unjust" since the experts will with perfect logic on their side reply, "Nobody is now talking about just deserts. No one is talking of punishment in your archaic vindictive sense of the word. We no longer think of convict X as a person but rather as a psychological function of his heredity acting upon his environment."

The scientistic theory of the cause and cure of crime inevitably has this effect because scientistic doctrine is forced by its own methods to *reduce* man to the level of one of his aspects, in this case his psychological and biological aspect. What such modern treatment amounts to then is that the social scientist acting on behalf of society is given full legal rights by the duped citizenry to treat his criminal patients as objects by means of psychoanalysis and the use of wonder drugs. Once the true nature of such "treatment" is understood, most people would still prefer to be punished for definite acts of wrongdoing than to be treated in an impersonal way by so-called medical expert "brainwashers." Men and women even though guilty of crime are not rats and guinea pigs.

The medical theory of the cause and cure of crime would remove sentences from the hands of jurists and place them in the hands of technical experts whose special apostate social sciences expressly refuse to recognize that the criminal is created in God's image and whose express purpose is to destroy all traditional Christian concepts of morality and justice.<sup>10</sup>

American and British social scientists and law reformers are bent upon cutting down the authority of our courts of law in determining punishment, not only in murder cases

but also in all crimes of a pathological nature. The future of our courts would be limited to determining the accused person's state of mental health. If he is found to be "unhealthy," he would go for an indefinite term to a mental health center, only to be released upon the recommendation of some parole board. It is admitted by many penologists that this might involve a longer period of preventive detention than the law now imposes for particular offenses. He would be kept confined until some "expert" declared him to be cured of his "maladjustment." Such a deprivation of the criminal's freedom would of course not be punishment but only "treatment." C. S. Lewis warns us that such scientific healing would be just as cruel as any old fashioned punishment. He writes:

To be taken without consent from my home and friends; to lose my liberty; to undergo all those assaults on my personality which modern psychotherapy knows how to deliver; to be re-made after some pattern of "normality" hatched in a Viennese laboratory to which I never professed allegiance; to know that this process will never end until either my captors have succeeded or I grow wise enough to cheat them with apparent success—who cares whether this is called punishment or not? That this includes most of the elements for which any punishment is feared—shame, exile, bondage, and years eaten by the locust—is obvious. Only enormous ill-desert could justify it.<sup>11</sup>

Such a procedure would be a thoroughly retrogressive step disregarding all our basic civil liberties. It required centuries of struggle to establish the legal principle that government officials and experts have no right to hold men in prison indefinitely at their own will and pleasure. It was to prevent such tyranny that the *Acts of Habeas Corpus* were passed after the Restoration of King Charles II and enacted into the American Constitution. A great civil war was actually fought out in England partly over the injustices caused by the Court of Star Chamber and to establish the great principle that prison sentences can only be imposed by the courts after due process of trial and conviction and before a jury of one's peers according to known and objective rules of law. Modern social scientists in the name of their great god "science" would now have Re-

formed Christians scrap this safeguard of our Christian liberties and return to an apostate group of officials—the members of the various parole boards and their godless medical advisers—the same right of arbitrary arrest and indefinite imprisonment which our Puritan ancestors refused to allow the Stuart Kings.<sup>12</sup>

Our Anglo-American legal tradition that a court is the proper authority to impose punishment is based on sound reasons. The trial judge is presumably impartial. He has heard all the evidence and he has examined the accused's record. The prisoner has an opportunity to be heard on his own behalf and to be defended by trained lawyers. Above all, the proceedings are open so that the accused and his friends will know if there has been a miscarriage of justice. Will these safeguards be present if a prisoner's fate is determined by some secret "expert" conclave of psychiatrists and prison wardens under the authority of the national or federal parole board?

The so-called humanitarian theory of the cause and cure of criminals carries as its badge of appeal a semblance of mercy which is wholly false. That is no doubt the reason that it has deceived the majority of the Protestant church leaders both in America and in Britain. According to C. S. Lewis, "the error began, perhaps with Shelley's statement that the distinction between mercy and justice was invented in the courts of tyrants."<sup>13</sup> He then points out the Christian view:

. . . mercy tempered justice, or (on the highest level of all) . . . mercy and justice had met and kissed. The essential act of mercy was to pardon; and the pardon in its very essence involves the recognition of guilt and ill-desert in the recipient. If crime is only a disease which needs cure, it cannot be pardoned. How can you pardon a man for having a gumboil or a club foot? But the humanitarian theory wants simply to abolish justice and substitute mercy for it. This means you start being "kind" to people before you have considered their rights, and then force upon them supposed kindnesses which they in fact had a right to refuse, and finally kindnesses which no one but you will recognize as kindnesses and which the recipient will feel as abominable cruelties. You have overshot the mark. *Mercy*

*detached from justice grows unmerciful.* That is the important paradox. As there are plants which will flourish only in mountain soil, so it appears that mercy will flower only when it grows in the crannies of the rock of justice. Transplanted to the marshlands of mere humanitarianism, it becomes a man-eating weed, all the more dangerous because it is still called by the same name as the mountain variety. But we ought long ago to have learned our lesson. We should be too old now to be deceived by those humane pretensions which have served to usher in every cruelty of the revolutionary period in which we live. These are the "precious balms" which will "break our heads."<sup>13</sup>

In his important study, *Life, Death and the Law*, Norman St. John-Stevan has shown that it is in the name of the same humanitarianism and scientism that the Christian citizens of the English-speaking world are today being asked to legalize homosexuality, prostitution, suicide, abortion, artificial human insemination, sterilization of the unfit and euthanasia.<sup>14</sup> All these radical demands for changes in the existing laws forbidding such practices reflect the immense social and religious changes that have taken place in our Anglo-Saxon societies as the direct result of the conquest of our universities and state-controlled schools by the devotees of scientism. The appeal in every case to amend the existing laws, whether it be labelled humanitarian, liberal or utilitarian, is to the supposed scientific viewpoint new insight into the human situation which apostate psychology and social science claims to have provided. Here is the source of the demand for legal recognition of the "new moral" convictions of unbelieving humanists and for legislation that would implement them.

Any opposition on the part of orthodox Christians, whether Roman Catholic or Reformed, to such demands is usually met by the humanist assertion that the Christian's judgment is impaired by his dogmatic assumptions of a Christian view of man and his nature. To this argument the answer is simple. The Christian's dogmatism is as nothing compared with that of many humanist reformers of the law who have too often invoked the single case or the shaky hypothesis to undermine the structure of the positive law based on the Christian doctrine of man as created in

God's image. It is significant, for instance, that the many American states which have compulsory legislation to require the sterilization of the unfit, justified such an invasion of the liberties of the citizen by eugenic theories which could never be proved and are in fact now largely repudiated.

Given this situation, the Christian can expect to be increasingly confronted with laws to which his conscience cannot subscribe, and he will perhaps be tempted to look back nostalgically to an order in which the moral law had its inexorable sanctions. As St. John-Stevas sees it, the emergence of the pluralist society, in which tolerance must be the guarantee of any social peace, means that Christian moral teaching must commend itself by its inherent worth and not by its reliance on external penalties. Such a tension can in fact be creative of good, he suggests, but it must spring from an informed awareness of the true roots of morality, which are to be found not merely in the arbitrary dictates of ecclesiastical authority but in a consistent understanding of the nature and rights of man and hence in the moral law that defines his authentic needs. St. John-Stevas writes:

The basic struggle is not the relation of Church and State but the relation of Church and Society. Society cannot be redeemed by the coercive will imposed through the instrumentality of the state, but by the individual citizen spurred to action by persuasion.<sup>15</sup>

But this is precisely the problem at issue. How can Christians persuade unbelievers to think as Christians in scientistically-dominated universities, labor unions and political parties which all naively claim to be neutral as far as Christianity is concerned? The dominant motive of most modern universities, labor unions, schools, radio and television stations, newspapers and political parties is faith in science. This faith is not always expressed, but it is always assumed. Our modern world is convinced that science has the last word and it sees the pursuit of scientific knowledge as the only knowledge worth possessing since it is believed that its possession will lead to human blessedness.



Such scientism is no longer even argued but presupposed as something "self-evident," and it has obtained monopoly control of the major institutions of modern society. In such a situation it is futile to call upon Christians to rely solely upon persuasion to spread their life- and world-view. If true tolerance is to exist in our so-called pluralistic society then Christians must be allowed to express their own life- and world-view in their own distinctive Christian organizations and institutions and permitted to live out of their own religious convictions which include the denial that "science" can possibly save any man. If Christians must not impose their life- and world-view upon unbelievers, neither must unbelievers impose their philosophy of life upon Christians by appealing to such things as majority decisions and the good of society as a whole.

#### B. The Theoretical Consequences of Scientism

In the second place it must be pointed out that the so-called value-free methodology of modern humanist scholars is impossible. In the pursuit of so-called "facts" and scientific objectivity, social scientists insist on carrying out their analysis of society without reference to good or evil. Social life is thus found resting on institutions which fulfil certain functions for the maintenance of society in its existing form. And this being all that the anthropologist is allowed to say according to scientism, the terms by which he will describe the achievement of the noblest function in society will apply equally to its vilest aberrations. Thus today we find a distinguished anthropologist representing such practices as the unspeakably cruel murder of supposed witches as a cultural achievement.

Other anthropologists have similarly described head-hunting as fulfilling a social function in the societies in which they are practiced. "The religion of the Eddystone Islanders," writes Gordon Childe, "provided a motive for living and kept an economic system functioning." Head-hunting, which formed part of Eddystone's culture, only proved wrong in his view because, by keeping down numbers, it made improvements in material equipment superfluous and eventually left the islanders a prey to British

conquerors, who were unkind enough to wipe out such a socially useful custom.<sup>16</sup>

For this kind of scientific anthropology it would appear that social stability is the only accepted value and therefore becomes the supreme social value. Yet is not the stability of evil the worst of all evils?

In the same supposed concern for "scientific objectivity" Ruth Benedict asserts dogmatically in her influential *Patterns of Culture*:

Any scientific study requires that there be no preferential weighting of one or another of the items in the series it selects for its consideration. In all the less controversial fields like the study of cacti or termites or the nature of the nebulae, the necessary method of study is to group the relevant material and to take note of all possible variant forms and conditions. In this way we have learned all that we know of the laws of astronomy, or of the habits of the social insects, let us say. It is only in the study of man himself that the major social sciences have substituted the study of one local variation, that of Western civilization.<sup>17</sup>

For Ruth Benedict it would seem that the behavior of the man eaters of New Guinea is just as good as the behavior of a Francis of Assisi or of a Florence Nightingale. Does anyone in his right mind really believe such nonsense? If all cultural values are historically relative as Benedict and others would have us suppose, then their own undoubted love and concern for truth, itself a value, must also be relative. If this were the case, then the theory of cultural relativity must itself only be relatively and not absolutely true, in which case it could not be true at all. If Benedict wishes to have her theories regarded as true, then she herself must at least accept one value, namely truth. From this point of view the theory of cultural relativity is thus self-refuting.

For the pragmatist, no doubt this does not worry him for according to his position the task of science and scholarship is not to discover truth at all. For him science is simply an instrument which man uses to maintain social practices and to help realize his practical goals. For the pragmatist the question of whether science is true or false

is completely unimportant, unless it somewhat affects the question of whether it is useful. That is the decisive factor, and if one still cares to use the term "truth" then the pragmatist will say that whatever is useful or works is true.

According to Van Riessen this conclusion was implicit in the basic ideas of positivism, for there the norms of truth were based on experience only. He then warns us:

When closely examined, pragmatism turns out to be a philosophical nihilism, a nihilistic denial of objective truth. Though pragmatism must be carefully distinguished from a nihilism which denied all values and denied that reality had meaning, this latter form was nevertheless implicit in pragmatism. Pragmatism (for example, American pragmatism), though it gave up all objective values, defended itself against complete nihilism with the speculative idea of continual progress—though experience can give us no certainty about this.

Thus for a philosophy which took its positivistic starting point seriously, there remained nothing which could vouch for its certainty except the subjective and fleeting experience of the individual philosopher. And the positivistic philosopher can escape this fearful narrowing of his outlook only by indulging in the very sort of speculative thought which is condemned by his own positivism.

Thought has no values and no meaning; existence has no values and no meaning.<sup>18</sup>

For a brief discussion of the Christian answer to the other great intellectual movement of our age, namely, historicism which has done so much to confuse contemporary sociology and social science, the reader is asked to refer to the note at the end of this chapter.

### C. A Christian Theory of Value and Fact

According to Dooyeweerd and the thinkers associated with him in his efforts to build up a truly biblically-orientated social science, it is in fact impossible to study the data of the social sciences without implicitly making value-judgments. It is only in terms of some value system that the sociologist and political scientist can in fact discover even the so-called "facts" of social life. The values he holds will determine what he "sees" as facts. His values will

create the facts he uses as the basis for his view of the nature of various social phenomena. *Without values there are no facts.* Without the use of categories of explanation, structural principles, norms and principles we cannot obtain any understanding of the social facts and forms as they are actually present in society. It is impossible to explain these on the basis of the factual "givens" such as customs. Thus Dooyeweerd writes:

One has to keep in mind that the *factual* social relations in human society never can be determined *apart from* some essential social norms, not even when they are in conflict with these norms. This implies that the *causal explanation* is impossible in sociology without applying social norms. By way of example we wish to maintain that the casual explanation of increasing criminality from factors (such as the wrong kind of social environment, the bad-housing situation the economical crises, etc.) relates facts of an obviously *normative* character. If one would try to eliminate consistently all normative adjudication, one will discover that one is left with no essentially *social* facts at all.<sup>19</sup>

Dooyeweerd thus maintains that without social values there are no social facts. The fact presupposes the value, even if the fact is a deviation from the value. Secondly, for Dooyeweerd value is a normative idea.

Dooyeweerd's Christian theory of values must be understood in the light of his whole philosophy of the Cosmonomic Law-Idea. If one accepts the Cosmonomic Law-Idea as "the transcendental ground-idea of philosophy," then he realizes that the subject of traditional philosophy is not the free, autonomous being it is supposed to be and that the object is not just formless material for the ordering intellect of the subject. By accepting the Cosmonomic Law-Idea as the boundary between God and creation, subject and object both become *subject*, subordinated *under* God's law.

For Dooyeweerd God is the only true Subject without subjection to the law for the creation, though he is never *ex lex*. Thus it follows that all of creation has the sense of meaning. As Dooyeweerd puts it, "In Christ the heart bows under the *lex* (in its central religious unity and its

temporal diversity which originates in the Creator's holy will), as the universal boundary which cannot be transgressed between the *Being* of God and the *meaning* of His creation."<sup>20</sup>

The human subject and the creation object are therefore united in their common subjection under the law. It is man's task as God's image-bearer to formulate the meaning of the creation by his science and art. This is man's religious office in God's creation. In this way he not only fulfills his cultural mandate but also gives meaning and direction to his life. For the nihilist such as Nietzsche, "the highest values are void, purpose vanishes; the answer to 'why?' disappears." Thus nihilism simply means that nothing holds, that nothing binds me, no value, law, or norm, and that everything is meaningless and without sense. It thus includes two different though related concepts; Nietzsche therefore mentions them in the same breath. For if there is a law, there is an indicator of direction, and then there is direction and thus meaning and value. Or, on the other hand, if existence has meaning, it must emphasize relationship and order, and then law is implied, for the examination is possible only in relation to a standard and norm. It is for this reason that both concepts—law and meaning—are central in the Christian philosophy of the Cosmomic Law-Idea. The idea of law which a philosopher has will determine both his philosophy and his theory of value. Is law the law which God has ordained or is man the lawgiver? Or is there a law without a lawgiver, or is there no law? The same holds true for meaning and hence value. Is meaning and value to be found in the existence of existing, or in that the existent exists for the glory of God? Or is it possible for something to exist which is so self-sufficient that it can exist without meaning or value? Or is the meaning and value of existence found in humanity, or is everything meaningless and valueless?

Taking the Christian position as our standpoint, that law is the law which God ordains and that man exists to glorify God and to enjoy him forever, we can now proceed to describe the Christian theory of value.

If being under God's law is what gives meaning to the creation, that is, if the understanding of its sense and function wholly depends upon its relation to the law, then it follows that facts and values are intimately intertwined and related.

From a Christian view of the cosmos we cannot speak of Kant's "das ding an sich" (the thing in itself) for it does not exist. Nowhere are there any loose facts that are unrelated facts. A fact is always related to God's law for the creation, whether the fact is a thing, a relation, or an evaluation and from its relation to the law it derives its value at all times. As such, facts are values. Remkes Kooistra explains it well:

There is a consistent harmony between the expression of Dooyeweerd that "reality is meaning" and our basic ground-idea that "facts are values." Dooyeweerd has rightly observed that in this way we transcend not only the common subject-object idea, but also the Greek form-matter motive. If "meaning is the mode of being of all that is created" it follows that we cannot separate the factuality of something from its value, but that the meaning as mode of being finds its specialization or particularization in value as the mode of fact. Let me repeat this in other words. Meaning is the core of the matter. What does this do to the facts? If I say "This is a fact," I make a statement of evaluation, for to be real the fact must have meaning. On evaluation depends the status of the facts. Factuality of reality is the expression of its valuability. Man says it, yet factuality does not depend on man's evaluation.<sup>21</sup>

Kooistra then refers in his excellent lectures on facts and values to the Educational Creed of the Association for Reformed Scientific Studies and its relational definition of reality that "the essence or heart of all created reality is the covenantal communion of man with God" and that "life in its entirety is religion." Again Cornelius Van Til expresses the same idea:

God, as absolute personality, is the ultimate category of interpretation for man in every aspect of his being. Every attribute of God will, in the nature of the case, be reflected primarily in every other attribute of God. There will be mutual and complete exhaustive-

ness in the relationship of the three persons of the trinity. Consequently, no one of the persons of the trinity can be said to be correlative in its being, to anything that exists beyond the Godhead. If then man is created it must be that he is absolutely dependent upon his relationship to God for the meaning of his existence in its every aspect. If this is true it means that the good is good for man because it has been set as good for man by God. This is usually expressed by saying that the good is good because God says it is good. As such it is contrasted with non-Christian thought which says that the good exists in its own right and that God strives for that which is good in itself.<sup>22</sup>

From this theocentric perspective it follows that the value of all values, which constitutes their validity, is determined by their religious reference and meaning. Just as facts are not to be cut off from their meaning, so this meaning, on its part in the total picture, cannot be separated from its religious direction and tendency.

Kooistra then points out that "it is the heart with which one believes which discovers the basic value of any value. The heart as the religious centre directs the functioning of the human psyche as the evaluating centre." He rejects the modern theory that values can be identified with desires since man's heart transcends his emotional life.

For Kooistra a Christian theory of value must not only deal with the "vertical" relation of value with its Origin, the Creator of all reality, but also with the various modal aspects of reality which as we have already seen cannot be reduced the one to the other. "This means that the meaning of being is not only to be understood in its 'vertical' direction," he writes, "but that it also appears in a stratification of several modal aspects, a refraction into several modal law-spheres, to each of which a certain sovereignty in its own sphere must be allowed."<sup>23</sup>

Kooistra thinks that this Christian theory of value alone enables us to overcome the dilemma as to whether values were the properties of things or of the mind, that is, the conflict between so-called "objectivists" and "subjectivists."<sup>24</sup> Thus he writes:

Those scholars who wish to defend the objective existence of values assume that values are situated in the "evaluated object" regardless of its actual evaluation. Others choose for the subjectivity of values, by reducing them to certain psychical activities such as desires.

We should not be too amazed to discover this difference of opinion with regard to the location of the values. It corresponds with the two main directions of secularized scientific activity; those who defend the objectivity of values apparently belong to the group of scholars which is religiously committed to the ideal of science, whereas the other group is clearly committed to the ideal of the free human personality. In the same way as the former group claims absolute validity for the scientific method, so the latter demands unrestricted freedom for the human individuality.

Modern scholars are more confused than ever before about the problem of the objectivity or subjectivity of values. . . . We have seen how the subjectivist Parker tries to defeat objectivists like Moore and Ewing. This does not amaze us, because, as we have observed, in created reality values and their evaluation are both subject to the law.

It is the greatness of the creation that it contains so many values, that it finds its existence in a number of modes of meaning and value. And it is the greatness of the human being, that he as part of this created totality, nevertheless transcends this totality in self-consciousness, a self-consciousness in which the understanding heart functions in its knowing and ordering capacities, in the analysis of meaning and in the evaluation of values. Why is it that man is able to understand the value of created reality? There are two reasons: (1) the modal aspects of reality find their reflection in man's own structure, in his own subjectivity, as part of the creation; (2) man in his functioning in the totality of creation is met by a number of modal aspects of the creation reality which reveal themselves to him and disclose themselves before his wondering eyes.

In this way we can "walk" from left to right and from right to left, from subjectivity to objectivity and from objectivity to subjectivity. Which direction we choose does not make any great difference, as long as we move along in willing subjection under the law, in the vertical attitude of obedience to the Origin of all created reality.




Indeed, normativity can never be derived from the object nor from the subject, it is not in the "thing-as-such," nor is it in the autonomous subjectivity of the individual, but the normativity of the cosmonomic order finds its own expression in the subject of the inquiry as well as in the object.

It is for this reason that we do not want to speak about value as a certain hidden property of the objects, some third layer of quality. For every aspect of the object is related to some quality, even the statement about its matter is a qualification, and as such an evaluation, just like statements about its factuality. . . .

It is noteworthy that all apostate theories on facts and values are nevertheless distorted fulfillments of the cultural mandate. Just as a bird has to build a nest, so man has to find out the meaning of creation of which he himself is an integral part. Man must exclaim sometimes: "How beautiful this is!" just as the flower must open up to the warmth of the sun. In every modal aspect of creation we may distinguish between value and its valuability. Evaluating is an activity which grasps the valuability of the values. It is in the mode of values that the things exist for God; for "He has made all things for Himself." The law, being the boundary between man and God determines all of creation in categories of meaning and value.<sup>25</sup>

# KOOISTRA'S REPRESENTATION OF THE CHRISTIAN THEORY OF FACTS AND VALUES<sup>26</sup>



- I. The validity of the evaluation depends on the religious direction of the heart and the agreement of evaluation and cosmonomic order.
- II. The evaluation is the psychical experience of the subject in relation to the valuability of the object.
- III. The valuability of the object is the way in which the values open up to the evaluating activity of the subject.
- IV. The value of a thing is determined by its relation to the cosmonomic order.

We shall now briefly recapitulate the history of the social sciences in the light of this Christian theory of facts and values so as to understand where and why they went astray in their interpretation of man's nature and of man's social forms. The sciences of psychology and anthropology emerged into being just at the time the biological sciences were in their heyday, and all the ways of thinking appropriate to biology were carried over into these younger sciences. Thus it came about that the concept of *organism* came to be considered the only valid category of scientific characterization and explanation for the social as well as for the biological sciences. In other words, the same fate overtook the social sciences in the nineteenth century which had earlier overtaken the biological sciences in the previous century. When the biological sciences first began to get seriously underway from the middle of the eighteenth century onwards they were for some time hampered by the fact that they were tied to the mechanistic thought-forms of the well-established physical sciences. A *deus ex machina* was introduced in the shape of the so-called "vital principle" to account for the odd non-mechanical way of living things. As Woodger says in his fundamental work on *Biological Principles*:

I should like to offer some more examples of the consequences of the bifurcation of thought which followed the Cartesian dualism. One general consequence which appears to me to be of interest to biologists is that, as a result of this cleavage and of the rapid development of physical science, only two fundamental ways of thinking have been exploited; the physical on the one hand, and the psychological on the other. Thus biology has had the misfortune to fall between two schools. It has tended to look for aid in one direction or another and an independent *biological* way of thinking has hardly been seriously contemplated. Had Galileo been attracted to biological problems, biology today might be in a very different position and physics might have been less favorably situated.<sup>27</sup>

The turning point for the biological sciences came at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when largely because of the work of Hegel, new *organic* thought-forms and categories of explanation began to be brought into common

use. Thus Darwin's great work, the foundation stone of modern biology, was a translation into theoretical abstract thought of the Hegelian dialectical principle. What Hegel did was to articulate a logic which tried to give expression to the sort of thing we are dealing with when we study living growing things or developing societies. Such things cannot be adequately described in mechanical terms, that is to say, in terms of units which simply fit together and work by action and reaction—except at a very superficial level. They need the category of organism, a whole in which the parts cooperate to perform different functions and are determined by the function they perform. And correlative with this they need the idea of dialectical development whereby new elements are incorporated into ever larger and more complex wholes by mutual modification and sharing of functions. These organic categories do not of course replace mechanical and mathematical categories. They provide the context which makes it possible to see the individual physical and chemical processes of organic life as ordinary physical and chemical processes obeying ordinary laws; whereas lacking such an organic context and background there seems to be something mysterious about them which needs a vital principle to explain it. Joseph Needham has pointed out:

Biological organization . . . cannot be reduced to physio-chemical organization because nothing can ever be reduced to anything. The laws which operate at the level of the organic do not operate on the level of the inorganic.<sup>28</sup>

This brief resumé of the development of adequate "organic" categories of explanation in the biological sciences enables us to realize more clearly what the crucial problem of the social and moral sciences is today. In essence it is a methodological rather than an empirical one, namely, that of articulating the thought-forms and categories of explanation which are really appropriate to human life and the human level. In short, it is the problem of finding out how to think about human beings as persons rather than things and how to give expression to the fact that they are persons or minds rather than mere things. The emergence within

the last few decades of a number of philosophers known as "personalists" shows that this problem is very much alive in men's thinking today. The late John Baillie wrote in his greatest work *Our Knowledge of God*, "There is no more hopeful element in the philosophy of our time than the re-opening of the question of the nature of our knowledge of one another."<sup>29</sup>

Baillie then refers to works in this field, for example, Hocking's *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, Webb's *Divine Personality and Human Life* as well as his British Academy Lecture on *Our Knowledge of One Another*, Buber's classic *I and Thou* and Karl Heim's *God Transcendent*.

So far, however, the contributions of these "personalists" have been vague in the extreme. Apart from Dooyeweerd's monumental contribution, the only really clear treatment of the problem is that given by John Macmurray in his *Interpreting the Universe*, which has never received the full and close attention it deserves. As long ago as 1933, this book explored the whole question of different categories of explanation, which Dooyeweerd calls modal "moments" of reality in their theoretical formulation in scientific thought in human knowledge. Macmurray called these principles or modal "moments" "unity patterns," since the central problem in physical, biological and social science is that of representing unity in diversity. He writes:

By a unity pattern of thought I mean that it is a formal conception of the way in which different symbols can be united so as to constitute a whole. We might call it a form of synthesis, as Kant did, or a schema of unity.<sup>30</sup>

Macmurray showed how the two earlier unity patterns of mathematical-physical thought and biological-organic are each derived from a particular aspect of practical life. The mathematical-mechanical unity pattern of thought corresponds to utilitarian activity, in which things are precisely reduced to units, and hence made controllable. On the other hand the biological-organic unity pattern corresponds to aesthetic activity, in which elements are related by the principle of functional harmony. This would bear out Dooye-

weerd's notion of "universality in each orbit" according to which each modal sphere is a refraction of the religious fulness of meaning as well as his doctrine of analogical moments. Thus Macmurray says, "The living thing must be represented as a harmony of differences to form a unity."<sup>31</sup>

Macmurray then asked what must be the character of a fully personal unity pattern of thought, which has to do with life in its wholeness, with problems in the relations of man with man at the fully personal level. He answered that this had always been the field of religion. It is the religious man or every man so far as he is religious whose universe of discourse is personal, just as the artistic man has a universe of discourse which is significant form; and the practical man has a universe of discourse that is concerned with material things, things for his use. To think of the realm in which we live and move and have our being as persons and to be concerned with interpersonal relationships is at least a part of what it means to believe in God, and a key word of religion everywhere is *communion*, which means precisely the meeting of man with man as personal. If there is to be a personal unity pattern of thought, it must therefore necessarily be a religious one, Macmurray concluded. He writes:

The unity of personality, as we know it in the immediacy of living, is an apprehension of infinite personality in finite persons. We find ourselves therefore, as analogy would lead us to expect, in the field of religion. "God" is the term which symbolizes the infinite apprehended as personal and it derives, as indeed it must derive, from our immediate experience of the infinite in finite persons.<sup>32</sup>

In short the field of persons is the field of religion. The center of this field is the experience we have of other persons in relation to ourselves. Macmurray says in his little book, *The Structure of Religious Experience*:

In all our relations with one another we are in the field of religion; and since there is nothing in the whole range of our experience which may not be seen and valued in its bearings upon our relations with one another, there is nothing at all which does not belong,

directly or indirectly, to the field of religion. A person who has no religion, or a society which has repudiated religion, has merely forgotten that humanity exists only in the relations of human beings to one another.<sup>33</sup>

Macmurray followed up his important work before the war towards a contribution of a logic of the person with his outstanding Gifford Lectures published in two volumes as *The Self as Agent* and *Persons in Relation*.

"The present work," he declared in the former book, "is a pioneering venture. It seeks to establish a point of view. Its purpose, therefore, is formal and logical—to construct and illustrate in application the form of the personal."<sup>34</sup> Macmurray hoped that his venture, if successful, would lead to the reestablishment of theology, understood as the religious understanding of reality, as a valid form of human thinking. To think of the world in practical terms, he suggested, is ultimately "to think the unity of the world as one action, and therefore as informed by a unifying intention."<sup>35</sup> This leads on to some form of belief in God. Further, if philosophy is shown to be inadequate in its present egocentric form, and if, as Macmurray maintains, religion behaves towards its object "in ways that are suitable to personal intercourse," then God, not only Transcendent, but also Immanent, comes, not as a presupposition of philosophy, but as its conclusion.

Macmurray proves that the conventional view of the self as a thinker regarding the world as an object distinct from himself must ultimately lead to the solipsistic conclusion that there can be no proof of the existence of anything other than the thinker's own ideas. From this he argues that the philosophical notion of the thinker as an isolated self is a misconception. One can know existence only by participating in existence, for existence cannot be proved; and philosophy must therefore conceive of the self as an agent rather than as a detached observer. His criticism, of course, starts with a brilliant analysis of the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* and from its close argument emerges Macmurray's own conclusion that "my activity of thinking is what constitutes my existence."

In Descartes, the assertion of the "Cogito" implies immediately both the definition of the Self as a thinking being, and the dualism of mind and matter. "Cogito ergo sum" in spite of its form does not infer existence from thought. It identifies the two. Thought is the essence of my being. The dualism of mind and matter again is formally invalid, because it objectifies the distinction between subject and object, and so represents it as a distinction between two incompatible *objects* of thought . . . the dualism arises, in whatever form, in the interest of the primacy of the theoretical. It follows from the definition of the Self as thinker. Consequently, all philosophies which share the Cogito as their starting point, however they differ, have this in common that they presuppose the primacy of the theoretical. They conceive reason at once as the differentia of the personal . . . and at the same time as the capacity for logical thought. The "Cogito ergo sum" is self-contradictory because it asserts the primacy of the theoretical; while in truth, as Kant rightly concluded, it is the practical that is primary. The theoretical is secondary and derivative.<sup>36</sup>

Macmurray thus substitutes "I do" for "I think" and concentrates his attention throughout the remainder of the volume on the elaboration of a theory which gives primacy to action. "I do; therefore, *a fortiori* I think."

In his second volume, *Persons in Relation*, Macmurray develops a philosophy which is based on the reality and validity of interpersonal relationships. Having proved that the self is "agent" rather than "thinker" and thus having loosened philosophy from the grip of the theoretical, Macmurray can now go on to free the Self from egocentricity and to maintain that all meaningful action is for the sake of friendship. For Macmurray an isolated agent is inconceivable. One can only act in relation to something. The Self can exist only in relation to the Other, and a person exists as a person only in so far as he is in relationship with other persons.

Macmurray proves that from the very beginning of life, the relationship between mother and child is a relationship between persons; and the idea that the child starts life as a little animal governed by instinct, which only later acquires a personality, is dismissed as entirely erroneous.



In this Macmurray would have the concurrence of the psychoanalysts who for years maintained that adequate physical care of the baby is quite inadequate to his proper development as a person. The baby needs love as well as food.

In a concluding chapter Macmurray argues for a reconciliation of science and religion by showing that the former apperceives the world impersonally and the latter personally. He writes:

This implies two different conceptions of the relation between man and the world. For science this relation is an impersonal one; for religion it is personal. The scientific apperception is pragmatic. The world is material for our use . . . . The religious apperception is communal. The relation of man to the world is his relation to God, and we relate ourselves rightly to the world by entering into communion with God and seeking to understand and to fulfil his intention. The conflict between science and religion is at bottom a conflict between these two apperceptions conceived as opposite and incompatible. This incompatibility, however, is a misconception. To apperceive the world personally is to conceive it through the form of the personal, and this form is a positive which contains subordinates, and is constituted by its own negative. A personal apperception of the world, then, necessarily includes an impersonal apperception in its constitution. The impersonal apperception of science is merely a limitation of the personal apperception to its negative dimension. Formally, therefore, religion necessarily includes and is constituted by science; while science appears to be in conflict with religion only through a limitation of attention to the negative aspect of our relation to the world. It excludes from attention not merely the religious, but also the aesthetic aspect of the relation . . . . The proper way of representing the relation between religion and science, then, is to say that religion is the expression of an adequate apperception of our relation to the world, while science is the expression of a limited, partial, and therefore inadequate, apperception. This is, of course, not a criticism of science. The inadequacy of science is not scientific but philosophical.<sup>37</sup>

It seems then that the social sciences will have to learn to think in thought forms which are *religious* rather than

biological or mechanical in character if they are to pass out of their present "natural history stage" to fully mature scientific disciplines. According to F. S. C. Northrop in his important work, *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities*, the trouble with most of the social sciences is that they proceeded too rapidly to the formulation of scientific theorems before they had passed through the natural history stage of scientific inquiry.<sup>38</sup>

In the first stage of inquiry the scientific method is the method of analysis of the problem under investigation. "The rule governing this first stage of the inquiry," says Northrop, "may be stated as follows: the problematic situation must be reduced to the relevant factual situation." In other words, the initial question, which as it stands, cannot be answered—otherwise there would be no problem—must by means of this analysis be translated into a more specific question. When this method of analysis has guided one to the relevant facts, then one is ready to proceed on to the second stage of inquiry.<sup>39</sup>

In the second stage of inquiry, which Northrop calls the "natural history stage," we apply the inductive methods laid down by Bacon. As a rule this involves not one method but three, namely, the method of observation, the method of description, and the method of classification. According to Northrop, "The second stage of inquiry comes to an end when the facts designated by the analysis of the problem in the first stage are immediately apprehended by observation, expressed in terms of "concepts by intuition" and systematized by classification." The concept of "mind" and the concept of the "Unconscious" are both "concepts by intuition." The important thing about this stage, he says, is that it begins with immediately apprehended fact and ends with described fact, that is, fact brought under the control of concepts and therefore made theoretical. These concepts Northrop terms "concepts by intuition" because they are largely descriptive and qualitative in character. "They are concepts the complete meaning of which is given by something which can be immediately apprehended."<sup>40</sup>

In the third stage of scientific inquiry the proper method is to deduce hypotheses, theorems and postulates in terms

of which to explain the problem with which one is concerned. Northrop calls this stage "the stage of deductively formulated theory" which works with what he terms "concepts by postulation," that is, concepts which derive their meaning from and refer to entities and relations which are known to exist by means of postulation rather than by immediate apprehension.<sup>41</sup> As an example of such a concept by postulation we may note the "atoms" deduced by Dalton in terms of which he worked out atomic valencies for all the elements. Northrop defines such concepts as "one the meaning of which in whole or in part is designated by the postulates of some specific deductively formulated theory in which it occurs."<sup>42</sup>

Northrop points out that we cannot find out the meaning of concepts by postulation by observing anything. The source of their meaning is quite other than that of the meaning of concepts by intuition which belong to the natural history stage of inquiry.

In the light of Northrop's methodology we can appreciate the gravity of his charge that most of the social sciences proceeded too rapidly to the formulation of concepts by postulation before they had passed through the "natural history stage" of inquiry. He says:

The result [of such a procedure], inevitably is immature, half-baked dogmatic and for the most part worthless theory. Psychology [and we might add sociology] moved too quickly to deductively formulated theory, without having gone through the lengthy laborious inductive Baconian description of different observable personality traits and types, after the manner of the natural history biologists who are only now near the end of the completion of the natural history description of their subject matter.<sup>43</sup>

It would appear from Northrop's criticism, then, that the social sciences are in need of an adequate system of "concepts by postulation." For the Christian scholar such a set of concepts by postulation already exist in the Word of God. The Christian believes that the Bible alone can give him the working postulates of the doctrine of man in society in terms of which we can best understand and ex-

plain the vast mass of the data revealed by modern anthropology, history, ethnics, and so on.

As one who really believes in the powerful and living Word of God which alone can give us the right ordering principle of man's social life, Herman Dooyeweerd, unlike most other modern social scientists, openly begins his investigation of social phenomena from his Christian religious ground-motive. If it be objected that this is to make his social science dependent upon a faith principle, then it needs to be pointed out that all concepts by postulation whether Communist, liberal, conservative, humanist, or socialist equally originate from some faith principle and religious ground-motive. Failure to admit this fact is merely to be dishonest. Each historian or sociologist is forced to adopt some principle in terms of which he can select and interpret the vast array of facts. In studying history Karl Marx selected production as the most significant historical fact. David Riesman selected the development of population to explain the varying attitudes and behaviors of men in societies past and present and tended to overlook the role of inner motive and belief. Van Riessen says in *The Society of the Future*:

The very idea of an unprejudiced investigation of the facts resulting in their so-called objective description is an instance of self-deception. The investigator is far more objective if he acknowledges the non-scientific criteria he employs in his research. The charge that by so doing his analysis becomes onesided and dogmatic is not fair: no one can escape in science a starting point beyond science, in the field of worldview and principles. So it is better that one distinctly realizes *what* principles are employed in one's historical investigations.<sup>44</sup>

It is no exaggeration to say that Dooyeweerd's sociology and political science have gained rather than lost by reason of this biblical religious motivation. His belief in the sovereignty of God as Creator of the world as well as in the biblical motive of man's fall into sin, and redemption through Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Spirit has provided him with an ordering principle in terms of which the manifold relationships of man's life in society

fall into a coherent and meaningful pattern. The social science of the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Law-Idea is thus the answer so desperately needed by the crisis in modern society created by modern apostate science as a result of the refusal of scientists to be humble before God.

If enough Christian universities can be established in the English-speaking world in which the principles of this new Christian social science can be taught to the coming generation of Christian students of the great Protestant and Reformed denominations of America, Britain, Canada and the Australasias, then a whole new generation of Christian leaders in the various industries and professions will be educated who will know how to relate their Christianity to their lives because they will have already brought their studies and their minds into subjection to Christ.

<sup>1</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. III, p. 382.

<sup>2</sup> T. D. Weldon, *The Vocabulary of Politics* (Penguin Books, London, 1953); cf. also Bertrand de Jouvenel, *The Pure Theory of Politics* (Cambridge, 1963) and W. G. Runciman, *Social Science and Political Theory* (Cambridge, 1963).

<sup>3</sup> Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (Doubleday Anchor Book, New York, 1953, p. 39 (emphasis mine). The Christian reader will benefit from G. C. Berkouwer's opening chapter, "The Mystery of Man," in his great work *Man: The Image of God* (Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1962). Cf. also Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christian Realism and Political Problems* (Scribners, New York, 1953), Chapter 1, "Faith and the Empirical Method in Modern Realism."

<sup>4</sup> Howard Becker and Alvin Boskoff (editors), *Modern Sociological Theory* (The Dryden Press, New York, 1958).

<sup>5</sup> Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences* (Regnery Company, Chicago).

<sup>6</sup> Edward Glover, *The Roots of Crime* (Imago Pub. Co., London, 1960), p. ix.

<sup>7</sup> C. S. Lewis, "The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment," *Essays on the Death Penalty* (edited by T. Robert Ingram, St. Thomas Press, Houston, Texas, 1963) p. 7.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2 (italics mine); cf. Walter Moberly, *Responsibility* (London, 1939).

<sup>9</sup> *Report No. 26*, Committee on Psychiatry and Law, Topeka, Kansas, 1954, p. 8. The reader is strongly advised to read Barbara Wootton, *Social Science and Pathology* (G. Allen & Unwin, 1959) and her *Crime and the Criminal Law* (Stevens & Sons, London, 1963).

<sup>10</sup> For further reading consult Emil Brunner, *Justice and the Social Order*; A. E. C. Ewing, *Morality of Punishment*; Frank Pakenham, *The Idea of Punishment*; Lord Devlin's lecture on *The Enforcement of Morals* and H. L. A. Hart's reply to it, *Law, Liberty and Morality*; Glanville Williams, *The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law*, and Norman St. John-Stevás' reply, *Life, Death and Law*.

<sup>11</sup> C. S. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>12</sup> Patrick Devlin, *The Criminal Prosecution in England* (Oxford, 1959); also Patrick Devlin, *Trial by Jury* (Oxford, 1948). Devlin believes that the combination of judge and jury makes Anglo-Saxon justice not only workable but the best system so far devised by the mind of man.

<sup>13</sup> C. S. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 11 (italics mine).

<sup>14</sup> Norman St. John-Stevás, *Life, Death and the Law* (Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1961).

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 240.

<sup>16</sup> G. Childe, *What Happened in History* (Pelican, London) p. 15.

<sup>17</sup> Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Mentor Books, New York, 1950), p. 3. For further criticism of this doctrine see D. R. G. Owen, *Scientism, Man and Religion* (Westminster, Philadelphia, 1952), p. 62.

<sup>18</sup> H. Van Riessen, *Nietzsche* (Philadelphia, 1960), pp. 33ff.

<sup>19</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Syllabus 1946-1947*, p. 134.

<sup>20</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. I, p. 99.

<sup>21</sup> Remkes Kooistra, *Facts and Values* (Guardian Pub. Co., Hamilton, Ontario, in Christian Perspective Series, 1963), p. 52.

<sup>22</sup> Cornelius Van Til, *The Defense of the Faith* (Philadelphia, 1955), p. 69. Cf. C. Van Til's Introduction to Warfield's *The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible* (Philadelphia, 1960) pp. 1-68.

<sup>23</sup> Kooistra, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

<sup>24</sup> For a good introduction to the theory of value the reader should consult C. E. M. Joad, *Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics* (Victor Gollancz, London, 1947); then he should read S. Alexander, *Beauty and Other Forms of Value* (Macmillan, London, 1933); William Temple, *Men's Creatrix* (Macmillan, London, 1933); and finally, his *Nature, Man and God*, (Macmillan, London, 1949). In addition to Kooistra's excellent bibliography the reader should also consult Frank H. Knight, *Freedom and Reform* (Harper, New York, 1947), especially chapter IX, Fact and Value in Social Science.

<sup>25</sup> Kooistra, *op. cit.*, pp. 56ff.

<sup>26</sup> Reprinted from Remkes Kooistra's *Facts and Values*, p. 61.

<sup>27</sup> J. H. Woodger, *Biological Principles* (Routledge, Kegan & Paul, London, 1948), p. 56. His whole book deserves the closest study of all Christian biologists.

<sup>28</sup> J. Needham, *Time the Refreshing River* (Allen & Unwin, London, 1948), p. 32.

<sup>29</sup> J. Baillie, *Our Knowledge of God* (Oxford, 1949), p. 201.

<sup>30</sup> John Macmurray, *Interpreting the Universe* (Faber, London, 1933), p. 61.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 124.

<sup>33</sup> John Macmurray, *The Structure of Religious Experience* (Faber, London, 1946), p. 32.

<sup>34</sup> John Macmurray, *The Self as Agent* (Faber, London, 1957), p. 13.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 221.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 79ff.

<sup>37</sup> John Macmurray, *Persons in Relation* (Faber, London, 1961), pp. 217ff.

<sup>38</sup> F. S. C. Northrop, *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities* (Macmillan, New York, 1948), p. 19.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36; cf. Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (Hutchinson, 1959).

<sup>41</sup> Northrop, *ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

<sup>44</sup> H. Van Riessen, *The Society of the Future* (Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., Philadelphia, 1953), p. 68; cf. Alan Richardson, *History, Sacred and Profane* (S.C.M., London, 1964), and Reinhold Niebuhr, *Faith and History* (Scribner, New York 1949).

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#### A Note on Historicism

According to Dooyeweerd in *Renewal and Reflection*:

"Historicism," which allows reality to be absorbed in her historical aspect, is the deadly disease of our "dynamic" age. And no adequate cure will be found against it as long as the Scriptural creation-motif has not completely regained control of our way of life as well as of our thinking. It robs you of your faith in abiding standards; it even preys on your faith in the eternal truth of the Word of God. According to historicism all things are relative, all things are *historically determined*, even our faith in ultimate values.

Both Dilthey and Collingwood succumbed to historicism. Having exposed the underlying presuppositions of the various life- and world-views of mankind, they failed to provide a standard by which we could judge which philosophy of life is right and which is wrong. In his *Essay on Metaphysics* and in his *Autobiography* Collingwood suggested that we cannot properly speak of one set of absolute presuppositions as being truer than another. For since it is the very function of absolute presuppositions to make

coherent thinking and enquiry possible, it follows that they themselves cannot be established or overthrown by an inquiry. Investigation can never furnish evidence for or against them. And therefore, Collingwood argues, they cannot be judged true or false. The only inquiry which can be made concerning absolute presuppositions or faith-principles is the inquiry, what presuppositions or faith-principles are actually made at a given time by a given group of thinkers; and if metaphysics is by definition the science of absolute presuppositions, it must be the history of absolute presuppositions, for a historical science is the only science of them which is possible.

Dooyeweerd teaches that the only defense against this uncompromising historical relativism is to realize that historicism is the product of an absolutizing of the historical aspect of reality, as it becomes the object of special research of the science of history. Historicism arises and takes hold on our view of temporal reality whenever the creation motive of Divine Revelation has ceased to determine our view of reality. As a direct result of the abandonment of the biblical creation motive, the historical aspect of reality, in terms of which the science of history investigates facts and events, is identified with history in the concrete sense of "what actually happened in the past" or of what Oakeshott in *Experience and Its Modes* defines as "the practical past." The "practical past" may never thus be identified with the historical aspect in terms of which history is scientifically investigated. The reason is given by Dooyeweerd as follows:

Concrete events such as wars, famines, revolutions, etc., are all part of concrete reality which functions in principle in all aspects without exception. . . . As soon as you identify the historical aspect of reality with that which has happened you forget that concrete history displays many *other* aspects which are not themselves of a historical nature. Reality in its broadest sense is then identified with one of several aspects—the one abstracted by the science of history. Then you become an *historicist* in your vision of reality and you abandon the scriptural *creation-motive*.



How then must the historical aspect or law-sphere be distinguished from other law-spheres? Dooyeweerd answers:

The historical aspect distinguishes itself from the other aspects such as organic life, emotional feeling, logical distinction, etc., not by *what* happens within its realm, but by *how* it happens, the manner in which it takes place. For the historian, therefore, the important thing is to discover the modal moment of the historical manner in which a concrete event took place. He needs a criterion to enable him to distinguish the historical aspect from all other aspects of reality.

Dooyeweerd finds the modal moment or core of the historical aspect, which guarantees her peculiarity and her irreducibility in the cultural. A cultural act always consists of form-giving to a material. The cultural is the manner in which reality reveals itself in the historical aspect. As used by Dooyeweerd culture refers to all that which owes its existence to human form-giving, in distinction from that which develops naturally. Such cultural form-giving is founded in God's creation order and the cultural mandate to subdue the earth and have dominion over it. But this cultural mandate is given amid all the *other* mandates of creation. It touches only on the historical aspect of creation, which is subjected to cultural formation. Nevertheless, this cultural formation is itself merely an aspect of real things, events, etc., and a so-called cultural object such as Magna Carta or the American Constitution functions also in all the other aspects of reality which do not bear a cultural character as for example, the numerical, the spatial, the physical, the psychical, the aspect of logical distinction, the lingual aspect, the economic aspect, the aesthetic aspect, etc. Once we realize that every event of the past functions in all these other aspects of reality as well as in the historical we need never again be victimized by the historicist outlook. Only when the biblical motive of the creation of the world by God controls our thinking will historicism have lost its grip on our thinking and doing (pp. 45-49 of the Groen van Prinsterer Club's translation of Dooyeweerd's *Renewal and Reflection*, obtainable from 1314 Sigsbee, Grand Rapids, Michigan).

## CHAPTER IX

### THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATE

#### A. The Structural Principles of Human Society

As we saw in the last chapter modern humanistic social science has tried to examine the so-called "facts" of human society without any reference to principles or values arising out of the order of divine creation. Insofar as positive societal norms are taken into account, they are usually viewed as subjective axiological, psychical, or mental reflections of "objective" factual relations in human society, and, as such, capable of "causal explanation." And insofar as a "normative sociology" is acknowledged, it is suggested that this can only set forth the ideal social and cultural world as it *ought to be*, whereas theoretical "scientific" sociology can only study human society as it *is*. Thus Northrop states as a matter of course:

The method for determining the correct normative social theory cannot be that of natural science applied to social phenomena. The method of natural science is so constructed that no theory will be designated by it as correct unless the theory is completely in accord with the factual situation to which it refers. Since by definition and because of its very purpose a normative social theory is one which differs in whole or in part from the factual situation, it follows that the scientific method for determining normative social theory cannot be that of natural science applied to social materials.

This is the methodological reason why one cannot get the "ought" or the good for a given society from

the "is" for that society. When this point is overlooked, an error occurs which certain students of personal ethics term the "naturalistic fallacy" but which we, because problems of value arise in culture rather than in nature, shall term the "culturalistic fallacy." The fallacy is due not to a moral but to a methodological error. It consists in applying to normative social theory a scientific procedure which is appropriate only for factual social theory.<sup>1</sup>

Of this typical humanist separation between matters of fact and matters of value and norms, Dooyeweerd writes:

It stands to reason that this familiar separation between social facts and "ideal" social norms leaves no room for structural principles of human society lying at the foundation of the factual societal relationships. Since these structural principles can only be of a normative qualification and, as such, are not subject to historical change, they are in principle eliminated from theoretical sociology. Any idea that they determine the very nature of the different communal and inter-communal or inter-individual relationships is foreign to this view.

The historicist conception of "socio-cultural phenomena" does not permit the acceptance of societal structures of individuality, which, as such, are not subject to historical development, since they are exactly the transcendental conditions for every possible experience of factual societal relationships. As a result, the whole question concerning the inner nature of the different types of societal "groups" and inter-communal or inter-individual relationships is eliminated.

Instead, sociologists operate with "ideal types" in the sense of subjective generalizing constructions. And insofar as theoretical sociology speaks of structures of society, this term is not meant in our transcendental sense, but much rather in the pseudo-generic sense of "constellation" or "composition" of different "elements."<sup>2</sup>

Dooyeweerd then suggests that this view of man's social life betrays its scientific origin even among those sociologists such as F. Oppenheimer, F. S. C. Northrop and P. Sorokin who recognize the methodological difference between the natural sciences and the cultural sciences. Yet as long as sociologists hold to such a conception of "ideal"

types, they preclude themselves from obtaining any real insight into the basic problem of sociology, namely, that of discovering a total view of society. Lacking such a total view or ordering principle, they are forced to interpret social phenomena in terms of one particular aspect of reality. According to Dooyeweerd it is this lack which accounts for the emergence of the various schools of modern sociology. Unable to see the great diversity of aspects of man's temporal life as concentrated in the "heart" and directed to the Origin of life, the apostate sociologist is driven, by his religious need to find a substitute to fill in for the true unity of his life, to absolutize one of the relative aspects of life and to elevate it to the place of the heart. He must have his absolute, even if this means he must distort what observation discloses to be relative. His rational analysis of social phenomena is accompanied by the deeper drive, which in his unregenerate state as a sinner requires a distortion of the very "facts" he is in process of analyzing.

Apostate social scientists do not always agree on what they thus absolutize. This should not surprise us. Oneness of mind or heart, unity, and community and peace in the world of scholarship no less than in the world of politics and industry can only be the result of God's grace uniting our hearts and minds as a community of scholars by the power of his Word. Where men are not so bound, nothing is there to prevent them seizing first upon one and then upon another of the many aspects of our created life as being in their view the absolute origin of the other aspects. This is made possible by the very relative character of each of the life-aspects; being relative, the other meaning-aspects of life are involved in their very nature. The wholeness of meaning is present universally in a certain way in each aspect. It only requires a distortion of this creation-structure to see one aspect as the fulness of meaning required by the heart of all the other aspects.

As a result of this temptation so common to unregenerate scholars a great diversity of scientific "isms" has arisen in the course of scientific history. Man has been conceived of as a rational being, as a producer, as a technical being, as an economic animal. These and other views are all

"totality" views about man that arise not from a mere rational observation and analysis of positive facts presented to our "minds"—if that were the case no conflict between them would be possible—but instead they arise from the failure of apostate scholars to see the relative aspects of human life as all relative and from the resulting tendency to explain all the remaining relative aspects in terms of one that has been religiously absolutized and thus made the deeper source and unity of all the others. Of this tendency to find the key which will unlock the meaning of social phenomena in one relative aspect of created life, Dooyeweerd writes:

Sorokin tries to explain these "isms from the many-sided character of the socio-cultural universe." "Since the universe itself is many-sided," so he remarks, "there must logically be several standpoints, each of which specializes in the study of one of the main aspects." According to Sorokin, the net result of such divergence is a more adequate and many-sided knowledge of man's socio-cultural world.

But this very minimizing of the divergence between the different sociological schools betrays a fundamental lack of insight into the real character of the totality problem in sociology. If the appearance of the different "isms" were to be nothing but a specialization in the study of one of the main aspects of human society, their divergence could be reduced to that of the specific view-points of the different special sciences concerned with the study of societal relationships. But the various sociological "isms" are exactly characterized by the *absolutization* of a specific modal aspect *in order to grasp human society in the theoretical view of totality*. Such absolutizations cannot be corrected by other absolutizations. The very problem is how a general sociology may avoid them, this is to say, from what standpoint a sociological view of the totality of the different modal aspects is possible.<sup>3</sup>

The answer given to this crucial question by Dooyeweerd is that only the Word of God can provide us with a sure point of departure for our theoretical thought. What God's Word does not do, of course, is to tell us that there are fourteen or so law-aspects, law-spheres, and modalities in God's creation. That is a matter strictly of analysis.

The Word of God rather directs us to take whatever diversity of "modal moments" we find in God's creation as a diversity of the integral fulness of meaning of our religious life. In this way God's revelation written in the Holy Scriptures directs us to the integral creation-order concentrated in man's heart and at the same time liberates us from all apostate rationalistic ways of interpreting our experience. I can think of no more profound statement of this view of the Holy Scriptures as the ordering principle of our scientific as well as our practical life than that expressed in the *Educational Creed* of the Association for Reformed Scientific Studies:

Believing that Scripture reveals certain basic principles intensely relevant to education, we confess:

- (1) That human life in its entirety is religion. Consequently, scholarly study unfolds itself as service either of the one true God or of an idol.
- (2) That Scripture, the Word of God written, in instructing us of God, ourselves and the structure of creation is that integral and active divine Word or Power by which God, through His Spirit, attaches us to and enlightens us in the Truth, which is Christ.
- (3) That the Christ of the Scriptures, the Word of God incarnate, is the Redeemer and Renewer of our life in its entirety and therefore also of our theoretical thought.
- (4) That the essence or heart of all created reality is the covenantal communion of man with God in Christ.
- (5) That true knowledge is made possible by true religion and arises from the knowing activity of the human heart enlightened through the Word of God by the Holy Spirit. Thus religion plays its decisive ordering role in the understanding of our everyday experience and our theoretical pursuits.
- (6) That the diligent pursuit of theoretical thought in a community of scholars is essential to the obedient and thankful response of God's people to the cultural mandate. The task of the scholar is to give a scientific account of the structure

of creation and thereby to promote a more effective ordering of the everyday experience of the entire community. Thus scholarship pursued in faithful obedience to the divine mandate will heed the normative direction of God's Word and will acknowledge His Law to which all creation in all its spheres is subject and will bow before Christ's Kingship over all scientific work.<sup>4</sup>

For Dooyeweerd no less than for the Canadian scholars of the Association of Reformed Scientific Studies, "true knowledge is made possible by true religion"; and he also believes that "the task of the scholar is to give a scientific account of the *structure* of creation and thereby to promote a more effective ordering of the everyday experience of the entire community." It has been his achievement to have provided modern Christianity with just such an understanding of the structure of God's creation, in both its physical and social aspects. Let us then consider Dooyeweerd's teaching regarding the *structure* of the social and political universe of discourse.

As we tried to make clear in Chapter Six the law spheres or "aspects" or modalities of temporal existence do not exist by themselves. They are aspects of real individual things, events, acts and social forms. Thus Dooyeweerd cannot develop a workable sociology or Christian political science merely on the basis of his modal theory of reality. He must relate this to the particular things which we encounter as unities in our daily experience. He must, that is to say, proceed from the concept of function to the concept of the structures of individuality. As we saw in Chapter Six, the structures of individuality must be distinguished from the individual things of naïve experience themselves. The latter are the subjects; the structures of individuality signify the cosmonomic principle of the subjects, their "structural type."

The structural type of such natural things as rocks, plants and minerals are obviously less complicated than those we encounter in the area of human relations and of human society, since in society we find men as individuals within larger wholes, for example, families, various pro-

fessional and recreational associations, etc. Nevertheless, Dooyeweerd approaches the problem of the nature of a societal relation in the same way in which he approaches the nature of a natural thing such as a tree. The theory of the structures of individuality for natural things is also applicable to the structure of the temporal relationships of human society because both physical things and human beings are under God's law and both are thus objects in contrast to God who is the only Subject. It is obvious that at this point Dooyeweerd has already broken with the humanist theory of subjects and objects as denoting persons and things.<sup>5</sup>

Just as individual trees grow and perish, so the persons who make up the state grow and perish. But what can we call a tree after the individual tree no longer exists? And what is the permanent thing which is yet present after all the present living generation of persons who function and work in a given state has disappeared from the scene? What is it that constitutes the basis of the state, as so eloquently described by Edmund Burke in the following words:

The state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico and tobacco, or some other low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.<sup>6</sup>

What is the essential structure of this partnership between the living and the dead which we call the state?

Dooyeweerd suggests that we can only answer this question by first considering what constitutes the structure of anything created. In his treatment of the structure of



a thing he often employs the example of a tree. By means of theoretical thought we can abstract a particular tree from its natural habitat, and retain a loose thing which is capable of being analyzed further.<sup>7</sup> We know that this particular tree functions as a subject in the first three modal aspects of reality, the numerical, spatial, and physical. Thus a tree may be said to function subjectively in the aspect of number, space, and movement. It functions in the numerical and spatial spheres, as its leaves can be counted and as it occupies a certain place. And it also functions in the physical sphere. It can be chemically analyzed and can be contemplated by the physicist as a moving mass of energy built up of atoms and electrons. But from these perspectives alone, one cannot meaningfully speak of a *tree*. A stone or book can also be described from the viewpoint of the first three modalities. The structure of this specific thing—the “tree”—remains a mystery to anyone who refuses to go further than a merely physico-chemical explanation. The physico-chemical explanation is not incorrect as far as it goes but it is not sufficient to comprehend theoretically this living thing in its true nature. It is here that Dooyeweerd parts company with such humanist semanticians as Korzybski and Hayakawa. In their enthusiasm for what they term their non-Aristotelian logic based on the recognition of these various levels of abstraction made possible by man’s penetration into the microscopic and sub-microscopic levels of reality, Korzybski and Hayakawa tend to reject naïve experience altogether. According to Dooyeweerd, we must certainly take note of the lower orders of the abstracting process, but we must not stay content with such lower order abstractions. Thus it is meaningful to speak of a “tree” only if we notice that it is subject to the laws of the organic level of reality and therefore functions as a biological or organic subject. A tree displays its vital aspect in the process of growth, metabolism, and reproduction, and since this biotic subject-function is its last subject-function, we can say that the biotic modality or level of abstraction *qualifies* a tree. In other words, a tree is biotically qualified because the last modality in which it functions as a subject is the biotic sphere, and it is from

this sphere that a tree claims its peculiar nature and original individuality. The biotic function therefore occupies a cardinal position in the structure of individuality which constitutes a tree as a tree and not a rock or snake.

This defining or qualifying function Dooyeweerd calls the *leading function*, since the earlier aspects are typically directed to this function in the one individual thing.<sup>8</sup>

Dooyeweerd would agree with Korzybski that the reality of a thing, however, is not shut off in any single modality, and thus it is dangerous to identify a thing solely in terms of one level of abstraction. Thus the structure which constitutes a tree as a thing is individually expressed in the remaining modalities as well as in the lower-level orders of reality. In all the post-biotic aspects, a tree however functions as an object rather than a subject. Thus we can say that the structure which constitutes the tree as a thing has an objective individual expression in every post-biotic modality or level of created reality. For example, in the analytical-logical modality a tree functions as an individual conceptual object accessible to our cogitative function, and in the historical modality or level of abstraction a tree appears as an individual cultural object. A tree can become an individual legal object in the juridical modality. It has a lawful owner and its ownership can be the subject of litigation. In the modality of faith, a tree is an individual object of faith. A tree has been created by God and so points beyond itself to God whose name is glorified even in his creation of a tree. God is above the creation, and because of him creation has meaning and purpose. And this meaning or purpose is only revealed to those who view the cosmos in the light of God's revelation of himself in the Holy Scriptures.

The tree thus functions in all aspects of temporal created reality, but within this total structure of the tree the aspects are ordered or grouped into a particular unique individual whole around the leading function. This unique grouping around a specific function Dooyeweerd calls the structural principle or structural law to which the individual thing is subject and which makes its existence possible.<sup>9</sup> The structural principle of individuality or structural type

has constant validity within the temporal cosmos, and it may never be identified with the single tree which today is and tomorrow is burnt in the fire and passes away.

According to Dooyeweerd the structural principles which govern physical reality also define human societal relationships and institutions. They are the transcendental conditions of our experience of the variable factual societal relations. Within human society, these structural principles are of a normative value, and we cannot therefore approach the study of human society and its relations as "pure facts" apart from any normative view, as modern apostate social science tries to do. It is impossible to study such social relations and entities as the state, the church, the family, industry, or political party in the same supposedly objective and so-called "scientific" way in which we study physical, chemical, or biological phenomena.

Dooyeweerd begins his analysis of the structural principles of human society by distinguishing between authoritative societal relationships and free societal relationships. The former possess an internal communal character that is to a certain degree independent of the interaction of its members and is marked by authority, for example, the immediate family, church, and state. Free societal relationships, in contrast, are of an external character and are much freer. He therefore defines a community as "any more or less durable societal relationship which has the character of a whole joining its members into a social unity, irrespective of the degree of intensity of the communal bond."<sup>10</sup> An association is either an inter-individual or inter-communal relationship, "in which individual persons or communities function in coordination without being united into a solitary whole. Such relationships show the character of mutual neutrality, of approachment, free competition or antagonism, cooperation or contest."<sup>11</sup> In an association, individuals are coordinated next to each other without the relation of authority, as, for example, in the case of a buyer or seller. Dooyeweerd holds that each community is also defined by a structural principle. This principle is characterized by two functions, a foundational and a leading function.<sup>12</sup> An insight into the proper connection be-

tween these two tells us what the structural principle of the community is.

The family, for example, is founded on the biotic or organic function, since that is the basis of the marital union. However, we have not yet defined the family when we have pointed out the difference of the sex of the marriage partners nor have we defined the family as do many non-Christian sociologists when they merely trace the history of the family down the ages. We have to account also for the leading function, which is one of moral love between the partners.<sup>13</sup>

Dooyeweerd teaches that the structural principle relates the temporal social forms to the cosmic structure. He maintains that this view is a sound development of the Christian doctrine of the creation of all things after their own proper nature. He writes of the marriage bond:

The inner nature of a matrimonial bond urges itself upon man because it is not his own creation. Doubtless the factual matrimonial relationship between a man and a wife may be bad enough. Man and wife may break the marriage bond. But it is impossible to make such a factual behaviour into a social norm, because it contradicts the very nature of the matrimonial relation and the latter is a fundamental institution of every human society. The bolshevist authorities were obliged to capitulate to the "logic of the social facts" when they saw that the communist doctrine of marriage as a free companionship, dissoluble at any moment by the will of each of the parties, in its practice led to a fundamental disintegration of the Russian society.

In the same way the inner nature of a State, of a university, of a Church, of an industrial enterprise, or, in an undifferentiated society, of a sib, a tribe, or a guild, cannot be identified with the variable and changing factual relationships in which their internal structural types are realized. The latter urge themselves upon man and cannot be transformed by him. This is why the real structural principles of human society can never be replaced by constructed "ideal types," in the sense of Max Weber.<sup>14</sup>

H. Van Riessen agrees with his master upon this point:

Everything that is created is of a religious meaning-structure, i.e., it has to serve God. It exists for God's glory and for his unsearchable good pleasure; and unto

that end he has subjected it in his laws. In nature everything has its own peculiar character. Likewise what man constructs in the sphere of culture has its own peculiar nature. A community is always qualified by a determining meaning-function. It is never something indefinite. Accordingly, each relationship has of necessity a specific structure, and this structure depends upon the meaning of such a community. A community is always determined and limited by the nature of the activity jointly performed, e.g., family life, union work, technical production, scientific research. Such a limitation concerns the number of people constituting the group, the reason for their grouping, and the duration of the group. Man functions in a group in a qualified sense, without the loss of his personal identity. His personal identity is not to be merged in any single relationship nor in the totality of relationships. Man does not exist for the sake of any form of society.<sup>15</sup>

#### B. The Doctrine of Sphere Sovereignty

With the development of the structural principles of human society we have arrived at the second "level" of "sphere sovereignty," the first level being that of the modal independence of each law-sphere or law-aspect of the creation. We pointed out in Chapter Six that each law-sphere has a status, rooted in its divinely-instituted nature, which cannot be infringed upon by any other sphere. This constitutes its modal sovereignty or sovereignty in its own orbit, being founded in cosmic time. This doctrine of the sovereignty of the various spheres of society is perhaps the most significant element in Dooyeweerd's sociology and political science, since with it he wants to provide modern Christians with an intellectual weapon in the struggle against the totalitarian tendencies of modern society.

This tendency towards the idolization of the community and the state is today advanced not only in Communist lands but in all Western societies as well, not least in the English-speaking world.

John Macmurray warned in his first series of Gifford Lectures (1953) delivered in the University of Glasgow, Scotland, that "the tendency towards an apotheosis of the

state" has today resulted in a "crisis of the personal." He explains what he means as follows:

The cultural crisis of our time is a crisis of the personal. I need only refer to two aspects of the situation . . . in order to make clear what I mean by a crisis of the personal. One of these is the tendency towards an apotheosis of the state; the other is the decline of religion. The two are intimately connected, since both express a growing tendency to look for salvation to political rather than to religious authority. The increasing appeal to authority itself reflects a growing inability or unwillingness to assume personal responsibility. The apotheosis of political authority involves the subordination of the personal aspect of human life to its functional aspect. The major social revolutions of our time all wear this livery, whether they are fascist or communist in type. The justification offered by the democracies for resistance to the death against both is the same, that they rest upon a philosophy which sacrifices the personal values, and so the personal freedom of men to the exigencies of political and economic expediency. At this level, the crisis of the personal is the crisis of liberalism, which was an effort, however ambiguous, to subordinate the functional organization of society to the personal life of its members. Yet nothing could be more revealing of the depth of the crisis we are facing than one fact. Communism rests upon a criticism of liberal democracy. Liberalism, it maintains, contradicts itself. While it stands in theory for human freedom, in practice, it is a defence of human exploitation. Communism set out to resolve this contradiction by abolishing exploitation and realizing freedom in social practice. The declared intention was to achieve a form of society in which the government of men would give place to the administration of things. Yet its own practice, we see, defeats its intention and leads to an apotheosis of the State and to an organized and efficient exploitation of its citizens. In communist practice the personal is subordinated to the functional to a point at which the defence of the personal becomes itself a criminal activity.<sup>16</sup>

Unfortunately, while Macmurray recognizes this crisis of the personal in men's apostasy from the living God, he is unable to offer any truly adequate solution because he is lacking in a truly biblically-oriented conception of the

structural principles of human society and is still motivated at the deepest levels of his political thinking by the false modern humanistic nature-freedom motive. He is still gripped by the false, apostate, humanistic dilemma resulting from a forced option between collectivism or individualism, the community versus the individual. While Macmurray is obviously dissatisfied with individualism and with collectivism, all he seems able to suggest as the only course open to us to follow is to choose an agreeable compromise position somewhere in the middle. It is Dooyeweerd's firm conviction that Christians need not thus be tied by this false dilemma, and he suggests another possibility, typified by his biblically-motivated principle of the balance of authority and freedom under God and of the sovereignty of the various social spheres. Only by means of these two principles, he teaches, can modern Christians avoid falling into the humanist trap of justifying collectivism on the basis of the defects of individualism. And since economic individualism has been defeated in modern society, humanity is thus confronted with a decisive choice between totalitarianism and a new Christian trend in political and social development which would recognize the principles of sphere sovereignty and of the proper balance of authority and freedom.<sup>17</sup>

What then is the principle of sphere sovereignty? The answer is that God alone is absolutely sovereign. No particular bearer of authority on earth is the highest power from which other forms of authority are derived. No community or institution, not even the state, must absorb the individual completely. Only the Kingdom of God should absorb all of men's interests. And the Kingdom of God should not, in the collectivist sense, be identified with any temporal organization. Every temporal organization must reflect the divine law of love as it governs the eternal Kingdom of God. As we have seen, a community is characterized by the relationship of authority and subjection. But this authority is always limited, being defined by its own structural principle. Within human society, therefore, there is no organization such as the state, which is the

whole in which other societies are but parts. H. Van Riesen says :

Each sphere of authority is limited by its own societal relationship. The relation of authority and freedom exists *within* such relationships and not externally. The social relationships exist together on a basis of equality; the one is not subordinate to the authority and control of the other. Subjection to authority exists only within a relationship. *Societal relationships properly stand in a coordinate relation to each other, not in a preferred or subordinate position.*<sup>18</sup>

In other words, the family, the university, the commercial or business enterprise, the farm, the recreational club and whatever other groups naturally develop out of the organic life of human society, including the churches, do *not* owe their origin, existence, or structural principle to the state. They have an inner principle and cultural task all their own, entrusted to them by Almighty God. They hold a cultural mandate directly from the Creator for the pursuance of their own peculiar task. Upon this sovereignty given them by God the State may not infringe.

It is vital to understand the exact nature of the authority which is exercised by men in their various social spheres. The authority comes to them in a natural, organic way, not mechanically, as in the case of governmental authority. No parent exercises authority over his child because he was voted into the office of parent or because he first received the permission of some local mayor or magistrate. No scientist speaks with authority upon his subject merely because government has appointed him to that position. The scientist and the artist *command* respect by their own genius. People bow to an Einstein and a Picasso and recognize each as a master in his field of endeavor, not because he exists as a citizen of a given state, but because of his intrinsic authority. What is true of the authority of individuals is equally true of the authority of the organic spheres within society. In a family the authority over the group affairs of the home is not received by appointment from the Government, but comes directly from God to the parents concerned. In a scientific organization, such as a university or a school, no state can rightfully dictate the scientific con-



clusions to which the members of such institutions may come. That is what makes the interference of the Kremlin in the Lysenko affair so deplorable. The laws which are to be enforced in these social spheres are *the laws inherent in the sphere itself*. Similarly, in a business organization, no set of arbitrary governmental edicts and regulations can promote business operations, but only the economic laws of the business world apply; for example, a business must operate at a profit or it will go bankrupt. Farming likewise does not receive its laws of operation and terms of reference from the government in power but only from God, and it must obey God's great ecological and biological laws for the lands and forests. William Vogt and Fairfield Osborn have both warned the world of what will happen to mankind unless farmers do obey such laws.<sup>19</sup> By disobeying God's laws for the lands and forests men have brought soil erosion and deforestation and upset the rain cycles of large parts of the earth. Thus does God punish men who do not treat the earth with due respect as careful stewards of his creation.<sup>20</sup> Whenever any government, whether Russian, British or American, presumes to determine the natural laws of operation in these social spheres, those working in such spheres inevitably grow restive and protest against what they consider to be an illegitimate interference in the internal workings of their field. Such facts clearly indicate that there is indeed a natural sovereignty given to these social spheres of which man is instinctively conscious.

Dooyeweerd recognizes that this sphere sovereignty between communities and social groupings has not always existed in human history. Such anthropologists as Childe, Rivers, Frazer, Frankfort, Durkheim and others have rightly pointed out that primitive society is characterized by an "undifferentiated" state of social organization, in which all the duties of a person were fulfilled within a single unity which may be called a tribe, a sib, a clan, or a sub-division of these. Does not this historical evidence shatter the principle of sphere sovereignty? Dooyeweerd does not think so. He writes:

When we establish that a matrimonial community, a state, or church, etc. have a constant inner nature, determined by their internal structural principles, we do not mean that *all* of these societal structures of individuality have been realized in every phase of the development of mankind. We only mean that the inner *nature* of these types of societal relationships cannot be dependent on variable historical conditions of human society.<sup>21</sup>

We have already referred to the norm of differentiation in history. Human culture must pass through a primitive stage, but it may not linger there. The norm of differentiation demands *individualization* in history,<sup>22</sup> so that separate communities may appear and thus express more profoundly the totality of the meaning of God's creation. This the individual has been better able to do by means of living in the differentiated communities of civilized societies with their more open communities than by living in the single undifferentiated units of social organization of primitive society. The process of differentiation, therefore, for Dooyeweerd is a good one, even if it does break up the homogeneity of the closed societies of primitive men.

As soon as the individual does break out of a closed society into what has been termed "the open society" by which his individuality has been constricted, the problem at once emerges how the new groupings around which he builds his life, for example, the scientific grouping of Plato's Academy or the ecclesiastical community of the primitive church or of Martin Luther or John Calvin, should be related both to the individual and the society out of which both have arisen.

Apostate thinkers have answered this question by generally falling into collectivism or individualism. Thus Plato and Aristotle both advocated a collectivist solution to the crisis brought upon the classical city-state by the individualizing tendencies of the sophists, poets and dramatists of their age. Human society, according to Plato, has a metaphysical foundation, which he found in the metaphysical idea of the state. This idea-form enjoyed a supertemporal and deified existence in the world of the eternal forms or ideas. Aristotle sought the metaphysical foundation of

society in the substantial essential form of man. He found it in the human rational soul which made man a social being. In medieval political thought we detected a synthesis of biblical and Greek motives in the schema "nature and grace." Nature and grace, we saw in our study of Thomas Aquinas' political and social thought, are two spheres related to each other as the higher to the lower. The goal of the state is to supply man with temporal goods and as such is the highest relationship within the sphere of nature. But since Aquinas regarded the church as the institute of grace as the perfect earthly community, he taught that the state must serve the church.

In revolt against such collectivistic conceptions, political thinkers since the Renaissance under the influence of the modern nature-freedom motive have denied the existence of any such metaphysical root of societal relationships. They have maintained that the individual alone is real and self-sufficient and that he precedes any societal relationship. A human community such as the state is simply a collection of self-sufficient independent "mental substances," who together conclude a "social contract" in order to achieve a greater pursuit of happiness and to protect their property. The tie uniting individuals in modern liberal humanistic conceptions of politics thus becomes external and mechanistic. In antiquity, as we saw, we encountered such mechanistic theories of the state in the Stoics. In modern times the mechanistic view of the state is found expressed in the humanistic version of natural law doctrine, which holds that societal relationships arise through a social contract and thus equates law with the general will of individuals rather than with the will of God.

#### C. Collectivism or Individualism: A False Dilemma

The conflict between collectivistic or individualistic theories of society has come to dominate the political thought of the last hundred years in the English-speaking world. Reacting against the individualistic theories of Locke and J. S. Mill, a whole generation of Anglo-Saxon political thinkers, writers and journalists have been advocating a collectivistic solution to the problems facing the

English-speaking world. Such collectivistic theories of government have left a deep imprint not only upon the British Labor Party and the American Democratic Party and the Canadian Liberal Party but also upon British, American and Canadian Conservatism. As one wit said, "We are all socialists now." A. V. Dicey first drew the attention of English-speaking scholars to this intellectual development in his famous lectures before the Harvard Law School in 1898, later published as *The Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century*.<sup>23</sup>

Referring to the main current of legislative opinion from the beginning of the twentieth century, Dicey said that "the main current of legislative opinion from the beginning of the twentieth century has run vehemently towards collectivism." He continued:

When the last century came to an end, belief in laissez faire had lost much of its hold on the people of England. The problem now before us is to ascertain what are the new causes or conditions which since the beginning of the present century have in England given additional force to the influence of more or less socialistic ideas.<sup>24</sup>

It is surprising that many Christians both in Britain and in North America apparently see no other remedies than socialistic planning and the economic direction of the nation's life by the state for the economic malaise and social distress brought upon society by the individualistic attempt to apply economic rationality and technical reason to the productive and exchange process. In his devastating indictment of *Collectivism in the Churches*, Edgar C. Bundy focussed the spotlight upon the left wing collectivistic, socialistic churchmen who have come to dominate the social and political thinking of the National Council of Churches of Christ in America in so many ways.<sup>25</sup> Thus it has come about that Marxist categories of political thought rather than Christian categories have come to dominate the thinking of many American, British and Canadian Christians. It has also come to dominate the thinking of American, British and Canadian labor unions and industrial organizations such as the AFL and the CIO, the British Trade Union Movement, and Canadian Labor Congress.

It is often claimed that in contrast to European socialist movements the American, British and Canadian labor movements are merely "functional" associations for the promotion of the worker's welfare, and that they are free from the doctrinaire dogmatism of their European counterparts. This is generally hailed as a distinct advantage, opening the way for common action by people committed to various religious beliefs or no beliefs at all. For this reason, no doubt, many American, British and Canadian Christians feel justified in supporting the labor movements of their respective societies.

Belief in functionalism is a typical example of man-centered political and social thinking. According to God's Word, men and their organizations never function as such, because man is not a functional being, but a religious being, called to serve his Creator in all his actions at work and at play. To surrender on this point, that is, to consider the socialistic movements of America, Britain and the Australasias and their supporting trade unions as merely functional organizations, is to render them completely incapable of righting the wrongs of our capitalistic society. Was not the error of the capitalist precisely that he treated his worker as a tool and function of the economic system? The functionalistic approach of the socialist movement and its supporting trade unions is the result of their falling into the same humanistic error for which they so vehemently condemn and denounce the capitalists. The capitalist and the socialist make the error of not basing their theories of society and thus their political and economic activities upon the right view of man revealed in the Holy Scriptures. Thus both conservatives, liberals, and socialists stand revealed in their true colors as radical unbelievers who prefer to trust in their own reason, science and planning than in the Word of God.

This explains why the socialist movement and its labor unions have been unable to relieve the real distresses of the modern American, British, Canadian and Australian workers, namely, their growing depersonalization and atomization into particles of mass men. The socialists rightly protested against the exploitation and poverty of the work-

ers of a hundred years ago. However, they made the same mistake as the capitalists did in viewing the problems brought upon the English-speaking world by the Industrial Revolution in the field of labor relations entirely from a rationalistic and materialistic point of view. The socialists bitterly attacked the capitalists for their preoccupation with money and profit at the expense of the worker as a man and as a person. However, today Wilson, Brown and Cousins in Britain, Walter Reuther, George Meany, and James Hoffa in the United States, and Claude Jodoin and the leaders of the New Democratic Party of Canada such as Stanley Knowles, Douglas Fisher and Tommy Douglas are all preoccupied with the same thing.<sup>26</sup> They too are obsessed with the idea of obtaining welfare and security in terms of material possessions, and they too adhere to the narrowed down Marxist view of man as an "economic" animal.

Many Christians throughout the English-speaking world, including many Anglican and Methodist bishops and clergy, apparently see no dilemma except the one embodied in capitalism versus socialism, private enterprise versus state control. The question must now be asked whether this dilemma of collectivism versus individualism and of socialism versus capitalism is a genuine one.

According to Dooyeweerd it is not, since the Word of God does not recognize any such dilemma. He rightly claims that neither collectivism nor individualism recognize the true structure of societal relationships. The dilemma only arises when the structures of individuality are neglected, which alone present a basis for the solution of the problem of the one and the many. Outside the biblical doctrine of man in society, apostate thinkers have to construct human society rationally out of the wills of sovereign individuals or out of some absolutized single community, be it church or state. The principle of sphere sovereignty, Dooyeweerd claims, alone presents us with a proper insight into the connection between man and his social forms, since the individual is never defined or absorbed into a temporal social bond. These are limited in the expression of their authority by their structural principle.<sup>27</sup>

The error of individualism is that it constructs the communities and associations of human society out of elemental atomistic relations between individuals conceived as sovereign agents with the result that it does not recognize that these communities also have their own peculiar structural principles. But collectivism absolutizes one of the many temporal communities, namely, the one that is made to embrace all the others, as the whole which embraces and enfolds the parts. This was true of the classical city-state and of all modern totalitarian regimes. The error of such collectivistic solutions is that then this single all-embracing community is given the place of the religious basic community, the Kingdom of God, which transcends time and place. Man cannot thus be enslaved by any such absolutized earthly community, be it church or state, since man, in the center of his personality, his "heart," also transcends time, while as long as he remains in history he functions in a multiplicity of equally significant communities and associations.<sup>28</sup>

The biblical view of man in society can alone provide a way out of the dead-end humanistic street of individualism versus collectivism, for it alone clearly reveals that man is an individual created together with other men. Man's personality can develop only in relationship with God and with his neighbor. Man is called by his Creator to love the Lord his God with all his "heart" and his neighbor as himself. Must we therefore conclude that man is a little of both, partly individualist and partly collectivist, and that we simply have to try and steer a middle course between these two extremes? The answer is no. For the biblical understanding of personality in society is entirely different.

The common error of both individualism and collectivism, in typically humanistic fashion, is that they take their starting point in man, whether that be the individual or the group. The biblical view of man in society transcends this dilemma. In the light of the Word of God we know that God created man for community with his fellow men and as a social being. This means that man does not find his purpose in himself as Locke supposed nor in the group as Karl Marx supposed but in the God who made him. The

individual and the community are equally called to live in obedience to the laws of their Creator. In fact it is only by such obedience to God's law for man in society that the present conflict between the individual and his society will be resolved. Both the individual and the community will then occupy their God-given place in a society dominated by love and service.

This love for one's neighbor must *not* be understood in the humanist sense which finds expression in man's service to the state as in Russia and Red China but in service to God, and so in service to one's fellow man. Disharmony and strife are always the result of man's sinfulness and disobedience to God's law, and they can only be removed by the grace and power of the risen Christ. This biblical truth is ignored by both the Left and the Right in present-day Anglo-American, Canadian politics. All our major parties in the English-speaking world seek to establish community by appealing to human reason, science, selfish interest and utility rather than by an appeal to God's sovereign will revealed in his Word. For this reason no true Christian can any longer support the Labor or the Conservative Party in Britain, the Democratic or the Republican Party in the United States, and the Progressive-Conservative or the Liberal or New Democratic Party in Canada until all these parties come to acknowledge Christ's Kingship over English-speaking culture. It is time for all English-speaking Christians to break with the superficial dilemma posed by the extremes of the Left or the Right. Until they do so, they will be unable to counteract effectively the secularizing influence upon Anglo-Saxon culture inherent in the controversy of individualism versus collectivism.

#### D. The Christian Doctrine of the State

Dooyeweerd maintains that it is the primary task of a truly Christian philosophy of the state to "disclose the internal structural principle of the body politic as it is found in the divine world order."<sup>29</sup> The normative structural principle of the state rests upon God's will and purpose for man in society and not upon the will of a monarch, a



dictator, or the "general will" of the people. For Dooyeweerd this structural principle can best be discovered by concentrating "on those two functions in the structure of the body politic whose mutual relation proved to be the dialectical problem in the theories of the state rooted in the humanist immanence standpoint."<sup>30</sup>

In all these possible theories and forms of the state, we always encounter the historical function of *power* and the juridical legal function of *justice*. As a result we may distinguish between law-states of the Lockean liberal constitutional type, for example, America, Britain and Canada, and the power-states of the Rousseau type, represented by the Communist totalitarian democracies. A Christian philosophy of the state will seek to find in the structural principle of the state the proper relation which God wills to exist between power and justice. In most apostate theories and forms of the state a basic tension exists between these two poles of political and legal life, but in a truly Christian philosophy of human government this tension may be overcome. Dooyeweerd suggests that "there is nothing of which our time is so much in need with respect to the state and society as an insight into the constant transcendental structural principles of societal relationships. They have not been directed by man's reason, but are anchored in the divine wisdom exhibited in the world's order."<sup>31</sup>

Before he can uncover the structural principle of the body politic, Dooyeweerd first disposes of Brunner's argument to the effect that a Christian theory of the state is impossible because, according to Brunner, the factor of constraining power in the structure of the state contains an intrinsically demonic and radically sinful element. As such it is supposed to remain necessarily caught in a dialectical tension with the Christian commandment of love and the idea of true communion. Thus Dooyeweerd points out:

Brunner in his repeatedly quoted book *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen* [*The Divine Imperative*] defends this view. He considers it to be a necessary consequence of the essential difference between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism that there is a Roman Catholic but not a really Protestant philosophy of law and of the state. Wherever Protestantism tries to

project such a philosophy it has already been affected internally by the Roman Catholic leaven. Roman Catholicism bases its philosophy of the State on the Aristotelian natural law which is not of Christian but of pagan origin. Reformed Christianity cannot recognize any form of natural law and has to accept the State in the latter's peculiar dialectical structure. In it there is an irreconcilable tension between three factors, viz, an element of the order of creation in the moment of communion, a constraining legal order related to sin, and an in no way justifiable system of power which is "merely factual, unjust, hungry for power, and half demonic."

The fundamental nature ["Grundwesen"] of the State is considered not to be *justice*, but *power*.<sup>32</sup>

For Brunner then the state is a worldly order. It is not holy; indeed its very essence is sinful. For Brunner a *Christian* state is thus a contradiction in terms.

Dooyeweerd rightly points out that these notions arise from Brunner's dialectical irrationalistic standpoint, and they clearly show that Brunner does not distinguish between the normative structural principle of the relationship of the state and its subjective realization in a sinful worldly order, that is, in a concrete state. Refusing to develop a truly Reformed doctrine of the state, Brunner simply uncritically relapses into a synthesis with the state-theories of the immanence standpoint of humanism by accepting in principle the dialectical basic problem of the nature-freedom motive. Falsely, he supposes he can reduce this basic problem to the "basic antithesis" in the Christian view between creation and the fall. At the back of this synthetic standpoint emerges the false contrast between nature and grace, which in Brunner's teaching assumes the form of a dialectical tension between the "commandment of love of the moment" and the "law as such." Dooyeweerd observes concerning Brunner's doctrine:

A really Christian view of the State, because of its very starting point from the Biblical basic motive of creation, fall into sin and redemption, should radically reject Brunner's "dialectical basic problem" derived from the immanence standpoint. The internal structural principle of the State as a supra-arbitrary institution can never be internally antinomic; neither can the

function of power in this structure be call "semi-demonic" and "unjustifiable in any sense" on our standpoint. Brunner commits the serious error of confusing the factor of power in the *structure* of the body politic with the *subjective way* in which States in the sinful world can abuse their power. But when Brunner writes, "There has never been and there never will be a Christian State," the question must be asked: Is the word "Christian" intended here in the sense of "without sin"? If so, can this statement then not be applied with equal justice to all the other types of societal relationships, inclusive of the Church in their subjective manifestations? Then the thesis loses any *special* meaning. Brunner characterizes the supposed essence of the body politic as *power*, as an "irrational product of history" which can only be understood by faith . . . by thinking of the hidden God in history. This merely proves how much this author's conception of power has been infected by modern irrationalism. His conception of law has been chiefly derived from neo-Kantian positivism and his "idea of community" from irrationalistic phenomenology.

It is a matter of serious doubt if the task of the Christian should be to lend the biblical Christian background of creation and sin to this *dialectical* "mixtum compositum" of humanistic conceptions.<sup>33</sup>

Unlike Brunner, Karl Barth will have nothing to do with the creation-ordinances which might act as directives for our "natural" life. The fall of man, says Barth, has so basically corrupted "nature" that the knowledge of the creation ordinances has been completely lost. As a result of this dialectical "dualism," any thought of Christian political action becomes cut off at the very root. According to Barth and to a lesser degree according to Brunner, Christian politics and Christian social action are impossible because there is no longer any contact between the "natural" life as we know it and the creation but only with the fall. For Barth there is an immeasurable gulf between God and the world. On the earthly side of this "deadline" all is sinful and lies under God's curse. Thus Barth teaches one cannot speak of anything as "Christian," not even of a Christian marriage, much less a Christian State or politics. For Barth an organization based on so-called Christian principles is a monstrosity, indeed little short of blasphemy.

It is claiming to be something which by the definitions of his dialectical theology no human organization can ever be.

The Word of God for Barth is delivered directly to each individual like a flash of lightning, with reference only to a concrete situation; and any attempt on that individual's part to derive general principles from it is a mere human construction which can in no sense claim divine validity.

According to Dooyeweerd, the state is grounded in history and rests upon the historical formation of power. The state does not arise in history until in the process of differentiation, "the power of the sword" is separated from the undifferentiated organization of primitive society and is concentrated in a government. While the family relationship has existed from the beginning of human life on this planet the state has not. The state's historical foundation makes it possible for it to assume various forms. The foundational function of a natural relationship, in contrast, is free from human formation, and it is therefore less variable in its structure. In every relationship in which historical formation is the foundational function, its form is always organizational form, a form in the historical factors of power brought together through intentional organization into a constant cooperative unity. Thus a democratic state has a different organization from a dictatorship. Natural societal relationships on the other hand do not have organizational form. The form of a family, for example, is independent of cultural level and milieu. Dooyeweerd is careful to distinguish between organization and organism. He rejects the Romantic theory of the state which conceives of it on the analogy of a living organism, for example, Hegel's philosophy of the state. Such political romanticism idealizes the organic at the expense of what is formed through organization, but in a Christian philosophy of the state such idealization of the organic should be avoided. That which is the result of organization is not of less value than that which is the product of organic growth. The corruption of the creation through sin does not originate in the historical modality, but permeates all modalities and lies primarily in the heart of man. Dooyeweerd indeed finds in historical

organization in societal relationships the source of cultural enrichment and political development which should be welcomed.

To recognize the foundational function of the state, it is not sufficient to say that it rests upon historical formations of power. The same can be said of church and industry. Historical power is a modal concept which can be predicated of a multiplicity of structures of individuality. The historical power that a specific relationship possesses as a foundational function depends upon the structural principle determined by this type of historical power. Dooyeweerd writes, "The typical foundational function of the geno-type (State) can nowhere else be found but in an internal monopolistic organization of the power of the sword over a particular cultural area within cultural boundaries."<sup>34</sup>

From this definition of its basis, it is evident that the state exists because of human sinfulness, so that together with its coercive power, the state is a characteristic institution of God's common, temporal and conserving grace. The Roman Catholic view, which grounds the state in the sphere of the natural, thus does not do justice to the fact of sin. In both the Old and New Testaments the organized power of the sword is emphatically related to man's fall (Romans 13:1-5; I Peter 2:13; Rev. 13:10; I Samuel 12:17-25; 24:7, 11; 26:9-11; II Samuel 1:14-16).

Dooyeweerd is careful to point out that it would be fundamentally wrong to confuse the fact that the power of the sword inherent in the office of government has been incorporated into the world order by God because of sin with the sinful subjective way in which the power of the sword is handled in a particular state. We must first understand the power of the sword in its institutional structure before we try to judge the actual handling of it.

The fact that the state is based on the power of the sword must not be interpreted naturalistically, since the foundational function is but a part of the state's structural principle, in which power is normatively related to the state's *leading* function which is justice. The foundational function is an historical one insofar as its meaning is opened

and thus anticipates the positivizing of justice and law. And thus there need not be a tension between power and justice. We may therefore properly define the state as *a public legal community of government and subjects on the historical basis of a monopolistic organization of power within a particular geographical area*. Such a definition of the state places the state's "might" in direct coherence with "right."

The end function of the state is thus juridical and the state is typically qualified as a juridical relationship. The leading function in the structure of the state must be characterized by this integration of justice, otherwise it degenerates into tyranny. As Augustine pointed out long ago, a mere power-state which disavows justice as its leading function is nothing else but a band of robbers. On the other hand, the state cannot continue to exist if law is separated from its historical basis of power.

#### E. The Christian and Nuclear War

Modern pacifists who advocate unilateral nuclear disarmament would do well to remember that no state can exist without power as well as justice. It is argued that the advent of nuclear weapons has effected nothing less than a moral revolution in the Church's received doctrine that Christians may lawfully wage war upon just and necessary occasions. Whereas such a doctrine may have been valid in former times when wars were of limited scope and intensity, the nuclear disarmers such as G. B. Caird now think that the advent of weapons of mass destruction has created a totally new situation. Thus the time has now come for Christians to demand of their respective governments that they set an example by unilaterally renouncing war as a method of national policy and banning the use of all nuclear weapons. For Caird as well as other pacifists the Kingdom of God must be consummated within the existing world historical order. God is to stand surety for the realization of human purposes and values. For Caird, as for Ritschl earlier, the Kingdom of God is pretty much equivalent to the moral unification of the human race through action prompted by universal love

of neighbor. Thus for most pacifists, religion tends to become only a new aspect of moral activity, with the result that the Kingdom of God has become stripped of its eschatological transcendence that belongs to it in the Scriptures. It therefore becomes hardly more than a realm of moral ends, a purely present and mundane commonwealth. By thus ignoring Christian eschatology, the Christian pacifists land themselves in the rationalist syllogism: "This is the only world in which we can live. The use of nuclear weapons will destroy our chance to achieve the good life in the world. Therefore nuclear weapons must be banned."

Does the Word of God in fact teach us any such thing. The answer is that it does not. In the New Testament we are given no picture of peace on earth among the nations. On the contrary, prophecies abound of the most terrible wars among people at the end of future history before the final consummation which transcends history. The hope of peace outside of faith and trust in Jesus Christ is alien to the New Testament. The hope of an earth in which dwells righteousness is bound up with the expectation of a new heaven and a new earth. The reign of absolute peace belongs to eschatology, to the realm of eternal life.

If the Word of God does not teach us to expect the perfect reign of peace on earth, neither does it suggest any specifically Christian attitude to war. Like slavery, Paul and John take war for granted as being part of the human predicament resulting from human sinfulness. Yet the New Testament as a whole does adhere to two basic principles laid down by our Lord himself:

(1) Christ does not regard the state as a final institution to be equated somehow with the Kingdom of God. Instead, it belongs to the age of sin which still exists but which will vanish as soon as God's Kingdom is finally and completely brought in at the second coming of Christ. As long as this age continues, however, Christians must give to the state due obedience and loyalty, because under the conditions caused by sin it is willed by the Creator as the custodian of justice and for the restraint of the worst outward consequences of human sin.

(2) While recognizing that the state exists as an institution of God's common grace to maintain public order and to repress crime, and while making such contributions as are necessary to enable the state to carry out its task, Christ, however, also teaches that his followers are not bound to render the state allegiance when it claims prerogatives that belong only to God, and when it demands more than is necessary to its life.<sup>35</sup>

According to Cullmann, Paul merely enlarges upon these two sides of the Lord's teaching about the state. In the middle of his discussion about the Christian commandment of love in his Epistle to the Romans, Paul breaks off in chapter thirteen to consider the contrary principle upon which the state is based, namely, the power of the sword. For Paul the state does, properly and rightly, exactly the opposite of what the Christian is to do; it takes vengeance on him who does evil (verse 4). In chapter twelve it is stated that the Christian on the contrary is by no means to repay evil with evil. Nevertheless, we are to accept the state and submit ourselves to it for conscience sake. For if the state takes vengeance, it does so as the "holy servant of God." "It is God's holy servant for vengeance upon the evil doer." Even if it does not know this itself, it stands nevertheless unconsciously in God's service. How this is possible, that is, for a Christian to obey the state, is not explicitly explained by Paul. At the end of his own book, however, Cullmann himself seeks an explanation of the contradiction between the state using the force and power of the sword and the Christian being commanded by the Lord to "love others as I have loved you" and to rely upon persuasion rather than force. The tension between the former's concern with the judicial principle of retribution of evil-doing and the latter's concern for forgiveness of wrongs done personally to himself is due, states Cullmann, to the chronological dualism, the chronological tension which characterizes the new situation brought about by Christ's death and resurrection. That is, the end-time has already begun, and yet its consummation is nevertheless still outstanding. Cullmann says:



Primitive Christian eschatology is not merely a waiting for the future, as A. Schweitzer and others maintain, but neither is it merely faith in the present as already fulfilled; "realized eschatology" to use C. H. Dodd's expression. It is both.<sup>36</sup>

Applying this biblical eschatological understanding of the relations existing between the state and the Christian to the pacifists' policy for unilateral nuclear disarmament, what do we find? We find that the pacifists for their own devious purposes have seen fit to resolve the tension laid down by God himself by having us believe that God's Kingdom has fully and completely arrived within the historical process. According to the pacifists the state must here and now begin acting like something God never meant it to act like, namely, a church. Naturally, holding such a doctrine of realized political eschatology, the American and British pacifists feel quite justified in revoking the right of the American and British states to defend themselves against their Communist aggressors. Whatever else such a doctrine of the state may call itself, it cannot qualify as a biblically-oriented doctrine. John Calvin wrote in the *Institutes*:

It is the dictate both of natural equity and of the nature of the office that princes are armed not only to restrain the crimes of individuals, but also to defend the territories committed to their charge by going to war against any hostile aggression, and the Holy Spirit, in many passages of Scripture, declares such wars to be lawful.

By calling upon the American and British governments to deny themselves the right to defend their respective nations against a possible Soviet or Red Chinese aggression, the pacifists are in effect denying America and Britain their God-ordained right to exist as states. Brunner points out:

To deny on ethical grounds, this elementary right of the State to defend itself by war simply means to deny the existence of the State itself. War, that is, the readiness of the State at any time to support with all the means of power at its disposal the recognized aims of its policy which are regarded as necessary,

belongs to the very nature of the State, so long as it has no better protection of its rights.<sup>37</sup>

It is because of this fact that the great doctors of the Church, Roman Catholic as well as Protestant, have always taught and recognized the doctrine of the just war, but they have also restricted such a just war to the war of defence against the obvious aggressor. Do the pacifists think God prefers an Anabaptist state of anarchy to the present rule of law and justice in America, Britain and Canada?

Bemused by their realized political eschatology and confused by their identification of the political and spiritual orders and of the spheres of church and state, the pacifists even promise us that if America and Britain unilaterally renounce their right as states to defend themselves against their aggressors, God somehow will come to their rescue and bring in the victory of the Lamb of God. Let not the pacifists try to deceive us. The victory of the Lamb of God is assured, but it will be a victory over all states, Communist and Capitalist states included; and when it comes, history will have been brought to its finish. Far from peace at the Communist price bringing us the reign of righteousness, it would in fact mark the realization of the apocalyptic vision of the beast coming up out of the earth, since it would involve the destruction of all those claims to justice and the rule of law presently enjoyed by Americans, Britons and Canadians. It would be a peace to which the present dangers of nuclear warfare might well be preferred by most English-speaking people. There are worse things than being physically dead. The protection of right by might will never be unnecessary as long as there are men who do not submit of their own free will to the judgment and rule of right and law, and that means as long as there remains evil in this world.

The abandonment of nuclear weapons by the NATO Alliance of Western powers advocated by many Christian pacifists would constitute a disastrous diplomatic defeat for the NATO powers in the present war of nerves being waged by the Kremlin. It is all the more important to avoid such a defeat when diplomatic and psychological defeat is the only kind of defeat that Soviet Russia can now afford to

inflict upon the West, and when a war of nerves is the only kind of war in which the great powers can any longer indulge. Weakness may not be the same thing as treachery, but it serves all the same purposes. The pacifist case in fact has yet to be proved. It has so far been better to fight for one's freedom than to be occupied, and successive occupations have destroyed nations as effectively as bombs. Peace has been maintained over long periods only by the balance of power; and it is sad that so many American and British churchmen should be seeking to upset the psychological balance of power in favor of our mortal enemies.

Granting the right of the NATO Alliance to defend itself, the only question that remains to be asked and answered is what is the best method of defending ourselves in the age of nuclear weapons? The argument of those who have been in favor of basing Western defence upon the nuclear deterrent was, and still is, that this prospect would be so appalling that it would be enough to restrain the Kremlin from any action which might let loose such a devastation. Unfortunately, this argument cuts both ways. If the fear of unleashing atomic warfare is sufficient to deter the Kremlin, might it not also be sufficient to deter us from invoking nuclear retaliation in the event of attack by conventional weapons only, since it would be followed by a Communist counter-retaliation no less devastating? The Soviet high command knows full well that no American or British government would dare to make the terrible decision, if not initially attacked with nuclear weapons, of starting a mode of warfare which must involve ruin in both directions. Realizing this unwillingness, the Communist leaders may well doubt that we would in fact ever use the nuclear deterrent in response to a breach of the peace with conventional weapons only. As things stand at the moment then, we are thus in very grave danger that the West will be destroyed by a series of armed coups on the Hitler model which we would not have the strength to challenge with conventional weapons and which would not seem separately of sufficient gravity to justify the use of nuclear warfare. In other words, the purpose of their hydrogen bombs will be to deter our deterrent while their tanks and submarines

pulverize us into submission. Faced by this grim dilemma of suicide or surrender what should we do? The answer is to find a middle way of defending our heritage by building up our own conventional weapons to the Russian level. Only in this way shall we emerge from a situation in which we may one day have to decide between surrendering our glorious Anglo-American heritage to the scientific barbarians of the Russian Steppes and letting loose upon ourselves and the rest of mankind the horrors of an atomic holocaust. Either we go on enjoying a good time for a few more years and then spend the rest of our lives as Soviet slaves, or we make the necessary sacrifices of sweat and treasure and remain free men under God. Let all Christians in the English-speaking world pray for peace with justice and trust in God, but in the meantime let us keep our conventional and nuclear weapons ready for action.

#### F. The State's Integrating Role

The correlation between law and power expresses itself in the structure of the authority of a ruler over his subjects. The state, that is to say, unites the government and the people within a given territory into a politico-juridical whole. Have we not then arrived at a totalitarian view? Dooyeweerd answers in the negative, because this integration does not make other communities and associations within society intrinsic parts of the state, but a public legal community arises, whose purposes are limited by its leading function of justice.

In the territorial legal community of the body politic, all the specifically qualified juridical interests should be harmonized in the sense of a truly public legal retribution against lawbreakers and integrated into the public interest.<sup>38</sup> According to Dooyeweerd, this implies that the term "public interest" may never be used as a slogan for any sort of political program, but it must be juridically qualified, since its use may never warrant an encroachment upon the internal sphere-sovereignty of the non-political societal relationships, for example, family life, education, science, church and industry.

We must see this "public interest" in the context of all of God's holy ordinances. Only then can the limitation of what the public interest constitutes be balanced successfully against private interest. For the limits of both public and private interest can only be found in the divine institution of the various offices of human life. In each of these offices God maintains his sovereignty in the particular way that is appropriate to each office.

In each office man must recognize the sovereignty of the Lord according to the order and authority that God gave for that office, and this as we saw in Chapter One is what Kuyper meant by his doctrine of sphere-sovereignty. It is not a question of a number of small sovereigns but of services to be rendered in various ways to God's order for human society through these divinely-appointed offices. The government is thus as much a servant of God as a parent; it must express and apply God's sovereignty in the life of the state according to the divine ordinance and consequently may not transgress the limits of the sphere of competency assigned to it. The authority of government ceases where that of another divine office begins. The government's task is to regulate, according to the criterion of the public interest, every subject's and every social sphere's external relations to the other spheres, so that all individuals and societal relationships can flourish in peace and order. That is why Dooyeweerd teaches that the modal moment of the juridical aspect of the state is retribution or judgment, the well-balanced harmonization of a multiplicity of interests. The public law of the state must therefore seek to maintain harmonious relationships between *all* the interests within its territory. No single interest within the borders of the state can be ignored. Thus Dooyeweerd writes:

The internal political activity of the state should always be guided by the idea of public social justice. It requires the harmonizing of all the interests within a national territory, insofar as they are enkaptically interwoven with the requirements of the body politic as a whole. This harmonizing process should consist in weighing all the interests against each other in a

retributive sense, based on the recognition of the sphere sovereignty of the various societal relationships.<sup>39</sup>

The purpose of government then is to protect individual and group interests against any encroachment, thus enabling them to develop in peace (I Tim. 2:3). This is what Dooyeweerd understands by the political principle of integration.

Does the principle of integration endow the state with the power and right to interfere in other social relationships and within the various spheres of society? The answer is no. The state must never interfere in the internal law of the family, the school, the church, science or industry. The internal law of these social spheres is beyond the state's jurisdiction. However, all these relationships have an external as well as an internal juridical function. A church, for example, is affected by a noisy factory, so that the latter is rightly prevented by law from interfering with public worship. A state must try to harmonize such external legal interests, but it must also respect the internal sovereignty of other relationships and promote justice as a whole by utilizing public law in order to balance the external legal relations of societal relationships.

As we have seen, every relationship functions in all of the modal aspects of reality, and this includes the relationship of the state. Thus the state has the following aspects among others: the mathematical, consisting in the unity of the nation in the plurality of its citizens and members; the aspect of power, in that the government which rejected the power of the sword would in fact be abdicating; the economic, coming to expression, for example, in the politics of taxation; the linguistic for example, in such objective symbols as flags, standards, titles and medals; the biological, since the state is a political vital community, which, as subject, sustains a relation with the objective political *Lebensraum* within which a certain national type of people are gradually formed with their own national characteristics; the spatial, in the territory occupied by the state; the juridical; the ethical or moral, expressing itself in patriotism and love of one's country; and finally, the aspect of faith.

<sup>1</sup> F. S. C. Northrop, *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities*, p. 279.

<sup>2</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. III, p. 158.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 163.

<sup>4</sup> See Appendix Four of this book for the full statement of this Creed. I know of no comparable ideal for Christian University education in either the modern, medieval or ancient Church. If all Protestant Christians were to adopt this Creed and establish Christian schools upon its basis, a Christian revolution would soon take place in the English-speaking world to counteract the "Scientistic Revolution."

<sup>5</sup> For a good account of this distinction, consult James Brown, *Subject and Object in Modern Theology* (SCM Press, London, 1953), especially Chapter Six, "God Indissolubly Subject."

<sup>6</sup> Quoted by E. E. Reynolds, *Edmund Burke* (S.C.M., 1948), p. 83.

<sup>7</sup> It is interesting to compare Dooyeweerd's account of this method of "abstraction" with that described by Alfred Korzybski in his book *Science and Sanity* (The International Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Co., Institute of General Semantics, Lakeville, Connecticut, 1949), pp. 371-411. A good "layman's introduction" to Korzybski's system of semantics is S. I. Hayakawa, *Language in Thought and Action* (Harcourt, New York, 1949) who teaches that words are not the things they signify.

<sup>8</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. III, p. 56; cf. Spier, *An Introduction to Christian Philosophy*, p. 159 for a good summary of Dooyeweerd's teaching.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78ff.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 177.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 404ff.

<sup>13</sup> Dooyeweerd's beautiful Christian sociology of family and marriage is well summarized by Spier, *op. cit.*, pp. 194ff. For Dooyeweerd's own account, see *A New Critique*, Vol. III, pp. 265ff. This whole section is the Christian answer to the modern humanist world of sex and family sociology.

<sup>14</sup> Dooyeweerd, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

<sup>15</sup> H. Van Riessen, *The Society of the Future*, p. 77.

<sup>16</sup> John Macmurray, *The Self as Agent*, pp. 29ff.

<sup>17</sup> H. Van Riessen, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71.

<sup>19</sup> William Vogt, *Road to Survival* (Victor Gollancz, London, 1949), and Fairfield Osborn, *Our Plundered Planet* (Little & Brown, Boston, 1948).

<sup>20</sup> For a good introduction to a Christian sociology of the farm and field, consult Allan A. Read, *Shepherds in Green Pastures* (The Council for Social Service of the Anglican Church of Canada, 600 Jarvis Street, Toronto, Canada). If Christian farmers in the English-

speaking world wish to form their own Christian farm organizations, they should consult Michael Fogarty's account of them in Europe in his great book, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe*, Chapter XVIII, The Farmer's Movements. It is high time English-speaking Christian farmers had their own distinctive organizations.

<sup>21</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. III, p. 170.

<sup>22</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Renewal and Reflection*, p. 56.

<sup>23</sup> A. V. Dicey, *Law and Public Opinion in England during the 19th Century* (Macmillan, London, 2nd ed., 1940).

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. liii. of introduction.

<sup>25</sup> Edgar C. Bundy, *Collectivism in the Churches* (The Church League of America, Wheaton, Illinois, 1960). With this account the reader should compare Maurice B. Reckitt, *Maurice to Temple* (Faber, London, 1947) and J. H. Nichols, *Democracy and the Churches* (Westminster, Philadelphia, 1951).

<sup>26</sup> C. Crysdale, *Industrial Struggle and Protestant Ethic in Canada* (Ryerson Press, Toronto, 1962). This gives a good description of the scene in Canada.

<sup>27</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Renewal and Reflection*, p. 56; also *A New Critique*, Vol. III, p. 260.

<sup>28</sup> J. D. Dengerink, *Critical Historical Analysis of the Sociological Development of the Principle of Sphere Sovereignty in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Kok, Kampen, 1948), p. 192.

<sup>29</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. III, p. 401.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 411.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 402. With Dooyeweerd's Christian Reformed doctrine of the state, the reader should compare a recent American Roman Catholic doctrine of the state: John C. Murray, *We Hold These Truths* (Sheed and Ward, New York, 1960), and a modernist Protestant doctrine of the state: John C. Bennett, *Christians and the State* (Scribners, New York, 1958).

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 402ff.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 403ff.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 414.

<sup>35</sup> Oscar Cullmann, *The State in the New Testament* (SCM, London, 1957, pp. 24ff.

<sup>36</sup> Cullmann, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

<sup>37</sup> Brunner, *The Divine Imperative*, p. 469.

<sup>38</sup> Dooyeweerd, *op. cit.*, p. 446.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*; the reader is also referred to the recent translation by the Groen van Prinsterer Society of Calvin College, Grand Rapids, of Herman Dooyeweerd's excellent monograph *The Christian Idea of the State*, published in 1965, originally published in Holland as *De Christelijke Staatsidee*, Franeker, Wevers. Also cf. Dooyeweerd's articles published in the Dutch quarterly *Antirevolutionaire Staatskunde*, I (1927), pp. 73-107, 142-195, and the monthly edition of *Antirevolutionaire Staatskunde*, I (1924-1925), pp. 7-25, 62-79, 104-118,



161-173, 189-200, 228-244, 309-324, 433-460, 489-504, 528-542, 581-598, 617-634; II (1926), pp. 244-265, 425-445.

In these articles Dooyeweerd dealt with the concrete issues facing the Anti-Revolutionary Party in the light of his Christian political science and the Christian doctrine of the State. As such they may help Anglo-Saxon Reformed Christians in dealing with the problems connected with Christian political action in the English-speaking world.

## CHAPTER X

### THE PROBLEM OF THE RELATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE AND RELIGION AND THE STATE

Many people have denied the possibility of a Christian state, either because they suppose that "faith" is the exclusive concern of the church as the institution of grace or because they are convinced that a Christian state would only be possible if all of its citizens were practicing Christians, and this ideal can never be realized. Others accept the ideal of a Christian state and see its possibility in a specific relation in which the state supports a particular church, for example, Franco's Spain. In many parts of the modern world the Roman Catholic Church has concluded special "concordats" with various governments which give it a privileged status in society as, for example, in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Quebec. The same belief is expressed by those who would have the state accept a certain confession to which its monarchs must subscribe as, for example, the monarchs of Holland and Great Britain.

According to Dooyeweerd, none of these solutions to the great problem of the relation of church and state is satisfactory. The first denies flatly that the structure of the state can be expressed at all in the sphere of faith, and thus it would shut off the state's individuality in the ethical sphere. The second approach of "concordat," believing that the state lacks an internal pistical or faith function, seeks to compensate for this by externally binding the

state to the church. This Roman Catholic view commits the error of denying a real Christian character to the state as such. While partial to the third Dutch and British concept of a Christian monarchy insofar as he does not deny that the state can sustain external ties with churches inside its own territory, Dooyeweerd believes that such ties must not be allowed to infringe upon the sovereignty of either the church or the state.

As we have already seen, Dooyeweerd teaches that every created thing, including the state, functions in all modalities. The structure of the state has a typical pistical or faith function. Not only the Christian state but also the non-Christian state as well functions in the modality of faith. Unbelief as such is only another form of misdirected faith and a wrong employment of faith, the worship of an idol rather than of the living God of the Bible. It seeks its final authority and certainty in a lie rather than in the truth. Every state functions in the modality of faith and is either Christian or pagan. A neutral state such as that advocated by liberal humanists in the English-speaking world today is a fiction of their own perverted "scientistic" imagination. A non-Christian state also makes a confession of faith. It forces the people to bow down before the false gods of power, production and profits, the will of the majority, and "blood and iron." Especially since the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, the life of most modern states has been pushed in an apostate direction, and a political confession or ideology has been made in the name of the sovereignty of the people, of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of the omniscience of the state itself, or of the goddess "Reason" or Science.

#### A. The Dualist Answer of the Early Undivided Church

When the Church of God arrived upon the earthly scene of the Roman Empire, Christians already found there a mammoth state organization giving expression to its religious encouragement of emperor worship: the *imperium Romanum*.

As we saw in our study of the political philosophy of classical idealism, the Graeco-Roman state was conceived of as the *societas perfecta* in which was included all lesser forms of association. Thus it should come as no surprise that the worship formerly ascribed to the cultural gods of Mount Olympus and of Rome became concentrated in the worship of Augustus Caesar. The Roman emperors thus became the bearers of the totalitarian authority of the old Graeco-Roman cultural religions. Of Augustus Caesar, Edward Salmon writes:

Augustus was very conscious of the multiplicity of nations in the Roman Empire. There was no common language, no common culture, no common way of life, no common conception of the national destiny. Yet if the Empire was ever to be united, it could only be as the result of some common loyalty, some common idea which all its component members shared. Augustus tried to find that common idea in the field of religion. Hence he instituted a new Palatine Triad. But the Palatine was becoming increasingly identified with the imperial family that lived there. Hence the Palatine Triad was only ancillary to the real core of the new cult, which we can call by its traditional name of Caesar-worship.

This undoubtedly was inspired to a very large extent by the well-known practice of ruler-worship in the Eastern Mediterranean. Such deification of himself, however, did not appeal greatly to Augustus, even though he could scarcely take the extreme step of rigorously suppressing such proof of devotion. There is evidence to prove that he was personally worshipped in the eastern provinces, e.g. in Egypt, where he received the adulation customarily lavished on a conqueror. But the career of Antony had taught him that eagerness for such extravagant honours was politically dangerous. Consequently he hit upon an ingenious compromise that was acceptable to east and west alike. He combined the eastern tendency to worship the ruler with the western tendency to revere dead ancestors, the most national and sacred of Rome's religions. He did not, officially, countenance personal worship of himself either at Rome or in the provinces. What he did was to encourage the worship of the imperial house with the worship of the goddess Roma. He thus suggested that the imperial house and the State were virtually one, or at the very

least that their fortunes were inextricably bound together.

A great and rapid extension of the new Caesar-worship took place after 12 B.C. when Augustus succeeded Lepidus as Pontifex Maximus. But even before then it had been gradually growing; the Secular Games festival must have contributed not a little to the new spiritual basis that the State found under the Empire.<sup>1</sup>

It was in this way that the later Roman Emperors came to be looked upon as the very embodiment of divinity itself and the guardians of the best traditions and values of classical culture.<sup>2</sup>

The immediate effect of the coming of Christianity upon the scene on both practical and theoretical politics was the birth of the idea of duality, the notion, that is to say, that the citizen of the earthly kingdom belongs at the same time to a divine and universal society. This does not merely mean that the Christian has an ultimate court of appeal against all the decrees of temporal governments, for example, the imperial order to worship the head of the Roman state; such an idea was already familiar in classical antiquity. As we have seen, the concept that there was a universal law written in the hearts of men against which the magistrate could never justly offend cannot be described as one of the distinctive contributions of the early church to Western civilization. What Christianity did was to create on earth a visible society, which among other things claimed guardianship over the universal law of nature written on men's hearts.

Lord Acton has pointed out:

It was left for Christianity to animate old truths, to make real the metaphysical barrier which philosophy had erected in the way of absolutism. The only thing Socrates could do in the way of a protest against tyranny was to die for his convictions. The Stoics could only advise the wise man to hold aloof from politics and keep faith with the unwritten law in his heart. But when Christ said "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's," He gave to the State a legitimacy it had never before enjoyed, and set bounds to it that had never yet been

acknowledged. And He not only delivered the precept but he also forged the instrument to execute it. To limit the power of the State ceased to be the hope of patient, ineffectual philosophers and became the perpetual charge of a universal Church.<sup>3</sup>

Unfortunately, the perversion of Christianity has reached the stage today where even large numbers of so-called Christian clergy, instead of working tirelessly to limit the powers of the modern state, are helping to urge that man be reformed and remade by the power of the State instead of by the power of God. They are in fact appealing from God to Caesar.

The guardianship of the moral law of the Universe thus claimed by the early Christians was never held to be exclusive. From the first, Christians affirmed that temporal rulers carried a divine commission to punish evildoing and to foster righteousness. Justice, they believed, belonged to the order of creation as distinct from the order of redemption, and the obligation to uphold it was therefore antecedent to the establishment of the Church. It was common ground among the early church fathers that even when rulers failed in this obligation, their subjects continued to owe obedience to them.

In his classic study of *The Two Sovereignties*, Joseph Lecler has shown how there was another claim implicit in Christianity, the claim to extend the reign of Christ over the whole human life. This claim forbade indifference to the temporal order even when the temporal order was under the control of pagan emperors. In a sense it meant that the claims of the Church were ultimately unlimited. It was not enough that Christians should be free to perform their religious duties in the midst of a hostile or indifferent community. They were pledged to capture the community, to infect every aspect of its life and activity with their teaching. Lecler thinks that this combination of an unlimited program for the conquest of souls, and therefore, an unlimited dominion over human behavior, with the recognition that temporal authority also had a sacred place in the economy of the universe has presented mankind with a dilemma

which has never been solved. He shows how in their successive attempts to grapple with it Christian theologians have operated within the framework set by a third principle, the primacy of spiritual authority. That means, he suggests, that whatever the obligations of a Christian in relation to the state may at any time be defined as being, they must be held to take precedence over duties owed directly to temporal authorities if only because for Christians those duties derive from faith.

Lecler distinguishes as the three principal ingredients of Roman Catholic doctrine upon the subject of the relations of church and state (1) the existence of a sphere specially reserved for the church and of a sphere specially reserved for the state; (2) the duty of Christians to do their best to ensure that the activity of the state shall be directed towards Christian ends; and (3) the assertion of the primacy of the spiritual authority.<sup>4</sup>

The potential incompatibility of such objectives needs no emphasis. In the first phase of Christian history, when the church was on the defensive in a pagan society, the negative elements in its theory of obligation towards the state were necessarily dominant. It thus asserted the need for obedience chiefly by means of the doctrine of passive obedience. For three centuries the Hellenistic Roman Empire continued to treat Christianity with contemptuous indifference, varied from time to time by brutal gusts of hearty and heathen persecutions. Relations such as these afforded little occasion for any specially subtle problems to arise. But when for weal or woe, the Emperor Constantine became a Christian, the real headaches for the church began. In Constantine the Church of God contended with a new kind of enemy, the Christian ruler who used his protection of the church as a pretext for exerting control over it. Whatever other effects may be attributed to that momentous conversion, it certainly created new and overwhelming issues between church and state, the repurgations of which are still being felt in Western lands to this day.

In his important work *Church and State from Constantine to Theodosius*, S. L. Greenslade gives us a good summary of relations between church and state during this crucial period when every fundamental aspect of the problem emerges in principle and makes it possible to illustrate in germ the great questions that have agitated medieval and modern thought upon this subject.

Two major problems affected the relations of church and state according to Greenslade, at this time. They were Donatism in Western Christendom, and Arianism, predominantly but not exclusively, in Eastern Christendom. The Emperor Constantine was chiefly concerned in both issues to maintain good government and to accept and enforce ecclesiastical decision. The Arian controversy involved questions of dogmatic truth to a much greater extent than did Donatism, and Constantine attempted at first to solve it on dogmatic lines, though with greater confidence in the effect of his personal pressure. But he found in the East a solid block of conservative opinion which was, to say the least, suspicious of Athanasius; and he also found the intransigence of Athanasius a stumbling block to that unity in the Church which it was his prime object to secure. These circumstances became transparently clear under his successors when various Emperors imposed their own dogmatic solution upon the contending parties, thus proving that the state is more wedded to the majority than to truth.

As a Christian monarch Constantine was entrusted with great responsibilities as the supreme overlord of Christendom, and most churchmen, especially the courtiers such as Eusebius, were at first content to take at his hands anything he was disposed to give. But just as churchmen may become a menace in politics, so no Christian emperor can rightly or satisfactorily, human nature being what it is, be entrusted with permanent control of the church; secular power tends to corrupt good churchmanship in priest and laymen. The remainder of the fourth century illustrates the methods, and the difficulties, through which attempts were made to reduce tension between church and state. Out of it all emerged the so-called "dualist" theory of church and



state relations, later expressed by Pope Gelasius as the doctrine of the Two Swords, the spiritual and the temporal. Of this theory Greenslade says:

Is the dualist solution of the problem of Church and State the correct one? Let it be said at once that it possesses the outstanding merit of giving the lie to the omniscient, totalitarian state. There are realms of life over which the State as such has no absolute rights. Render unto God the things that are God's! In some degree the Church of the fourth century was successful in inducing the State to respect this principle; and how vital it is that the Church should stand firm by this demand is manifest to all of us children of an age in which the powers and the requirements of the State increase daily. Nevertheless, the dualist principle is never easy of application. It cannot be worked out with rigorous logic without denying or frustrating the Christian mission to the world. It cannot mean that there is a larger sphere of life which is not God's, not under His law, and with which the Church has nothing to do. We cannot as a Church withdraw from the world, abandoning society to paganism or materialism. Fourth century monasticism was tending to do this, in reaction from the secularization of Christianity which accompanied the removal of persecution and the favour of the State. But the Church in general intended not a complete severance, but a cooperation between two bodies, each autonomous in certain respects yet having much to do with each other. Now if the dualism is not to be absolute, the difficulty of deciding what belongs to each sphere will be all the greater. One can quickly enumerate some particulars. The State will keep the peace, collect taxes, the Church will preach the Gospel, administer the Sacraments. But, to take a single instance, what of education, which was provided by the Roman State but which has often been claimed—by Maurice for one—as properly the concern of the Church? That is a live issue today in Britain and France and no doubt elsewhere.<sup>5</sup>

By uncritically accepting the structure of the Graeco-Roman state as this had developed over the previous thousand years and as it had come to exist in the time of Constantine the Great and the Emperor Theodosius, the church fathers did not solve the problem of the relation between

church and state and between religion and state at all. Instead of using their influence to reform the structure of the state along Christian lines, they largely accepted it as it stood. Leaving the whole world of the classical idealist and Stoic interpretation of man's life in society, as this had come to be embedded in the distorted form of the Roman imperial state, essentially untouched and unreformed by the quickening Word of God, the church fathers sought a solution by thinking of the church as an addition to that of the civil unregenerate state. As Evan Runner states:

To use the language of our modern positivistically minded opponents of sphere sovereignty, *they stayed with the facts* (i.e., adjusted to what was there about them). But, in doing so, let us be sure to observe, *they lost hold of the facts*. For in every "positive fact" of human society there is not only some inescapable structure of the creation ordinances (e.g., one cannot set up a form of state that is not somehow bound to the structural requirements of the state), but also the degree of conformity to or deviation from the creation norm which is a divine command, a norm, (not a cultural law in the sense of natural laws) that was operative in the cultural forming activity of the men who built the Greek polis and Rome.<sup>6</sup>

The great error of the dualist answer of the church fathers lay in their conception of the church as a society additional to the civil society and in their failure to distinguish between the church as the body of Christ and the church as a cultic and ecclesiastical institution, and in their failure to distinguish between church and state and religion and state. By these failures they introduced into Western civilization the idea of a second society claiming sovereignty over the whole of life. Now the rule of the Lord Jesus Christ is absolute and sovereign. As Maurice and Kuyper saw, the Kingdom of Christ is the total renewal in Christ of human life in all its structures. Yet the clergy of Christ possess no such total authority over the rest of Christ's people. Both church and state are separately and equally subordinate to the rule and kingship of Christ. The *Declaration of Faith Concerning Church and Nation* of the Presbyterian Church of Canada well declares:

Jesus Christ, in the administration of His Father's will, employs all the heavenly and earthly powers He may choose to serve Him. He employs the Church and the Civil State, entrusting to each its own distinctive function. He has ordained the Church to serve Him in the proclamation of His word, in the administration of His sacraments and in the life of faith which works by love. He has also in His grace ordained the State to serve Him in the administration of His justice and benevolence, by discerning, formulating and enforcing, such laws and policies as will promote the well-being of all its citizens and curb license, discord and destitution. . . .

The Church and State are intimately related. Their true relationship derives from the subordination of each to Jesus Christ. Each is bound to aid the other according to its appointed power and functions, but neither is given any right thereby to attempt domination over the other. We reject any doctrine which misconceives the Church as the religious agent of the State. We reject any doctrine which misconceives the State as the political instrument of the Church. . . .<sup>7</sup>

Frightful tensions and rifts in society were to develop as the result of both church and state each alone claiming to be sovereign, that is, the source of both authority and power in society. Authority over men can only be vested in God who allocates to both church and state their own respective functions of power. As a result of this confusion between authority and power the unity of all the spheres of life as aspects of man's central service of God in the rule of Christ could not be achieved.

#### B. The Feudal Answer of the Middle Ages

With the destruction of the Roman Empire in the West a breakdown of centralized administration and government took place, giving way instead to feudalism. In his great work, *Feudalism*, F. L. Ganshof emphasized the truth that in the early middle ages "the feudal bond was a factor of considerable importance in preventing the total breakdown of the State."<sup>8</sup>

In these new feudal conditions which emerged in Western Europe during the early middle ages, the church found

that the only way it could survive was to find its niche within the rising network of feudal relationships based on the holding of land. As a result of this new tendency to treat the organization of religion as a branch of secular life, and consequently to bring the property on which this organization was based under the same rules governing the holding of secular property, a revolution took place in the Western church's constitutional structure. In exchange for the privilege of holding on to its properties in land, the Western church had to agree to provide the new ruling classes of Western Europe, i.e., the kinglets, feudal barons and subtenants-in-chiefs with trained administrators, teachers and bureaucrats. Thanks to its monopoly of literacy and education the Church was thus able to exert a dominant influence in government. In this way there emerged what has been called the "territorial church" or "proprietary church system." Whereas in the days of the Roman Empire the local bishop had been his own master, working inside a given area with powers almost unlimited in his special work and controlling all church properties which under Theodosius had been made inalienable, now the local bishop held his church property as a "beneficium" from a feudal superior. As such he could not dispose of it when he saw fit. Not only did the proprietary church system thus break up the old imperial ecclesiastical organization but it also created the new parish system. As soon as he could afford it, the local landlord or feudal seignor built a village church on his manor and then endowed it with a "living" and appointed its "incumbent." The objects of such parish church endowments differed widely. Piety no doubt led many to desire to have in their neighborhood a church and a priest who would inculcate some standards of decency in the serfs and peasants by calling down upon their heads divine sanctions of hell fire if they disobeyed their landlord. Others founded churches as a method of providing security for their younger sons within the new social order. Others again were more attracted by the prospect of material gain through the tithes which were introduced by Charlemagne, as well as through the gifts of the faithful and other church dues. In his

fascinating book *Money and the Church*, Luther P. Powell has examined the process by which the medieval church became rich. Subsidies and tributes began to multiply as feudal society prospered. A "spoils" system, antedating by far the political oddities of the American system, developed, with "the pope quite naturally claiming the goods of an archbishop, bishop or abbot who died." As the middle ages passed, the multiplication of revenue-producing devices seemed endless: "fruits during vacancy," "annates," "expectations," "illegitimate fruits" (revenues from a parson who had gained his benefice uncanonically), "servitia," "the pallium," "pluralities," "Peter's Pence," "income tax," "apostolic tax," "procuration," "visitation tax," and so on. When the writer of this book was recently instituted to his benefice and vicarage, he had to swear that he had not bribed the patron of the living to obtain it and thus had not become guilty of the charge of simony.<sup>9</sup>

Whatever the motive, the foundation of such private churches and parishes had the effect of decentralizing and secularizing the Christian ministry and loosening the previous personal ties between the local bishop and his diocesan clergy. The old imperial bishoprics and large city parishes were gradually broken up and church discipline collapsed. "With the conception of churches as the property of lords," writes J. P. Whitney, "a deeply rooted secularization sets in, which was intensified by the anarchy of ecclesiastical rule."<sup>10</sup>

The new system was adopted in all the new Germanic lands and later in the Slavonic and Magyar states. According to Ernst Troeltsch these new states of the West administered the church purely as a territorial church, incorporating its organism into the body of the new feudal states. "In these lands there arose a church order which differed fundamentally from that of the Early Church," he writes. "Its fundamental idea was that of the rights of property and of possession enjoyed by the sovereign princes over whatever Church might happen to be under their jurisdiction. It was only thus that the development of ecclesiastical vassalage

and of ecclesiastical land-tenure became possible, which gave the Church completely into the hands of the lords of the manor and of the feudal lords, at whose head was the king."<sup>11</sup> As a result of this endowment with the means of livelihood within the federal structure of medieval society the church itself thus became willy-nilly involved in the secular order. But the price paid for this political and economic integration was heavy. Henceforth the church would be at the disposal of the new rulers, who used the spiritual forces of the Holy Catholic Faith to provide the ideological justification of their own right to exploit and depress their subjects. Troeltsch says:

The idea of the Territorial Church placed the religious forces of organization and thought at the service of the State and its tasks of civilization. The fact that Christianity was forced to develop this kind of civilizing activity was neither the result of inner compulsion nor the outcome of religious thought. Rather it was due to the force of circumstances and to the compulsion of an uncivilized state, which had to utilize for its own ends the ecclesiastical organization, and the vital tradition of ancient civilization which it contained; only thus was the State able to build up a civilization of its own. Thus Christianity drew into the realm of ideas governed by the Church and religion those tracts of life which were not directly connected with the Church. In particular, it was the genius of Charlemagne which opened up this path for Christianity, and in so doing, essentially and permanently determined the peculiar basis of medieval Christendom.<sup>12</sup>

In other words Christianity was used by feudalism as the principal of social integration and the Gospel of Christ was made to provide the necessary ideological cement for the new feudal social and political order.

As a result of this territorial church system the leaders of Western Christianity found themselves forced into the service of the rising monarchies and baronies of Western Europe. Under Charlemagne the territorial church system even included the Pope of Rome. The emperor of the Franks also governed the Frankish Church and used its officials to educate and govern his widespread dominions. The new

type of church polity was continued by Charlemagne's successors in France and Germany. By the beginning of the eleventh century nearly all German, Italian, French, Spanish and English bishops felt themselves to be officials not of Jesus Christ but of their respective rulers. The words used by St. Gerhard of Tours to describe this situation are characteristic: "We received the care and government of the church of Toul by divine grace at the command of the emperor Otto and his noble brother."

In his study, *Church, State and Christian Society*, Gerd Tellenbach points out that the social matrix in which the great Hildebrandine movement to reform the Church in the West matured was characterized mainly by the predominant role in society assigned to the Christian ruler, and by the withdrawal of the Church from the active conversion of feudal society. Ever since the revival of the Christian empire under Charlemagne, the publication of Augustine's *City of God*, and Pope Gelasius' formulation of the doctrine of the two swords, the monarchical principle based on the conversion of the world by a divinely instituted kingship to which the clergy must be subordinated had been gaining ground at the expense of the sacerdotal principle based on the conversion of the world by the priestly hierarchy.<sup>13</sup> Under Charlemagne this tendency in Christianity was openly expressed in political theory and established in political practice. This Carolingian principle of royal Christian theocracy was carried over into the Holy Roman Empire created by Otto the Great in 962 and maintained by succeeding German emperors. Tellenbach points out that "most bishops and popes accepted the royal domination of the church as of divine institution. Not even the monks found anything wrong in the prevailing system. As little exception was taken to the proprietary church systems as to the theocratic powers of the king." From being fathers-in-god within their own dioceses these early medieval bishops had now become feudal prelates and princes within civil society.<sup>14</sup>

### C. The Papal Answer

With the reform of the Papacy undertaken by the German Emperor Henry III at the Synod of Sutri in 1046 A.D. which saw the election of Pope Clement II, a great reform movement began to make its voice felt in Western Christianity, demanding the end of this secular control of the clergy and the end of prelacy.<sup>15</sup> But instead of restoring true Christian episcopacy and church government by presbyters and people these medieval reformers created a revolutionary new system of church government based upon the centralization of the Western Church in the papal monarchy. It is one of the great tragedies in the history of Western Christianity that in their well-meant efforts to reform the Church of God of all those abuses which had crept into it as a result of the territorial church system, they should have seized upon a remedy which was perhaps worse than the disease they sought to cure. Possibly the Hildebrandine reformers felt that the only way that the church could regain her independence of secular control was to centralize the church in the papacy and thus make the church as a whole powerful enough to withstand the encroachments of the secular powers of Western Europe. Only by thus uniting the full spiritual resources of the church under the determined leadership of the bishops of Rome did the reformers believe they could bring full freedom of action to the church in the West and thus stem the complete secularization of the church which had taken place during the previous five hundred years.

According to Tellenbach the eleventh-century reform movement which began with a simple demand for the moral regeneration of society gradually widened its objectives so that these now came to include first a complete repudiation of the theocratic monarchical principle introduced by Constantine and developed by the Frankish and German kings during the succeeding centuries. To the Gregorians this principle was anathema. So they set out to deprive the secular rulers of Europe of their ungodly dominion over the internal affairs of the church by depriving them of the divine and sacramental character which they had come to



occupy in the existing social order as a result of royal theocracy and the proprietary church system. Thus they attacked root and branch all ideas of the divine right of kings to govern the church as wrong. Turning their back on the Gelasian theory of the two great and complementary powers and hierarchies in Christian society, the reformers sought to reduce the medieval kings of Western Europe to the position of servants of the Pope who would carry out the church's right order.

Such right order in the world could not be established until the king's theocratic and sacerdotal position had been repudiated since in Gregory's eyes the right order implied the existence of a free church in a reorganized society. Such a program involved nothing less than a revolution in the structure and organization of Christian society as this had developed in the West during the previous five centuries. As applied to Germany in particular it involved the overthrow of the whole existing scheme of society and a revolution in the conception of the relationship between church and state. For two centuries the imperial government both in Germany and Italy had been so designed that the king depended on the bishops as his local government officials.<sup>16</sup> Naturally the king felt he had the right to appoint whom he thought would be loyal to him and most suited for the position.

In addition the Gregorians attacked root and branch the idea of the legitimacy of divine right and paramount overlordship on which the claim of the German emperors to rule the Church was founded. In the opinion of the reformers the German theocracy had to be eradicated since it endangered the supremacy of Rome over the churches of Western Europe. Thus they turned their backs on the old Gelasian doctrine of the two swords and Pope Gregory VII demanded and obtained Emperor Henry IV's submission at Canossa in January, 1077 A.D., thus publicly repudiating the king's sacerdotal position as God's vicegerent on earth. From now on the papal theory was that the king is a removable official. He has a divine duty on earth, but he only remains a king so long as he performs this duty. Moreover, it was claimed by the pope that it rested with him as

the successor of Peter and Vicar of Christ to determine when a king was acting "*rex iustus*." Thus Gregory rejected the ancient doctrine that kings were sent by God either as leaders of the righteous or as a scourge for the wicked and he turned his back on the received Christian dogma of passive obedience and non-resistance.

Considered in the light of the existing social order in Western Europe during the eleventh century Pope Gregory's attempt to change the relationship of clergy and laity and of church and state amounted to nothing less than revolution. While Gregory may well "*have grasped the idea*" of the papacy more logically than any of his predecessors," at the same time, as Tellenbach also maintains, "his ideal represented a catastrophic disturbance of the social order into which he was born." According to Tellenbach, Pope Gregory's novelty consists in the fact that he for the first time in the Church's history came out fair and square for the claim that had lain dormant for so long that it is the Church's business to convert the world not by relying upon the sacerdotal monarchy but on the sacerdotal priesthood. The great significance of Pope Gregory's pontificate is thus due to the fact that it marked the final rejection by the Western Church of the old attitude of mistrust towards the world. For Gregory such an attitude had no meaning and his historic role was to enunciate logically and unequivocally the opposite principle, the conversion of the world by the Catholic priesthood.

In the second place the reformers of the eleventh century were determined to drive the laity from the position they had come to occupy in the church as a result of the proprietary church system. Henceforth, all appointments in the church, they declared, should be only made by and with the approval and consent of the Supreme Pontiff. Hence arose the struggle over the right to appoint bishops in Germany, known as the "investiture contest." Not satisfied with securing the submission of King Henry IV at Canossa, Gregory tried to redefine and make far more precise the relations of the various ranks within the Church itself. Here too it was felt right order must prevail. In

Gregory's eyes Rome's true place was at the head of the Universal Church, and the true order could only prevail if Rome ruled. According to Tellenbach, among Gregory's contemporaries there was no general agreement as to whether the visible church was a monarchy or an aristocracy, whether all bishops were subordinate to the pope or whether they were his equals, holding their office directly from God. From this difference of opinion there arose the second historic struggle which Gregory VII and his successors at Rome had to wage. Before Gregory's time the rights of the Roman Church had been largely theoretical. As Archdeacon of Rome, Hildebrande had gone to the trouble of collecting all the legal weapons of the Roman See; as Pope of Rome, Gregory VII wrote them into the Constitution in his *Dictatus Papae*. Nothing could be more marked than the different tone in which the papacy now asserted its right over other dioceses in the West. Whereas in earlier days the papal claim to intervene in the ecclesiastical life of other dioceses had been cautiously phrased, now the claim rang out categorically in proud and dominating tones.<sup>17</sup> The Hildebrandine papacy refused to remain bound by tradition. Instead by extending and forcing the meaning of old laws it created entirely new ones. The old command that every Catholic Church must be in harmony with Rome was no longer restricted to matters of belief alone; it was made to include liturgical uses and external organization. Thus the Mozarabic rite was replaced by the Roman in Spain; and from this time bishoprics were only to be created or divided, or monasteries and other foundations reformed with the pope's permission; whereas hitherto the king and lay owners had had the chief voice in these matters. Similarly, in Gregory's time the principle of the devolution of ecclesiastical appointments to the pope was first asserted, and when elections were contested, the nomination to the vacant church was to fall to the pope. Where earlier Roman doctrine had merely asserted that bishops could be deposed with the consent of the pope, Gregory VII laid it down that the pope or his legates could depose without the cooperation of a synod and even without hearing the accused. On

the basis of an old law which ordained that important matters were to be reported to Rome, the pope now felt himself justified in interfering in the life of individual churches and in exercising the functions of the local dignitaries either in person or through legates. This is in fact the real meaning of the universal episcopacy claimed by the pope; the pope henceforth is to be bishop everywhere, with the bishops merely acting as his representatives in their own dioceses.<sup>18</sup>

According to Whitney, Gregory's aim in respect to the government of the Western Church was the formation of a feudal ecclesiastical state analogous to the civil feudal state of his times. Only when so organized as a feudal state did Gregory think that the Church could be enabled to maintain its supremacy over the secular state and so safeguard the immunities and privileges of the clergy. As Whitney well says of Gregory's policy, "To present Christianity in a feudal form was necessary for its preservation in a feudal world." In this way Gregory made the papal monarchy a reality and opened the way for the age of Pope Innocent III and Pope Boniface VIII.

Given such development in Western Christianity it is not surprising that Eastern Orthodoxy broke off relations with the Papacy, not simply because of mere cultural and racial factors or due to the accidents of ecclesiastic diplomacy, as the humanist historian, Steven Runciman, supposes in his book on *The Eastern Schism*,<sup>19</sup> but rather because of the fundamental revolution which took place in Western spirituality as result of the centralization and feudalization of the Western Church's constitution in the medieval papacy.

The revolution which took place possibly finds its roots in the failure of the Roman genius fully to apprehend and bow to Christian Truth. It is characteristic of the spirit of Rome, whether ancient or modern, to conceive of life in terms of government, and of government in terms of authority, and of authority in terms of power. Thus in Western society at large, justice has been sought through law and administration wherein a few tend to control the many; and the Roman genius in government has always tended towards such centralization and been suspicious of the diffusion of

power. Likewise in the individual life, man is seen as subject to the Natural Law and as working out his own merit by self-control and obedience to that law. Even God becomes thought of as a Tyrant. As a result of such a psychological tendency, the healthy pattern of Christian life and thought became dislocated, and remains so to this day.

As a result of the concentration of power in the hands of the medieval, papacy, the Church of God in the West was gradually transformed from a free society of persons under their diocesan bishops into a feudal theocracy under the pope as God's vicegerent, from a fellowship of the Holy Spirit into a power-organization, and the fundamental relationships within the Body of Christ were henceforth conceived as relations of authority and obedience. Grace likewise became mechanized. Unhappily, while the power of the Church in the world and the power of the hierarchy in the Church and the power of the pope in the hierarchy went on increasing, there was for centuries no effective force to counter-balance it. The masses of the people, ill-educated, unfamiliar with the Bible and even with the language of worship, came to look upon the Church as a great *machine of grace* which went on working independently of them, performing spiritual functions for their benefit but not needing nor inviting participation. The clergy themselves from their own point of view could hardly avoid seeing matters in a similar light. There was for centuries no body of educated lay opinion which was capable of discharging the proper function of the laity as an *order* within the Western Church. It was from the monasteries and the clerical order that the initiative had to come, and the great body of the faithful came to be regarded as a docile flock whose business in the church was to "hear and obey" the priests without question. The inevitable result followed. The unity of the Body of Christ was lost to view and the word "church" began to be used as if it meant the clergy in contrast to the laity. From the eleventh century onwards the laity began to lose all sense of active participation in the redemptive and priestly work of the Church and in so doing to lapse into spiritual serfs in the Kingdom of God. The Holy Spirit was thought

of no longer as moving freely through the whole Body but as canalized in the sacraments, and thus in the hands of the clergy. Worse still the Liturgy or Service of Holy Communion as Gregory Dix has proved in his monumental work *The Shape of the Liturgy* came to be thought of as something *said* for the people by the priest, and not as something *done* by the presbyter and people acting together within the High Priesthood of the Ascended Christ who ever lives to make intercession for all His people.<sup>20</sup> This growth of clericalism in the Western Church is today coming to be recognized as being one of the gravest symptoms of that medieval distortion of Christian life and thought which underlies all our later Western divisions and controversies.

While in Eastern Christendom the whole body of the laity retained their corporate responsibility for bearing witness to the faith once delivered to the saints, the tendency has gradually developed over the centuries in the Western Churches, both Catholic and Protestant, for only the clergy to make an active witness for Christ. In the Orthodox world we look in vain for the Western distinction between the *ecclesia docens* and the *ecclesia docta* (the church teaching and the church taught), between the clergy, whose privilege it is to teach and instruct, and the laity, whose duty it is meekly to attend. The lay theologian is as common in Orthodox Christendom as he is rare in the West, while many Orthodox clergy are never allowed to teach at all. In Greece, for example, the country parson is usually a local farmer or craftsman of some kind, who is ordained so that he can preside, as bishop's deputy, at the parish Eucharist or Lord's Supper. The task of preaching is more likely to be given to a local doctor or schoolmaster. Nearly all the Professors of Theology at Athens and Salonika are laymen. It is not thought necessary to wear a collar in order to speak with authority of the things of God. For the West, on the other hand, both Catholic and Protestant, the very words "layman" and laity" have been severed from their biblical roots, and they have acquired a purely negative meaning. The layman in Britain, America and Canada is no longer one who through the mysteries of baptism and confirmation has be-

come a member of a priestly body, the *laos*, or holy people of God. He is considered only in terms of what he is *not* and cannot do. He is an outsider, a non-expert, in short, one who is not a minister of religion.

As a result the Western layman has come to accept the idea that his proper role in the liturgy is a purely passive one. He goes to church to hear a service performed for his benefit by a clergyman, assisted by a select body of men and women all dressed up to look as much like clergy as possible. As to his extra-liturgical ministry, that is circumscribed by the well-defined frontiers of what is called "church work," i.e., raising money, organizing a religious youth club, or visiting for stewardship purposes. Most of our hymns seem to imply that the only activity proper to the layman is as a lay helper within the church institution or as a church worker. They have no conception of the laity as itself part of Christ's apostolate in the modern world. One hymn of J. M. Neale sums up this attitude. After describing the virtues proper to bishops comes the couplet:

And to their flocks, a lowly mind  
To hear and to obey.

It appears that these lines give a fair picture of the general Anglo-Saxon view of the place of the layman in the Church of God—to hear and to obey. There is little idea of the layman's vocation as one of God's prophets, priests and kings. Excluded from any active part in the services of the church's worship on Sundays, deprived of his extra-liturgical apostolate, the layman is left to his own private devotions. As a result there has been developing over the centuries a rank spiritual individualism, leading to a nauseating religious subjectivism and sentimentalism. Piety, in the modern sense, has become an inadequate substitute for a ministry involving the whole personality and embracing every legitimate field of human activity. Something has surely gone wrong. The Son of God did not take our human nature upon him in order that we might be turned some into parsons and others into parishioners. The Apostolic vision of a recreated universe has faded in Western branches

of Christianity, given place to a dualist world, half sacred, half secular. There is no real cure for all this without a recovery of the true sense of the liturgy and worship of the Church as the corporate action of the whole Body of Christ and without the laity of Western society assuming full responsibility for the great cultural mandate to bring all areas of life into subjection to Christ. Such a recovery is at last beginning to take place in the English-speaking world, thanks to the great liturgical movement<sup>21</sup> and to groups of laymen becoming concerned enough to take Christian action in society.<sup>22</sup>

The revolution in Western Christianity reached its peak in the exalted claims of Pope Innocent III and Boniface VIII to be suzerains of all earthly kings and in their claim to depose kings on the basis of the papal theory of delegation of power which reduced secular government to the status of a mere instrument of ecclesiastical authority. Such claims to totalitarian authority over society assumed far more authority than is permitted to any office-holder within the church as a temporal institution of grace and the Word of God. In this connection we must remember that the medieval popes confused the Kingdom of God with the temporal church institution and so they were led to make claims on behalf of the earthly ecclesiastical organization which by right belong only to Christ. Again we must remember that the medieval Western Church had to use all her spiritual prestige even to maintain a standard of order and decency after the collapse of Roman imperial rule in the West. This explains why the Western Church began more and more to magnify her authority, claiming first a full measure of independence over against the civil power under Pope Gregory VII, and ultimately under Popes Innocent III and Boniface VIII a right of supremacy over it. Only by such means could the heathen barbarians have been tamed and civilized. For many years the medieval papacy was an effective striking force which was used for good ends, establishing Christian standards of marriage, of behavior, of education and curbing such medieval tyrants as King John of England. But this was achieved at the price we have already discussed. At the Reformation Chris-



tian men rose up against Rome because she in her turn had stopped being the mother of freedom and had become instead the imposer of pagan tyranny.

Writing of this revolution in the relation between church and state in the Middle Ages, J. S. Whale well says:

The close of the eleventh century marks one of the great turning points in the history of the West. Religion is to be related to life, not by repudiating a monasticism which withdraws from secular life . . . but by an ecclesiastical control of that life in all its ranges, in the name of Christ the King. In an age still rude, brutal and barely Christian, Western Catholicism confronted the secular power with the Crown Rights of the Redeemer in his Church. Those rights came to be expressed . . . in terms of canon law, hierarchical organization and temporal power. The Church was Christ's Church and the Bishop of Rome was his vicar. Western Catholicism reminded emperors and kings that there are aspects of human life which belong to Christ and which can never belong to Caesar. It asserted the reality and supremacy of the spiritual order in this naughty world. . . . In no unreal sense some of the great medieval popes might be called the first Free Churchmen, in that they did vindicate the transcendent reality and freedom of supernatural religion. In the name of the Redeemer they did battle with society still barbarian and half pagan in its gross sensuality and violence; they quenched the slumbering fires of paganism in the waters of baptism, and in the name of the Redeemer laid claim to the whole of human life from the cradle to the grave—and beyond the grave.

That this papal Church itself became rich and worldly, fat and tyrannical, no informed person would deny. That it sometimes forgot the rights of Christ and appropriated them to itself in insolent pride is notorious and incontestable. . . . At length, in the name of reform and evangelical freedom, its rule was refused by multitudes and, for good or ill, modern history was born. Yet, in spite of its high clerical and hierarchical pattern, it is the high Churchmanship of this medieval achievement in the West which modern Protestants cannot afford to forget, whether they represent State Churches or Free Churches. For a Hildebrand, an Anselm and an Aquinas (as for Calvin, Isaac Watts and Thomas Chalmers in later generations) the Church's

one foundation was Jesus Christ, her Lord. These men steadily refused to allow that Christ's holy religion could ever become a department of state, "a mere Portfolio of Public Worship." With the ultimate fate of Byzantinism before our eyes we see what they saved us from in the West, and the debt we owe them.<sup>23</sup>

Had Western Christians suffered the fate of their brethren at Byzantium where the Church of God was entirely at the mercy of the Eastern Roman Emperors as well as that of their brethren in Russia where the Church was virtually the private property of the Czars, it is hardly possible that the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century could have taken place, let alone succeeded. By preventing the medieval German emperors from centralizing power in the German monarchy the medieval popes had ensured that the German princes would become the dominant power, so powerful in fact that they were able to guarantee the safety of Martin Luther from execution by the imperial power. Without the armed support of Frederick the Wise, the Elector of Saxony, Martin Luther would have been burnt as a heretic.

#### D. The Answer of the Modern Nation State

Ever since the medieval popes made good their claim to supremacy over the feudal monarchs, they sought to exercise a control in terms of width and extension and a control in point of depth and intensity. Thus acting through their subordinate officers, they sought a control to range over the whole area of Western Europe, to direct all classes of the one universal society of Christendom, and to bring that one society and its classes under their direct control. Secondly, the medieval Church sought to penetrate down into all the daily issues of life, the economic, the legal and educational which could be brought under the comprehensive rubric of the righteousness and justice of the divine law. The medieval papacy tried to justify this claim to hegemony over the secular order in terms of an identification of the Decalogue with the Natural Law. Troeltsch points out:

Medieval Christianity produced two great types of classic social doctrine; first, the relative type of the idea of Christian society which is represented by Thomism; and secondly, the radical idea of Christian society which was evolved by the sects. The position of the first type may be stated thus: the Church, which is regarded as a universal institution endowed with absolute authoritative truth and the sacramental miraculous power of grace and redemption, takes up into its own life the secular institutions, groups and values which have arisen out of the relative natural law; the whole of the secular life, therefore, is summed up under the conception of a natural stage in human life, which prepares the way for the higher supernatural stage, for the ethic of grace and miracle.<sup>24</sup>

By the fourteenth century both of these two types of theocratic control began to be challenged and even overthrown. The claim to dominion in terms of width and extension was confronted more and more by the growing consolidation of organizations calling themselves "regna," that is, the "new" dynastic monarchies and principalities such as the Angevins, the Capetians, the Hapsburgs and the Houses of Castile and Aragon. The regnum was a territory or region which was the home of an *ecclesia* or church of its own related to the *Una Sancta Ecclesia Catholic* but yet calling itself *ecclesia Anglicana* or *ecclesia Gallicana* in just the same way as the regnum called itself *regnum Anglicum* or *regnum Francorum*. What was to be the future of these rising national monarchies and their churches and of their relations to each other and to the papacy? An answer to this question begins to appear in the political theories of such thinkers as Bartolus of Sassoferrato and Marsilius of Padua. These theories are of crucial importance for they laid the intellectual foundations of the modern secular state. As we saw, during the high Middle Ages the whole of society was conceived of as a *corpus Christianum*, and every department of its life was under the control of the Church which was, in its specific character, *corpus Christi*. T. M. Parker has reminded us in his Bampton lectures, *Christianity and the State in the Light of History*, that we, today, are constantly in danger of supposing that the distinction

between the "spiritual" and the "secular" community which we have long been inclined to take for granted was similarly accepted and understood in pre-Reformation days. He points out that this is a delusion; even the Reformers themselves were "essentially agreed in preaching an ultimate identity of Church and State." The tenacity of this tradition, the strength of its influences, both in Eastern and Western Europe, the forces which contributed to its long prevalence and the slowness of its gradual decay in fact provide the main theme and framework of Parker's valuable study.<sup>25</sup> In this view every member of medieval society was obligated to make Christian profession; all children were baptized in infancy into membership of this so-called Christian society; and exclusion from the sacraments carried with it the loss of civil and legal rights, the only concession being to certain foreign ingredients of the population, the wandering Jew and in some places the colonizing Musselman. According to Sir Ernest Barker, "The excommunicated person could not enter either the Church or the Law Court; could not receive either the eucharist or a legacy; could not own a cure of souls or an acre of soil."<sup>26</sup> As Neville Figgis put it, "The word Churchman means to-day one who belongs to the Church as against others. In the Middle Ages there were no others, or if they were, they were occupied in being burnt."<sup>27</sup> Again K. S. Latourette points out in his monumental *History of the Expansion of Christianity*:

Conversion became not so much a matter of individual convictions as of group action. It represented, however, a marked departure from the original nature of Christianity and from the usual process of expansion in the first three centuries. It was conformity to what seems to have been, until the time of Christ, a prevailing conception of religion. Religion was generally thought of as a tribal or national affair. It was naturally of use to the individual, but the individual did not have the right to reject it. To depart from the cult of one's group was to be guilty of disloyalty. It was with this conception of religion that most of the converts of these thousand years adopted the Christian faith. It was by this process that Christianity became the faith of Western and Northern Europe.<sup>28</sup>

By thus misconceiving not only the true nature of Christianity but also the state, the medieval religious leaders created the intolerable tensions we have already described. No wonder the working classes of both medieval and modern Europe have never taken kindly to official religion thus imposed upon them at the point of the sword.

#### 1. Marsilius of Padua and the Doctrine of the Secular State

Reacting against this political conception of religion Marsilius of Padua in his *Defensor Pacis* (1324) taught the supremacy of the state in a society which he now thought of in political rather than religious terms. All typically medieval political thought had been concerned with what the state ought to be and to aim at. In such Aristotelian terms, as Alan Gewirth rightly says in his book on Marsilius of Padua, Marsilius now replaced this emphasis on formal and final causes by an emphasis on material and efficient causes.<sup>29</sup> His conception of sovereignty as a factual monopoly of coercive power might have come straight out of the teachings of the English jurist Austin. He is not worried about the ultimate ends of man but considers what men proximately and overtly seem to want. They seek civil peace and order so that they may each prosecute a utilitarian calculation of means. For Marsilius peace and order cannot be secure if there is at any moment a possible conflict of jurisdictions. Thus he wished to establish the internal sovereignty of the new rising national state of Europe by ending the several jurisdictions existing within it; hence ecclesiastical immunities must be abolished and churchmen made altogether subject to the civil government. Marsilius wanted to subject all public affairs to the will of one authority: government elected by and responsible to the legislator, in which sovereignty ultimately resided. For Marsilius the ultimate legislator is the mass of the people; if those who are citizens in the temporal sphere are also the faithful in the spiritual they are competent to decide alike in ecclesiastical as in civil matters. A church controlled by laymen must see that its clergy both preach and practice complete detachment from the world.

For Marsilius the "new" monarch of Europe must become emperor of his own kingdom. Now if it could be said that the king within his own kingdom was sovereign, might it not also be said that there was also a person in his "*ecclesia*" or church who was also the supreme head and governor of that church? And might not this supreme head, if that were so, be the prince of the kingdom? Such in fact was the conclusion drawn by Marsilius. Accordingly, he taught that in all temporal concerns the control of the clergy by the state is in principle exactly like the control of agriculture and trade. In other words, insofar as religion is a social phenomenon it should be subject to social regulation like other human interests. Such a scheme, utterly in conflict with the prevailing conceptions of medieval authority, required a detailed refutation of the claims of the popes and the Church. Marsilius did so by tracing the evolution of papal claims and showing by historical proofs that Peter never received the "plenitude of power" from Christ; he was never bishop of Rome; and even supposing that he had been, was never handed down. According to Marsilius papal power was merely the result of slow accretion and usurpation and the existing mass of Canon Law had no real validity. In these ways he undermined the whole coercive power of pope and priest. The clergy were merely spiritual advisors exercising spiritual powers, with the pope only an honorary president and head of the church by historical evolution. The clergy has only one function: "to know and teach those things which according to the Scriptures, it is necessary to believe and to do, or to avoid, in order to obtain eternal salvation."<sup>30</sup> The clergy were bound to live in complete and apostolic poverty. Transgressions of the Gospel law, and sin and heresy, were, as such, only punishable by Christ in the future life. Excommunication is a function of the state; so were laws against heresy, although it might be unwise to make them. In short, Marsilius is a thorough secularist and a complete Erastian. The great novelty in his theory of the relations between church and state consisted in his subsuming religion and the affairs of the Church under the general affairs of the State, and in his declaring

that the care of religion and its control were, as in classical antiquity, one of the functions of the state. If the medieval political theorists thus misconceived the nature of the state by thinking of it as subordinate to the church, Marsilius and his humanist successors have also misconceived the nature of the church. Both Roman Catholic and apostate humanist thinkers continually tend to confuse religion with the church as a cultic institution of grace. While such an identification continues it will be impossible to solve the problem of the proper relation between the state and Christianity.

In addition to challenging the papal claims to sovereign control in terms of width and extension the other claim in point of depth and intensity also came to be disputed in the later Middle Ages. The church could only penetrate and pervade all areas and issues of life as long as two conditions continued to be satisfied. The first was that the state should continue to remain inadequate to the performance of its primary functions—the duty of providing security and an ordered civilized life, and that of furnishing an effective scheme of judicial and legal order. The second was that the minds of men should continue to depend so much on the sacramental power of the church and on her right of giving and withholding access to her sacraments. By interposing various forms of sacramental machinery between the individual and God the medieval Church had obtained a complete monopoly over God's grace. So long as men continued to believe that the supernatural life of their souls was created, nourished and perfected through the sacraments, and that the priests administering them possessed in virtue of their ordination miraculous powers of "making God out of the bread and the wine" and hence were able to dispense forgiveness of sins, so long would the laity of Western Europe remain in a condition of spiritual serfdom and bondage.

Both these conditions were beginning to fade in the course of the fifteenth century. The modern state was beginning to appear and through a civil service was shouldering its responsibilities. Princes were beginning to concern themselves with the relief of the poor and to control and

promote education. The great feudal baronage was gradually being reduced to obedience and the King's justice began to be dispensed throughout the length and breadth of the land. More important still, the attitude of the minds of men to the sacramental claims to power of the Roman Catholic Church were also beginning to change. A new conception of the working of inward faith and the operation of individual conscience was struggling to be born. Great mystics such as Meister Eckhart and his disciple Tauler and Suso as well as Thomas a Kempis and the great Husites, John Hus and John Zizka, began the neutralization of the hierarchical and ritual apparatus of the medieval church as well as to realize a practical piety. Frederick G. Heymann, we think, has proved his thesis that "the Bohemian Reformation was not, like Waldensianism or Lollardism, a fore-runner of the later Reformation but an integral part of it and by no means least important phase. In other words, the birth of Protestantism as a movement of decisive importance for the shaping of modern Western man did not originally take place in Germany at the beginning of the sixteenth century but a hundred years earlier in Bohemia."<sup>31</sup>

At the same time Duns Scotus and William of Occam had paved the way for a new philosophical outlook on life by showing up the logical defects of Scholasticism.<sup>32</sup> No less important than these later developments in the late Middle Ages was the decline in the economic power and influence of the territorial and military nobility who began to recede more and more into the background of social life giving place to the town-dwelling middle classes and urban workers. This movement of people away from the old agrarian life in which the Church had held undisputed sway over the superstitious peasantry to the great new urban centers of Flanders, northern Italy and along the Rhine and Thames Rivers created new social conditions in which the clergy could exert far less influence than it had hitherto done. All these factors taken together are therefore a significant symptom of the decay and waning of medieval culture and the formation of a new civilization in Western Europe at



once capitalistic and commercial in its social structure and secular and humanist in its ideology and outlook.<sup>33</sup>

## 2. Machiavelli of Florence and the Doctrine of Reasons of State

This fundamental change in the intellectual and political conditions of Western civilization is nowhere more apparent than in the mind and political thinking of Niccolo Machiavelli. Francis Bacon said that Machiavelli had "set forth openly and sincerely what men are wont to do, and not what they ought to do." Benedetto Croce has put forward the claim that Machiavelli laid down the "true and proper foundation of a philosophy of politics," because he was the first to recognize "the necessity and autonomy of politics, of politics which are beyond good and evil, which have their laws against which it is useless to rebel, which cannot be exercised and driven from this world by holy water." Bacon's and Croce's opinions of Machiavelli appear to be sustained by a large number of facts, which since Machiavelli's time has exerted an increasing influence on political morality and on political action. It is undeniable that Machiavelli lived and wrote his books at a time when Western Europe was passing through a critical epoch of change and reorganization. His tremendous significance in the history of Western political thought is precisely that he clarified and put into words a change in the outlook of many Europeans which had already taken place. Ernst Cassirer assesses the measure of this change:

When Machiavelli conceived the plan of his book, *The Prince*, the center of gravity of the political world had already been shifted. New forces had come to the fore and they had to be accounted for—forces that were entirely unknown to the medieval system. When studying Machiavelli's *Prince* we are surprised how much his whole thought is concentrated upon this new phenomenon. If he speaks of the usual forms of government, of the city republics or of the hereditary monarchies, he speaks very briefly. But when Machiavelli begins to describe the new men and when he analyzes the "new principalities" he speaks in an entirely different

tone. He is not only interested but captivated and fascinated. We feel this strong and strange fascination in every word about Cesare Borgia. . . . He frankly confesses that, if he had to found a new state, he would always follow the famous model of Cesare Borgia. All this cannot be explained by a personal sympathy for Cesare Borgia. Machiavelli had no reason to love him; on the contrary, he had the strongest reasons to fear him. How was it that, in spite of all this, he spoke of this enemy of his native city not only with admiration but with a kind of awe? This is only understandable if we bear in mind that the real source of Machiavelli's admiration was not the man himself but *the structure of the new state* that had been created by him. Machiavelli was the first thinker who completely realized what this new political structure really meant. He had seen it in its origin and he foresaw its effects. He anticipated in his thought the whole course of the future political life of Europe. It was this realization that induced him to study the form of the new principalities with the greatest care and thoroughness.<sup>34</sup>

In a word, what Machiavelli set himself to describe was the birth and nature of the modern godless apostate "power" state created by brute force and maintained by force. While loudly acclaiming that they still believe in justice and the rule of law, most modern rulers' actions have more often been modelled on Machiavelli's dictum: "It is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not, according to necessity."<sup>35</sup>

As the great absolutist national States replaced the feudal monarchies of Europe, the new Machiavellian doctrine of the state was a theory that seemed more and more to correspond to the new facts of apostate and post-Christian European political life. The great significance of Machiavelli was that, like the Sophists of old, he had the courage and the honesty to face the new facts of political life. While his book, *The Prince*, is couched in the form of injunctions or precepts for rulers, it consists, in fact, of empirical generalizations about the way in which successful so-called Christian rulers do actually behave. Machiavelli's writings are statements about the world as it is, and not *a priori* max-

ims about the world as it ought to be. Whereas political philosophy from Plato onwards had been largely about what was the best form of State and about the governing sanctions of political life derived from a metaphysical life-and-world-view, and whereas medieval political thinkers had generally acknowledged the divine origin of the state, in the mind and writings of Machiavelli political science henceforth becomes a mere description of the state as it is in fact rather than as it might be in theory. Machiavelli does not bother to refute the theocratic theory of politics; he simply ignores it. He speaks from his political experience, and his experience had taught him that factual political power is anything but divine. He had encountered the men who were the founders of the new principalities and he had closely observed their methods. As Cassirer tartly remarks:

To think that the power of these new principalities was of God was not only absurd, it was even blasphemous. As a political realist Machiavelli had, once for all, to give up the whole basis of the medieval political system. The pretended divine origin of the rights of kings seemed to him to be entirely fantastic. It remains a product of imagination, not of political thought. Machiavelli does not follow the usual ways of scholastic disputation. He never argues about political doctrines or maxims. To him the facts of political life are the only valid arguments. It is enough to point to "the nature of things" to destroy the hierarchic and theocratic system. Machiavelli studied and analyzed political movements in the same spirit as Galileo, a century later, did the movement of falling bodies. He became the founder of a new type of science of a political static and a political dynamic . . . . In his theory all the previous theocratic ideas and ideals are eradicated root and branch. Yet he never meant on the other hand to separate politics from religion. He was convinced that religion is one of the necessary element's of man's social life. But in his system this element cannot claim any absolute, independent and dogmatic truth. Its worth and validity depend entirely on its influence on political life.

By this standard, however, Christianity occupies the lowest place. For it is in strict opposition to all real political virtue. It has rendered men weak and effemi-

nate. "Our religions," says Machiavelli, "instead of heroes canonizes those only who are weak and lowly" whereas the "Pagans deified none but men full of worldly glory, such as great commanders." . . . According to Machiavelli this pagan use of religion was the only rational use. In Machiavelli's system . . . religion is no longer an end in itself; it has become a mere tool in the hands of political rulers. It is not the foundation of man's social life but a powerful weapon in all political struggles. . . . Religion is only good if it produces good order; and good order is generally attended with good fortune and success in any undertaking. Here the final step has been taken. Religion no longer bears any relation to a transcendent order of things and it has lost all spiritual values. The process of secularization has come to its close; for the secular state exists not only *de facto* but also *de jure*; it has found its theoretical legitimization.<sup>36</sup>

Machiavelli's doctrine of the pagan "power" state was to lead in the field of political action to the recognition and, consequently, to the widespread adoption of *raison d'etat* as something which justified the rejection by European governments of accepted Christian standards of morality and Christian political values. In this sense Frederick the Great and Bismarck of Prussia, Richelieu and Napoleon of France and Hitler and Stalin of the totalitarian democracies are heirs of Machiavelli. His new approach to politics was also to lead to the so-called value political methodology of such apostate humanist political thinkers as de Tocqueville, and Denis Brogan, Raymond Aron, and James Burnham who are all true Machiavellians insofar as they attempt to describe modern political life without reference to transcendental norms and values.

The doctrines of Machiavelli are a challenge to every Christian since they involve the rejection of rules of human behavior which the Church has always proclaimed to be universal. His doctrines are the seed bed of most apostate political thought and action in the modern world and he must therefore be held partly responsible for the present discontents which afflict modern society. Whereas rulers before Machiavelli no doubt had not always lived up to the

rules of Christian behavior and such rules had been constantly broken, the *sinfulness* of such a breach had up till Machiavelli's time been regularly recognized. The implication of Machiavelli's teaching was that these were rules only to be invoked when it suited the ruler who was bound by no other laws than the safety and the preservation of the state. In Machiavelli then we may detect the germ of the nineteenth-century "transvaluation of all values" and the brutal and nihilistic denial of all absolute political standards and values. In Bismarck the doctrine of reasons of state was developed into the political practice that all means are justified in order to preserve the state.

Not only in Machiavelli's own day but also in all succeeding centuries the doctrine of *raison d'etat* has been a challenge to the Christian doctrines of universal justice and politics.

We may thus conclude that Machiavelli's political thought is, to quote Chabod, "at once a synthesis and a condemnation of two centuries of Italian history."<sup>37</sup> It reveals the bankruptcy not only of Italian political life but also of apostate political science which seeks to describe the facts of man's political life without reference to the divine order of God's creation and of universally applicable Christian moral standards.

## E. The Answer of the Reformation

### 1. The Answer of the Godly Prince

From one point of view the Reformation of the sixteenth century symbolizes the protest of the nation-state against the universal state, and it marks an important stage in the process by which modern Europe was resolved into a series of independent sovereign nation-states. Thus conceived, it consisted in the attempt of the state (or of the "godly prince," to use a favorite sixteenth-century expression) to diminish or even abolish the papal claim to hegemony in church and state. The issue thus raised in the total range of its sweep touched European life at many points. It touched the issue of jurisdiction or the sphere of the rights

of the clerical courts with their appeals to Rome and of the rights of priests to "benefit of clergy." It touched taxation or the right of the papacy to draw revenues parallel with those of the prince. It touched education or the rights of the clergy to control teaching in schools and universities. It touched the issue of patronage or the right of the pope to decide who should be appointed to bishoprics and other important clerical preferments.

In place of this papal claim to hegemony over European society, princes generally desired to establish their own dominion or *imperium*. In the kingdoms which succeeded in overthrowing the papal jurisdiction, princes such as King Henry VIII of England and the Elector of Saxony carried their desire to the length of making themselves "*summi episcopi*" or of assuming the title of "supreme head" of their own national church. According to the *Act of Restraint of Appeal to Rome* passed by the English Parliament in 1533 "this realm of England is an empire . . . governed by one Supreme Head and King unto whom a body politic compact of all sorts of people divided in terms and by names of spirituality and temporality be bounded and owe to bear next to God a natural and humble obedience."<sup>38</sup> The Act thus denies the subjection of England to any external authority temporal or spiritual and so embodies the fundamental principle of the Henrician reformation. In the Act of Supremacy it is laid down that

The King our Sovereign Lord, his heirs and successor kings of this realm, shall be taken, accepted and reputed the only Supreme Head in earth of the church in England called *Anglicana Ecclesia*.<sup>39</sup>

Socially the Reformation was a revolt of the subject laity against a dominant clergy not only enthroned in the pulpit but standing at the altars of Christendom as mediators of God's grace and sitting in the confessional to judge God's children. The clergy thus bore in their keeping the keys which alone could unlock the door to salvation. In addition, by means of the Canon Law the church had cognizance of all cases dealing with marriage, wills, trade,

death, heresy, sorcery, exaction of tithes and glebe rights, not to mention defamation and perjury.<sup>40</sup>

The popular revolt was a general revolt against these sacramental and jurisdictional powers of the *sacerdotium*. What was at issue in the first instance was the sacrament of penance with its system of obligatory satisfactions and its connected system of monetary payments. The pinch of the purse combined with a resentment against the pride of the priests. Nowhere were these resentments felt more deeply than in Germany. The financial burdens placed by the papacy on the German people were heavier than in any other country in Europe and as soon as opportunity offered there was a great eagerness to get rid of them. Such an opportunity was provided by Martin Luther. On October 31, 1517, Luther posted his famous Ninety-Five Theses concerning the question of indulgences, in which he summoned his fellow professors at Wittenberg to a debate. What was the unusual element and content of the document which was to spread like a forest fire through all Germany in fourteen days and in a month to put all Christendom on fire? The answer is contained in Luther's first thesis:

When our Lord and Master, Jesus Christ, said "Repent" He called for the entire life of believers to be one of penitence.<sup>41</sup>

In other words penance is not only an outward mechanical performance but an inner attitude of mind which continues throughout life. Such a New Testament conception of Christianity naturally aroused the wrath of all peddlers of penances who called upon the pope to close Luther's mouth. In July, 1518, he was summoned to Rome, but then authority was given to Cajetan to deal with the case at Augsburg. Thither Luther repaired but he refused to withdraw his attack upon the indulgence traffic.

Meanwhile the dispute rapidly assumed a wider significance and was being extended in scope to embrace many other subjects beside indulgences. The dynamite contained in the scholar's theses exploded into a general national German revolt against the papacy and the whole existing religious system. The protest against indulgences had

swelled into a mighty protest against the corruptions of Christ's Holy Catholic Church. As Luther became embroiled in a bitter paper war with Eck and other papists, so his grounds of theological protest widened until they constituted nothing less than a total and complete rejection of medieval Catholicism as well as of the claim of the Bishop of Rome to be Christ's Vicar upon earth.

## 2. The Lutheran Answer

Luther's thought upon the subject of the relation between church and state begins with a realization of the eschatological tensions which exist between the sacred and the secular, between what ought to be and what is among human beings, between sin and grace, law and gospel. According to Luther, the business of the Church of God is not to save civilization but to save souls, not to force men to be good but to offer them the one way by which alone they can become good, namely God's offer of salvation in Christ. Belonging to the age to come the church must rely upon the methods and principles of Heaven rather than of a fallen world. Love rather than force must be the church's method of dealing with men. On no account must spiritual authority be confused with worldly authority. Thus Luther totally repudiated the medieval Latin Catholic conception of the church, namely the idea that the kingdom of Christ was visibly represented in the outward hierarchical institutions of the medieval church. While retaining its outward institutional forms, Luther modified the church in such a way that it became quite other than it had been during the Middle Ages. First, he allotted to it quite a different significance from that which it had claimed under Pope Boniface VIII. The church insofar as it was an external visible legal institution became henceforth not a divine foundation but something established by human law. Thus he defined the church by reference to grace and faith and not as medieval catholicism had done by reference to institutional continuity, authority and outward forms. For Luther the church is "the congregation of saints and true believers, in which the Gospel is rightly taught and the



sacraments are rightly administered." In its "essence" the Church is invisible. In its temporal manifestation as a "congregation," it has its "visible marks" as the true Church in the pure preaching of the Word, in the just and proper administration of the Sacraments and in the fruits of faith. Luther has obviously here understood the Church in terms of its faith aspect. The historically-founded internal organization of the institution does not seem to have worried him very much, with the result that the structural principle of the ecclesiastical institution remains unexplained. From the outset he was caught in a dualistic scheme of "nature" and "grace" in which he tended to think of the true Church as belonging solely to the spiritual sphere of grace and its outward institutional manifestation as involved in the sphere of nature and life in this fallen world.

For Luther the sole function of any church, whether Roman, German, or English, is to preach the Gospel of Christ. To order the material and political life of mankind is neither its duty nor its right. Nor has the church any reason to act as the guardian of the human race, issuing laws and regulations on these matters as if men could not settle such things alone by the help of reason. Further, the church is neither able nor called upon to keep true Christians in their capacity as citizens under its guidance, government and tutelage. Thus Luther overthrew the whole catholic ideal of civilization and limited the church to its one great task of bringing men back to God. In his view it is essential that men distinguish between the reign of Christ and the world of human sinful culture. Accordingly, in defending himself in his pamphlet against the peasants he writes:

There are two kingdoms, one the kingdom of God, the other the kingdom of the world. God's kingdom is a kingdom of grace and mercy . . . but the kingdom of the world is a kingdom of wrath and severity. Now he who would confuse these two kingdoms—as our false fanatics do—would put wrath into God's kingdom and mercy into the world's kingdom; and that is the same as putting the devil in heaven and God in hell.

While Luther charged these chiliastic enthusiasts with trying to find a basis for worldly order solely in the gospel,

neglecting the law under which historical existence must still work itself out, he charged the papacy with having tried to turn the Holy Gospel into a new version of law, neglecting its eschatological power of consummating and thus superseding historical existence.

Christ indeed claims an absolute lordship over men as the papacy had maintained but he wishes to exercise it not from without by institutional means of legal coercion, as the popes had falsely supposed, but from within. Christ wishes to reign within men's consciences and hearts and not through the pope on Peter's throne. Christ is concerned not so much with the overt actions of men as with their inner springs and motives of action. As the Revealer of God's absolute moral standards for human behavior summed up in the Sermon on the Mount, he brings all men under conviction of their sinfulness, lovelessness and faithlessness. But as Savior, he creates in those who identify themselves with him in his death on the cross, a new power to love God and neighbor as he loves God and men. It is in such terms that we must try to understand the Lutheran distinction between the realm of the sacred and that of the profane.

It is vital that we remember that Luther's attitude towards the problem of the relation between church and state, at least in two important respects, was essentially medieval rather than modern; here his thought is nearer to Thomas Aquinas than to Calvin.

First, we must remember that Luther did not use the words "state" or "society" in our modern sense of these terms. His experience of government was that of the Elector of Saxony and other German princes. When Luther discussed matters of church and state, therefore, it is not surprising that he should fix his attention on the German nobility and ruling princes. His assumption as to the divine right of the nobility to rule cannot be understood at all unless we remember this fact. Luther had looked to the Elector of Saxony to protect him from the pope and emperor just as he also looked to the German nobility to maintain law and order against Carlstadt and his followers who were menacing Wittenberg in 1522 with revolutionary iconoclasm. For a similar reason Luther in 1520 had addressed his

reforming manifesto, neither to the emperor nor to the people but to "the Christian Nobility of the German Nation"; calling upon them to oppose and reform the corruptions within the Church.

Second, Luther showed himself to be still a medieval man in his attitude to natural law. The authority behind his appeal to the landed nobility is not only Scripture, but the law of nature, written on the very heart of man at the creation, and having a divine sanction. According to Luther the divine sanction of law extends beyond the Decalogue; it covers all the permanent forms and structures of human society—marriage, family, the principle of paternal authority as well as the principle of the "godly" prince. For princely rule corresponds in civil society to the position of a father in a family. According to Luther the sanctions of natural law give the same honor and obedience to the territorial prince as it gives to parents on the basis of the Fourth Commandment. In the name of natural law the German nobility and princes can rightly demand from their subjects reverence, honor, taxes and various other feudal services. On this basis alone can the prince take police action at home and wage war outside his territory.

As things turned out, the secular rulers made themselves absolute, using the Lutheran churches merely as agents of German local government. Luther has been falsely blamed for this development by Roman Catholic historians who have accused him in addition of making the German people excessively subservient to authority. Actually Luther intended just the opposite. He expected a federal equilibrium, a society of several levels of association, from the family up to the imperial council, in which a conscientious ruler and a law-abiding people, banded for spiritual purposes in a church could all try to live according to God's Word. Indeed, says Bornkamm, Luther instilled in the German nation "an aversion to an absolute imperialism, an aversion not forgotten until recent times. So far from advocating a supine surrender to tyranny, Luther taught that there is a right to resistance against tyrannical princes, certainly a right to passive resistance."

Thus Luther's paternalism is by no means absolute but it is explicitly and genuinely qualified by the fact that the prince rules under God, and therefore his authority as a ruler is neither absolute nor arbitrary. It is his duty to respect the conscience of his subjects. Thus Luther allows the right to refuse obedience to the civil authorities if they should try to extend to the sphere of conscience a coercive power which must be limited to the sphere of goods and of bodies.

### 3. The Calvinist Answer

Only by returning to the Pauline and Augustinian view of man, of sin and of grace, can the problem of the relation of the Christian to culture and to the state be properly solved. John Calvin provided the solution of the Christian's relation to the world by himself returning to the biblical ground motives of creation, the fall into sin, and the redemption of the world by Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Spirit. Whereas Martin Luther clung to the idea of a lower earthly sphere in which man is capable of doing much good, Calvin's logical mind could not put up with such dualism. On the one hand, his deep insight into the terrible consequences of sin did not allow him to admit that fallen man, when left wholly to himself, could produce any good in any domain whatsoever; and on the other hand, he found it impossible to subscribe to the view of Zwingli, who virtually surrendered the absoluteness of Christianity by teaching that at least certain heathen philosophers who remained utter strangers to the Gospel of Christ shared in God's saving grace. Calvin found the solution for the problem of how to account for the good along with the bad in unregenerate man in his concept of *Common Grace*. He was the first Christian thinker who drew out a clear-cut distinction between God's common and God's saving grace, between the operations of the Spirit of God which are common to mankind at large, and the sanctifying work of the same Spirit which is limited to God's elect. Calvin's clearest statement of this doctrine of Common Grace is of such importance for our subject that it deserves quotation in full.

A question . . . here presents itself to us again. For in all ages there have been some persons, who, from the mere dictates of nature, have devoted their whole lives to the pursuit of virtue. And though many errors might perhaps be discovered in their conduct, yet by their pursuit of virtue they afforded a proof, that there was some degree of purity in their nature. . . .

These examples, then, seem to teach us that we should not consider human nature to be totally corrupted; since, from its instinctive bias, some men have not only been eminent for noble actions, but have uniformly conducted themselves in a most virtuous manner through the whole course of their lives. But here we ought to remember, that amidst this corruption of nature there is some room for Divine grace, not to purify it, but internally to restrain its operations. For should the Lord permit the minds of all men to give up the reins to every lawless passion, there certainly would not be an individual in the world, whose actions would not evince all the crimes, for which Paul condemns human nature in general, to be most truly applicable to him. . . .

If every soul be subject to all these monstrous vices, as the Apostle fearlessly pronounces, we clearly see what would be the consequences, if the Lord should suffer the human passions to go to all the lengths to which they are inclined. . . . In his elect, the Lord heals these maladies by a method which we shall hereafter describe [God's sovereign saving grace in Christ]. In others, he restrains them, only to prevent their ebullitions so far as he sees to be necessary for the preservation of the universe. Hence some by shame, and some by fear of the laws, are prevented from running into many kinds of pollutions; others, because they think that a virtuous course of life is advantageous, entertain some languid desires after it; others go further, and display more than common excellence, that by their majesty they may confine the vulgar to their duty. Thus God by his providence restrains the perverseness of our nature from breaking out into external acts, but does not purify it within.<sup>42</sup>

Abraham Kuyper has found in this passages of Calvin's *Institutes* "the root of the doctrine of common grace."<sup>43</sup> Into Christian thought a new root had been planted which would one day grow into the mighty tree of the Christian Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Law-Idea. Kuyper not only

finds in the above passage the root of the doctrine of common grace but he also explains why it constitutes such an indispensable element of a truly Christian philosophy of human culture. Thus declares Kuyper:

It did not arise out of philosophical invention but out of the confession of the mortal character of sin. . . . But apparently this [confession] did not square with reality. There was in the sinful world outside the Church so much that was beautiful, so much to be respected, so much that provoked to envy. This placed [the formulators of the Reformed confession] before the dilemma; either to deny all this good, against their better knowledge, and thus to err with the anabaptists; or to view man as not so deeply fallen, and thus to stray into the Arminian heresy. And placed before **that** choice, the Reformed confession has refused to travel either of those roads. We might not close our eyes to the good and beautiful outside the Church among unbelievers in the world. This good was there and that had to be acknowledged. And just as little might the least bit be detracted from the total depravity of sinful nature. But herein lay the solution of this apparent contradiction, that also outside the Church, among the heathen, in the midst of the world, grace was at work, grace not eternal, nor unto salvation, but temporal and for the stemming of the destruction that lurked in sin."

By means of his common or temporal conserving grace, God maintains the life of all men, relaxes the curse which rests upon them by reason of their disobedience, and arrests the process of corruption, while his church mediates to men his saving grace in Jesus Christ. Thus man's temporal life with its family, state, marriage and economic relationships and structural principles of human society are preserved, even when renewing regenerating grace is not available. Even when men deny God, his goodness and love enables them to perform civil good, to love each other and to keep contracts and have social virtues, not because of innate goodness within them but because of God's overarching and undergirding common grace. Thus social and cultural life is possible not because men are naturally good or reasonable as Aristotle and Aquinas supposed, but because God's com-

mon grace preserves men and women from the worst consequences of their own lust, avarice, envy, wrath, and pride.

The fundamental importance of this answer of Calvin's to the question of how culture is possible in a world of totally depraved men will be recognized from the implications we have just drawn from it. Instead of interposing a rationalistic doctrine of Natural Law between God and his creation as the Roman Catholics have done, Calvin openly acknowledges God's sovereignty over the whole man, both in his sinful and in his regenerate states. Henceforth, the Christian is called by his vocation to bring the whole of life, both sacred and secular, under God's control. Henceforth, the curse is no longer thought of resting upon the world itself as Roman Catholic medieval monasticism had supposed, but only upon what is sinful in it. Instead of monastic flight and withdrawal from the world, the duty now becomes emphasized of serving God in the world in every position of life. To praise God in his church and to serve him in his world became the inspiring impulse of Reformed Christians in Holland, Scotland, England, Switzerland and the New World. As Richard Niebuhr says:

Calvin's more dynamic conception of the vocation of men as activities in which they may express their faith and love and may glorify God in their calling, his closer association of church and state, and his insistence that the State is God's minister not only in a negative fashion as a restrainer of evil but positively in the promotion of welfare . . . above all his emphasis on the actuality of God's sovereignty—all these lead to the thought that what the Gospel promises and makes possible as divine possibility is the transformation of mankind in all its nature and culture into a kingdom of God in which the laws of the kingdom have been written upon the inward parts.<sup>45</sup>

A recent discussion of Natural Law in G. C. Berkouwer's *De Algemene Openbaring* where it is proved how different Calvin's idea of natural law is from that of the medieval philosophers bears out Niebuhr's fine account of Calvin's cultural significance and explains why Calvinism marked the beginning of a new Christian philosophy of culture. While the medieval Catholic theory was grounded

in the rational nature of man, which, according to Thomistic philosophy, must always—with the necessity that attaches to being—strive after the good, Calvin grounds his doctrine of man solely in the Word of God which reveals as central the corruption of human nature directed *against* the good will of the Lord in hostility and disobedience. He writes:

For Calvin the natural man does not live from what remains of the real, ontological goodness within the ordinances of God, but he moves within the witnessing force and the evidence of the divinely ordained good as revelation of His holy will. The predominating aspect in Calvin is not the goodness of human nature but the *goodness of the law and the ordinances of God*. Calvin's doctrine of common grace does not arise out of the inclination to remove anything from the corruption of human nature, but out of the certitude that this total corruption is taught by the Scripture.<sup>46</sup>

Earlier in the same book, we read:

The total depravity of man is, indeed, present, according to Calvin, but that is for him, not equivalent to the absence of all God's gifts to human nature. For Calvin is convinced that man can manifest his total depravity *with* his gifts and *in* the function of these gifts. A profound view of sin is background of Calvin's thought; one could say, a total-existential view, which is religious in character and is governed by the question of the attitude of the heart of man towards God. The absence of the true, religious obedience of man towards God does not exclude it that man, with the gifts left to him, functions in the world, where he is still assigned a place. . . .<sup>47</sup>

We find ourselves here in the area of the activity of God in preserving and governing. Therein lies the possibility of the connection between so-called "natural law" and . . . *corruptio naturae*. It is indeed a strange thing, that in the radical aversion of human life from God and His Holy will, in its inability to subject itself to the law of God, there is nevertheless still present a championing of right and justice, a punishing of evil and a reward of good, a valuing of community with one another and of limits set for man in that community, a seeking of truth and science. Every man stirs



and moves within the superior power of the works of God and of the preservation of His blessing—bestowing law . . . and *in* his actions, *in* his conscience, *in* his judgement with regard to others and *in* his protest against complete anarchy, he manifests the superior power of the work and the law of God. . . . To acknowledge this does not therefore involve an optimistic estimate of man. For this man, in the total direction of his existence, is turned away from God, and moreover can also in his concrete deeds progress continually farther along the road of manifest degeneration. In Romans chapter two Paul is not speaking of a constant quality of the heathen (the doing of that which is contained in the law). The process of sin can also so burst forth that there remain only minimal remnants of the power to distinguish. The eye of man can increasingly be darkened with respect to the goodness of God's ordinances, so that he finally has an eye only for the "law" that is pleasing to himself and that protects his own life. Life can develop as Paul predicts it for the last days, viz., in almost complete and uncompromising opposition to what the law of God still makes valuable in human life. Those are the days in which man will even be without natural love. Therein can be manifested the judgement of God, as it already was revealed in the divine "giving over," of which Paul mentions in Romans chapter one. This proves that one cannot describe the history of humanity (and we may add of human culture) from the point of view of human "nature" and its "natural light." The relation between the general revelation of God, common restraining grace and human life is not a static one, but a dynamic relation, which is completely and utterly tied up with the development of history and with the process of sin. One will never be able to write about general revelation and about common grace without also paying attention to that judgement of God which is already manifest in history.<sup>48</sup>

From this profound analysis of Berkouwer we may rightly gather the radical novelty of Calvin's explanation of human culture. How superior is his explanation is obvious if we compare what has just been quoted with the embarrassment Augustine felt in trying to explain the enlargement and the long life of the Roman state. It should also be noted how intimately Calvin's approach to culture

is integrated with his whole theology of the centrality and sovereignty of the living God. Calvin unashamedly rejected the autonomy of man's reason as the final reference point in knowledge and instead looked to the Word of God as the final, inspired and infallible authority for all his thought and action. For Calvin man's relationship to the living God of the Holy Scriptures was determinative for *all* the relationships of his life. It is in this sense that we may call Calvin the first truly catholic Christian philosopher of culture. Unlike Thomas Aquinas he did not admit a separation of human life into two realms of nature and grace but demanded that all spheres of culture be brought into subjection to God. For this reason his doctrines of church and state began a new era in Western history, giving a new character and direction to men's lives in many lands.

How then did Calvin envisage the relation which should exist between church and state? What functions did Calvin assign to the civil power?

Calvin saw the church and the state as two interdependent entities each having received its own authority from the sovereign God. In his conception the state is never secular as Luther taught, nor are the state and church separated in the modern sense of the word. Because of Calvin's insight into the real nature of the Church as a body of believers called to serve God in the temporal structure of the visible church as well as being members of the invisible church, the Reformed Churches which he established took on a different complexion from those established by Luther. Both Anglicanism and Lutheranism were hindered in their development as true churches by the interference of the civil power. Both the German Lutheran Church and the Church of England became in effect departments of state along the lines laid down by Marsilius. While the chief magistrate in charge of a Lutheran consistory became known as *summus episcopus*, in England the sovereign claimed the title of supreme head, and governor, thus making a caricature of what all true German and English reformers desired. Only in Calvinism to begin with did the Reformers' ideal for independent corporate life in Christ achieve adequate expression. Whereas in

Romanism the pope made law and was subject to no man's criticism, in the Reformed Church no one was held to be infallible and beyond criticism. Christ was the sole head of the Church, and Christ as presented in the Scriptures was the supreme authority and law to which all church officers and leaders must yield obedience.

This new Reformed conception of the church was reflected in the civil sphere. Both Butzer in Strasbourg and Calvin in Geneva agreed in condemning all tendencies towards political absolutism in mortal sinners as an offence against the sovereignty of God and tending to idolatry. In the state, as in the church, the reformers opposed the absolutizing of the fallible.

According to Calvin, church and state must live in peace and must cooperate in subjection to the Word of God. Each is to have its own jurisdiction. The state has authority in purely civil matters, the church in spiritual matters. Calvin abolished the "benefit of clergy" clause of the Canon Law, placing himself and his ministerial associates in obedience to the magistrates in all civil affairs. The magistrates on their part were to be under the jurisdiction of the church court in things spiritual. Calvin in fact thought of the state as being constituted of Christian citizens.

Calvin held a realistic view of the nature of the state. It is a secular order ordained by God on account of sin, and as such it is a divine rather than a natural ordinance, instituted as a power of coercion on account of sin. The state exists as an institution of God's common grace not because men are "naturally" sociable or reasonable as Aristotle and Aquinas had supposed but because men are sinful as the Word of God teaches. Hence for Calvin the service of the state is just as much a Christian vocation as the service of the church. The magistrates are in fact the representatives of God; their calling is not only legitimate "but by far the most sacred and honorable in human life" (*Institutes IV, 20, 1*), and we owe them obedience for conscience' sake. He affirms the duty of the subject to obey his prince, since civil law presupposes that law of God which is its final sanction. Yet Calvin's *Epistle Dedicatory to*

*King Francis*, with which his *Institutes* opens, clearly implies that the divine right of kings is always qualified and limited by that divine right to the obedience of men's souls which is unlimited and final. In the last issue we must always obey God rather than men.

For this reason, Calvin's teaching about the state strongly rejects those political theories of the Renaissance which would have given a purely secular foundation to the state, and to the right of the monarch. As J. S. Whale points out:

For Calvin, any secular power which vies, so to speak, with God is guilty of *lese-majeste*, treason against Him who is the sole source of all power. The right possessed by all worldly power is always derivative; it is from God. The ruler is no more than a steward, an official responsible to Him that sitteth upon the throne. Indeed, though Calvin had no enthusiasm for popular sovereignty in the modern democratic sense, he could attack monarchy with devastating acuteness and power. He always saw the king as, in some sense, the rival of God and he is always prophetically aware that the Crown Rights of the Redeemer will be challenged by the Divine Rights of Kings. In all Calvin's political thinking, therefore, the idea of *libertas* played an increasingly decisive role. For him the word had a twofold meaning. Primarily it meant the free and sovereign lordship of God, and the absolute validity of His laws. But it also meant, inferentially and ultimately, the solemn right and responsibility of the people to choose by vote the bearer or instrument of that divine governance. Calvin affirms the sovereignty of the prince and the duty of submission to him; but he always limits this duty by reference to the sovereign right of God over men's souls. He is constantly thinking of the situation which might befall French protestants if their king should refuse to allow free course to the preaching and hearing of the Word. In such a situation the individual *believer would have no option but to resist*.<sup>49</sup>

Calvin made resistance to unjust princes not only permissible but an absolute obligation for only constituted representatives of the people. While deprecating in the

strongest possible terms the right of resistance on the part of "private persons," he states:

If there be, in the present day, any magistrate appointed for the protection of the people and the moderation of the power of kings, such as were in ancient times, e.g., the popular tribunes upon the consuls among the Romans; or with power as perhaps is now possessed by the three estates in every kingdom when they are assembled: I am so far from prohibiting them, in the discharge of their duty, to oppose the violence or cruelty of kings, that I affirm, that if they connive at kings in their oppression of the people, such forbearance involves the most nefarious perfidy, because they fraudently betray the liberty of the people, of which they know they have been appointed protectors by the ordination of God.<sup>50</sup>

Municipal authorities, estates-general and parliaments were thus exhorted to call rulers to account as a part of their high vocation before God. In a letter written to Coligny in 1561, Calvin applied this principle. He had, he said, been asked beforehand whether, in view of the oppression of the Huguenots in France, active resistance would not be justified. He replied that if the princes of the blood took action to maintain their legal rights and if the Parlements of France joined with them, then indeed all good citizens might lawfully aid them in rising up in arms.<sup>51</sup> Of this Reformed doctrine of the Christian right to resistance, J. H. Nichols has said:

This bold specification of the political responsibilities of "minor magistrates" was of the greatest significance. By its means the medieval tradition of the higher moral law as the rule of government was effectively related to the one institution which in the circumstances was in a position to make it good, the estates-general and parliaments of the European kingdoms. Sixteenth-century Calvinism viewed all European states as by right constitutional. Parliamentarianism was thus penetrated and disciplined by a Reformed doctrine of vocation in Holland and England, while in Roman Catholic Spain and France the Cortes and Estates-General withered away and natural law became a merely academic speculation.<sup>52</sup>

Calvin thus conceived of civil government as both a vocation sacred in the eyes of the Lord and as one of the institutions of God's common grace in maintaining justice and restraining the worst consequences of human sin. He indeed tended to make the state overstep its functions—the reasonable direction and co-ordination of the secular activities of men—by converting it into an instrument for compelling all men to yield external obedience to the moral law.

Yet where the affairs of the church were concerned, Calvin recognized very definite limits to the state's powers. He insisted upon the right of the church to independence in all spiritual matters. While both the Lutheran and Anglican Churches had assumed an Erastian complexion which they have only lost when transplanted to North America and other lands where they have adopted a synodical type of conciliar polity, Calvinism developed what may best be defined as a system of coordinate jurisdiction.

While not democratic in his political thought, Calvin may rightly be regarded as the founder of constitutionalism in modern church government, as well as of the principle of the limitation upon the powers of the state in the sense of duly constituted checks upon the civil magistrate. Although Calvin never himself realized the separation of church and state in his beloved Geneva, it was implicit in his achievement of the spiritual discipline within the church. The long struggle he waged for the right of the church to discipline its own members was the focal point of dispute in the long hard contest Calvin waged with the city council of Geneva. Of this new type of spiritual discipline, Benjamin Warfield writes:

By this programme [of church discipline] Calvin became nothing less than the creator of the Protestant Church. It is purely *Church* discipline which is contemplated [by Calvin], with none other than spiritual penalties. And the Church is for this purpose especially discriminated from the body of the people—the State—and a wedge is thus driven in between Church and State which was bound to separate the one from the other. . . . The Spiritual liberties which he demanded for the Church in 1536, for the assertion of

which he was banished in 1538, for the establishment of which he ceaselessly struggled from 1541, he measurably attained at length in 1555. In the fruits of that victory we have all had our part. And every Church in Protestant Christendom which enjoys to-day any liberty whatever, in performing its functions as a Church of Jesus Christ, owes it all to John Calvin. It was he who first asserted this liberty in his early manhood—he was only twenty-seven years of age when he presented his programme to the Council. And thus Calvin's great figure rises before us as not only in a true sense the creator of the Protestant Church, but the author of all the freedom it exercises in its spiritual sphere.<sup>53</sup>

While Calvin never developed a doctrine of sphere sovereignty as such, it was implicit in his recognition of the independence of the sphere of the *adiaphora*, the things indifferent. He recognized alongside of church and state a third realm, an area of life having a separate existence and jurisdiction. In this realm where conscience reigns supreme, no pope or king may hold sway. This area of free conscience Calvin did not restrict to a few mere details such as personal taste in clothing and food, but it includes music, agriculture, science, technical learning, and social festivities. Henry Van Til points out:

Calvin proclaims freedom from both church and state for this whole large area of life in his doctrine of Christian liberty, making man responsible and accountable to God alone in his conscience. This doctrine of Christian liberty is therefore one of the foundation stones of Calvin's cultural philosophy (Inst.III,19).<sup>54</sup>

For Calvin the Kingdom of God is not completely contained within the two magnitudes of church and state as medieval catholic philosophy had supposed in its doctrine of nature and grace. Neither church nor state for Calvin occupy a place above all other societal relationships.

Josef Bohatec has proved in his standard work *Calvins Lehre von Staat und Kirke* that Ernst Troeltsch showed little real understanding of Calvin's social and political philosophy. Although aware of the fact that Calvin's view of human society forms an organic unity, he paid little

attention to the idea of an organic society in Calvin's teaching because he concentrated his whole attention on Calvin's doctrine of the church. Bohatec distinguishes Calvin's thought from the medieval idea of a *corpus christianum* and shows that Calvin's objection both to a world-church and world-state is precisely that not only can neither bring to realization the organic unity that is aimed at but also they both bring about disorganization and tyranny.<sup>55</sup> Bohatec then shows that, having rejected both extreme forms of social organization and development, Calvin tries to bring both typical regulations of life into one organic whole. In this he wished to bring out the truth that both church and state, each in its own sphere, must claim independence since as social structures and ordinances created by God, they have to be of equal value. The full significance of Calvin's doctrine of church and state as coordinate but independent bodies can only be realized when we contrast it with either the classical view which conceived of religion as a means to an end, namely the glorification of the city-state or the medieval Catholic view which conceived of the temporal power as at the disposal of the spiritual power. Calvin's significance in the history of the study of the relation between church and state is that he was the first to show that neither institution exhausts all the richness of God's Kingdom and rule among men, and that neither church nor state should ever occupy a place above all the other manifold social relationships and structures.

#### F. The Answer of the Puritans

Distinguished historians such as William Lecky, R. H. Tawney, Lord Acton and Christopher Dawson have all acknowledged that Puritanism has been the most potent force in the shaping of modern Anglo-American civilization. According to the great rationalist historian William Lecky:

It is difficult indeed to overrate the debt of gratitude that England owes both to her own Non-episcopal Churches and to those of Scotland. In good report and evil, amid persecution and ingratitude and horrible



wrongs, in ages when all virtue seemed corroded and when apostasy had ceased to be a stain, they clung fearlessly and faithfully to the banner of her freedom. The success of the Great Rebellion was in great measure due to the assistance of the Scotch, who were actuated mainly by religion, and to the heroic courage infused into the troops by the English ministers, and to the spirit of enthusiasm created by the noble writings that were inspired by Puritanism. It is to Puritanism that we mainly owe the fact that in England religion and liberty were not disserved; amid all the fluctuations of its fortune, it represented the alliance of these two principles, which the predominating Church invariably pronounced to be incompatible. The attitude of the latter Church (Anglican) forms indeed a strange contrast to that of Puritanism. Created in the first instance by a court intrigue, pervaded in all its parts by a spirit of the most intense Erastianism, and aspiring at the same time to a spiritual authority scarcely less absolute than that of the Church it had superseded, Anglicanism was from the beginning at once the most servile and the most efficient agent of tyranny. Endeavouring by the assistance of temporal authority and by the display of worldly pomp to realize in England the same position as Catholicism had occupied in Europe, she naturally flung herself on every occasion into the arms of the civil power. No other Church so uniformly betrayed and trampled on the liberties of her country. In all those fiery trials through which English liberty has passed through since the Reformation, she invariably cast her influence into the scale of tyranny, supported and eulogised every attempt to violate the Constitution and wrote fearful sentence of eternal condemnation upon the tombs of the martyr of freedom.<sup>56</sup>

The great socialist historian R. H. Tawney pointed out in his classic work, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, that "the foundation of democracy is the sense of spiritual independence, which nerves the individual to stand alone against the powers of this world; and in England, where squire and parson, lifting arrogant eyebrows at the insolence of the lower orders, combined to crush popular agitation, as a menace at once to society, and to the church, it is probable that democracy owes more to Nonconformity than to any other single movement."<sup>57</sup>

The Roman Catholic historian, Christopher Dawson, writes:

In England the pure Calvinist tradition was united with that of the Anabaptist and independent sects to produce a new movement which was political as well as religious and which marks the first appearance of genuine democracy in the modern world. And in this revolutionary attempt . . . the Calvinist conception of the democratic aristocracy of the saints provided the inspiration and the driving force.

This translation of the Holy Community from an ecclesiastical ideal to a principle of revolutionary political action was not confined to the sectarian extremists such as the Baptists and Fifth Monarchy men; it was accepted by the leading Independent divines such as the two Goodwins, by intellectuals like Vane and Milton, and in fact it does mark the beginning of a new world, for, as Troeltsch points out, the great experiment of the Cromwellian Commonwealth, short-lived though it was, by the momentum of its religious impulse opened the way for a new type of civilization based on the freedom of the person and of conscience as rights conferred absolutely by God and nature. The connection is seen most clearly in America where the Congregationalist Calvinism of New England, which was a parallel development to the independent Puritanism of Old England, developing from the same roots in a different environment, leads on directly to the assertion of the Rights of Man in the Constitution of the North American states and to the rise of political democracy. . . . The modern Western beliefs in progress, in the rights of man, and the duty of conforming political action to moral ideals, whatever they may owe to other influences, derive ultimately from the moral ideals of Puritanism and its faith in the possibility of the realization of the Holy Community on earth by the efforts of the elect.<sup>58</sup>

What was this great motivating force that enabled the puritans to stand alone against the powers of this world? The answer is the tremendous sense they had of being under the immediate and direct authority of the Living and Sovereign God of the Holy Scriptures. H. Richard Niebuhr well says in his fundamental work, *The Kingdom of God in America*, speaking of this Protestant awareness of God's

immediate and direct sovereignty over each individual Christian:

The positive counterpart of this negation of all human sovereignty was more important. It was the affirmation of God's direct rule. He governed all things immediately by the word of His mouth, and to him all political organizations, churches and individuals were directly responsible. In place of the hierarchical structure in which the higher governed the lower, the Protestant set forth the idea of multiplicity in which many equals were all related directly, without mediation, to the ultimate ruler. In religious life this conception of the kingdom was expressed in terms of the priesthood of all believers; elsewhere it formed the implicit presupposition both of democracy and nationalism, though in these areas the principle took a long time to work itself out. In any case, the confession of the sole rulership of God and the declaration of loyalty to his kingdom was an even more important element in the Protestant faith than was the rejection of mundane representatives of the divine rule. To times which do not believe in God . . . the sincerity with which religious Protestants maintained this principle will be suspect and the power which it conferred will remain an enigma. They will criticize the Protestant movement as an inconsistent liberalism and will explain that it derived its strength from the forces of self-interest which it unleashed in defiance of its dogma. But Protestantism was never liberal in the sense that it made free man the starting point of its theology or its ethics. The human freedom of which it spoke was not a presupposition but a goal: so far as man was concerned it presupposed his bondage to sin. Its real starting point was the free God. So Calvin confessed:

We are not our own; therefore neither our reason nor our will should predominate in our deliberations and actions. We are not our own; therefore let us not presuppose it as our end to seek what may be expedient for us according to the flesh. We are not our own: therefore let us, as far as possible, forget ourselves and all things that are ours. On the contrary, we are God's: to him, therefore let us live and die. We are God's; therefore let his wisdom and will preside in all our actions. We are God's; towards him,

therefore, as our only legitimate end, let every part of our lives be directed.

The statement is characteristically Protestant in its rejection of the liberal assumption that man must begin with himself, with his reason, his will, his self-possession. It is even more characteristic in its direct assertion of the divine sovereignty and in the implicit rejection of the claims of any institution or creature to possess men in the name of God.<sup>59</sup>

Again we must ask what exactly was it that was contributed to this "Calvinist tradition" of the direct and ever present sovereignty of the living God by the Puritans in the English-speaking world of the seventeenth century? What were the major differences between the right-wing Calvinists of the Presbyterian type and the left-wing Puritan Independents both of whom acknowledged the sovereignty of the Lord over their lives as well as his sovereign saving grace in Christ crucified and risen and ascended?

Before we can answer this question we must note that the same tension between Presbyterians or Calvinists and Puritan Independents were to be observed in the English colonies on the Atlantic seaboard as in the motherland herself. The chief New England colony, Massachusetts Bay, represented essentially the same theocratic position as did the English Presbyterians such as Dod, Baynes, Preston and the two Goodwins. The Congregationalists in America on the other hand desired a somewhat looser form of ecclesiastical government, coercing schismatic or heretical individuals or churches through the civil authority rather than directly by Church courts. In both cases the elders and ministers constituted virtually a self-perpetuating corporation within the congregations. The congregationalism of the Cambridge Platform and the Presbyterian Puritanism of the Westminster Assembly alike represented the intolerant conservative republicanism of classical Reformed churchmanship. Of this Presbyterian intolerance, J. R. Tanner of Cambridge University, in his excellent lectures entitled *English Constitutional Conflicts of Seventeenth Century* points out:

The Presbyterian clergy [in England] were determined that no toleration should be allowed to the sects. "To let men serve God according to the persuasion of their own consciences," wrote one of them, "was to cast out one devil that seven worse might enter." "I am confident of it upon serious thoughts . . ." said another, "that if the Devil had his choice, whether the hierarchy, ceremonies and liturgy should be established in this kingdom or a toleration granted, he would choose and prefer a toleration before them." Yet a toleration was what the army [Cromwell's] agreed in demanding."<sup>60</sup>

In adopting this intolerant attitude towards the Independent Puritans in Cromwell's army, the Presbyterian clergy were of course only following the agelong tradition of the Western Church. As we saw, Thomas Aquinas was most intolerant of heretics. According to Joseph Lecler in his massive study of *Toleration and the Reformation*, the Angelic Doctor, like the Church of Rome as a whole, was "relatively tolerant towards pagans and completely intolerant towards heretics," stating explicitly that "to accept the faith is a matter of free will, but to hold it, once it has been accepted, is a matter of necessity." Lecler proves that the Reformers on the Continent inherited this intolerant tradition of the one true Faith and one true Church, and conceived themselves to be restoring these by rooting out the corruptions and abuses introduced by the papacy. For them, as for medieval theologians, Revelation had laid down the Holy Catholic Faith, professed, maintained and defended by one Catholic Church, so that heresy was as grave an aberration to the one as to the other.

Toleration, therefore, was neither an intrinsic principle of the Reformation, nor a logical expression of Protestantism; and Zwingli could drown Manz, and Calvin could connive at the judicial execution of Servetus with as much conviction as had the Papal Inquisition when it sent Protestants to the stake. Lecler then shows that even if the medieval maxim of one Holy Roman Church and one Holy Roman Empire had been abandoned, the several national kingdoms, which developed from its broken unity were equally wedded to the new shibboleths of *cujus regio, ejus*

*religio* (of the prince, so of his religion) and of *ein Reich, ein Volk, eine Kirche* (one realm, one folk, one church). According to Lecler, and with his judgment we are bound by the massive evidence he adduces to agree, neither the principles of the Reformation nor the practice of the Reformers leaned to the toleration of dissent from the one Faith and one Church of their several territories. Lecler tells us that the Catholic humanists were the only exception to this generalization; for they strove earnestly and long for reconciliation by compromise and comprehension between Protestant and Papist, and hoped thereby to restore the unity of Christendom. As regards nations, he says, only "two great nations legalized tolerance—France and Poland; and both these countries were Catholic"; while, on the other hand, "amongst all the countries that were divided by the Reformation, England comes last in so far as tolerance is concerned." For Lecler toleration came to birth in Western civilization chiefly for reasons of political expediency and of state.<sup>61</sup>

Insofar as Lecler claims to have confined his study of toleration to the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, he may perhaps be excused for not giving the credit which they deserve to the English Independents who, unlike the sixteenth-century Catholic humanists and as a matter of the deepest religious conviction, did succeed in achieving religious toleration not only for Christians of differing views but also for Jews. Has Lecler never heard of Oliver Cromwell's granting of religious toleration to the Jews? As Tanner points out:

The establishment of religious liberty as the sects understood it was dearer to the heart of Cromwell and his advisers than any other single political object, and it might be said that the main purpose of the Instrument of Government was to make this unassailable for ever.<sup>62</sup>

In 1645 and 1646 the growth of these religious sects, many of them advocating political democracy as well as religious toleration, had been extraordinary. Most important, perhaps, was the propaganda carried on within the Army by John Lilburne even when in prison in New-

gate. Anglo-Saxon democracy was born in June, 1647, when at Newmarket and Triploe Heath the Puritan Army covenanted not to disband until its rights and liberties were assured. Democratic left-wing Puritanism had challenged the theocratic right wing of Presbyterian Calvinism.<sup>63</sup>

Even before the outbreak of the English Civil War there had been a similar out-break of left-wing Puritan sects against the Congregationalist theocracy in Massachusetts Bay. The first written constitution of the English-speaking world was the "Fundamental Orders of Connecticut" of 1639. Drawn up by seceders from Massachusetts, these Orders set neither religious nor property qualifications on the electoral franchise. Other refugees from the Bay Colony, led by Roger Williams, founded Rhode Island. Rhode Island had a strictly civil "covenant" which explicitly used the word "democratical" and provided for majority rule, government by consent, and religious toleration and due process of law. Roger Williams was thus the American counterpart of John Lilburne, and the left-wing Puritans of Rhode Island were the New World counterparts of the Old World democratic Puritans of Cromwell's army.

Roman Catholics sometimes cite Maryland as a democratic pioneer. But, as Nichols points out, this is "due to a confusion between democracy and toleration. While the Puritan Commonwealths based their governments on popular consent and discussion, Lord Baltimore ruled Maryland as absolute feudal owner and master."<sup>64</sup>

What were the main distinctions between these right-wing and left-wing Puritans, both of whom acknowledged the sovereignty of the Living God?

In the first place, they were distinguished by their view of the Church. The Puritan Independents had taken over from the Baptists the principle of the Church as being "gathered" by a "covenant." Such a gathered church was to be distinguished from a parish church, in which the whole community of all those baptized in infancy was included. Both Luther and Calvin had required that all children should be baptized in infancy, so that the whole population became included in the visible church's member-

ship. In this way both leaders had hoped to stress the outward objective nature of God's sovereign prevenient grace, and they hoped that children thus baptized in infancy would respond to God's grace by conversion, through growing up in a Christian home. According to L. B. Schenck in his *The Presbyterian Doctrine of Children in the Covenant*, Calvin's defence of paedobaptism and his championship of community religion were ultimately rooted in a single principle in his mind. While it was only to the children of baptized adults that he would administer baptism, this actually meant that he administered it to all children, since "to be a citizen of Geneva it was necessary to make a profession of faith in Christ."<sup>65</sup> Calvin knew that many who made this profession were not truly regenerate, and that many of the homes into which children were born were therefore not truly Christian; and he taught that in these cases baptism was unaccompanied by the promised blessing; but he did not profess to know with anything like certainty which or how many these cases were, and he was accordingly not deterred from a practice which at least ensured that the children of Christian parents should be adopted in the earliest infancy into the membership of the Church. By an extension of the same principle T. S. Eliot defines a Christian society as a society of "men whose Christianity is communal before being individual."<sup>66</sup>

A gathered church on the other hand consisted only of members who had made a conscious and deliberate "decision" for Christ as Lord and Savior and who were willing to testify that they had been "saved" and were willing to undertake exacting religious requirements in a "covenant." Many supporters of this type of Christianity were Arminian in their theology, and they were the religious precursors of Billy Graham in the twentieth century. Of this Arminian type of evangelism, Spurgeon later said that the spirit of its system leads directly to legality, for while Evangelical Arminians deny salvation by works the tendency of the errors they hold is to elevate the importance of the sinner's moral activity at the expense of God's saving grace and to direct emphasis primarily to the human will and endeavor. For Spurgeon this was the logical outcome



of a system which regards the human decision as the crucial factor in determining who is saved, and which represents faith as something which every man may call into exercise if he so chooses. "I could not preach like an Arminian," Spurgeon once said and he tells us why.

What the Arminian wants to do is arouse man's activity; what we want to do is to kill it once for all, to show him that he is lost and ruined; and that his activities are not now equal to the work of conversion; that he must look upward. *They* seek to make the man stand up; *we* seek to bring him down, and make him feel that he lies in the hand of God, and that his business is to submit himself to God and cry aloud, "Lord, save, or we perish." We hold that man is never so near grace as when he begins to feel he can do nothing at all. When he says, "I can pray, I can believe, I can do this, and I can do the other," marks of self-sufficiency and arrogance are on his brow.

Arminianism, by making the love and salvation of God to turn upon the fulfilment of conditions on the part of the sinner instead of entirely upon sovereign grace, encourages an error which cannot be too strongly opposed; Do you not see at once that this is legality, that this is hanging our salvation upon our work—that this is making our eternal life to depend on something we do? Nay, the doctrine of *justification* itself, as preached by an Arminian, is nothing but the doctrine of salvation by works after all; for he always thinks faith is a work of the creature, and a condition of his acceptance. It is as false to say that man is saved by faith as a work, as that he is saved by the deeds of the law. We are saved by faith as a gift of God, and as the first token of his eternal favour to us; but it is not faith as our work that saves, otherwise we are saved by works; and not by grace.<sup>67</sup>

Fortunately, the actual practice of these Arminian Puritans was much better than their theology, and their covenant type of church was the spiritual progenitor of the later democratic type. As Lord Lindsay of Balliol College, Oxford University, pointed out in his standard work, *The Churches and Democracy*:

The inspirers of democracy in seventeenth-century England were the Anabaptists and the Independents, and finally the Quakers. This, not simply because they

had taken more literally and centrally than others the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers, but because they had insisted on the self-governing congregation. That meant that they had practical and indeed daily experience of a fellowship united in a common purpose beyond themselves to which purpose each and every member was found to have something to contribute. Democracy was, therefore, for them a mystical institution from the practical experience in which it realized itself.<sup>68</sup>

In other words our political democracy in England and America was later to arise out of this Puritan experience of church democracy. People who chose and elected their own pastors naturally soon demanded the same right to elect their magistrates and politicians. This congregational covenant of the gathered church had therefore in effect individualized the original Reformed covenant between God and his people. Every single individual became a church member only by deliberately undertaking personal responsibility for testimony and good conduct, and the left-wing Puritan church was constituted by a social contract of such members under God's law. The latter had its equivalent in the "governmental compact" of such political thinkers as Althusius, Goodman, and Hotman, in the name of which they called upon rulers to give an account to the people. As J. H. Nichols points out:

The gathered church was an association constituted by the voluntary adherence of each of its individual members to the specific constitution instituted by Jesus Christ. The political equivalent of the gathered church, consequently, was the "social contract", according to which the political community itself was conceived as constituted by an explicit or tacit "owning of the covenant" by each citizen. In these matters John Locke, the classic theorist of Anglo-American democracy, showed himself a true son of the Puritan Independents.<sup>69</sup>

What had thus happened was that the Calvinist vocation of the "lesser magistrates" to enforce the moral law had become extended to include all private persons in their capacity as citizens. A revolution in politics which the old Greek Sophists had longed for with such passion and which

Aristotle and Aquinas and the Roman Catholic Church had prevented for so long had at last taken place in America. Of this amazing development, Woodhouse says in his great work *Puritanism and Liberty*, "The consciences of common men were a new phenomenon in politics and one that has never since disappeared."<sup>70</sup> The great constitutional lawyer of England, the late A. V. Dicey, referring to this doctrine of individual responsibility, says:

The first [of these basic principles of Constitution] is that every wrongdoer is individually responsible for every unlawful act in which he takes part, and what is really the same thing looked at from another point of view, cannot, if the act be unlawful, plead in his defense that he did it under the orders of a master or superior. This doctrine of individual responsibility is the real foundation of the legal dogma that the orders of the king himself are no justification for the commission of a wrongful or illegal act. The ordinary rule, therefore, that every wrongdoer is individually liable for the wrong he has committed, is the foundation on which rests the great constitutional doctrine of ministerial responsibility [to Parliament].<sup>71</sup>

H. Richard Niebuhr has warned us that we are not to think of these left-wing Puritans as motivated by purely political considerations. Whatever political fruits were later born out of their strivings, they were directly due to the great Puritan belief in the sovereignty of the Lord. Thus he writes,

From the fundamental conviction of divine sovereignty it moved on to three further positions which were defended by all parties, though with different means and varying strength. We may designate these three positions as Christian constitutionalism, the independence of the church, and the limitation or relativization of human sovereignty. All three of these ideas have left their impress upon American life, though their significance does not lie in their social results save for a point of view which regards God as having been made for America rather than America for God.<sup>72</sup>

The Puritans believed that since God is the source of all power and value, his nature and his will, rather than

human nature and human desires or ideals, should be consulted in all human actions. Again, if God is really the beginning and the end, then his character and intention need to be learned from his Word and not prescribed to him by means of ideas of his will supposedly gained from a study of the dictates of human reason, as Thomas Aquinas supposed. God's revelation of himself in his Word thus became for the Puritans the only basis for the organization of life under his sovereignty. To live as a citizen of God's kingdom meant for them to make the Bible their frame of reference and ultimate point of reference. Speaking of the relation between Puritanism and the constitutional building of early America, Richard Niebuhr remarks:

Connections between the Christian constitutionalism of the constructive Protestants and the political constitutionalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were intimate and close. It has been frequently suggested that the former was dependent on the latter. Yet the basis of the one was the idea of the sovereign people and of the other the faith in the sovereign God, and this divergence in source led to dissimilarity and conflict as well as to association. It is not evident that Christian constitutionalism owed more to its political cousin than the latter owed to the former, or that the dynamic of the popular will led more to life and movement under the constitution than did the dynamic of the divine will.<sup>73</sup>

The second distinction between conservative Calvinism and left-wing Puritanism lies in the emphasis the Independents placed upon the continuing role of the Holy Spirit in illuminating the mind of the Church. Both Calvin and Luther had believed that the Bible could only be truly and existentially interpreted by means of the inward testimony of the Holy Spirit. In the intervening century, however, little had been made of the continuing work of revelation, as Calvinism and Lutheranism lapsed into Scholastic rationalistic objectivism. The Congregationalists and Quakers amongst the Puritans now developed Calvin's argument extensively and lived in a vivid apprehension of the presence and guidance of the Holy Spirit.<sup>74</sup>

The political counterpart of this Quaker method and principle of "waiting upon the Lord" became in due course

the principle of government by discussion. Lindsay has shown how this takes place in his *Essentials of Democracy*,<sup>75</sup> being at pains to make clear that liberal Anglo-American democracy does not merely consist in counting heads or establishing the strongest pressure group. Democracy means entering into discussion, the submission of diverse points of view to mutual criticism with the intention of discovering some new understanding of the truth. The Roman Catholic priest cannot possibly enter into the democratic process because he cannot admit the possibility of God's continuing revelation and the discovery of new truth through the group. For the Roman Catholic, Truth is what is laid down by the pope and in the Canon Law. The most dramatic illustrations of this fundamental aspect of democratic practice among our Puritan ancestors are to be found in such examples as the silent waiting of Oliver Cromwell and his "Ironsides" upon the Lord in prayer before going into battle against the Royalists at Marston Moor in Yorkshire. The Puritan conviction was, in the words of John Robinson just before he set sail for the New World in the Mayflower, that "the Lord has more truth yet to break forth out of His Holy Word."

As Christian democrats we believe that it is only by letting the minority first have its say that a Bill should become law. Our form of parliamentary and congressional government means legislation by the whole House or Senate by a method we call debate. Spokesmen of the minority party share in this debate just as freely as spokesmen of the majority. The vote comes at the end; but what comes at the end is not really what lies at the heart of our Christian constitutionalism. In our opinion as Protestants the debate is far more important than the division. For it is the debate that makes it possible for opinions to be formulated and exchanged; the debate enables representatives of different points of view to persuade one another of the merits of their case; the debate affords a constant possibility of adjustment and compromise. In this process the minority which may not always be conscious of itself as a minority participates on equal terms.

Such a method of government by discussion and debate requires our system of political parties, without which it would be impossible to provide for genuine popular discussion of public policy. Our Protestant emphasis upon the duty of all Christian citizens to speak out their mind and to take part in debate upon matters of public importance has provided a unique religious support for our system of the "loyal opposition." Neither Roman Catholic nor Eastern Orthodox societies have been able to produce the common dedication and the faith in discussion and debate which is the presupposition of the loyal opposition. In all Roman Catholic countries there has never emerged a truly party system. Either one was a Roman Catholic and therefore anti-democratic or he was an atheist or secularist and democratic and therefore anti-clerical. As a result, because France and Spain and Italy never experienced the Puritan Revolution they have not been able to make democracy work since the party in power has tended to look upon the party in opposition as a potential enemy of the state. Even in France and Spain today dictators decide all real matters of policy.

The final and most important distinction between right-wing and left-wing Puritanism was the demand made by the Independents for toleration and therefore for a separation of church from state. So long as the Christian magistrate was duty bound to realize the "holy community" according to the pattern laid down by Christ, an aristocracy of the "saints" would be inevitable. Thus Massachusetts Bay and New Haven had both confined the franchise to church members and, like Calvin's Geneva and Knox's Scotland, expected the state to enforce church discipline. The "Levellers" in England and Roger Williams in America on the other hand sought to free the civil authority from all such theocratic and ecclesiastical control. The state, they argued, should be guided in its action only by those moral laws accessible to the reason and conscience of even unregenerate men. As J. H. Nichols puts it:

They postulated a civil state subordinate only to the ethical norms known to all rational men. They wanted no ecclesiastical or biblical authorities smuggled into the domain of this law of nature.<sup>76</sup>

Williams realized how closely interwoven were the threads binding church and state, going back as they did into the early middle ages when the feudal landlords and rulers had first used the Church of Christ to further their own political and ideological ends. Separation of church and state with its necessary corollary of religious toleration could not be introduced into British societies without undermining the whole basis of the old territorial church-state system, thereby loosening the whole order of society. As such it was a political problem as well as a religious one. How can we establish society upon a purely political basis without undermining the whole social order? If the state can no longer depend upon the church to provide it with its moral and ethical norms and standards, upon what can it depend?

Such questions involved nothing less than a new political philosophy of the state. Of the difficulty of these problems facing Williams, Vernon Louis Parrington has written:

No other man in New England comprehended so fully the difficulties involved in the problem, as Roger Williams, or examined them so thoroughly; and out of his long speculations emerged a theory of the commonwealth that must be reckoned the richest contribution of Puritanism to American political thought. Religious toleration was only a necessary deduction from the major principles of his political theory. He was primarily a political philosopher rather than a theologian—one of the acutest and most searching of his generation of Englishmen, the teacher of Vane and Cromwell and Milton, a forerunner of Locke and the natural rights school, one of the more notable thinkers that the English race has produced. His life was devoted to the problem of discovering a new basis for social reorganization.<sup>77</sup>

Richard Niebuhr takes strong exception to Parrington's humanistic belief that the significance of Puritanism in

early America can only become clear if "we will take the trouble to translate dogma into political terms." Especially does Niebuhr object to Parrington's view which we have just quoted that Williams was primarily a political philosopher rather than a theologian; and that religious toleration was a necessary deduction from the major principles of his political theory. Of these statements Niebuhr tartly comments, "To social interpreters like Parrington political and economic interests are alone real and the language of politics and economics is the only language."<sup>78</sup>

We would agree with Niebuhr in his judgment that Williams must first of all be understood as a deeply religious man. Williams did not advocate religious toleration as a matter of reason of state as Lecler suggests European rulers did, but as a matter of Christian principle. It was not because he believed all truth relative that he advocated toleration. On the contrary, as Niebuhr says, "Despite the modern tendency to interpret Roger Williams as primarily a political thinker, it seems impossible that one should read his writings without understanding that he also like Thomas More . . . was first a churchman. He was a seeker, discontent with every institutional religious organization. In spirit he was the most other worldly of all the New Englanders, a Protestant monk."<sup>79</sup> We think that Niebuhr is right in affirming that Williams was indeed a deeply religious man, but we have to agree with Parrington that he did try to locate the basis of society in Natural Law rather than in the Word of God. According to Parrington, the development of Williams' thought falls into three stages: (1) the substitution of the compact theory of the state for the divine right theory of such Royalist Anglicans as Mainwaring and Sir Robert Filmer; (2) the rejection of the suppositious compact of the early Reformed thinkers such as Althusius and the fictitious abstract state—still postulated by many thinkers—and the substitution of a realistic conception of the political state as the sovereign repository of the social will, and the government—or agent of the state—as the practical instrument of society to achieve its desired ends; and (3) the difficult problem of creating the necessary machinery of a democratic common-



wealth suitable to conditions as they existed in Rhode Island.

In his substitution of the compact theory or covenant conception of political obligation for that of divine right, Williams was brought face to face with the fundamental assumption of the Massachusetts theocracy, based on Scripture, that the political state is established and sanctioned by God—an assumption that was freely used to justify the coercion of conscience. As a theologian, Williams critically examined the biblical authorities, and while conceding the divine source of government in general, he was careful to cut away all theocratic deductions from the Pauline assertion that “the powers that be are ordained of God.” In a letter to the Town Clerk of Providence Williams writes, “Government and order in families, towns, etc. is an ordinance of the Most High, Romans 13, for the peace and good of mankind.”<sup>80</sup> At the same time he agreed with Richard Hooker in discovering this order of government to be grounded in God’s natural rather than revealed law; that is, the state is an order of creation rather than of grace. The state is divine in origin because it is natural. Thus Christ himself had properly distinguished between the things that concerned the state and those that concerned the church. Accordingly, he concluded from this distinction that the affairs of state must be kept separate from ecclesiastical affairs. “A Civil Government is an ordinance of God to conserve the Civil peace of the people, so farre as concerns their Bodies and no farther.”<sup>81</sup>

Williams never retreated from this view that the state can never coerce the individual in his intellectual and religious opinions, because such an interference is beyond the state’s natural prerogatives. He says:

Every lawful magistrate whether succeeding or elective, is not only the Minister of God, but the Minister or servant of the people also (what people or nation soever they be all the world over), and that Minister or Magistrate goes beyond his commission who intermeddles with that which cannot be given him in the commission from the people.<sup>82</sup>

Having thus reduced the right of the magistrate to force men's religious obedience, Williams next worked out a theory of the origin and nature of the state. Accepting the major postulates of the compact theory of the state as this had been developed during the later Middle Ages, namely, that government is a man-made institution, that it rests on the consent of the governed, and that it is founded on the assumed equality of the subjects, Williams showed that these ideas had found living expression in current American political experience and practice. Had not Independents and Separatists "gathered" together by means of such a "social covenant"? Had not the Pilgrim Fathers made the Mayflower Compact? Had not Richard Hooker drawn up the Connecticut Compact? In short, Williams understood the origin of the state in terms of his Congregationalist experience of the origin of his church. In their definition of the Church it is not primarily the body of saints called together by Christ, but a collection of individuals who have come to share the same religious experiences and convictions. Perry Miller in his important book *The New England Mind* has suggested a definite relation between the congregational form of church polity and the Separatists' political philosophy.<sup>83</sup>

Such an individualistic political outlook had been conditioned by Peter Ramus who developed a so called "Protestant logic." Ramus placed in the human reason, which is the instrument of logic, a certain content of truth, which is set forth by judgments and axioms. For Ramus human reason is endowed with knowledge which can be set forth in propositions. The certainty of truth must therefore be sought in the thinking self-consciousness.<sup>84</sup>

Since all church members share this reason, enlightened as it is by grace, they may join together to form a church. Beyond the individual member there is for Williams no higher ecclesiastical authority. The individuals themselves contract to form a church "covenant," whose basis is the common will of the members. For Williams the church is thus a religious organization, thought of as a voluntary society composed of strict and exclusive believers who having decided to accept Christ as Lord and Savior, then with-

draw themselves from the world to maintain themselves unsullied by its surrounding sinfulness. Williams believed that the legal status of any church should be made identical with that of a trading company or business corporation. According to Williams a church is a corporate body with corporate rights, and the several members enjoy all the freedoms and privileges that inhere in them by law and nature in their civil capacity. The character of its membership and the content of its creed are of no different concern to the civil magistrates than those of any other corporation. As regards the old established state churches of Europe, Williams writes, "The state religion of the world is a Politic invention of men to maintain the civil state." At greater length his thesis runs:

The Church or company of worshippers (whether true or false) is like unto a . . . corporation, society, or company . . . in London, which companies may hold their Courts, keep their Records, hold disputations and in matters concerning their society, may dissent, divide, breake, into Schismes and Factions, sue and implead each other at Law, yea wholly break up and dissolve, into pieces and nothing, and yet the peace of the Citie not be in the least impaired, or disturbed: because the essence or being of the Citie, and so the well being and peace thereof is essentially distinct from those particular Societies; the Citie-Courts, Citie-Lawes, Citie-punishments distinct from theirs. The Citie was before them, and stands absolute and intrue, when such a Corporation or Societie is taken down.<sup>85</sup>

If the church for Williams becomes a corporate body solely devoted to religious purposes, the state also becomes conceived of as an organization devoted to solely secular and civic functions. It is the product of social necessity. So far from being the product of some original compact made long ago in pre-historic times it was the product of a present and actual "covenant" entered into between the several members of a free community for their common goverance. Nor was this American "covenant" an unyielding constitution of Burke's later irrevocable compact but rather something flexible and responsive to changing conditions. In short, for Williams the state is a mutual

agreement, arrived at frankly by discussion and compromise, to live together in a political union, organizing the life of the commonwealth in accordance with the dictates of right reason, natural justice and utility. The state exists, not as the secular arm of religious theocracy, but as an instrument for regulating the relations of what Augustine had called the "exterior man." The only right the state has to exist is for the sake of order and the restraint of crime and thus to provide a basis for society.

From this conception of the origin of political obligation as a social "covenant" made between equals and arising out of the exercise of their rational wills, Williams derived a new locus for sovereignty. Rejecting Hobbe's conception of the state as the repository of a fictitious abstract sovereignty, he located sovereignty in the total body of citizens within a given community, acting in their political capacity. The state is merely the political machinery devised by the sovereign people to effect definite ends. And since the single end and purpose for which the body of citizens erects a state is the furtherance of the common good, the government becomes a convenient instrument to serve that common good, responsible to the sovereign people, and strictly limited by the terms of the social agreement. Thus Williams writes:

The Sovereign power of all civill Authority is founded in the consent of the People that every Commonwealth hath radically and fundamentally. The very Common-weales, Bodies of People . . . have fundamentally in themselves the root of Power, to set up what Governments and Governors they shall agree upon.<sup>86</sup>

Since governments are but "derivatives and agents immediately derived and employed as eyes and hands and instruments," the state or sovereign people can make their "own severall Laws and Agreements . . . according to their severall Natures, Dispositions, and Constitutions, and their Common peace and welfare."<sup>87</sup> In a famous passage Williams states:

From this Grant I infer . . . that the Sovereign, originall and foundation of civill power lies in the

People . . . And if so, that People may erect and establish what forme of Government seemes to them most meete for their civill condition. It is evident that such Governments as are by them erected and established, have no more power, nor for no longer time, than the civill power or people consenting and agreeing shall betrust them with. This is clear not only in Reason, but in the experience of all commonwealths, where the people are not deprived of their naturall freedom by the power of Tyrants.<sup>88</sup>

For Williams, then, the state is society working consciously through experience and reason, to secure for the individual citizen the largest measure of freedom and well-being. It is armed with a potential power of coercion but only to serve the ends of justice. In such a state, government can exist only by making converts to sound reason, and by compromise and discussion and not by force, and above all by a public system of education in which the citizens will be brought up to think and speak as American citizens rather than as Christian churchmen and so learn the meaning of democracy as government by the will of the majority.

Enough has been said, we hope, to prove that Williams' political theory has moved a long way from the basic postulates of the Reformation. The issue is ultimately one of God's sovereign will or of man's autonomy and natural reason. In theory Williams no doubt still accepted the idea of the sovereignty of God. In actual political practice he had come to adopt the traditional appeal to reason and natural law. Having received no guidance from Calvin in just how to work out the doctrine of divine sovereignty into a Christian theory of politics, Williams perforce had to turn to the received medieval political tradition, which located the realm of human politics in the sphere of the natural. Taking hold of whatever there was available in the political heritage of the Western world, Williams worked out a liberal humanist theory of politics, not realizing that in so doing he had helped to introduce the main heresy of the modern world, the doctrine (or perhaps assumption rather than doctrine) that it is man's rational will

rather than God's revealed will which must henceforth decide man's conduct in the field of law, politics and the state.

Of this seventeenth-century tendency to find man's salvation in man's natural reason and in natural law, Paul Hazard has well said:

Natural law was the offspring of a philosophy which rejected the supernatural, the divine, and substituted, for the acts and purposes of a personal God, an immanent order of Nature. It further proceeded from a rational tendency which affirmed itself in the social order. To every human being certain inherent faculties are attached, and, with them, the duty of putting them to their natural use. Finally, it derived from a sentiment or state of feeling; the authority which at home arbitrarily determines the relations between subject and ruler, and which, abroad is the cause of nothing but wars, must be done away with, and replaced by a new law, from which happiness may perhaps result, a political law which shall regulate the relations of the various peoples imbued with the idea that they themselves are the architects of their own destiny.<sup>89</sup>

Having thus done his best to take religion out of politics, Williams laid down twelve theses, of which the following reach the heart of the matter:

(1) God requireth not an uniformity of Religion to be inacted and enforced in any civill state; which enforced uniformity (sooner or later) is the greatest occasion of civill Warre, ravishing of conscience, persecution of Jesus Christ in his servants and of the hypocrisie and destruction of millions of souls.

(2) It is the will and command of God, that . . . a permission of the most Paganish, Jewish, Turkish or Antichristian consciences and worships bee granted to all men in all Nations and Countries: and they are only to be fought against with the Sword which is only in soule matters able to conquer, to wit, the Sword of God's Spirit, the Word of God.

(3) True civility and Christianity may both flourish in a state or Kingdom notwithstanding the permission of divers and contrary consciences, either of Jew or Gentile.<sup>90</sup>

Of this doctrine of toleration Vernon Parrington writes, "It was not toleration in the narrow sense of benevolent non-interference by an authority that refrained from exercising its reserved right, that Roger Williams was interested in; it was rather religious liberty as a fundamental human right, that had never been surrendered to the civil power, that lay beyond its jurisdiction and was in no way answerable to it."<sup>91</sup>

While wholeheartedly commending Williams for this demand for religious liberty and complete religious toleration, we must disagree with his naive belief in the possibility of community between men upon the basis of their common reason and in terms of an appeal to natural law, apart from a common allegiance to the rule of Christ. In this theory of Williams we have the major historical factor in the rise of the modern secular humanist idea of a human society based upon a common reason rather than upon a common religion. Williams deliberately founded his position on tolerance on a philosophic basic. That basis is his doctrine of the place of reason in religion. He subordinates religious conviction to the law of sufficient reason. As Cassirer says, "Though the human mind is dependent on revelation for the full measure of saving truths, yet it remains, nevertheless, the measure of their possibility." Of Williams and later Puritans, Cassirer points out that they took as their motto the text in Proverbs, "The spirit of a man is the Candle of the Lord" (20:27), but he says, "they took that spirit to be reason. Reason discovers what is Natural; and Reason receives what is supernatural. To go against Reason is to go against God." Cassirer then warns to bear in mind that "the reason upon which they would base religious faith is rather practical reason than theoretical reason. The a priori of pure morality is the starting point of their doctrine; and from here they ascend to religious belief on the one hand: and on the other to the sphere of metaphysical certainty, to speculative knowledge of the nature of the soul and of the intelligible world."<sup>92</sup>

To Puritans and Prelatists alike, Williams in effect said: Unite on essentials and agree to differ on non-essentials. But how does a man distinguish between these

two? Williams answered by improvement of one's reason, by its employment in the fields of science and of moral conduct, and above all, by its employment about the truths of Natural Religion. In this appeal to the same fundamental ideas of reason and natural law as the basis for common social action, we may discover the origin of the modern secular belief in the possibility of community apart from a common allegiance to the rule of Christ, as well as the secular humanist hatred of all specifically Christian social and political action. It is not difficult to see in Williams' theory of a civil state subordinate only to ethical norms known to all rational men the thin edge of the humanistic wedge which in the so-called "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth century was to deify the human reason in the manner we have already described, making the claim for a new morality based upon pure reason rather than upon the pure Word of God, and demanding in the French and Communist revolutions reliance upon *civic* virtues, *civic* institutions and *civic* education.

By accepting a so-called "natural" realm of civil polity as a concrete area of life not needing to be reformed by the living Word of God, not only did Roger Williams give a foothold to the revolutionary mind of apostasy in the form of a later scientific humanism to wage war upon the people of Christ, but in addition he gave enormous encouragement to the process by which Anglo-American-Canadian Christianity became divorced from the concrete issues of daily life. Henceforth, Anglo-Saxon political, social and economic life was to become progressively more divorced from "religion" which became confined to chapel and church.

Williams did not realize the imperative need for a truly biblically-based theory of law, politics and the state. If the Word of God is the Christian's lamp unto his feet and if faith in Christ alone is to be one's only guide in this life, then it surely follows that the Christian will seek God's will also in the political and social sphere. If in Scripture alone we can discover the will of the sovereign God, then we will want to develop a view concerning the basis of justice and law and government which is not only external to that Word of God but which finds its roots there. Again if the life of



faith in Christ is solely significant for the Christian person, then he will not try to live by the light of nature or by an unregenerate human reason after he has been set right with God. Can we indeed speak of justice and law without thinking of a divine law-giver?

Summing up our discussion may we not claim that Williams had in effect replaced his faith in the living God of the Scriptures by another faith in his own inner light and reason? Williams mistook the failures of Christians in the past to treat their fellow men tolerantly as a proof that organized Christianity as such was to blame. But this simply does not follow. The Christian is commanded by Christ to love the sinner no matter how much he may detest the sins of the sinner. In the absence of a truly Christian theory of politics, law and government, men like Williams had recourse to the traditional political doctrine of Stoicism as this was being revived by Grotius, Pufendorf and Locke. Williams did not realize that this natural law doctrine had an origin foreign to the Reformation and that it involved tendencies and consequences which would lead away from the Reformation brought about in Western Christianity.

#### G. Dooyeweerd's Answer

The problem of the relation between church and state and between state and religion is still with us in all parts of the Western world. For though, as Williams saw, the earthly state is independent of the church as a temporal institution of God's common grace and vice-versa, since both are modally limited authorities in the Kingdom of God, the central religious claim of Jesus Christ can never be reconciled with a really totalitarian apostate secular state whether this calls itself liberal, democratic or communist.

Whenever the earthly state tries to infringe upon the rights and liberties of the other sovereign spheres of society and especially upon the sphere of the temporal church institution by destroying the liberties of Christians to worship God and to educate their own children in the fear and nurture of the Lord in Christian day schools as well as to serve God in Christian labor unions, and business and farm

organizations, conflict between Christian citizens and apostate governments will be inevitable just as long as Christians remain true to their allegiance to God's Kingdom and acknowledge Christ's sovereignty over human life in its entirety. Here we have the origin of the struggle between true and false religion, between the city of God and the city of Satan, *e.g.*, the present life and death struggle being waged by faithful Christians in East Germany, in Soviet Russia, and in Red China.<sup>93</sup>

Dooyeweerd teaches that the traditional Christian solution of the problem of the relation which should exist between church and state is no real solution of the problem at all. It allows a false form of state to exist by denying as a matter of principle that the earthly state needs to be reformed in the light of fundamental Christian basic motives of God's sovereignty as declared in his Word. At the same time it introduces the false notion of a limited rule of Christ over his followers. As a result Christ is confined by most modern English-speaking Christians strictly to the sphere of the supernatural, the ecclesiastical and sacramental, and the preaching of the Gospel.

This having been done, neither the state nor the church as a temporal institution of this world nor the central religious rule of Christ can be seen for what it really is according to the constitutive will of God as revealed to man in the Holy Scriptures. As we saw in our study of Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique of the supposed neutrality of scientific thought (Chapter II), the so-called "facts" of Western political life cannot be truly seen in their real light until we have abandoned the so-called "positive facts" of the secular humanistic doctrine of man's life in society as well as of his basic political and legal concepts; and then, illumined in the depths of our hearts by the powerful Word of God, we are given the true ordering principle of human life in terms of which we are brought to "see" the religious root of our temporal existence in God's creation ordinances and the structural principles for human society.

Some words used by C. N. Cochrane in the preface to his *Christianity and Classical Culture* would for Dooyeweerd

apply not only to classical culture but to modern post-Christian culture as well. Writing of the Emperor Augustus Caesar's efforts to create a world which would be safe for civilization, Cochrane says:

From this standpoint, such originality as the emperor exhibited was merely one of method. In this sense, however, his settlement may well be accepted as the last and not least impressive undertaking of what we may venture to call "creative politics."

The history of Graeco-Roman Christianity resolves itself largely into a criticism of that undertaking and of the ideas upon which it rested: viz. that it was possible to attain a goal of permanent security, peace, and freedom through political action, especially through submission to the "virtue and fortune" of a political leader. This notion the Christians denounced with uniform vigour and consistency. To them the state, so far from being the supreme instrument of human emancipation and perfectibility, was a straight-jacket to be justified at best as "a remedy for sin." To think of it otherwise they considered the grossest of superstitions.

The Christians traced this superstition to the acceptance of a defective logic, the logic of classical "naturalism," to which they ascribed the characteristic *vitia* of the classical world. In this connexion it is important to notice that their revolt was not from nature; it was from the picture of nature constructed by classical *scientia*, together with its implications for practical life. And what they demanded was a radical revision of first principles as the presupposition to an adequate cosmology and anthroplogy. The basis for such a revision they held to lie in the logos of Christ, conceived as a revelation, not of "new truth," but of truth which was as old as the hills and as everlasting. This they accepted as an answer to the promise of illumination and power extended to mankind, and, thus, the basis for a new physics, a new ethic and above all, a new logic, the logic of human progress. In Christ, therefore, they claimed to possess a principle of understanding superior to anything existing in the classical world. By this claim they were prepared to stand or fall.<sup>94</sup>

It is our firm conviction that Dooyeweerd has in fact revealed the defective logic of modern scientific humanism

by revealing its apostate religious motivation. As a result, he calls upon all Christians throughout the world to demand a radical revision of first principles as the presupposition to a truly adequate *Christian* cosmology and anthropology. The basis for such a revision Dooyeweerd holds to lie in the Word of God of Holy Scriptures. This he believes is the *only* answer to the vain promises of modern scientists and so-called scientific politics, and therefore, the basis for a new political and legal science. In other words, Christian political and legal thought must be done within the presuppositions of the Christian life- and world-view and in terms of the biblical doctrine of man as created in God's image rather than within the presuppositions of the scientific life- and world-view and in terms of the evolutionary atheistic doctrine of man as formulated by such men as Julian Huxley and Bernal and C. H. Waddington.

As Dooyeweerd sees it, we must stop thinking of both church and state in non-Christian terms. Thus he would reject both the Roman Catholic and the Baptist idea of church and state as being derived from pagan thought forms. Before he can even begin to discuss the relations which should exist between church and state he would have us clarify our minds as to what these structures mean. What then does Dooyeweerd understand by the concept "church"?

First, he insists that we distinguish between the idea of the "una sancta ecclesia" (one holy church) as the Body of Christ and the institutional temporal church, or in traditional terms as *ecclesia invisibilis* and *ecclesia visibilis*. Dooyeweerd says of the latter distinction, "I cannot say that I think this terminology particularly felicitous. It has been derived from the metaphysical antithesis between *noumenon* and *phenomenon*. However we need not at all interpret these terms in a speculative sense."<sup>95</sup>

It was because Augustine did not properly distinguish between the Church as the kingdom of Christ in the hearts of men and the temporal church institution, that he came to hold the erroneous opinion that the state can only become Christian by subjecting itself to the direction of the institu-

tional Catholic Church. As a result of his identification of the Church in its supra-temporal religious fulness of meaning as the body of Christ with the temporal church institution Augustine laid the foundation for the medieval view of the Holy Roman Empire, with its secular and spiritual sword, under the supremacy of the papacy.

According to this medieval view the "*ecclesia visibilis*," as the temporal manifestation of the "*ecclesia invisibilis*," that is, the supra-temporal body of Christ, became identified with the temporal Church institution. This latter spiritual institution was assumed to enjoy the transcendent fulness of power and the all-embracing scope of the "*ecclesia invisibilis*." During the same medieval period we have already noted the beginning of the deviation from the Christian conception of the state. Instead of being understood as a sovereign sphere of human life directly responsible to Almighty God, the medieval state became understood as the secular arm of the temporal church institution.

As a further result of this mistaken medieval Catholic equation of the visible Body of Christ with the temporal church institution, the medieval dualism between "nature" and "grace" became inevitable. For this medieval theory, temporal life belongs to the sphere of nature. Christ is not the direct King of secular life. The sphere of faith and religion is separate; it is the sphere of grace. Human society as such is not a part of the body of Christ, but in its inner structure and nature is worldly and devoid of grace. It has its origin and purpose in man's earthly existence and, as such, does not lead to eternal life. The only connection that the sphere of nature can have with the sphere of grace is by means of the temporal church institution. Society can be bound to Christ only through the church.

Of the political consequences of this "nature" and "grace" dualism, Dooyeweerd writes:

This universalistic conception of the Church institution was the erroneous starting point of the scholastic theory of human societal structures. It involved a compromise with the classical Greco-Roman view of the State as the perfect whole of human society inclu-

sive of the public religion. Fundamentally it was a manifestation of the "carnal desire" to deify the temporal Church-institution, to give the temporal authority of the Church dominion over the souls of the believers, and to guarantee the temporal Church the supremacy over the whole of societal life, including the secular government. The "*ecclesia visibilis*," viewed as the hierarchy of a sacramental institution of grace, with its monarchical culmination in the papacy, was as such supposed to transcend all the "secular" societal relationships and to embrace the whole of Christian life. In this universalistic conception the Church-institution is absolutized to the perfect Christian society.<sup>96</sup>

According to Dooyeweerd the only way modern Christians can today hope to avoid these evil consequences of the medieval synthesis of "nature" and "grace" is to maintain the biblical teaching that the invisible church or the Church as the Body of Christ includes far more than the mere institutional life of the church. The Church as the Body of Christ includes all of temporal human society insofar as it derives its life from the Lord Jesus Christ and employs its energy to advance his Kingdom and rule over the hearts of men. Thus a Christian marriage, family, state, school, or any other Christian relationship which acknowledges Christ as King of heaven and earth belongs to the visible Body of Christ on this earth just as much as does the visible temporal ecclesiastical institution. Dooyeweerd well says:

The *ecclesia visibilis* is not limited to the institutional Church, but in principle embraces all the structures of human society. The only Christian starting-point remains the supra-temporal "*ecclesia invisibilis*." In this religious radical community in Christ all temporal societal structures are equivalent to one another, just as all the different law-spheres are irreplaceable refractions of the fulness of meaning in Christ, each in its own modal structure.

Naturally this does not mean that from the viewpoint of temporal life all societal structures are of the same importance. It is quite evident that in this respect the institutional structures are much more fundamental than the structures of free associations.<sup>97</sup>

Just as Dooyeweerd rejects the collectivistic conception of the temporal church institution held by Roman Catholics, so he also repudiates the individualistic conception of the visible church held by the Baptists, Congregationalists and other modern church groups. The first modern scholar to distinguish between these two types of Christianity was the German scholar, Troeltsch, in his famous work *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*. Approaching his subject from the standpoint of a humanistically-motivated sociology derived from Simmel's formal tendency, Troeltsch declared that three types of Christianity had emerged in the course of history:

(1) The Church as an institution able to receive into itself the masses; and to adjust itself to the world by taking "up into its own life the secular institutions, groups and values which have arisen out of the relative Natural Law, and are adapted to the conditions of the fallen state."<sup>98</sup>

(2) The Sect, which for Troeltsch is a voluntary society composed of strict and exclusive believers, who having experienced "the new birth" withdraw themselves from the world to maintain themselves unsullied by the surrounding sinfulness. The Sect either does not recognize the institutions, groups and values which exist outside of Christianity at all, or in a quietly tolerant spirit of detachment from the world it avoids them, or under the influence of an enthusiastic eschatology it attacks these institutions and replaces them by a purely Christian order of society.<sup>99</sup>

(3) Mysticism, which is a purely personal and individual apprehension of religion. It leads "to the formation of groups on a purely personal basis which has no permanent form."<sup>100</sup>

According to Dooyeweerd, Troeltsch's conception of the church and sect type of Christianity and of the relation of both of these to the world of human culture stands and falls with his view concerning the "religious sociological basic schema of Christianity," which itself is dependent on the starting point of his "Religionssoziologie."

This latter sociological conception of religion is rooted in the historicistic immanence standpoint, according to which theoretic (scientific) thought has to

view the Christian religion, and all the temporal manifestations of the "corpus Christi" (Body of Christ) in societal life, merely as historical sociological phenomena. Their subjective meaning-content has to be approached according to a supposedly dogmatically unbiased scientific method. This method uses such "formal sociological idea types" as "church" and "sect," which are mere subjective schemes of thought and have not been based on the internal individuality-structures of the communities concerned. . . . Thus the inner nature of the temporal Church-institution is replaced by a schematic subjective "ideal type." Such a type is thought to be derivable from a particular moment of the religious-sociological basic scheme of the historical phenomenon "Christianity" and its rational subjective effects in historical development. The "ideal type" is then imposed on the phenomenon as *the* church-type and used to interpret all real church formations as historically determined nuances of one and the same basic sociological schema.

It stands to reason that in such a scientific attitude a truly normative structural idea of the institutional Church, ruled by the Biblical basic motive itself, cannot play any role. Instead, the kingdom of Jesus Christ in the hearts of men is interpreted in the sense of a universalistic sociological conception of the temporal Church-institution, inspired by the dialectical scholastic basic motive of nature and supra-natural grace.

In this way Troeltsch's ideal-type church is completely oriented to the medieval Roman Catholic view of the Holy Roman Empire under the papal supremacy. The primordial question as to whether this conception of the ecclesiastic institution is compatible with the Biblical meaning of the religious kingdom of Christ is not seriously taken into consideration. . . .

The result is that Troeltsch's church-type is nothing but a scientifically untenable generalization of a typical Roman Catholic social form in which the structural principle of the institutional Church has been realized. It is impossible that such an ideal type can do justice to the different Church-formations issued from the Reformation, let alone that it should be able to account for all facets of the modern Roman Catholic view of the Church. Rather it prevents the investigator from gaining an insight into the inner nature of the Church-institution *as such* guaranteed by its normative structural principle.



And without this insight the different social forms in which this structure has been realized cannot be related to one and the same structural type.<sup>101</sup>

Dooyeweerd then suggests that Troeltsch assumes as a matter of course that a polar tension must exist in the religious basic idea of the Gospel between religious individualism and religious universalism. By isolating the life and work of Christ from its Old Testament context, Troeltsch is forced to describe the relation between Christianity and the temporal-worldly ordinances in terms of the false dilemma of an ascetic avoidance of the world or a compromise with an inferior "nature." For Troeltsch the "church type" of Christianity must necessarily involve "universalistic tendencies" and strive after the "ecclesiastical unity of culture" under the leadership of the institution of grace; while the idea of a "free Church" must necessarily belong to a sectarian type of Christianity. Of this consequence of Troeltsch's humanistic methodology, Dooyeweerd declares that Ernst Troeltsch could not help going astray, when he tried to interpret the phenomena of Church and Sect from these a priori basic tenets.

The fact is that Troeltsch's humanistic abstractions of church and sect types of Christianity are both in conflict with the biblical transcendent stand-point, according to which a sect can never be equivalent to the temporal church institution. Dooyeweerd explains:

The sect-type [of Christianity] is of an individualistic-nominalistic origin and serves to construe the temporal Church-community from the "converted individuals" (who make up its membership). Insofar as it starts from the dialectical basic motive of nature and grace, it holds to the dualistic nominalist conception of the latter. Therefore it cannot be equivalent to the idea of the institutional Church when viewed from the Biblical standpoint. But we must immediately admit without any reserve that the rise of sects is often an indication of a process of decay in the Church institution.

As soon as the temporal Church-community is based on the personal qualities of converted individuals, it ceases to be a *Church*. According to the Biblical view of the latter the founding of our salvation is solely

to be sought in Christ Jesus and not in ourselves. He is the firm ground on Whom the temporal Church relationship is built. Apart from the fact that it is beyond human power to judge the hearts of our fellow men, the qualities of the individual Christians are a treacherous kind of quicksand for a church-formation. This is why the concept "association" does not suit the institutional Church. The true Christian Church, in its institutional manifestation, is not built by men. Christ builds His Church by His Word and His Spirit, and not out of "converted individuals" but in the line of the Covenant. . . . If we believe Christ is to rule the temporal Church institution, we must acknowledge that He alone is the judge of the regeneration of individual members. Such judgement cannot be entrusted to men.

Any attempt to base the temporal Church community on personal regeneration is an act of interference with the authority of the King of the Church, a fundamentally revolutionary thought, inverting the relation between the *ecclesia visibilis* and the *ecclesia invisibilis*. The temporal Church community can only be an instrument of the Divine grace in Christ Jesus through the administration of the Divine Word and the sacraments. . . .

The sect considers the visible Church, in the sense of *congregatio fidelium* (congregation of the faithful) as a group of converted individuals and thereby misinterprets the divine structural law of the institutional Church. Although this institution cannot be built on the personal regeneration of its members, it remains qualified as a Christian faith-community in the organized administration of the Word and the sacraments, and as such it is necessarily an institutional manifestation of the *ecclesia invisibilis electorum*. The spiritually dead members are not really included in the invisible Church, although outwardly they behave like believers. They cannot be outwardly distinguished from the true believers by us, but they are left to the judgement of the King of the Church. Troeltsch says that these facts prove the unavoidable compromise embodied in the Church as an institution. But in the sect-type we find the same state of affairs, which is based on man's absolute incompetence to judge the heart of his fellow-men. The subjective intention to build the Church community from regenerated individuals alone cannot alter this fact.<sup>102</sup>

In the light of these considerations Dooyeweerd rightly considers that we must therefore discard Troeltsch's statement of the problem of the relation of Christians to human culture and to its social institutions including the institution of the state in terms of withdrawal or compromise or conquest.

As Dooyeweerd sees it, the only perspective in terms of which to truly understand the problem of the relation of church and state is to "see" the former as an institution of "special" grace and the latter as an institution of "general" or "common" grace. Dooyeweerd prefers the use of the term "temporal conserving grace" rather than "common grace" to denote the grace of God in Christ by which the temporal world order is preserved by limiting the consequences of the destructive power of sin. Thus, temporal life with its family, state, marriage, and economic relationships is preserved, even when renewing, regenerating grace is absent. God's conserving grace enables apostate culture to develop and unfold.

How does Dooyeweerd understand the relation between "regenerating grace" and "conserving grace"? He teaches that there is no grace or goodness of God in our sinful and fallen world apart from Jesus Christ, the Savior of the world. The grace of God, Father, Son and Spirit, operates in a twofold manner as conserving and renewing grace, both of which operate throughout the entire realm of human life. There is no question here of reintroducing as it were through the backdoor the medieval basic religious motive of "nature" and "grace." Life is not divided into two spheres of "conserving grace" and "regenerating grace." This Dooyeweerd makes clear:

We have defined this relation as follows: particular grace directly concerns the supra-temporal root of mankind, whereas common grace remains restricted to temporal life . . . . Common grace has its root and centre only in Christ as the incarnate Word. We opposed any kind of dualistic theory of "specific spheres of grace" which is essentially nothing but an after-effect of the dualistic basic motive of "nature" and "grace" . . . . "Gratia specialis" or "gratia particularis" really refer to the radical change brought

about by Christ Jesus in the apostate root of the whole temporal cosmos, which is concentrated in mankind; therefore, this "particular" grace bears a *radical-universal* character. Already in the *present* dispensation this radical change of direction in the root of life must necessarily reveal itself in temporal reality, in its conserving effect as well as in its regenerative operation. Its conserving effect is primarily manifest in the preservation of the temporal world-order by God in Christ Jesus, as the Head of the Covenant, so that the disintegrating effect of the fall into sin in temporal life is checked.

God does not renounce His creation, not even in its subjective apostasy. He maintains the temporal structures, which cannot find their creaturely root, their religious centre, in the spiritual of darkness. . . . In the full Scriptural sense of the word Christ Jesus is the "second Adam," in Whom nothing of God's creation can be lost. Only in Him all the nations of the earth are blessed. Only in Him is God willing to have mercy on his fallen creation, and only in Him can the conserving effect of common grace have its creaturely root. Outside of Him there is no Divine grace, no "common grace" either, but only the manifestation of God's wrath on account of sin. "Special grace," which we had better call "renewing" or "regenerating grace," only embraces the "ecclesia invisibilis," i.e. reborn mankind.<sup>103</sup>

By means of his special grace God is restoring the whole of his creation to its original splendor and glory. It is found at work in the world whenever and wherever the Christian attitude towards life expresses itself in word or deed or institution. For this reason Dooyeweerd rightly claims that the deeper unity between the two modes of God's grace becomes apparent insofar as it expresses the Christian spirit at work not merely in the cultic community of the temporal church institution but in the whole of life. Dooyeweerd says, "This is what Dr. Kuyper meant by his view of the 'Church as an organism' in which he clearly and fundamentally opposed the dualistic separation between 'special' and 'common grace.'"<sup>104</sup>

Dooyeweerd himself prefers the use of the expression "temporal manifestation of the body of Christ in all societal relationships" rather than Kuyper's term—the "church as

an organism." It is evident therefore that the "*ecclesia visibilis*" in this universal sense cannot be identical with the temporal Church institution, which remains bound to its specific structural principle and could only appear within history after the Lord's incarnation on Christmas Day. Yet, as Dooyeweerd makes clear, "The temporal revelation of the "*corpus Christi*," in its broadest sense, on the other hand, embraces all the societal structures of our temporal human existence, and made its entry into the world at the first manifestation of the antithesis between the *civitas Dei* and the *civitas terrena*."<sup>105</sup>

Granted Dooyeweerd's contention that the state is an institution of common rather than special grace ordained by God as a coercive power of government on account of human sinfulness, the question immediately arises, Is a Christian state possible? In answer to this question Dooyeweerd replies that we must realize from the outset that it is erroneous to identify this basic problem of every Christian theory of the body politic with the question about the relation between the State and a temporal institutional Church. Such an identification usually implies that the only possible manifestation of the Christian State is its subservience to the Church as an institution. Then the body politic has to use its power of the sword to suppress the promulgation of doctrines rejected by the Church as heretical.

He points out that this view is "not the outcome of a Christian way of positing the problem which starts from the radical Biblical basic motive," and he further suggests that "in this conception it is taken for granted that the State as such, *i.e.*, in its internal essential structure, cannot have a Christian character. This latter must be imparted to it from outside by means of a teleological attitude of subservience towards another temporal societal structure, *viz.*, the Church as an institution."<sup>106</sup>

As we have already suggested this question about the proper relation between church and state can only be correctly expressed after a proper insight has been gained into the internal structural principles of both church and state. If it can be shown that the structure of the state as

such cannot express itself in a Christian faith-community, then of course a Christian state would be impossible, because it would be prohibited by its own structural principal. Does the structural principle of the state prevent it becoming Christian? Dooyeweerd says, "The answer to this basic question is also decisive for the answer to the question whether a truly Christian politics is possible. Also in this case the primary question is not whether in a particular country and in a particular constellation of national conviction a Christian policy can be carried out, but if such a policy is possible according to the internal structure of the State as such."<sup>107</sup>

Before proceeding to answer this question, Dooyeweerd points out that no earthly state can avoid functioning in the modality of faith. He says, "Never can the State as a temporal societal relationship struggle free from the grasp of the sphere of faith, within which a higher will than its own has assigned a structural function to it. This is the astounding truth which must at least arouse every wavering mind from his dreams of political neutrality with respect to the life of faith. The State can no more be neutral in this respect than science. The political slogan of neutrality is as much under the leading of an attitude of faith and as certainly originates from a basic religious commitment as any other political conviction."<sup>108</sup>

The vital question at once arises: what faith does in fact motivate the state? Is it an apostate faith in man's sovereign reason or is it a faith in the sovereign God of the Holy Scriptures? According to these same Scriptures God has revealed himself as the sovereign source of all governmental authority and as the avenger of all that doeth evil (Romans 13:4). In God's holy will the two functions of the state's structure—power and justice—find their unity of origin. *No earthly state can obliterate these two functions of might and right without destroying its structural character as a state.* Dooyeweerd maintains this for one good reason: "In its function of belief every State remains subject to this politico-pisteutic revelational principle as to an unbreakable *political norm of faith.*"<sup>109</sup> He adds:

But this revelational principle in the "nature," i.e., in the internal structure of the State-institution, cannot be detached from the Word-Revelation. The latter reveals the State as an institution "ordained on account of sin" and thus connects it in the faith-aspect of experience with the fall into sin of the whole of mankind and the redemption in Christ Jesus. Without this Word-Revelation the political revelational principles become a "law of the flesh," a law of the sinful idolatry either of Ares or of Dike, or in whatever form the two radical functions of the State may be absolutized. And always this political apostasy is included in a process of opening and deepening of the modal function of faith, because the structure of the State can only realize itself at a *disclosed* level of culture. The political confession of faith in God's sovereignty over the life of the body-politic has from the start been typical of a Christian view of the State.

This confession would be deprived of its Christian sense if it were taken to mean nothing but the expression of a merely "natural belief," i.e., apostatized from the Word-Revelation. God's sovereignty over the State can only be accepted by us in its true sense if we recognize the "regnum Christi." Only in Christ as the Incarnate Word can we truly know and worship God as our Sovereign in the life of the State. Without the political confession of our faith in the "regnum Christi" our recognition of God's sovereignty will become idolatrous.<sup>110</sup>

For this reason the government of a people consisting largely of Christian citizens must in the political sphere as in all other spheres adopt a Christian motivation for its policy and conduct of the affairs of state. All temporal authoritative societal relationships ought to be earthly manifestations of the Body of Christ. A Christian state is a temporal manifestation of God's Kingdom just as much as a Christian temporal church institution, and it too must engage in struggle against the powers of darkness. Thus Dooyeweerd eloquently writes:

According to its faith-aspect the State is subject to Christ's kingship, which ought to find its own typical expression in the internal life of the State. Holy Scripture is too explicit on this subject for a Christian to be permitted to think that the structure of the State as such falls outside the Kingdom of Christ. According

to the Scriptures Christ is the "Prince of the kings of the earth." David's hundred and tenth Psalm, cited by Christ against the Pharisees, calls on all earthly kings and rulers to bow down under the Son's sceptre. All Messianic prophecy is unanimous on this point, though without increasing emphasis it points to the suffering and death of the Messiah as the road to the establishment of His Kingdom. The New Testament maintains this thought to the end of the Apocalypse, where the Incarnate Word appears as the King of Kings and the Lord of Lords. He is the Judge pronouncing the last judgment on the world, Who will beat down the heathen with the sword of His mouth and rule them with a rod of iron.

The Scriptural data exclude the view that according to its essential character the State, as an institution of common grace, has to live by the light of "natural" revelation only. This conception, moreover, essentially implies the acceptance of the dualistic basic motive of "nature" and "grace." A State that does not bow before Christ's sceptre and excludes Him from all political activities, although living in the light of the revealed Word, remains irrevocably lost in the *civitas terrena*, the kingdom of darkness. But God maintains the divine office and the divine structural law of the body politic also in this state.<sup>111</sup>

While thus teaching that the Christian state can and should make a political confession of its faith in Christ's sovereignty, Dooyeweerd is most careful to point out that this does not mean that in any of its manifestations the "Christian State" as such should have an ecclesiastical confession, or that the State ought to assign a public juridical position in political life to the institutional Church.

Such a view is incompatible with the structural principle of the body politic. The Christian State is not qualified as a Church community, but ought to respect sphere-sovereignty also in its function of faith. This is even the first fruit of a truly Christian policy; that the sphere sovereignty of the different societal structures ordained by God in His holy world-order is recognized and respected in all spheres of life. The State should not strain its power to dominate the internal societal relations that have received their own specific vital law from God. . . .



As a typical institution ordained on account of sin, the State can only be a temporal expression of the supra-temporal radical unity of governmental power and governmental justice in Christ Jesus. Christ is the King and Ruler of the State and the Redeemer from the disintegrating effect of sin in the life of the nations, i.e., He is the King of common grace.<sup>112</sup>

As Dooyeweerd thus understands it, the state no less than the church is called upon to be a temporal manifestation of God's Kingdom and it too must struggle against the powers of darkness. An apostate state thus has no future. By ascribing sovereignty to itself or another creature it serves the kingdom of darkness. As long as history continues there will never exist a state or a church which completely and transparently reflects the full glory and goodness of the Body of Christ. The struggle against all those forces of evil which seek to obscure Christ's absolute sovereignty over the lives of men and nations is therefore both internal and external in both church and state. The conflict between God and the powers of darkness and evil will continue until the Last Judgment. Here too in political life the great antithesis is at work.

We may conclude our summary exposition of Dooyeweerd's profound Christian philosophy of the state with some of his own words.

In the principle of the Christian State political life in its internal structure is directed towards Christ. The positive formation of the typical leading public juridical principles of the body politic is opened to give expression to Christ's kingship over the whole of the internal political life of this societal relationship. But this is only possible on the basis of the historical power that the Christian conception of the State has been able to secure in the national conscience. This should be the first goal of any political struggle for the Christian State.

The "Christian State" is certainly not a system of external formulas. If there is no Christian political community of faith uniting government and people, it is impossible for an official prayer, or the formula "by the grace of God" to impart a Christian character to the State. But the Christian character of public life in the body politic does not depend on the individual attitude

of faith of each of the subjects. Everything in the State depends on the character of this institution as a public community, on the spirit pervading all its communal activities.

If the life of Christian faith is considered to be only an *individual* concern, it is not possible for us to conceive a political Christian community of faith. Then the idea of a Christian State is a *contradictio in terminis*. But if we take this individualistic view seriously and do not shrink from thinking it out consistently, it is equally impossible for us to speak of a Christian community of faith in the *temporal institutional Church*.<sup>113</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Edward T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World, 30 B.C. to A.D. 138* (Methuen, London, 1944), pp. 27ff. Cf. also Oscar Cullman, *The State in the New Testament* (SCM Press, London, 1955); and Ethelbert Stauffer, *Christ and the Caesars* (SCM Press, London, 1955).

<sup>2</sup> C. N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture* (London, 1944), Chapter III on Roma Aeterna; The Apotheosis of Power, and pp. 126ff.

<sup>3</sup> Gertrude Himmelfarb, *Lord Acton* (London, 1955), p. 45.

<sup>4</sup> Joseph Lecler, *The Two Sovereignities: A Study of the Relationship Between Church and State*, translated by H. Montgomery (Burns Oates, 1952).

<sup>5</sup> S. L. Greenslade, *Church and State from Constantine to Theodosius* (SCM, London, 1954), p. 60. Cf. Noel King, *Theodosius and the Establishment of the Christian Religion*, (SCM Press, London, 1958).

<sup>6</sup> H. Evan Runner, *Christian Perspectives, 1961*, p. 82.

<sup>7</sup> See appendix Two for a full statement of this magnificent declaration.

<sup>8</sup> F. L. Ganshof, *Feudalism* (Translated by P. Grierson; Longmans, London, 1952), p. 3.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Luther P. Powell, *Money and the Church* (Association Press, 1962) According to Powell the watershed of Christian giving is decided by one's answer to the question: "On which side of Calvary are you living? Do you work *for* salvation or *from* it."

<sup>10</sup> J. P. Whitney, *Hildebrandine Essays* (Cambridge, 1932), p. 6. For the best introduction to medieval history, the reader should consult Previte-Orton's abridgement of the *Cambridge Medieval History* in his work *The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History* (Cambridge, 1952). Vol. I and Vol. II.

<sup>11</sup> Ernest Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, Vol. I, p. 216.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 218.

<sup>13</sup> Gerd Tellenbach, *Church, State and Christian Society* (Translated by R. F. Bennett; Blackwell, Oxford, 1940), pp. 25ff. and pp. 69ff.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 90ff. Also cf. James Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire* (Macmillan, London, 1876).

<sup>15</sup> For a useful account of this reform movement, consult Z. N. Brooke, *A History of Europe, 911-1198* (Methuen, London, 1938), p. 110. Chapter V. The Revival of Christianity. For a good history of the papacy, also consult Walter Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages* (Methuen, London, 1955), especially chapter IX on Gregory VII (Hildebrande).

<sup>16</sup> G. Barraclough, *The Origins of Modern Germany* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1946), pp. 101ff.

<sup>17</sup> Ullmann, *op. cit.*, p. 275ff.

<sup>18</sup> For a further discussion of this claim consult E. L. Mascall, *The Recovery of Unity* (Longmans, London, 1958), pp. 207ff.

<sup>19</sup> Steven Runciman, *The Eastern Schism* (Clarendon Press, London, 1959), and for an excellent account of Eastern Orthodox spirituality, see Vladimir Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church* (James Clarke, London, 1957).

<sup>20</sup> Gregory Dix, *The Shape of the Liturgy* (Dacre, London, 1954), pp. 597ff.

<sup>21</sup> A. G. Hebert, *Liturgy and Society* (Faber, London, 1949); Alfred Shands, *The Liturgical Movement and the Local Church* (SCM, London, 1959); Ernest B. Koenker, *The Liturgical Renaissance in the Roman Catholic Church* (Chicago, 1954); Massey Shepherd, *The Liturgical Renewal of the Church* (New York, 1960); J. D. Benoit, *Liturgical Renewal* (SCM, London, 1958).

<sup>22</sup> Michael Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820-1953*. Cf. also Appendix Five of my book, *Christian Action Movement in Canada*.

<sup>23</sup> J. S. Whale, *The Protestant Tradition*, pp. 284-285.

<sup>24</sup> Ernst Troeltsch, *Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, Vol. II, p. 461.

<sup>25</sup> T. M. Parker, *Christianity and the State in the Light of History* (Black, London, 1955), p. 45.

<sup>26</sup> Ernest Barker, *Church, State and Study*, (Oxford, 1948), p. 65.

<sup>27</sup> J. N. Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State* (Cambridge, 1935), p. 38. Dr. Figgis goes on to say that in the Middle Ages a churchman meant what we now mean by an ecclesiastic.

<sup>28</sup> K. S. Latourette, *A History of the Expansion of Christianity* (Harper, New York, 5th edition, 1939) Vol. II, p. 16, Vol. III, p. 51.

<sup>29</sup> Alan Gewirth, *Marsilius of Padua. The Defender of the Peace* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1958), Vol. I.

<sup>30</sup> Marsilius of Padua, *The Defensor Pacis* (Edited by C. Previte-Orton, Cambridge, 1928), Book I, vi, 8.

<sup>31</sup> Frederick G. Heymann, *John Zizka and the Hussite Revolution* (Princeton University Press, London, 1956), p. 2.

<sup>32</sup> Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, pp. 489-527.

<sup>33</sup> William Ferguson, *The Renaissance* (Holt, New York, 1940), Chapter I, The Background of the Renaissance, pp. 1-43.

<sup>34</sup> Ernst Cassirer: *The Myth of the State* (New Haven, Yale Paperback, 1961), p. 133.

<sup>35</sup> N. Machiavelli: *The Prince* (Dent, London, 1944), p. 117ff., also 137ff.

<sup>36</sup> Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State*, pp. 136 and 138.

<sup>37</sup> Federico Chabod, *Machiavelli and the Renaissance* (Bowes & Bowes, Cambridge, 1959).

<sup>38</sup> J. R. Tanner, *Tudor Constitutional Documents, 1485-1603*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 1930), p. 41.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47. The best most recent work on the Reformation is that by my former Tutor at Cambridge, the Rev'd. Professor W. O. Chadwick, *The Reformation* (Pelican, London, 1964). An older but still valuable work is that by Thomas M. Lindsay, *A History of the Reformation*, Vol. I and II (T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1946). Also the great Lutheran scholar, E. G. Schwiebert, *Luther and his times* (Concordia, Saint Louis, Missouri, 1950); also the great Calvinist scholar, John T. McNeill, *The History and Character of Calvinism* (Oxford Press, New York, 1954).

<sup>40</sup> For a good account of this Canon Law, see the introduction to *The Canon Law of the Church of England* (SPCK, London, 1947).

<sup>41</sup> Bertram L. Woolf, *The Reformation Writings of Martin Luther* (Lutterworth Press, London, 1952), Vol. I, p. 32. For a brilliant account of the development of Luther's theology see Gordon Rupp, *The Progress of Luther to the Diet of Worms, 1521* (London, 1956).

<sup>42</sup> John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (Translated from the Latin by John Allen; W. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1949), Vol. I, Bk. II, chapter iii, pp. 315ff.

<sup>43</sup> Abraham Kuyper, *De Gemene Gratie* (Kok, Kampen, 1902), p. 7.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> Richard Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture*, pp. 217ff.

<sup>46</sup> G. C. Berkouwer, *De Algemene Openbaring* (Kok, Kampen, 1958), pp. 157-181. This important work is now available in an English translation: *General Revelation* (Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1955).

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 170.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 170ff.

<sup>49</sup> J. S. Whale, *op. cit.*, pp. 305ff.

<sup>50</sup> Calvin, *Institute*, IV., 20, 31.

<sup>51</sup> J. W. Allen, *Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century* (Methuen, London, 1941), p. 59, quoting Calvin's letter to Bonnett.

<sup>52</sup> J. H. Nichols, *Democracy and the Churches*, p. 25. For a further discussion of the doctrine of the right to resist dictators, consult W. E. H. Lecky, *The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe* (Longmans, London, 1910), Chapter Five, The Secularisation of Politics, Vol. II, pp. 153ff.

<sup>53</sup> B. B. Warfield, *Calvin and Augustine* (Presbyterian and Reformed, Philadelphia, 1956), pp. 18ff.

<sup>54</sup> Henry R. Van Til, *The Calvinistic Concept of Culture* (Presbyterian and Reformed, Philadelphia, 1959), p. 99.

<sup>55</sup> Josef Bohatec, *Calvins Lehre von Staat und Kirche* (1937); cf. also his *Antirevolutionaire Staatskunde* (1926) and *Calvin und das Recht* (Teudingen in Westphalia, 1934). For a discussion of sphere sovereignty, consult Evan Runner's masterly article in *Christian Perspectives*, 1961, pp. 53-87.

<sup>56</sup> W. E. H. Lecky, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 177ff. In all fairness to the Anglican Church it must be pointed out that she did breed the Puritans and that Lecky's attack applies more to such Anglican bishops as Laud than to many of the Anglican clergy who were thwarted in their efforts to bring the Reformation in their Church to completion by introducing Calvin's spiritual discipline into their church by a scheming and wily woman, Queen Elizabeth, who was a typical sixteenth-century "politique" as well as by many of the nobility who feared the consequences of a complete reformation. The best work on Puritanism in the age of the Tudors is M. M. Knappen, *Tudor Puritanism* (University of Chicago, Chicago, 1949).

<sup>57</sup> R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (Pelican, London, 1938), p. 243.

<sup>58</sup> Christopher Dawson, "Religious Origins of European Disunity," *Dublin Review*, October, 1940, pp. 151ff., pp. 153ff.; quoted by Nichols, *op. cit.*, pp. 29f. See also C. Dawson, *Progress and Religion* (Sheed & Ward, London, 1945) and C. Dawson, *Religion and Culture* (Sheed & Ward, London, 1948).

<sup>59</sup> H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Kingdom of God in America* (Harper Torchbook, New York, 1959), pp. 23-25. Also consult William Haller, *The Rise of Puritanism* (Harper Torchbook, New York, 1957).

<sup>60</sup> J. R. Tanner, *English Constitutional Conflicts of the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, 1937); now reprinted as a Cambridge paperback; p. 138 in hard cover edition. By far the best introduction to the Civil War in England.

<sup>61</sup> Joseph Lecler, *Toleration and the Reformation* (Translated by T. L. Westow; Longmans, London, 1960), Vol. I, p. 25, Vol. II, p. 500ff.

<sup>62</sup> J. R. Tanner, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 144; cf. G. P. Gooch, *Political Thought: Bacon to Halifax* (Oxford University Press, London, 1946), pp. 59-72. Also S. R. Gardiner, *The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625-1660* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1936), p. 316.

<sup>64</sup> Nichols, *op. cit.*, pp. 31ff.

<sup>65</sup> L. B. Schenck, *The Presbyterian Doctrine of Children in the Covenant* (Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 13.

<sup>66</sup> T. S. Eliot, *The Idea of a Christian Society* (Faber, London, 1946), p. 59.

<sup>67</sup> Quoted by Iain Murray in his splendid article, "The Forgotten Spurgeon," in his magazine *The Banner of Truth*, March, 1962, and February, 1963, Banner of Truth Trust, 78 B. Chiltern Street, London, England.

<sup>68</sup> A. D. Lindsay, *The Churches and Democracy* (Epworth, London, 1934, p. 24.

<sup>69</sup> J. H. Nichols, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

<sup>70</sup> J. Woodhouse, *Puritanism and Liberty* (London, 1941), p. 53.

<sup>71</sup> A. V. Dicey, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-207.

<sup>72</sup> H. R. Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65ff.

<sup>74</sup> Howard Brinton, *Friends for 300 Years* (Harper, New York, 1952), pp. 16ff.

<sup>75</sup> A. D. Lindsay, *Essentials of Democracy* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1929).

<sup>76</sup> J. H. Nichols, *op. cit.*, p. 36. See also Anson Phelps Stokes, *Church and State in the United States*, Vols. I, II, III (Harper and Bros., New York, 1950) for a most exhaustive treatment of this great subject.

<sup>77</sup> V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought* (Harcourt, New York, 1930), Vol. I, p. 66.

<sup>78</sup> Richard Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>80</sup> Roger Williams, *Letter to the Town Clerk of Providence* in the Narragansett Club Publications, Vol. VI, p. 401; quoted by Parrington *op. cit.*, p. 67.

<sup>81</sup> Roger Williams, *The Bloody Tenent*, Narragansett Publications, Vol. III, p. 349.

<sup>82</sup> Roger Williams, *The Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, Vol. IV, p. 187.

<sup>83</sup> Perry Miller, *The New England Mind*, (New York, 1939), p. 119.

<sup>84</sup> J. P. A. Mekkes, *Ontwikkeling der Humanistische Rechtsstaatstheorieën* (Amsterdam, 1940), p. 113; also consult R. L. Colie, *Light and Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 1957).

<sup>85</sup> Roger Williams, *The Bloody Tenent*, Vol. III, p. 76.

<sup>86</sup> Roger Williams, *The Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, Vol. III, pp. 214, 355, 366.

<sup>87</sup> Roger Williams, *The Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody*, Vol. IV, p. 487.

<sup>88</sup> Roger Williams, *The Bloody Tenent*, Vol. III, p. 248.

<sup>89</sup> Paul Hazard, *The European Mind (1680-1715)*, (London, 1952), pp. 269ff.

<sup>90</sup> Roger Williams, Preface to the *Bloody Tenent*, Vol. III, p. 3.

<sup>91</sup> Vernon Parrington, *op. cit.*, pp. 71ff. Cf. J. B. Bury, *A History of the Freedom of Thought* (Oxford University Press, 1947). Bury says, "To Roger Williams belongs the glory of having founded the first modern State which was really tolerant and was based on the principle of taking the control of religious matters entirely out of the hands of the civil government" (p. 97).

<sup>92</sup> Ernst Cassirer, *The Platonic Renaissance in England* (Nelson, London, 1953), p. 41.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. Richard W. Solberg, *God and Caesar in East Germany* (Macmillan, New York, 1961), pp. 94ff.; Walter Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union* (Macmillan, 1961). For a first hand account of Red China's war against God, consult Paul B. Denlinger's article "The Church and Communists in China," published in the *Canadian Intelligence Service*, June, 1963 (Flesherton, Ontario). Mr. Denlinger was an Episcopalian missionary priest in Red China.

<sup>94</sup> C. N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1944), p. vi.

<sup>95</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. III, p. 509.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 510.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 534ff.

<sup>98</sup> Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (Translated by Olive Wyon; G. Allen & Unwin, London, 1949), Vol. II, p. 461.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 993.

<sup>101</sup> Dooyeweerd, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 529ff. Dooyeweerd refers the reader to Bohatec's great work *Calvins Lehre vom Staat und Kirche* (Breslau, 1937).

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 532ff.

<sup>103</sup> In case anyone should accuse Dooyeweerd of supposing that common grace somehow makes man independent of God this passage we have just quoted must be read in the light of his earlier statement in Volume 1 of the *New Critique*:

The revelation of God's common grace, on the other hand, by which the effects of sin were checked and retarded, is not to be separated from the Word-revelation in its general sense.

This common grace cannot be understood in the subjective apostate function of faith. Apart from Christ it does not become a blessing, but a judgment on humanity. Consequently, every fundamental dualism in the conception of the relation between *gratia communis* and *gratia specialis*, in the sense that the latter has an independent meaning with the respect to the latter, is essentially a relapse into the scholastic scheme of nature and grace. It is even a greater set-back than the Thomistic-Aristotelian conception, which at least conceived of 'nature' as a '*praeambula gratiae*' (Vol. I, p. 309).

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 525ff.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 525ff.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 501.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 501ff.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 502.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 503.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 503.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 503ff.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 504.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 507ff.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS LIFE

#### A. Dooyeweerd's Rejection of Economic Individualism

Dooyeweerd rejects both collectivistic economics and socialistic planning as well as laissez-faire capitalistic individualism. The latter advocated as its basic principle the adage "laissez-faire, laissez-aller," that is, the unrestricted free play of economic forces in human society or the practice and theory of the free market in all things. The classical school of economics founded by Adam Smith and David Ricardo argued that economic laws operated automatically without the necessity of human legislation. Dooyeweerd explains this theory of the hidden hand of economic providence:

The economic law of supply and demand, which after the definitive abandonment of the medieval guilds was positivized as a basic norm for the economic determination of prices, was only a norm for the economic inter-individual relations in the modern freedom of exchange; just as the principle of contractual liberty was only adapted to the juridical inter-individual relations. But this economic norm oriented to a free market situation was presently to be denatured and absolutized by the classical theory into an unalterable, pure, "natural law."

In it the economic aspect on its law-side opened out in anticipation of the individualistically conceived rights of man, of the utilitarian autonomous rational



morality and of the faith in the science ideal. But the process of disclosure here showed a poignant *disharmony*. The excessive individualizing and rationalizing of the formative process, guided by the faith in the sovereignty of the mathematical and natural scientific thought, resulted in the idolatry of the abstract individualistic idea of the "homo economicus." And this idolatry also came to expression in the formation of the economic principles to positive norms. A hard-headed calculation of private profits became the only rule of conduct in economic life; it broke every bond with economic communal principles.

Just as the science-ideal was a continual threat to the personality ideal, the individualistic rationalizing and technicizing of economic life was presently to reduce thousands of labourers to actual wage-slavery. Economic life had been delivered into the hands of the officially still "Christian" bourgeois-mentality, permeated by the utilitarian spirit of the Enlightenment.<sup>1</sup>

A brief examination of Anglo-Saxon economic history during the past few hundred years amply bears out the truth of Dooyeweerd's analysis of economic individualism. Unlike modern monopoly capitalism and finance, early Anglo-American capitalism was not based upon the irresponsible exercise of economic power by a few over large masses of men. On the contrary, economic life was more or less controlled by a feeling of mutual responsibility between masters, journeymen, and apprentices. By and large, economic relationships tended to be highly personal—between master and craftsman and journeyman and apprentice, laboring together in the same workshop; between buyer and seller, living together in the same village or town. The very character of this relation produced some restraints upon the sinful human tendency of the master to exploit his workman or the seller to cheat the buyer or the workman to produce sloppy goods or services. Following Lewis Mumford's account in *Technics and Civilisation* we may in fact distinguish three technological-industrial complexes—namely, that of the medieval "eotechnic" period which lasted more or less in various Western nations until the middle of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: the "paleotechnic" phase of the Industrial Revolution from

which we have not yet altogether emerged; and the modern "neotechnic" phase of automation and mass production, still in process of development.

In the eotechnic period social organization was upon a feudal basis, the main material of industry was wood, and almost the sole sources of power were wind and water. The craftsman of the time, as opposed to the peasant, was normally a member of a craft guild, working at home for as many or as few hours as he pleased; he was a respected member of his community and he took great pride in his work. It is true that his status was fixed from birth, but this was not felt to be a drawback and it had the great advantage of providing security, freedom from anxiety, and above all a sense of belonging; moreover, paradoxical as it may appear, social intercourse between classes of different levels was much freer than in the industrial society that later developed. Membership in a guild, manorial estate, or village protected the individual throughout his life and gave to each person his own special role to play in society and above all it gave him a sense of belonging. Thus, while the Middle Ages suffered from plagues, lack of sanitation, appalling housing conditions, cruelty and superstition, nevertheless, in the sphere of work and labor relations conditions were often a great deal better and more satisfying than they have been since. Of the industrial psychology of this period J. A. C. Brown says:

Although a society in which status is fixed at birth may seem to have many drawbacks from the standpoint of the modern individual, it is likely to be forgotten that it also had its advantages. The anxiety and sense of insecurity which are inseparable from a competitive society with mobile status were avoided, everyone had a secure awareness of belonging. . . . At best, there was an affectionate and obedient attitude not only towards the real family but towards the father substitutes right up the hierarchy; the master of the gild, the lord of the manor, and finally the benevolent authority of the Church.<sup>2</sup>

The next stage was that of the Industrial Revolution and of early mercantile capitalism and the domestic stage of industry. Business and private affairs in this earlier

stage of capitalism at their best tended to be governed by much the same moral and ethical code, which was based upon the Protestant emphasis upon the individual's personal accountability to God for his business and his private conduct. The goal of Puritan Christianity in regard to social matters was the creation of a responsible self-disciplined body of *free* men and women, a citizenry of independent landholders, small businessmen and self-respecting journeymen skilled in various trades and professions. R. C. K. Ensor's description of this evangelical motivation of Anglo-Saxon businessmen deserves quoting:

The essentials of evangelicalism were three. First, its literal stress on the Bible. It made the English the "people of a book," somewhat as devout Moslems are, but few other Europeans were. Secondly, its certainty about the existence of an after-life of rewards and punishments. If one asks how nineteenth century English merchants earned the reputation of being the most honest in the world (a very real factor in the nineteenth century primacy of English trade), the answer is: because hell and heaven seemed as certain to them as to-morrow's sunrise, and the Last Judgement as real as the week's balance sheet. This keen sense of moral accountancy had also much to do with the success of self-government in the political sphere. Thirdly, its corollary that the present life is only important as a preparation for eternity.<sup>3</sup>

The key stone of this mercantile capitalism was a sense of responsibility to God for the conduct of one's business and personal life and a sense of self-reliance. As Lord Lyndhurst once said in some famous words: "My lords, self-reliance is the best road to distinction in private life; it is equally essential to the character and grandeur of a nation." The classic expression of this doctrine of self-reliance was given by Samuel Smiles in his book *Self-Help* published in 1859. Smiles tells us that its "chief object unquestionably is to stimulate youths to apply themselves diligently to right pursuits—sparing neither labour, pains nor self-denial in prosecuting them—and to rely upon their own efforts in life, rather than depend upon the help and patronage of others."<sup>4</sup> His book might best be described as

the primer of the self-made man, a term which the Victorians often used in no derogatory sense, being wiser in their generation than we are in ours. If all self-made men had in fact followed Smile's teaching more closely, the term would never have acquired the unpleasant connotations now attaching to it. Smiles urged men to make a success of their lives, but he also urged them to cultivate those qualities which he sums up as "character." Although they must try to climb to the top of the ladder they must not do so by pushing other people off its rungs. Smiles expected a man to practice self-help without becoming selfish in the process.

Behind this Victorian evangelical morality there lay the great Reformation doctrine of the calling. From this doctrine of the calling has been derived the moral and spiritual dynamic which brought about the Industrial Revolution. By endowing common labor with Christian dignity and value Luther and Calvin gave the workers of Reformed nations a new sense of their dignity and importance. Tawney well says of this doctrine that "Monasticism was, so to speak, secularized; all men stood henceforward on the same footing towards God."<sup>5</sup>

Had our Anglo-American Puritan forefathers not had a high sense of their calling to serve the Lord by a "godly self-discipline" at work it is doubtful whether our modern industrial Atlantic society would ever have been built, depending as it does upon the need for men's courage, resource, endurance, persistence, precision, judgment and reliability in dealing with machines. It is thus no accident that the Industrial Revolution took place first in England, Holland, Germany and the United States, the main centers of evangelical Christianity, for the workers in these lands had, thanks to their evangelical and Reformed up-bringing, learned how to do an honest day's work.

The material potentialities of modern science might have waited in vain for their fulfilment, as had been the case with Greek mechanics in the ancient world, had it not been for the social initiative and enterprise of early Anglo-American capitalists. This initiative and self-reliance received its moral impetus from the religious and moral traditions of the Puritans. Historians such as Max Weber,

T. Robinson, and Ernst Troeltsch have proved how much the Industrial Revolution owes to the moral and social ideals of Puritanism,<sup>6</sup> which inculcated the duty of unremitting industry and thrift while it discouraged rigorously every kind of self-indulgence.

Thus there grew up a new social type, the hard working, conscientious, abstemious man of business, whose only interests were his counting house and the meeting place of his chapel. It was men of this caliber and moral stamp who supplied the driving power of Anglo-American and Dutch capitalism and were the real founders of the economic power of Great Britain, America and Holland. Thanks to these Puritans and evangelical business-men and merchant adventurers, whose moral dynamic stemmed from their Calvinist faith that God will prosper the hard worker and curse the lazy and slothful, the standard of living of Britain, Holland and America was raised to a level never before reached in the history of the world.

Because of such collectivist historians as R. H. Tawney and the Webbs, it has become fashionable to decry these Puritan capitalists, while the Hammonds have taught two generations of schoolboys to look upon the Industrial Revolution as an unmitigated disaster. Replying to this caricature of history, T. S. Ashton, Professor of Economic History in the University of London, condemns as perverse the view that technical and economic changes were themselves the source of calamity. He writes:

The central problem of the age was how to feed and clothe and employ generations of children outnumbering by far those of any earlier time. Ireland was faced by the same problem. Failing to solve it, she lost in the 'forties about a fifth of her people by emigration or starvation or disease. If England had remained a nation of cultivators and craftsmen, she could hardly have escaped the same fate, and, at best, the weight of growing population must have pressed down the spring of her spirit. She was delivered, not by her rulers, but by those who, seeking no doubt their own narrow ends, had the wit and resource to devise new methods of administering industry. There are to-day on the plains of India and China men and women, plague-ridden and hungry, living lives little

better to outward appearance, than those of the cattle that toil with them by day and share their places of sleep by night. Such Asiatic standards, and such unmechanized horrors, are the lot of those who increase their numbers without passing through an industrial revolution.<sup>7</sup>

And we might add, without passing through a spiritual revolution such as the people of Reformation lands passed through during the sixteenth century. When Macaulay compared his own day with the past, it was inevitably to rejoice in the change. Since popular economic history was taken over by the Fabians and socialists, any similar contemporary comparison would equally inevitably be a cause for lamentation. In a very important recent work on *Capitalism and the Historians* it has been proven that the structure of left-wing economic historiography (the political purpose of which was largely hidden from subsequent generations nurtured in the bosom of popular education) depended for its emotional appeal on forgetting Thomas Malthus and his discoveries about population increases in relation to diminishing physical resources as quickly as possible. Actual case studies of the English factory system and the conditions of life of the English workers buttress the conclusion of the authors, T. S. Ashton, L. M. Haecker, Bertrand de Jouvenel and W. H. Hutt—that under capitalism the workers, despite long hours and other hardships of factory life, were better off financially, had more opportunities, and led a better life than had been the case before the Industrial Revolution.<sup>8</sup>

It is into this heresy of regarding the operations of “capitalism” as a voluntary process which most socialists and Western theologians seem to have fallen. To these writers the growth of population was merely a consequence of industrialism. But this is to neglect the research of the last thirty years which has upset the thesis that industrialism “created” the economic problem.

Economic change means a change of institutions, habits, and ideas; it takes place, partially at any rate, because the old institutions, habits, and ideas have become ossified or purposeless or obstructive. Behind the change

from the defensive, "social" economic policies of the Middle Ages to the offensive, "individualistic" economic policies of the nineteenth century is one major factor: *the consciousness of man's increased power over nature*. The age of Malthus was in some respects as short of the indispensable necessities as the age of Aquinas, but it was equipped with better tools and blessed with business entrepreneurs whose vision pierced beyond the contemporary gloom to glimpse an age of plenty beyond. Answering the question of why the "first industrial take-off" happened in Britain and not in France or elsewhere W. W. Rostow writes in his *The Stages of Economic Growth*:

And so Britain, with more basic industrial resources than the Netherlands; more nonconformists, and more ships than France; with its political, social and religious revolution fought out by 1688—Britain alone was in a position to weave together cotton manufacturing, coal and iron technology, the steam engine, and ample foreign trade to pull it off.<sup>9</sup>

The economic primacy of Victorian England cannot be explained, therefore, entirely in terms of natural resources, James Watt, and a fortunate absence of foreign competition. In the final analysis, it was due to the men of wit and infinite resource who felt called by their faith in the living God to carry out the Creator's cultural mandate.

By the eighteen-eighties of the last century the spirit and structure of this early Anglo-American capitalism underwent a profound and revolutionary change, as new methods of the organization of capital and new methods of production were devised. A whole new collection of devices and ceremonials were developed in the business world which enabled business men to set aside the moral scruples and Puritan ethic which had formerly governed the lives of their grandfathers and fathers.

Of these legal devices none has been more insidious than the invention of the limited liability company and the modern business corporation. Such business corporations have one outstanding feature, viz., they are completely irresponsible, having neither bodies to be kicked nor souls

to be damned. Beyond good and evil, insensible to argument or moral appeal, they symbolized the mounting independence of modern monopoly capitalism and finance from the old restraints and scruples of Christianity, both Roman Catholic and Protestant.

"As directors of a company," wrote William M. Gouge, "men will sanction actions of which they would scorn to be guilty in their private capacity. A crime which would press heavily on the conscience of one man, becomes quite endurable when divided among many."<sup>10</sup> Where the dishonesty or fraud or exploitation has become the work of all members of a business, every such business man can now say with Macbeth in the murder of Banquo: "thou canst not say I did it."

As industry became more mechanized and passed out of the hands of owners of capital into that of the managers of capital and production, so economic life tended to become depersonalized and industry tended to become more autocratic and oligarchic in its structure. In their classic work, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, Adolf Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means show what had taken place by 1925. Nominal powers of decision over the use of capital had become whittled down to *pro forma* annual meetings of shareholders attended by perfunctory, negligible or cranky minorities. As James Burnham explained in his book *The Managerial Revolution*, the executive and managerial classes had in effect taken over the *de facto* control of Anglo-American and Canadian productive processes and business enterprises. According to Burnham the technical and industrial society in which we now live is developing into something that may best be described as an administrative or managerial or organizational society:

We are now in a period of social transition . . . from the type of society we have called capitalist or bourgeois to a type of society which we have called managerial. . . . What is occurring in this transition is a drive for social dominance, for power and privilege, for the position of ruling class, by the social group of the managers.<sup>11</sup>



In support of this thesis Burnham points out that a new class in managerial and administrative positions is multiplying in numbers and increasing in power throughout the Western world. With increasing mechanization in industry and the increasing bureaucratization of society we can therefore envisage a state of things, when this new administrative class will outnumber the industrial wage earners. Moreover, while the initial impulse towards the growth of administration comes from the necessity of controlling a force so powerful as large scale modern industrial mass production, the tendency of administration according to Parkinson's law is to extend its control over the whole life of society. Even the professions, such as scientific research, medicine and teaching are in danger of being subjected increasingly to central bureaucratic direction and regulation.

In his latest work *Power Without Property*, Adolf A. Berle, Jr. has analyzed a yet further development in modern monopoly capitalism: namely, the advent in the place of the *individual* shareholder of the *institutional* owners of the effective majority of shares in a corporation or business. The ownership of modern capital is tending to pass out of the hands of individual holders of portfolios of shares into the hands of giant financial cartels such as insurance companies, banking houses, governments investment syndicates, and the controllers of enormous pension schemes. Such controllers of new investment are not completely in control of the productive enterprises of modern society, but they soon will be if present trends continue. According to Berle:

Three-fifths of all capital funds used by corporate business in the post-war period has been derived from internal sources, i.e., retained earnings and depreciation allowances. An additional one fifth . . . has involved increases in short term debt, principally accounts payable and bank debt.<sup>12</sup>

Only one fifth was raised in the traditional long-term capital market. Berle has further shown that the power of making profits increasingly rests with those executives who control the use of modern capital already mentioned;

the new, self-perpetuating class of top executives, newly privileged with special fringe benefits, options to acquire shares in their own concerns at favorable prices and great and profitable powers of appointment. He also points up the growing power of the unit trusts, boards of pension funds and so on. "In terms of law, nothing apparently has changed." In fact there has been—there still is—a social, economic, even a political revolution taking place in our society. No one apparently is looking at the new institutional "broker's men" who are moving in, "taking over," and building up.<sup>13</sup>

The "managerial revolution" has thus already created a privileged faubourgeoisie living in "contemporary" sub-topias, exercising a faceless and standardizing influence on an increasingly lulled and affluent proletariat surrounded by "fringe benefits," and administering an increasingly white collar life from within proliferating bureaux. The organization man and the executive type are not what was imagined as the elite of the Industrial Revolution and the Machine Age.

The combined effect of these tendencies has been to produce an industrial society dominated by functional or technical rationality! The adjective is necessary to distinguish this meaning of rationality from a very different one, i.e., from the belief in reason as a quality in men which impels them to seek, and enables them to apprehend, truth and justice. Technical rationality is the capacity of applying means to ends or of organizing actions in order to reach a previously defined goal. It is in the production of goods that technical rationality has come to exercise undisputed sway, and because of the dominant position of industry in modern society the habit of thinking in terms of technical rationality has spread imperceptibly into other spheres of modern life.

In the drive for lower costs and greater output per man hour, all the technical skills of industrial engineering and production planning are enlisted. The effort to break down work into simpler operations never ceases. The demands of the competitive market compel management to make new experiments and to employ new methods in the

most economical use of capital and labor. The process of technical rationalization so far from diminishing in range and intensity may be expected to exercise an increasing influence in the affairs of modern society. The workers themselves increasingly realize that their own welfare depends upon greater productivity and that this in turn depends upon technical efficiency.

Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, H. Van Riessen, and Friedrich George Juenger in their brilliant expositions of the effects of this rationalized production on human life have shown how in some particular features the inner essence of this process has been startlingly revealed. It is characteristic of an age of machine production that in some industries it is necessary for some men to work in shifts. Machines tire less quickly than men; they need less prolonged periods of rest. It is they that set the pace, and when they are working at full stretch it takes three men to keep up with them. The unit of production is no longer one man, but three. The person has become an anonymous, interchangeable unit. He can be represented by a number.<sup>14</sup>

In discussing the functional implications of the assembly line method of production, Juenger says:

An invention like the assembly line shows functional thinking to a high degree, for here all the functions of work are lined up within the sequence of a lifeless time, and the workmen are stationed along the line as functionaries of a work process that has been cut into pieces. What is the consequence? The worker loses his identity; as a person he loses his individuality; he is only noticeable as the performer of a function. As a human figure he fades out; and from the point of view of technical progress it would be desirable if he disappeared altogether.<sup>15</sup>

Again, in modern industry payment is usually by the hour. It does not alter the significance of this fact that in earlier periods payment was also sometimes by the hour. The point is that it belongs to the essential nature of modern industry that time is no longer calculated in terms of the services of *known persons* but by the hours of labor of *anonymous interchangeable labor forces*. The hour for which a man engaged in the building of a bridge is paid

is not part of his life; it is part of the several hundred thousand hours required for the building of the bridge. Working time, that is to say, is disconnected from the man who does the job and related exclusively to the piece of work. In other words, *a man's work is divorced from his personal life*. The breaking up of his working life into a succession of identical units which he cannot combine into a meaningful scheme takes from him the power to order his life as a whole. It need not surprise us if provision for the distant future, for sickness, accident, and old age pension, is taken likewise step by step from the individual and transferred to the state.

As the labor force engaged in modern industry has increased, so the manager has become further removed from his workmen, till the head executive of a factory now enjoys only the most tenuous community of feeling with his workmen. The rationalization of production has affected the work not only of the manual workers but also of the managers, whose functions may often be reduced to carrying out instructions transmitted to them from head office and so leaving them little scope for personal decision. It has also affected the work of the large clerical staffs, a large part of whose time is now spent in the filling up, checking and filing of forms. At all levels of industry there is thus the tendency of functional rationality to deprive the average man of independent thought, initiative and responsibility, and to transfer these capacities to the relatively small numbers in top managerial positions.

Economists of the so called "classical school" have furthered this process of depersonalization by their definition of labor as a "commodity" along with other commodities in the general system of production and exchange.

In so far as man in his work is reduced to the position of a mere functionary, who carries out a mechanical task in which he is replaceable by others, *work loses its personal quality. It ceases to be a sphere of personal and moral activity. It no longer fosters, as God means it to do, the growth of personal character, by affording opportunities for personal decision, exercise of judgment, mastery of intractable material, and growth in understanding and*

*skill.* Paul Tillich has summed up this far-reaching change in the structure of work in modern society in this manner:

Through the tools placed at his disposal by technical reason, man created a world-wide mechanism of large scale production and competitive economy which began to take shape as a kind of second nature, a Frankenstein, above physical nature and subjecting man to itself. While he was increasingly able to control and manipulate physical nature, man became less and less able to control this "second nature." He was swallowed up by his own creation. Step by step the whole of human life was subordinated to the demands of the new world-wide economy. Men became units of working power.<sup>16</sup>

The research work of the Elton Mayo School, or the Human Relations in Industry School, have provided us with first-hand evidence of this depersonalization of men's work in modern society. Elton Mayo bases his whole analysis of industrial society upon the concept of the little man lost in the vast industrial machine. He writes:

In a modern industrial society we find two symptoms of social disruption. First, the number of unhappy individuals increases. Forced back upon himself, with no immediate or real social duties, the individual becomes a prey to unhappy and obsessive personal preoccupations. . . . Second, it is characteristic of industrial societies that various groups when formed are not happy to cooperate wholeheartedly with other groups. On the contrary, their attitude is usually that of wariness or hostility. It is by this road that a society sinks into a condition of stasis and atomization.<sup>17</sup>

The investigations carried out in the Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric Company under Elton Mayo's direction provided convincing evidence that the the old individualistic "rabble hypothesis" of society as well as the attitude of management towards labor as a commodity was fundamentally at the root of the workers' discontent, and that management best succeeds when it treats workers as persons rather than things and restores a genuine feeling of community amongst its workers by "making factory groups

so stable in their attitudes of group cooperation that men in the groups explicitly recognized that the factory had become for them the stabilizing force around which they developed satisfying lives."<sup>18</sup>

In other words, this particular company had begun to make a small beginning in re-creating the social bonds which had become so disastrously severed through the destruction of community as a result of the application of technical rationality towards man's social and economic life.

The conditions of modern industrial production have at the same time made it more difficult for men to realize that in their work they are exercising a useful social function. To a shoemaker in a village his function and responsibility are evident; if he fails to make good shoes, the community will go unshod. But for the worker in a large factory his contribution to the whole may easily seem negligible. He is remote from the ultimate use of what he is making, which may only be a tiny part of the completed whole.

The heart of the problem of work in modern society thus lies in the divorce of work from the worker's personal life and from life in real community, which has deprived work of its meaning.

It is imperative that Christians understand that the conflicts that rend modern society and the evils connected with industrialism, though they have in fact been accompaniments, are *not* the inevitable consequence of the coming of the machine. The real source of the trouble is to be located rather in those seventeenth-century doctrines of man in society defined earlier in this book as the modern humanist post-Christian nature and science ideal. Behind the technical developments of the past two hundred years lies the whole spiritual process of modern man's attempt to emancipate himself from the control of Almighty God and his revelation of man's nature as created in God's image. Apostate men in their drive for independence from God have sought for freedom without any binding moral or religious sanctions, i.e., not only emancipation from ecclesiastical absolutism but also freedom from God him-

self. In addition, apostate Western men have striven for creativeness without responsibility and worshiped the cult of a higher material standard of comfort and the accumulation of money in the bank as the true content and meaning of human existence. Lastly, modern unbelievers have striven for power over nature and over their fellow men without any sense of reverence for either God's creation or their fellow men.

As a direct result of these spiritual tendencies originating in the modern nature and science ideal, Christians should be able to realize that it was not by some inexorable law of nature that the release of the forces of economic rationality of the laissez-faire school of economic individualism and of technical production brought about the far-reaching social changes in the conditions of men's work in modern society which we have described. It brought about the changes which it did because the acquisition by modern men of the new powers of technics and science took place within the context of the modern humanistic drive for complete spiritual autonomy and independence from the Lord Jesus Christ. Emil Brunner well says of the apostate context within which these changes took place:

It is this context which gave to technics, and also to the new science, both a prodigious stimulus and also that direction which has today suddenly confronted us with a terrifying problem. Technics has been cut free from the moral and religious context of human life and has become autonomous because its deepest motive was the desire for autonomy on the part of man. From this point of view we can understand why technics acquired such a speed of development and why the tempo was not moderated in order to allow the necessary social adaptations to take place. The furious revolutionary changes in the conditions of life due to the development of technics took place in a period which was very little in a condition to digest, socially and morally, so large a mass of changes. It was not able, that is to say, to bring about the social adaptations and modifications which were necessary if technics were not to become a danger to the life of man.<sup>19</sup>

Thus we cannot hope to understand modern society or the nature of modern industry if we take account only

of those elements in it which meet the eye. As Christians we have to look beneath the surface for the repressed forces which, though they have been ignored by modern apostate economists and sociologists, retain their vitality and have exerted a continuous, though often unrecognized, pressure. The dominance of functional rationality and the elevation of technics from being merely a means of life to a position where they are regarded as the end of life in modern post-Christian society has meant that human and social factors in the process of production, distribution, and exchange have been left out of account, with the consequent depersonalization and de-Christianization of the lives of millions of modern men and women who have become pulverized into so-called "mass man." These suppressed forces have violently asserted themselves and given rise in our century to a crisis of the first magnitude. V. A. Demant points out:

Nowhere has the tendency of rationalist accounts of man's world and idealistic thought been more harmful than in the social and economic sphere. Take just one instance which has had far-reaching effects. Our modern industrial society got into its stride under the influence of an abstract theory of human needs and behaviour—namely, that men would always act from motives of the maximum economic gain, buying cheapest and selling dearest, irrespective of boundaries of family, class and nation. In other words, the real world of men and women, with their attachments, loyalties, hopes and fears, moral and religious convictions, was supposed to be amenable to purely economic incentives in a free market. It was assumed that all other motives would give place to the maximum of buying and selling of land, labour, commodities and even money. This is what I mean by a rationalistic explanation of human life, for it is a picture made by the rational intellect in abstraction from the reality of human existence. Actually this economic "paradise" hardly got going before society in all sorts of ways started protecting itself against its tendency to dissolve all the realities of social living. All forms of socialism, whether democratic, communist or fascist, are vast measures of "protection" against the gale set blowing by the attempt to put purely economic rationality into practice. In seeking so to protect the realities



of labour, family, neighbourhood, race-groups and nations from dissolution, men in the twentieth century are, of course, openly or undesignedly making for the undoing of the whole European and Christian attachment to the significance of the person. It is a judgement upon the perversion of man's discovery of himself, which has led him to try to impose his inner creations upon the real world.<sup>20</sup>

Dooyeweerd and Van Riessen thus reject the doctrines of economic individualism and economic rationality because they make too absolute a distinction between the state and society and because they look upon man too much as an isolated unit in the social and economic process; and because they absolutized economic norms as "natural laws" which they claimed would automatically operate without reference to human persons. Laissez-faire economists have looked upon economic laws in a naturalistic fashion, not as principles for human conduct which must be fulfilled as norms. Such an apostate economics consecrates science and technics in the service of selfish interests rather than in the service of God and of one's own neighbor. Dooyeweerd writes:

It was not the positivizing of the economic law of supply and demand, nor the rationalizing and individualizing of economic life in themselves that were sinful, but the mode in which they occurred. The curse in the opening-process on the law-side, proceeding under the guidance of the Humanistic faith in reason, was only the poignant disharmony in the excessive development of certain anticipatory moments of the economic aspect, at the expense of all the others. Considering this process from the point of view of its *historical basis*, we find an excessive increase of the formative power on the part of the cultural sphere of modern natural science, at the expense of the formative power of the other cultural spheres. This means a negation of the principle of *cultural economy*. Western culture could not bear this. When presently the consequences of the tyranny of the science-ideal began to appear in the course of history a fulminating opposition on the part of the other cultural spheres to this hegemony was bound to come, in order to save the entire western civilization from ruin. Under the guidance of the ideas of romanticism, after the French

Revolution had been liquidated, the Restoration-movement was to follow a seemingly historical, but indeed reactionary policy, which in its turn was to evoke the resistance of liberalism in the XIXth century.

And this liberalism itself could not fail to evoke the mighty reaction of socialism and communism.<sup>21</sup>

#### B. Dooyeweerd's Rejection of Socialism and Collectivism

If Dooyeweerd rejects economic individualism and laissez-faire economics because they lead to the depersonalization of millions of men and women in modern society, he also rejects all forms of economic collectivism because they lead to slavery and totalitarianism. As monopoly capitalism in its worst forms has minimized the state's positive task, reducing its duties to those of a night watchman, so twentieth-century socialism maximizes the role of the state so that it comes to absorb all men's economic and social life. As a result, the real task of the state is neglected in its unjust destruction of private life, e.g., especially in its attack upon private property.

Dooyeweerd has consistently opposed the principle of "planning" and the state-guided economy since he finds in it evidence of a totalitarian tendency to obliterate the sovereign spheres of human society. He would not claim that the economic life of a nation is totally separate from the function of government, but he does believe that if the government takes over the whole economy of the nation, the result will be the eventual enslavement of the whole population.

The struggle against the totalitarian formation of society can be waged with any prospect of success only if we hold fast to the principle of sphere sovereignty both in principle and in practice. Man's freedom in the abstract does not mean anything unless it is defended in the concrete situations of daily life. In other words, freedom means the freedom and independence of the various societal relationships of life against encroachment upon the part of the "Leviathan" state. Only if such institutions as the church, the university, the school, the factory, the farm and the recreational associations of modern society as well

as the media of communications remain independent of governmental control can the individual's freedom be guaranteed and protected.

The word "freedom" as used in the English-speaking world is a word whose political connotation springs as directly from our political experience as the connotations of the Greek word "eleutheria," the Roman word "libertas," and the French word "liberte" spring respectively from quite different historical experiences. In terms of our Anglo-Saxon political experience we do in fact understand freedom in Dooyeweerd's sense of the sovereignty of the various social spheres.

In the first place, the freedom of our Atlantic society springs from the absence from our society of overwhelming concentrations of power. This has been the most general condition of our political freedom, so general that all other conditions may be seen to be comprised within it. It first appeared in the seventeenth century with the establishment in our English-speaking world of the principle of religious toleration. The principle of religious freedom established the principle of the limitation of political authority. If the government has no right to interfere with the religious life of its subjects then there is a department of social life in which the political authority has no competence. It lies beyond the state's authority. Democracy, as we understand the term in Britain and America, is the denial of the omniscience of the power of government. The opposite of democracy is, therefore, totalitarianism, which rests on the claim of the state to have rightful authority in every department of human life. The recognition of the principle of religious freedom from political control also implied, in principle, the freedom of all cultural activities from state control. It implied and achieved in the course of two hundred years freedom of conscience, freedom of thought, freedom of learning, and of art and science and literature—in short, all that is involved in the freedom of the mind. As John Macmurray points out in his little book *Constructive Democracy*:

The implications of religious toleration run through all our democratic liberties—freedom of speech, free-

dom of thought, freedom of the press, of cultural association, of public criticism and propaganda. For it accepts the principle that the man is more than the citizen, and that the state is merely an aspect, and not the most important aspect of the community.<sup>22</sup>

Again, with us power has become dispersed among all the multitude of interests and organizations of interest which comprise our Atlantic civilization. We do not fear or seek to suppress diversity of interest, but we consider our freedom to be imperfect so long as the dispersal of power among them is incomplete, and to be threatened if any one interest or combination of interests, even though it may be the interest of the majority, acquires extraordinary power. Similarly, the conduct of government in our society has up till now involved a subtle sharing of power, not only between the recognized organs of government, but also between the Administration and the Opposition. In short, we consider our society to be free because no one in it is allowed unlimited power—no leader, faction, party or “class,” no majority, government, church, corporation, trade or professional association or labor union. The secret of its freedom is that it is composed of a multitude of small organizations in the constitution of the best of which is reproduced that diffusion of power which is characteristic of the whole.

Further, our Anglo-American political experience has disclosed to us a method of government remarkably economical in the use of power and thus peculiarly fitted to preserve our historic freedoms: it is called the rule of law. If the activity of our governments were the continuous or sporadic interruption of the life and arrangements of our society with arbitrary corrective measures, we should consider ourselves no longer free, even though the measures were directed against concentrations of power universally realized to be dangerous. For not only would government of this kind require extraordinary power since each of its acts would have to be in the nature of *ad hoc* intervention, but also, in spite of this concentration of governmental power, the society would be without that known and settled protective structure which is so important a condition of

freedom. But government by rule of law, that is, by means of the enforcement by prescribed methods of settled rules binding alike on governors and governed, while losing nothing in strength, is itself the emblem of that diffusion of power which it exists to promote, and is therefore peculiarly appropriate to a free society. The rule of law has been the greatest single condition of our historic freedoms, removing from us, that great fear which has overshadowed so many societies, past and present—the fear of the power of one's own government.

In addition to the rule of law and complete religious toleration we have long recognized the importance of two other freedoms: the freedom of association, and the freedom enjoyed in the right to own private property. A third species of liberty has been our historic freedom of speech and of the press. Beyond question this freedom of speech has been the key-stone of the great arch of our Anglo-Saxon liberties. Yet the keystone is not the arch, and the current exaggeration of the importance of freedom of speech is in danger of concealing from us the loss of other liberties no less important. While journalists would no doubt suffer most if we were deprived of our freedom of speech and of the pen, for the rest of us to be deprived of the right of voluntary association or of private property would be a far greater loss of liberty than to be deprived of the right to speak freely.

The freedom of association enjoyed through the English-speaking world has created a vast number of associations so that the integration of our Anglo-Saxon society may be said to be largely by means of voluntary associations; and for this reason we consider our freedom extended and made more secure. They represent a diffusion of power appropriate to our notion of freedom. The right of voluntary association means the right to take the initiative in forming new associations, and the right to join or not to join or to leave associations already in existence; the right of voluntary association is also a right of voluntary dissociation. And it means also the duty of not forming or joining any association designed to deprive, or in effect depriving, others of the exercise of any of their rights,

especially the right of voluntary association. A compulsory association is a conspiracy to abolish our right of association; it is a concentration of power actually or potentially destructive of what we call freedom.

In every society an institution of property is unavoidable. The simplest kind of institution is that of ancient Egypt where all rights to property were vested in the ruling Pharaoh. To our Anglo-Saxon way of thinking this type of institution is the most inimical to freedom. We have, perhaps, been less successful from the point of view of freedom in our institution of property than in our legal and political institutions, but there is no doubt about the general character of the institution of property most friendly to freedom; it will be one which ensures the widest distribution, and which discourages most effectively great concentrations of economic power. Nor is there any doubt about what this entails. It entails a right to private property—that is, an institution of property which allows to every adult member of society an equal right to enjoy the ownership of his personal capacities and of anything else obtained by the methods of legal acquisition recognized in society. This right, like every other right, is self-limiting; for example, it proscribes slavery, because the right to own another man could never be a right enjoyed equally by every member of society. But in so far as a society imposes external limits, arbitrarily excluding certain things from private ownership, only a modified right of private property may be said to prevail, which provides for less than the maximum diffusion of power that springs from ownership. For what may not be owned by an individual must nevertheless be owned, and it will be owned, directly or indirectly by the government, adding to governmental power and thus constituting a threat to freedom.

From experience we have found that the institution of property most favorable to freedom is this right to private property, for it is by this means only that the maximum diffusion of power that springs from ownership can be achieved. It is our experience that freedom is threatened not only when the government acquires extraordinary proprietary rights but also when great business

and industrial enterprises, and labor unions acquire control of great properties, plants and so on; all of which must be regarded as arbitrary limitations of the right of private property. Bound up with this right to property are other important private property rights. Thus we do not consider a man free unless he enjoys a proprietary right over his personal capacities and his own labor. Yet no such right can exist unless there are many potential employers of his labor. The freedom which separates a man from slavery is nothing but the freedom to choose his own job and to move among autonomous, independent organizations, firms, purchasers of labor, and this implies private property in resources other than personal capacity. Wherever the means of production and distribution fall under the control of the state as in Communist societies, slavery follows.

Dooyeweerd teaches that this principle of sphere sovereignty and its attendant freedom of speech, the rule of law, the right to freedom of association and the right to private property needs to be applied dynamically to meet the changing needs of modern society. But it should not be rejected in favor of a so-called guided economy and planning if we wish to retain our liberties. For, although the state functions necessarily in every modal aspect including the economic, its leading function is the juridical and legal; and all its economic activity must be in accordance with its purpose as a public legal community. In this opinion Dooyeweerd is joined by his former pupil and now professor of philosophy at the Free University, H. Van Riessen, who writes:

The state properly takes cognizance of economic life by providing public legal protection in its commerce and business enterprises. . . . The protection and development of this sphere *affects, demands* and *conditions* valid for other spheres. The state may properly develop and maintain national conditions favorable to an equitable commercial life, e.g., the guarantee of the value of its currency. The state exceeds its function when it interferes in economic life by determining individual conditions affecting credit that properly belong to the individual decision of the enterprise concerned. The digging of canals

and public power projects, such as the Boulder Dam, concern national *conditions* affecting the economic life, but also have a broader reach. For the digging of canals, and the reclamation and cultivation of inundated territory, e.g., are not limited solely to economic life; they enable life to unfold in all its rich variety of facets and relationships. Confusion arises on this point, because in keeping with the time, the content of the economic sphere is taken in too wide a sphere.<sup>23</sup>

Neither Dooyeweerd nor Van Riessen advocates the return to laissez-faire conditions. Instead, they think of the relation between the state and economic life analogously. The state ought not to regulate and direct economic life in such a way that it places its own authority above the authorities proper to the economic sphere. At the same time they are convinced of the necessity of the government developing and maintaining favorable national and local conditions in which the economic sphere may properly flourish. In borderline cases of distress, emergency, or injustice they believe the state ought to act protectively to put matters right.

For both Christian sociologists, the government is properly exercising its function of integrating justice and the public interest when it upholds the wage rate and protects collective agreements about conditions of work. Similarly, they favor governmental protection of the frequently powerless employees from economic exploitation by gigantic combines and cartels and monopolies. This involves the regulation of labor conditions, which are in any case a *matter of social concern* and they should not therefore be controlled by impersonal rationalistic economic considerations of profit alone. Both men favor social legislation, e.g., minimum wage laws, since it is part of the state's integrating function to prohibit gross social inequities.<sup>24</sup>

For the same reason they believe that all monopolies or near monopolies are impediments to the free development of the economic sphere of society as well as to liberty. They have no illusions about monopolies and they do not consider them optimistically, hoping they will not abuse their power. As Christian sociologists they know that no



individual, group, association or union can be entrusted with much power, and that it is mere foolishness to complain when absolute power is abused. It exists to be abused. And so they would encourage the growth of arrangements which will discourage its existence. In other words, they recognize that the only way of organizing the enterprise of getting a living so that it does not curtail freedom is by the establishment and maintenance of effective competition. Since monopolies are often the creation of the state, they do not think it beyond the capacity of society to build upon its already substantial tradition of creating and maintaining competition by law. But they also recognize that any confusion between the task of making competition effective and the task of organizing the enterprise of getting a living and satisfying wants will prove fatal to freedom. For to replace by political control the integration of activity which competition provides is at once to create an even greater monopoly and to destroy the diffusion of power inseparable from freedom.

Dooyeweerd and Van Riessen are insistent that the structural boundaries between the authority of the employer and the authority of the government must be maintained, for industrial life according to its own peculiar nature is not a part of government. The application of the principle of planning on the part of the government must necessarily regulate industrial life as part of the life of the state. By planning Van Riessen understands "a scientific concept of what is to take place in a specified area of human endeavour, embracing the activity of many people so that it would centrally control future events and future acts at the expense of freedom."<sup>25</sup>

Dooyeweerd holds that industrial life is the result of a process of differentiation in the course of history, by means of which it has come to develop its own inner nature and its own principles. This is the principle of free economic enterprise qualified by capital and labor, which may and must not be absorbed by the state if society is to develop as God has ordained. For this independent function of free enterprise is inseparably related to the principles of risk and mutual competition. And the profits earned are

wholly justified when we consider the services which free enterprise offers to human society. According to Dooyeweerd the only efficiency to be considered is the most economical way of supplying the things men desire to purchase. The formal circumstance in which this may be at its maximum is where enterprise is effectively competitive, for here the entrepreneur is merely the intermediary between consumers of goods and sellers of services. And below this ideal arrangement the relevant comparison is not between the level of efficiency attainable in an improved but not perfected competitive economy and the efficiency of a perfectly planned economy, but between an improved competitive economy and the sort of planned economy, with all its wastefulness, frustration and corruption, which is the only practical alternative. Everything that is inimical to man's freedom—monopoly, near monopoly, and state control of all the means of production and distribution—at the same time impedes the only efficiency worth considering. Of course, there is always the danger of the abuse of the profit motive, but this is not the primary feature of free enterprise, and it may be curbed. The regulation of the profit motive or the regulation of prices by the government must not, however, involve the removal of the business entrepreneur from our society, since freedom of enterprise depends upon spiritual liberty and responsibility. As soon as industry becomes a branch of the state, this freedom then comes to depend upon the "planning" of the government and thus would entail a usurpation of power by the state. Moreover citizens have a God-given right not to be economically directed and controlled by the government.<sup>26</sup>

Thus a government may not incorporate the internal legal life of industry or commerce, even if a program of guided economy aims at decentralization. For then the agreements between enterprises and businesses based on private law, in respect of prices and production, would have to disappear to make room for a determination of prices based on public legal rules. In such a state-controlled system there would no longer be any room left for the principle of risk and free economic enterprise. The responsibility for the development of economic life would then rest

upon public administrative organs, which these could efficiently exercise only if they came to enjoy a complete totalitarian control of the national and even the international market and the regulation of all the means of production, distribution and consumption.<sup>27</sup>

While recognizing that there is a need for a stringent control of certain features of modern big business and of international cartels and business combines and that the public interest may demand that private capital gains and deadly monopolies should be curbed, Dooyeweerd and Van Riessen do not believe that it would be possible to fit the internal life of industry and commerce into the strait jacket of a centralized public law without eventually enslaving the whole population and arresting further economic growth.

#### C. The Totalitarian Implications of Planning and Scientific Management

Alone among modern sociologists, Dooyeweerd and Van Riessen have detected the origin of this modern mania for "planning" in the modern apostate faith in the superiority and boundlessness of science and reason. Ever since Francis Bacon Western humanists have believed that man can redeem himself by applying scientific methods of control to his social as well as to his natural environment, rather than by repentance of his sins and by relying on God's Word. Human society must be governed by scientific law so that it can develop without disturbances. Scientism is therefore the religion of which both socialism and communism are the practice. Van Riessen says that "overestimation of the task of science in practical life is, in my opinion, the most disquieting symptom of the society of the future."<sup>28</sup>

In his work, *The Society of the Future*, Van Riessen warns that if the planners have their way, nothing will be left to chance, to improvisation, and individual initiative. The time will come when society can be treated as a scientific problem. It can then be analyzed, and from this analysis a prognosis of the future can be drawn. On such a basis a scientific plan will then be introduced assuring

human welfare and security. He points out that such planning will of course require the control of both society as a whole and of the individuals composing it in such a way that the plan will not be disturbed. Personal individuality will eventually have to be more or less determined by the planners, if their plans are not to be disrupted. Thus wages, prices, rents, social security, production quota, choice of profession, migration and birth rate will all have to be directed from the top. Applied science, so it is claimed by Bernal and Mannheim, gives a universally valid solution which *ought* to determine social reality. Thus the application of the plan will require psychological tools to compel people to conform with the social situation demanded by the plan. As Van Riessen envisages it:

Economic planning brings inflexibility, chokes private initiative; reverses the relation between authority and freedom; breaks through the sphere-sovereignty between state and economic life; liquidates the real influence of the people upon government, and tends towards an ever greater concentration of power and an ever lesser freedom of movement for the citizens.<sup>29</sup>

According to Van Riessen the scientistic transformation of society will not stop with economic life. Once the wheels have been set in motion, all areas of human life will be planned and coordinated and as a result the independence of all existing societal relationships will be destroyed. Such collectivism thus rejects the whole notion of the diffusion of power and of a society organized by means of a multitude of voluntary associations. The cure proposed for monopoly is to create more numerous and more extensive state monopolies and to control them by force. The organization to be imposed upon society will spring from the minds of the experts in charge of the various organs of government. It will be a comprehensive organization; loose ends, uncontrolled activities must be regarded as the product of incompetence because they unavoidably impair the structure of the whole. The government of a collectivistically-planned society will tolerate only very limited opposition to its plans; indeed, that hard-

won distinction, which is one of the greatest elements of our present Anglo-American freedom, between opposition and treason will be rejected; what is not obedience will be condemned as sabotage.

Planning envisions much wider perspectives than simply managing the currency and setting production quotas, for it cannot hope to succeed if confined simply to economic life. The population, for example, will have to be induced psychologically to accept the plan and thus it will become necessary to include the spiritual aspects of life in the planning process in order to convince the people they should fully support the plan. It is inevitable therefore that education and public control of all media of communication will have to be included within the powers of the planners. Even religion will have to fall within the sphere of planning and must adjust to it.

In this way planning will displace the rule of law since collectivism depends for its working upon a lavish use of discretionary authority. The organization it imposes upon society is without any inner momentum; it must be kept going by promiscuous, day-to-day intervention—controls of prices, licenses to pursue activities, permissions to make and cultivate, to buy and sell, and the perpetual readjustment of rations, and the distribution of privileges and exemptions—by the exercise, in short, of the kind of power most subject to misuse and corruption. The diffusion of power inherent in the rule of law leaves government with insufficient power to operate a planned society. Such planning will also involve the abolition of what Simmons called “the division of labor between competitive and political controls.” Competition may, of course, survive anomalously and vestigially, in spite of policy; but, in principle, enterprise will be tolerated only if it is not competitive, that is, if it takes the form of syndicates which serve as instruments of the central authorities, or smaller businesses which a system of quotas and price controls has deprived of all elements of risk or genuine enterprise. Competition as a form of organization will thus first be devitalized and then destroyed, and the integrating office it presently performs in our free society will become incorporated into the

functions of government, thus adding to its power and involving it in every conflict of interest that may arise in society. And with the disappearance of competition will go what we have seen to be one of the essential elements of our liberty.

Yet of all the acquisitions of governmental power inherent in planning, that which will come from its monopoly of foreign trade will perhaps be the most dangerous for freedom; for liberty of external trade is one of the most precious and most effective safeguards a community may have against excessive power. And just as the abolition of competition at home draws the state into and thus magnifies every conflict of interest, so collectivist trading abroad will involve the government in competitive commercial transactions and so increase the occasions and the severity of international relationships. Socialism and planning is in short the mobilization of society for unitary action. Every aspect of life, as George Orwell foretold in his novel *1984*,<sup>30</sup> will become *politicized*, even love and marriage will become functions of government. Sex will become nationalized as it already has in Communist China where a husband has first to obtain permission from the local mayor of the commune before he can sleep with his own wife.

At present these tendencies have not yet been fully realized in the English-speaking world as they have been realized in Communist lands, but everywhere in our Anglo-Saxon democracies they are advancing, since collectivism appears to so many of our people as a remedy for elements in our society which everyone agrees are impediments to full freedom. It is vital that we all realize before it is too late that collectivism and freedom are real alternatives—if we choose one we cannot have the other. And collectivism can be imposed upon a gullible Anglo-American-Canadian electorate with an appearance of not destroying continuity, only if enough Britons, Americans, and Canadians forget their love of freedom. Today as never before in our glorious history the price of our historic freedoms under God is eternal vigilance. It therefore behooves every Christian citizen to become aware of the fact that

there will never come a moment when the decisive and irrevocable step towards a totalitarian society has been taken. Planning gains ground gradually. When one accepts it in principle one is compelled to go all the way. Although most Christians may reject the totalitarian end of the road of planning, the more they champion planning as the cure of all society's present ills, the less possibility they will leave themselves and others for a final resistance to and escape from all the bitter consequences.

The procedure and psychological techniques of planning as it works out in practice must therefore be clearly understood by every Christian citizen of America, Britain, and Canada. According to Van Riessen, apostate humanistic social planning begins with an analysis of society. Thus Karl Mannheim produced his famous book *The Diagnosis of our Time* and Beveridge his famous *Report*. Then follows the prognosis of the future and the design of the best plan. Next comes the information to the general public as good advice by means of slanted magazine articles, television, radio interviews, and feature stories in daily newspapers. The final stage is the introduction of the plan as a compelling rule and law for the whole population after a majority of the electorate have been bamboozled into voting the party in favor of such a plan into office. More often than not, the electorates of our nations now have to give a blank check to the winning party, which then proceeds to introduce socialistic measures, undeclared beforehand, unexplained after, wished for by so-called experts, and then forced upon the whole electorate by the state. Thus Labor voters in Britain, Democrat voters in America, and Liberal and New Party voters in Canada loyally ensure for their leaders more and more state powers, thus fulfilling the dreams of the apostate humanistic planners.

No doubt the first three stages up to and including the giving of advice to the electorate can be defended as being compatible with the democratic process. But what about the fourth stage, the control of society by an elite corps of scientists, engineers, and bureaucrats having at their disposal all the resources of modern methods of psychological manipulation of the masses on the subconscious level? That

would be the easiest and most dangerous method of social control. Vance Packard, in his important book *The Hidden Persuaders*, has warned us that such methods of thought control are already being used by big business to sell products and by the party machines to sell "images" of various political leaders during elections. He writes:

By the mid-fifties both major United States parties had become deeply involved in the use of professional persuaders to help in their image-building programs. In early 1956 *Nation's Business* . . . happily heralded the new, businessman's approach to politics. It proclaimed: "Both parties will merchandise their candidates and issues by the same methods that business has developed to sell goods. These include scientific selection of appeals; planned repetition . . . . Radio spot announcements and ads will repeat phrases with a planned intensity. Billboards will push slogans of proven power."<sup>31</sup>

Does not the use of such methods to force the people into becoming planning-minded and to lure them into acquiescence of dictatorship and "guided" democracy eradicate the people's sense of individual responsibility for making their own political decisions? Henceforth, it seems if some advertisers have their way, the electorates of our nations will not be won by the truth or falsity of party platforms but by something quite different, something that has nothing to do with truth but rather with its social usefulness to get the people to toe the political and economic line decided by the planners and bureaucrats. This is nothing but "the abolition of man" described by C. S. Lewis in his famous wartime lectures by this title. "From this point of view," he said, "what we call Man's power of Nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men over other men with Nature as the instrument."<sup>32</sup>

Two features of this crisis caused by the attempt to apply scientific method to man's social life may be observed: (1) the loss of personal freedom and responsibility, and (2) the secularization of modern life and the consequent alienation of the lives of millions of modern people from Almighty God and from each other.



The first feature of social planning is that it eliminates human freedom, initiative and personal responsibility since planning inevitably involves the scientific design of the people's activities in a given social field, both individually and as a group, as well as the control of these activities in accordance with the plan.

But how can this be achieved? Men and groups of men will tend to act if left alone, when they are motivated by a belief in the necessity or desirability of something and possess the needed freedom for such activity. To be motivated and to act in freedom is only possible on the basis of knowledge and this knowledge will generally be practical knowledge. Most individuals are interested only in the here and now and they will strive for that which seems useful or desirable. Such practical knowledge exists only in practice, is not reflective and cannot be formulated in rules. Writing of this practical kind of knowledge, Michael Oakeshott has truly said:

The method by which it may be shared and become common knowledge is not the method of formulated doctrine. And if we consider it from this point of view, it would not, I think, be misleading to speak of it as traditional knowledge. In every activity of man this sort of knowledge is also involved; the mastery of any skill, the pursuit of any concrete activity is impossible without it . . . . In a practical art, such as cookery, nobody supposes that the knowledge that belongs to the good cook is confined to what is or may be written down in the cookery book; technique and what I have called practical knowledge combine to make skill in cookery wherever it exists. And the same is true of the fine arts, of painting, of music, of poetry; a high degree of technical knowledge is one thing; the ability to create a work of art, the ability to compose something with real musical qualities, the ability to write a great sonnet, is another, and requires in addition to technique, this other sort of knowledge. Again, these two sorts of knowledge are involved in any genuinely scientific activity . . . . The same situation may be observed also in religion . . . It would be absurd to maintain that even the readiest knowledge of creed and catechism ever constituted the whole of the knowledge that belongs to a Christian. And what is true of cookery, of painting, of natural science and of religion,

is no less true of politics; the knowledge involved in political activity is both technical and practical . . . .

Technical knowledge . . . is susceptible of formulation in rules, principles, directions, maxims—comprehensively, in propositions. It is possible to write down technical knowledge in a book . . . . On the other hand, it is an essential characteristic of practical knowledge that it is not susceptible of formulation of this kind. Its normal expression is in a customary or traditional way of doing things.

Technical knowledge can be learned from a book; much of it can be learned by heart, repeated by rote, and applied mechanically; the logic of the syllogism is a technique of this kind. Technical knowledge, in short, can be both taught and learned . . . . On the other hand, practical knowledge can neither be taught, nor learned, but only imparted and acquired. It exists only in practice, and the only way to acquire it is by apprenticeship to a master—not because the master can teach it . . . but because it can be acquired only by continuous contact with one who is perpetually practising it . . . . Rationalism is the assertion that what I have called practical knowledge is not knowledge at all, the assertion that, properly speaking, there is no knowledge which is not technical knowledge . . . . The sovereignty of reason, for the Rationalist, means the sovereignty of technique.<sup>33</sup>

That Oakeshott is correct in his charge may be seen in the so-called principles of the “scientific management” of men developed by Frederick Taylor who was appointed by Henry Ford to “rationalize” his new method of the mass production of automobiles. Scientific knowledge was to Taylor in every respect the highest and best form of knowledge. Practical knowledge he regarded as haphazard and composed only of incidentally gathered pieces. But applied scientific knowledge he regarded as a scientific whole, systematically collected and universally valid. When pressure could be placed by management to compel its acceptance by the workers then it would replace practical knowledge. As J. A. C. Brown says:

Taylor noted that, whereas the industrialist has a clear idea of how much work he is entitled to expect from a machine, he has no comparable knowledge of

the limits of efficiency of his workers. Obviously if it were possible to estimate how much work a really capable worker could produce in a given operation working "all out" the employer would then have a useful standard by which he could assess the efficiency of other employees doing the same job. The road would then be open to increase the efficiency and output of each worker, and, if the work were scientifically organized, this might well be done without a proportionately increased expenditure of energy. With this aim in view, Taylor proceeded to work on three basic principles:

- (1) To select the best men for the job;
- (2) To instruct them in the most efficient methods, the most economical movements, to employ in their work;
- (3) To give incentives in the form of higher wages to the best workers.

These principles were first tested out in a famous experiment at the Bethlehem Steel Company, to which Taylor had meanwhile got himself appointed as "Consulting Engineer in Management," the first of many to bear that title . . . The researches of Taylor and his successor, Frank B. Gilbreth, came to form the basis of what is now known as Time and Motion Study.<sup>34</sup>

The whole assumption underlying such "time and motion" study in modern industry presupposes, first, that the only knowledge worth possessing and using in industry is that of scientists and engineers and that the practical knowledge of the workers must thus be eliminated. The second implication is that only the men of science and their technicians who carry out their scientific theories shall exercise real responsibility in modern industry. Thus today scientists and technologists are tending to determine every individual industrial operation and the assembly of all sorts of goods from cars to machine tools. In short, the industrial planners are alone to retain their humanity while the industrial workers are to be reduced to the level of planned animals. The social and industrial planners are to make the rest of us happy by thinking for us and looking after us in such a way that we shall be integrated scientifically and technically into community, so that we may no

longer bring any misfortune upon ourselves. Of this de-personalization trend in modern industry, Van Riessen has well said:

The price paid for scientific organization, whenever consistently applied, is the freedom of man in labour, his personal responsibility, the appeal to initiative, to decision, to effort, to skill, and everything over which man disposes in the scope of his freedom.<sup>35</sup>

Just as the institution of slavery in the ancient world tended to corrupt the owners of slaves as well as the slaves themselves so this new institution of the "scientific management" of the workers is tending to corrupt the managers. In his powerful book *Organization Man*, William H. Whyte, Jr. has proved that this judgment of God upon an apostate Anglo-Saxon business world has now happened. The modern attempt to integrate human beings upon a "scientific" rather than a religious basis has brought about its own bitter nemesis, the hidden frustration and cynicism of both managers and workers. And yet the devotee of the psychosocial sciences as a cure-all for all society's ills continues to believe that all human problems are soluble by scientific method, and that the brilliant individual can be "scientifically" reduced to a "prototype personality" which will allow his selection for management by a battery of psychological tests.

In his book *Organization Man* Whyte has defined the crucial problem facing modern society and has told people that they must face it. At the same time he has described and condemned the ideology which allows people to avoid facing it. The problem, that of the conflict between the individual and society, is, of course, age-old; but in modern bureaucratic society and especially in America and Canada dominated as they now are by the "organization" way of life, the pressure on the individual has become intense, and most intense of all on the "organization man."

According to Whyte, organization men do not simply work for organizations; they belong to them body and soul from the moment they awake to the moment they fall asleep at night:

This book is about the organization man . . . . They are not the workers, nor are they the white-collar people in the usual clerk sense of the word. These people only work for the Organization. The ones I am talking about *belong* to it as well. They are the ones of our middle class who have left home, spiritually as well as physically, to take the vows of organization life, and it is they who are the mind and soul of our great self-perpetuating institutions. Only a few are top managers. They are of the staff as much as the line . . . .

The corporation man is the most conspicuous example but he is only one, for the collectivization so visible in the corporation has affected almost every field of work. Blood brother to the business trainee off to join Du Pont is the seminary student who will end up in the church hierarchy, the doctor headed for the corporate clinic, the physics Ph.D. in a government laboratory, the intellectual on the foundation-sponsored team project, the engineering graduate in the huge drafting room at Lockheed, the young apprentice in a Wall street law factory.<sup>36</sup>

Such individuals have, in effect, enslaved themselves. Having found their lives increasingly at odds with the "American Dream" of salvation through individual hard work, thrift and competitive struggle, they have gradually evolved a new ideology to take its place, which makes or appears to make morally legitimate the pressures to conformity of society against the individual.

This new scientific religion Whyte terms the "Social Ethic," and he defines its major propositions as "a belief in the group as the source of creativity; a belief in 'belongingness' as the ultimate need of the individual; and a belief in the applicability of science to achieve the belongingness."<sup>37</sup> According to this new scientific religion which is the real religion of most Anglo-American organization men the conflicts between man and society are really only misunderstandings and not due to any inherent sinfulness; and thus they can finally be resolved in an equilibrium where the individual's aspirations and the community's needs can and should coincide. The Utopian faith in such an ultimate harmony springs, Whyte believes, from a growing pressure to accommodate to the needs of society and a

growing desire to justify it. Whyte does not condemn the obvious good will behind this new "Social Ethic" so much as the philosophy upon which it is based and derived. He sees the emphasis on social usefulness and the group as, in fact, the result of an apostate moral imperative, a search for a secular humanist faith which can replace the faith which Americans formerly found available in Protestant Christianity and which, it is supposed, offers so little guidance to those adrift among the dilemmas of the modern world.

Both at work and at home the moral concern to cooperate therefore becomes the organization man's driving force rather than the old Puritan ideal of rendering to God his due and most worthy praise. His education, the tests by which he is selected for his organization as a well-integrated all-rounder and the training he thereafter receives in fitting in with his group, all propel him in a direction which seems to him both right and desirable. And he is inclined to greet the frustrations and conflicts which later confront him with a conviction that cooperative methods can solve them.

At home in the community, the organization man is a good neighbor and citizen. In the new suburbs where young "organization people" may be found in dense concentrations, they have succeeded in spite of great differences in their religious backgrounds and social origins in re-creating the tight knit group with its distinct community spirit.

And yet so far as "tolerance" goes, however, the organization people of America, Canada and Britain stop abruptly in the face of any questioning of their central and unifying doctrine: that the individuals ought not, ideally, to find themselves in conflict with the group and that social usefulness is more fulfilling than solitary contemplation. When Whyte speaks of the cruelty with which an otherwise decent group can punish the "deviate," he might have quoted Tocqueville's voice of the sovereign majority: "You are free to think differently from me, and to retain your life, your property and all that you possess; but if such be your determination, you are henceforth an alien

among your people." However, Whyte is perfectly clear that it is a "tyranny of the majority."

According to Whyte, the people who live in those American subtopias which have the most intense communal life are aware of their predicament but not of its chief cause—that is, their reluctance to face the inevitability of conflict between themselves and society. It is a crippling disability, and the direct result of their religious commitment to the beliefs which make up the Social Ethic or the new American religion of *togetherness without God*. Intellectually, the Social Ethic is the fruit of William James and, more directly, of John Dewey's pragmatism; but the soil in which they both grew was the new and rapidly changing physical and social environment of America itself. This demanded, from the first, a tremendous and deliberate adaptation to its conditions. "Will it work?" was the question to ask of any idea, and cooperation was the way to see the idea put into practice. Yet at the same time the environment encouraged that stringent competitive individualism which, as we have seen, became so marked during the industrial expansion of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

It seems, therefore, that although from the first both the cooperative and the individualistic instincts have been present in solution, as it were, in American life, it is the former which has crystallized out. It is worth nothing, however, that the people who run the giant corporations, and who, in public, increasingly deify cooperation and well-roundedness, are themselves motivated by the old individualistic competitive drives and the determination to succeed and to control their own destinies.

Whyte argues, and we think correctly, that the secularization of James' pragmatism in the hands of Dewey and his followers has led to the indoctrination of at least two clear generations of Americans in the "life adjustment" view of education. It has ended in a fervent religious belief in the perfectibility of society, to be brought about by the techniques of the physical sciences applied to the social sciences. This, so ironically akin to the tenets of practical communism, is the "scientism" which Whyte at-

tacks, concentrating on its Utopian impracticality. He then examines such phenomena of practical scientism as the "Group Thinkometer" (which registers the combined opinion of a group without any individual having to admit to his part in it), and the attempts to find "ignition levels" in the size and composition of "leaderless groups" so as to produce group thinking and group creativity; and he points how that such techniques do not work. Similarly, the belief (again a part of scientism) that consensus, participation, and cooperation are unquestionably the most desirable and effective means of attaining all ends is deeply influential, regardless of its truth.

It seems relevant to ask here why Americans are so peculiarly a prey to scientism. Perhaps it is at least due partly to the very consciously present goal of "total" democracy. Having a vote in America is like being born—only the beginning of the trouble. As with the child, security, material comfort, and guidance are instinctive needs; independence and acceptance of the human predicament are hard to learn. People want to govern themselves for themselves, but the longing for leadership, for the intolerable burden of responsible decision to be taken from them, is perhaps the more urgent, precisely because it cannot be admitted.

Universal education has not yet given, and beyond a certain point perhaps can never give, the average individual an independent mind. In fact, it seems to begin by depriving him of those faculties of "native" suspicion and "common" sense which have previously given him some protection against exploitation. In this interregnum he knows just enough to be a prey to a scientism and the tyranny of the majority. And he is a prey to these things for a more poignant reason than the feebleness of his desire for freedom or that weakness of the individual spirit which critics of the average man think as typical of him. The individual is at the mercy of the group for the best as well as the worst reasons. Conscience doth make cowards of us all because we know ourselves well enough to question our motives when our individual actions are opposed to those of the group.



The sensation of freedom that people experience under authority has never lost its power to enslave the individual. And if authority take the name of science, this only gives it a more absolute power. "Science" tells the organization man that there can be an ultimate harmony between himself and the group; and in the name of this Utopian harmony, beset by subtle conflicts which he feels should not exist, he tyrannizes over himself. Whyte was concerned in his book specifically to warn Americans of the great danger of their continuing refusal to face up to the essential conflict between the individual and society, hidden as that conflict is by the beneficence of the Organization. Yet it is exactly this point that has gone unheeded, since to the faithful believers and worshipers of the religion of scientism, Whyte's voice was that of an atheist. Such idolaters would rather lose their immortal souls than surrender their faith in the god science. In serving the human Organization rather than Almighty God, their consciences have become deadened.

The movement in Britain and other parts of the English-speaking world toward such an organizational society may have been slower and different in character from that in North America but the same direction has been set. However much many British firms may strive to preserve the individual, personal note, they are constantly moving towards a stricter organization. There is infinitely more formal training in management than before 1939, and "management consultancy" has expanded rapidly since the war. There is a growing interest in group dynamics and managerial methods and time and motion studies. Leaderless discussions, "buzz sessions," and psychological tests are increasingly common on this side of the Atlantic as they have been on the other side for over a generation. Finally, "scientism" continues to make great headway in all of our British universities, with Sir Julian Huxley as its arch priest.

The second feature of the crisis brought about in modern society by this attempt to find salvation in science rather than in God has been the secularization of modern Anglo-American post-war life. The secularization and dis-

sociation of life from God arises whenever science itself is secularized and when its application controls practical life in its entirety. Gradually over the past two generations, God has been removed from Anglo-American people's thoughts, by means of the spirit of a science regarded as neutral, self-sufficient, independent of God and superior to all else. Such a "scientific attitude"<sup>37</sup> applied to practical life, especially with its vision of a planned society is gradually achieving control of Atlantic society. And it is forcing a very great dilemma upon all Christians in the English-speaking world. In every case where science, motivated by its new apostate presuppositions, gives the definite and determined solution for our personal and social problems there will be no room left for God. No place is now allowed for prayer in the public schools or in industry; no place is allowed for God's grace, providence and blessing. If a planned society is indeed scientifically correct, then we shall no longer need God. Every step in that direction makes the world more worldly and isolates it increasingly from God. Wages, prices, labor, pensions, illness, spending of money, recreations, birthrate, migration, choice of profession, education and politics—in short, everything can and will be controlled by scientific planning. It alone is thought to be capable of producing good and necessary results. As a consequence of this complete secularization of life which has overtaken modern men and women, they now find themselves with no place left in the universe.

The attempt to become independent of God so that man can master his physical and social environment has resulted in man's losing his sense of belonging to this earth. For this reason Romano Guardini claims that we have now reached "the end of the modern world."<sup>38</sup> This feeling of no longer belonging is observable throughout the world today in man's senseless striving for security and yet more power. And yet his efforts to conquer outer space, for example, have only resulted in all men feeling more insecure than ever. The means of power now at man's disposal have gotten out of hand and are being turned against humanity itself.

Men strove for power over nature in order to become independent of God's revealed will and purpose for them, and, as masters of God's world, to become equal with him. As a result, they have not only lost all sense of the sacred and the sublime in human life, but also they have alienated themselves from the very power they had discovered by means of their science and sought to employ for their own selfish ends. More and more, modern technics are reducing us all to slavery. As with Adam, man's striving for autonomy thus reveals the nature and consequences of sin. God himself is punishing our Atlantic civilization for its great apostasy from him by the present crisis in Anglo-American-Canadian social life. Secularization penalizes man by the loss of life's meaningfulness. Man's striving for independence from God has thus boomeranged and has become the very tool which now enslaves him.

By completely secularizing modern life and trying to scientize all personal and public relationships, millions of people now find themselves penalized by God in the loss of their own human dignity at work and in the meaning of their lives. In forsaking God, millions of men and women are now experiencing loneliness in the "lonely crowd" which throngs our great metropolitan conurbations. In forsaking God, modern man has severed his connection with the basis and true perspective of his existence and he has thereby opened up the way to nihilism.

Thus the masses now seek satisfaction in the worship of such false idols as sports, sex, gambling, and alcohol. But as they fail in all this to find true peace of mind, they too will eventually land in nihilism. Already, many of our leading artists, thinkers, poets and playwrights have reached this final stage where human existence is thought to be futile and senseless. Compare the war novel of Barbusse *Le Feu* with Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead* or the great First World War novel *All Quiet on the Western Front* with the Second World War novel *From Here to Eternity*. While the former novels show us the soldier in far worse physical conditions; the latter novels bring us in contact with a climax of a complete lack of any moral standards and any ethical norms. The same decline in literary values

and tastes holds for a comparison of Emile Zola with Jean Paul Sartre, of John Buchan with Ian Fleming; of Hemingway with Truman Capot.

Compare the great art of the seventeenth century with that of the twentieth century. In the canvasses of the great Spanish painter, Pablo Picasso, we may detect as nowhere else in modern art the tremendous spiritual agony undergone by modern men in their religious rebellion and apostasy from the living God of the Holy Scriptures.<sup>39</sup>

Again, compare the music of Bach and Beethoven and the dances of the eighteenth-century drawing room with the music of Fedor Stravinsky and the twist and we may discover another symptom of modern man's spiritual degeneration and moral decay as a person created in God's image

Again, compare the strict standards of morality in the American and British evangelical Christian marriage and home with the disintegration of marriage and family life since the end of the last war. In the United States divorces are now running at the rate of one divorce for every four contracted marriages. The fact that divorces are becoming more frequent in modern post-Christian society should not surprise Christian people, for they are an inevitable aspect of the moral decay of that society. Just as the concentration camp has marked the breakdown of the rule of law in the life of the state, so the divorce court of today marks the breakdown of the rule of fidelity in private life. More than all else divorce is the logical and inevitable outcome of unbelief and of a society which has turned its back on the living God, and which has lost its belief in Christian and biblical values.

Thus God punishes man's apostasy by turning his science against him, by confronting him with the meaninglessness of life apart from Him, and by his loss of moral standards and values by means of which man can alone keep control over his science and its technical and mechanical and chemical applications.

Our twentieth-century world has exhausted the illusion of modern civilization—that civilization which took its rise at the time of the Renaissance and early seventeenth cen-

tury with the emergence of the science and personality ideal. This is the profound, ultimate fact of our time. The magnificent alternative with which della Mirandola challenged European man four hundred years ago, to become beast or angel, has been decided in favor of the beast.

The first great honest atheist in European culture of modern times, Nietzsche (1844-1900) warned Europeans that the humanists and post-Christians of his day had no idea of what it truly means to live without a living faith in Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior. The last decades of the twentieth century have suggested what life without such a faith in Christ will be like. It will be like an ant society. It will be like Belsen and Hiroshima. It will be like one of Taylor's mass production factories where the workers have themselves become functions of the productive process. Without Christ, man and woman are literally nothing. What kind of nothing does Nietzsche here mean? Let him answer for himself: "What does nihilism mean? that the highest values are void; that purpose vanishes; that the answer to 'why?' disappears." According to Nietzsche man is nothing but a body in motion. "There is neither mind nor reason, nor thinking, nor consciousness, nor soul, nor will, nor truth."<sup>40</sup>

Nihilism thus means that nothing holds; that nothing binds me, no value, law or norm; and that therefore everything is meaningless and without sense. The term thus includes two different though closely related ideas. That is why Nietzsche, therefore, mentions them in the same breath. For if there is a law which binds man's life in this universe, then there is an indicator of direction, and then there is direction and thus meaning. Or, on the other hand, if existence has meaning, it must emphasize relationship and order, and then law is implied, for the examination of existence is possible only in relation to a standard and a norm.

It is for this reason that the two concepts "law" and "meaning" are so central in the Christian philosophy of the Cosmonomic Law-Idea. As we have seen, Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven both reject the apostate humanist theory of law and meaning. According to the humanist, both law

and meaning are merely constructs of the human reason. It is man himself who discovers values and decides what values should be judged valid. Unfortunately, the more values simply became constructs of the human reason, the more they became adulterated. Thus though the very same words might be used by apostate humanists as by Christian thinkers, in post-Renaissance philosophical, legal, and political thought, as we have already described in Chapter Five of this book, they took on a secularized meaning, characterized by the assumption that man rather than God is the sole criterion and judge of values. Van Riessen calls this process "the transition from *real* to *fictitious* values."<sup>41</sup>

If man's worship of his own reason and scientific method has resulted in such a terrible nemesis as we have described by dehumanizing millions of people, and if man's intellectual apostasy from the worship of the one true God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ has brought him to nihilism, then it is surely obvious that the only hope for the future of modern men and women is to restore meaning and hence purpose to modern life by returning to the only true source and origin of such meaning and purpose, namely, the God who created us and then redeemed us. Only Trinitarian Christianity can restore dignity and meaning to modern life, because God's revelation of himself as Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier is the only solid basis yet revealed for a true humanism which safeguards the dignity of individuals as persons created in God's image, as well as real community between men and the unity of mankind. All the scientific talk and propaganda to the contrary, economics and empty bellies are not the central problem of our age. The central problem of our age is men's empty hearts, people's yearning for a meaning to their lives, a purpose for which to live, and a reason for which to die.

It is to provide such a meaning, purpose, and reason that Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven, and Van Riessen and the new school of the Cosmonomic Law-Idea have devoted their lives. In this Christian philosophy men and women can find not only a view of human life in terms of which they can make sense of their experience and give meaning and coherence to their existence but a philosophy of human

society which alone can avoid the false dilemma of economic individualism or socialistic and communistic collectivism.

It is high time that English-speaking Christians follow Dooyeweerd's lead in exposing the so-called neutrality of much modern scientific thought and begin to base all their thinking—political, legal and economic—upon biblical and Christian foundations rather than upon apostate humanist presuppositions about the nature of man in society and in the universe.

Dooyeweerd's greatness as a Christian philosopher lies in the fact that, like Augustine of Hippo, he has made it clear that human life in its entirety is religious in fundamental structure; and that human scholarship unfolds itself as service either of the one true God or of some absolutization of one or more aspects of temporal reality. The true knowledge of reality is made possible only by the true religion which arises from the knowing activity of the human heart enlightened through the Word of God by the Holy Spirit. Thus religion plays its decisive ordering role in the understanding of our everyday experience and of all our theoretical and scientific pursuits. The task of all Christian scholars and students must therefore be to give a truly scientific account of the structures of God's creation and thereby to promote a more effective ordering of the everyday experience of the entire English-speaking community in every part of the world. May God help us in this great scientific Christian intellectual undertaking so urgently and so desperately needed.

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<sup>1</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. II, p. 361.

<sup>2</sup> J. A. C. Brown, *The Social Psychology of Industry* (Pelican Book, London, 1962), p. 26.

<sup>3</sup> R. C. K. Ensor, *England 1870-1914* (Oxford, 1946), pp. 137ff.

<sup>4</sup> Samuel Smiles, *Self-Help* (Edited by Asa Briggs; Murray, London, 1958), p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (Penguin Book, 1938), p. 100.

<sup>6</sup> M. M. Knappen, *Tudor Puritanism* (Chicago, 1939), Vol. II, pp. 339ff.

<sup>7</sup> T. S. Ashton, *The Industrial Revolution* (Oxford University Press, London, 1952), p. 161.

<sup>8</sup> *Capitalism and the Historians* (Edited by F. A. Hayek; Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1954).

<sup>9</sup> W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge, 1960), p. 33.

<sup>10</sup> Quoted by A. M. Schlesinger, *The Age of Jackson* (London, 1947), p. 335.

<sup>11</sup> James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution* (Pelican Books, 1945), p. 64.

<sup>12</sup> Adolf A. Berle, Jr., *Power without Property* (Sidwick and Jackson, London, 1960), p. 40.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 140ff., cf. Paul Ferris, *The City* (Pelican, London, 1962) for how the new system operates.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. E. Rosenstock-Huussy, *The Multiformity of Man* (London, 1949), p. 68; H. Van Riessen, *The Society of the Future* (Pres. and Reformed, Philadelphia); Peter F. Drucker, *The New Society* (W. Heinemann, London, 1951); and Lyndall F. Urwick, *The Pattern of Management* (Pitman, London, 1957).

<sup>15</sup> F. G. Juengen, *The Failure of Technology* (Regnery, Hinsdale, 1949), p. 75.

<sup>16</sup> Paul Tillich, *The Christian Answer* (New York, 1945), p. 5.

<sup>17</sup> Elton D. Mayo, *Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (Boston, 1945), pp. 7 and 8.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 99.

<sup>19</sup> Emil Brunner, *Man and Technics* (Supplement, Christian News Letter, London, January, 1948), p. 11. Cf. Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (Mentor Books, New York, 1950).

<sup>20</sup> V. A. Demant, *Our Culture: Its Christian Roots and Present Crisis* (London, 1947), p. 105. Also cf. V. A. Demant, *Religion and the Decline of Capitalism* (Faber, London, 1952).

<sup>21</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. II, p. 362.

<sup>22</sup> John Macmurray, *Constructive Democracy* (London, 1943), p. 11.

<sup>23</sup> H. Van Riessen, *The Society of the Future*, p. 80.

<sup>24</sup> K. Groen, "Dooyeweerd and Governmental Organization of Industry," published in *Jurisprudence Essays* (Kok, Kampen, 1951), p. 77.

<sup>25</sup> Van Riessen, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

<sup>26</sup> Dooyeweerd, *Renewal and Reflection* (Kok, Kampen, 1947), pp. 193-215.

<sup>27</sup> Van Riessen, *op. cit.*, pp. 201ff.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 127.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 201. Also consult F. A. Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty* (Routledge, Kegan & Paul, London, 1960).

<sup>30</sup> George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty Four* (Secker & Warburg, London, 1949). Cf. Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World* (Penguin Books, London, 1955).

<sup>31</sup> Vance Packard, *The Hidden Persuaders* (McKay Company, New York, 1958), p. 187.



<sup>32</sup> C. S. Lewis, *The Abolition of Man* (G. Bles, London, 1947), p. 40. This small book is worth its weight in gold and should be read by all Christian teachers and clergy in America. Also cf. Irwin Ross, *The Image Merchants* (Weidenfeld, London, 1959), and Edward Hunter, *Brainwashing—From Pavlov to Powers* (New York, 1960).

<sup>33</sup> Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics* (*Cambridge Journal*, Nov., 1947), pp. 88ff.

<sup>34</sup> J. A. C. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 12ff.

<sup>35</sup> H. Van Riessen, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

<sup>36</sup> William H. Whyte, *The Organization Man* (Doubleday Anchor Book, 1956), pp. 3ff.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>38</sup> C. H. Waddington, *The Scientific Attitude* (Pelican, London, 1948).

<sup>39</sup> Romano Guardini, *The End of the Modern World* (Sheed & Ward, New York, 1956).

<sup>40</sup> Calvin Seerveld, *A Christian Critique of Art* (*Christian Perspectives*, 1963); *A Christian Approach to Literature* (*Christian Perspectives*, 1964). Cf. also Erich Heller, *The Disinherited Mind* (Bowes & Bowes, Cambridge, 1952); Herbert Read, *Art Now* (Faber & Faber, London, 1948); and Rene Huyghe, *Art and the Spirit of Man* (Thames & Hudson, London, 1962).

<sup>41</sup> H. Van Riessen, *Nietzsche* (Pres. and Reformed, Philadelphia, 1960), pp. 26ff.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31; cf. Harry Blamires, *The Christian Mind* (London, 1963).

## CHAPTER XII

### CHRISTIAN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTION

#### A. The Nature and Purpose of Christian Action

Unlike the majority of English-speaking Christian philosophers, Herman Dooyeweerd has refused to remain in the ivory tower of academic, "pietistic," theoretical abstract discussion. Instead, he believes that it is the business of Christian philosophy no less than of Marxist philosophy to change the world. Thus he has chosen to play an active part in the political life of his country. For many years he was executive secretary of the Abraham Kuyper Foundation at The Hague and as such established its famous quarterly, *Antirevolutionaire Staatskunde*. He also played an active role both in the Dutch resistance against Nazi occupation of his motherland during the last war and an active role after the war in the Anti-revolutionary Party of Holland, helping to apply Christian political principles in Dutch political life. His Christian insights have borne good fruit in the *Statement and Declaration of Principles and General Political Program of the Anti-revolutionary Party*, of which an English translation is attached to this book as an appendix.

As we have seen, Dooyeweerd teaches that it is the Word of God alone which set us in the light of the truth and which discloses to us that our life on this planet in its integral wholeness is the service of either the true God or of various idols and absolutizations of one or more aspects of reality. Christian political life is thus an aspect of our

single-hearted service of God. He rejects as unbiblical Karl Barth's repudiation of Christian political and social action.<sup>1</sup> He states:

Culture is bound to human society, which, in its turn, demands cultural formation, i.e., a controlling manner of shaping social relations between men. All human power is derived from God. Christ has said that all power on earth and in the Heavens was given in His hands. The horror of power-formation for the sake of the fulfilment of the Christian task in the cultural development of mankind is, consequently, unbiblical. The Church itself is historically founded in power over men by means of the organized service of the Word and the Sacraments.

Doubtless, every power given in the hands of man implies a serious risk of abuse. But this state of affairs can only accentuate its normative meaning, it can never justify the opinion that power in itself is an evil.<sup>2</sup>

The question that Barth fails to ask is, To what ends will power in fact be used? For used it will be. Either political power will be used in the service of Jesus Christ or it will inevitably be used in the service of some idol and false religion.

Whether Barth likes the fact or not, *all* political action is religion, though we may not overlook the difference between true (real) and false (imagined) religion. Since all human life is lived out of the ineradicable and fundamental religious relation to God, all political life must express the *belief* of those who are engaged in it. This is true even where it is denied; its truth is its rootedness in the sureness of God's creation-ordinance for man. Thus the political life of mankind generally will disclose the same fundamental religious antithesis of direction that characterizes human life as a whole. In their faith, i.e., in their ultimate certainty, the "ways" of men diverge. Faith, which is the gift of God through the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit, is the wedge that divides humanity. Augustine long ago saw the City of God in this world as a work of God's grace in the hearts and lives of men as opposed to the kingdom of this world, which arises out of an apostate faith of rebellious humanity.

According to Karl Barth this "antithesis" between the *civitas dei* (kingdom of God) and the *civitas terrena* (kingdom of this world) is vertical, that is, between God and man, as creature. Man as creature is placed under the judgment of God. Dooyeweerd rightly rejects this teaching of Barth as a theological abstraction which denies the plain teaching of Holy Scripture. The Bible makes clear that God made this world good with all that is in it, and that God took delight in his creatures, man included. (Genesis 1:31). The judgment of God, according to Holy Scripture, is against man as sinner, not against man as creature, for the Lord's wrath is revealed against all unrighteousness, and his punishment fell upon the human race because of sin (Genesis 3; Romans 1:18; 5:12). But for Barth eternity stands in judgment against time and God declares an absolute "No" against all history; God is her judgment and her crisis.<sup>3</sup>

Over against such philosophic constructions of "dialectical" theology Dooyeweerd maintains that the biblical concept of the antithesis refers to the enmity that God has put between the Seed of the woman (the Incarnate Word and all those who are incorporated by faith into Christ's Body which is the Church) and the seed of the serpent (all those who live in enmity with God and who persist in their apostasy for him) (Genesis 3:15). It is this act of God which has determined the history of mankind, as Augustine clearly understood. Ever since Christ was born of Mary in Bethlehem of Judea, a great struggle has been waged between "the children of the light" and the "children of darkness." An antithesis or opposition exists between human life lived in apostasy and disobedience to God and human life lived in obedience to the new covenant which God established between heaven and earth through the death of his Son upon the cross. And since this antithesis roots itself in the heart of man, it does not merely affect the periphery but the *whole of a man's life*, and that includes his political and social activities. Not a single aspect of human life, even the most seemingly "neutral," lies outside this antithesis of godliness versus godlessness. For God is sovereign over his creation and Christ's Kingship

extends over the whole of culture. As Henry Van Til puts it:

The doctrine of the antithesis rightly interpreted holds to a duality in culture corresponding to the duality in the race—a beliefful culture and an apostate culture, for there is no possibility of reconciliation between Belial and Christ, hence no communion (*koinonia*), that is spiritual fellowship, between a believer and an unbeliever. (II Cor. 6:15). In principle, therefore, the antithesis (between the Christ of God and the world organized apart from Him) is absolute. It admits of no compromise; it permeates to the whole of existence; it leaves no area of life untouched.<sup>4</sup>

On this matter of neutrality the great Anglo-Catholic poet, T. S. Eliot, has also spoken. In 1939 he wrote, "The difference between the idea of a neutral society (which is that of the society in which we live at present) and the idea of a pagan society is in the long run of minor importance." Eliot then warned all English-speaking Christians that the Christless and Godless way of life is fast gaining ground in the Anglo-Saxon democracies, largely, he claimed, as a result of the modern "liberal" notice "that religion is a matter of private belief and of conduct, and that there is no reason why Christians should not be able to accommodate themselves to any world that treats them goodnaturedly." Eliot then points out:

The problem of leading a Christian life in a non-Christian society is now very present to us. It is not merely the problem of a minority in a society of individuals holding an alien belief. It is the problem constituted by our implication in a network of institutions from which we cannot dissociate ourselves; institutions the operation of which appears no longer neutral, but non-Christian, and as for the Christian who is not conscious of his dilemma—and he is in the majority—he is becoming more and more *de-Christianized by all sorts of unconscious pressures: Paganism now holding all the most valuable advertising space.*<sup>5</sup>

For this reason Dooyeweerd teaches that if the Christian religion is to exert an influence upon the life of the modern world, then it must live out of its own distinctive political and social principles. By reason of its transcen-

dental ground idea or absolute presupposition the Christian Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Law-Idea "includes within its range all of Christian thought as such." In this respect Dooyeweerd follows in the steps of Abraham Kuyper. In Kuyper's justly famous inaugural oration, *The Sovereignty of the Social Spheres*, delivered at the founding of the Free University of Amsterdam in 1880 and in his learned trilogy *De Encyclopaëdie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid*, Kuyper was the first Christian thinker to give the doctrine of the antithesis a scientific construction. Kuyper pointed out that this reality which is observable throughout the history of the world is rooted in the point of departure that characterizes every system of thought which proceeds from the human heart. Through regeneration a man becomes a new creature in Christ so that his consciousness is changed and his mind enlightened by the Spirit of God to understand the revelation of God given in the Holy Scriptures. Kuyper drew the conclusion that there are two kinds of people in the world: the believers in Christ and the unbelievers, the obedient and apostate. Hence, there must of necessity follow two kinds of science, art, and politics. Accordingly, no Christian can escape the dilemma which the antithesis sets forth, if he really takes seriously the universality of the Kingship of Christ and the central confession of God's sovereignty over the whole cosmos as Creator. It is in this sense that we must understand Kuyper's idea of the religious antithesis in human life and thought. As Dooyeweerd points out:

Many peace-loving Christians . . . do not recognize that this antithesis does not draw a line of *personal* classification but a line of division according to fundamental principles in the world, a line of division which passes transversely through the existence of every Christian personality. This antithesis is not a human invention, but is a great blessing from God. By it He keeps His fallen creation from perishing. To deny this is to deny Christ and His work in the world.<sup>6</sup>

The Christian political and social task is thus concerned with the *inner reformation* of man's political and social life as an aspect of the integral renewal of our whole

life in obedience to Jesus Christ. For this reason it must never be thought of in terms of some *one* particular question, of this or that political issue or campaign platform. A truly Christian political program could never become a one-cause platform campaigning, for example, for a return to the gold standard, a prohibition of prostitution or consumption of alcoholic beverages. Taken by themselves, all such things have nothing in common with true Christian political and social action. For the same reason a Christian political party would be a *political* party, not a worker's or farmer's or intellectual's party representing various pressure groups in society. *Christian politics is not a question of details at all but a question of principles.* Christian politics takes its origin in the Christian's acknowledgement of the total sovereignty of the Lord Jesus Christ over the whole of human life.

For this reason it should be clear why Christian political and social action can never be simply a question of getting Christian persons into existing political and social and economic positions. Many Christians today feel that they have done their Christian duty at the polls when they have voted for a Christian candidate regardless of whether the candidate's party affiliation and party platform openly acknowledge the sovereignty of Jesus Christ. Christian political life is *not* the accepted political life of the time being accomplished by Christian individuals; *it is doing the will of God as revealed in the Holy Scriptures in the political sphere of human society*, exercising our office according to the will of the Sovereign God as revealed in his Word.

In this sense of Christian political and social action we are but "followers of Christ" himself in the scriptural sense of the term. Our Lord was the great Servant of the Lord. He came to do his Father's will, and to do nothing else than that. This will of his Father was through him *to bring all things, whether in heaven or on earth, back to a right relation to the Father.* (Col. 1:19). Everything that has become disrupted and distorted by sin is to be brought back to a right relation with the Father by the coming of the Kingdom of Christ, the Righted Creation, which every person worthy of the name of Christian should serve (Matt.

6:33). Our Lord himself pointed to the parallel between his work and ours when he said, "As the Father hath sent me into the world, even so send I you" (John 17:18). In short, Christian political action is a function of our life service to the Lord Jesus Christ.

As such, Christian political action involves the administration of the world not on behalf of any Christian or group of Christians but on God's behalf. In this regard, some wise words of Evan Runner will bear quoting.

The Christian political task is to bring to the *world*, in the political way and for the political side of its life, the blessing of Christ's redemptive concern for the world. It is a task directed to human society in the world. It is genuinely Christian and meaningful only when it is an activity of service to the world. For this reason it can never be a camouflaged effort to further the interests of particular Christian citizens, of more or less Christian communities, or *even of the Christian churches* as they are instituted in a particular place and time. Christian political action is . . . for the good of the whole people. Christian political action seeks . . . as the political activity of the Body of Christ, to reform the world in its political aspect, so that there too an acknowledgement may come of the good and holy law of God and that thus the blessings that follow upon obedience may be showered upon the life of humanity. All idea therefore of political lobbies and pressure groups is excluded from a scripturally directed view of the Christian's political task.<sup>7</sup>

As service and administration of God's world, Christian political and social action is a *witness*. It is not therefore a question of "winning at the polls." How frequently one hears the Christian say, "If you cannot win at the polls there is no use in beginning political action." But this view forgets that no Christian action of any sort is undertaken with a view to earthly success but simply and solely to please God. Like the rest of the Christian's life, political life is first of all a witness. It is a witness to the direction this aspect of life must take from out of the Word of God, if human society is to be redeemed. It is a witness to the great fact that God alone is the source and origin of all political and legal obligation over men and that God alone



and not the State or one political party or social class is Sovereign over men.

The great illusion of modern post-Christian democrats and liberal humanists is that successful community can be created between man without reference to basic life- and world-views. Such persons expect men to live as brothers without believing in God as their Creator, to found a brotherhood of mankind without any common faith to bind them, to think as one while remaining utterly individualistic and self-seeking. Christians must bear witness to the fact that it is impossible to enjoy the fruits of Christianity without a living faith in Christ as Lord of life in its entirety. We must point out to the humanists that such secular values as "liberty," "equality," and "fraternity" are miserable shadows of the Christian doctrine of the Fatherhood of God, the true brotherhood of man made possible by the death of Christ, and the real liberty wherewith Christ makes men free from the power and guilt of sin. For this reason alone all present liberal humanist attempts to integrate the races outside of Jesus Christ are doomed to failure. It is impossible to expect colored and white people in any part of the world to live together in peace unless both come to share in God's forgiveness of their sins and both races find in Christ a common loyalty in terms of which they can build a stable society.

Likewise, in the social and economic sphere Christians are called to bear witness to the great truth that prosperity will only come to the English-speaking democracies when we eliminate the present injustices prevailing in British and North American labor relations by the application of Christian principles of mutual cooperation between management and workers and by basing our social and economic life upon principles of conduct derived from God's Holy Scriptures. All institutions of our society must become means of expressing God's law for human beings in society. Both industry and unions must be made subject to Christ's law of love before our nations can prosper. Both management and labor must become more and more directed by the Word of God until the Spirit of Christ can grow to full

stature in them and Christ can express himself completely through them.

Does this mean that Christians are going to isolate themselves from the world and that they should separate themselves from other workers and citizens? No, a thousand times, No! Just the contrary. A Christian trade-union is not a union of Christians that seclude themselves from the rest of mankind, but it is a labor union that is standing in the midst of the world and which devotes itself in word and action to the cause of social justice, to consultation and co-operation in trade and factory. Likewise, a Christian political party is not a party that withdraws itself from the hustle and bustle of political life, but it is a party which dedicates itself in word and deed to the cause of peace with justice for all groups within society. So Christian political and social action does not mean separatism or sectarianism. No, Christian unionism and Christian political action is real trade-unionism and real political activity, for both grow out of the only true source of true community known to mankind, namely, the love of God revealed for man upon the cross of Christ. Only at the foot of the cross of Jesus Christ can the conflict between capital and labor, between the individual and the group, between the private and the public interest ever be truly resolved. Only when both management and labor, both the individual and the group, both the governed and the governors accept God's forgiveness of their own sins—only then may we expect peace with justice to prevail. Real community in modern society is possible only on a truly Christian basis, where our fellow workers and citizens become our brothers for whom Christ also died. Only when both workers and managers, governed and governors are first reconciled to God—only then will they become reconciled to each other. Only when workers and employers, ruled and rulers have first been forgiven of their sins by God—only then will they be enabled to forgive each other of their trespasses.

## B. The Necessity for Christian Political and Social Organization

The question naturally arises whether Christians can for the purpose of the organization of the various activities of modern society unite themselves with those who openly or covertly reject Christ as the Lord of life in one and the same organization, or whether it is God's will and requirement that they organize themselves independently and call into being a system of Christian associations and learn to accept a conscious division between themselves and non-Christians. The classic Christian answer to this searching question has been given by Abraham Kuyper in his masterpiece *Pro Rege (For the King)*. After dealing at some length with the scriptural basis of such separate Christian organization, Kuyper goes on to say:

There is thus not the least uncertainty on this point. In mixing socially danger always lurks for Christians. One so easily allows the law to be laid down by society and its worldly forms. What society can get away with Christians too can so easily permit. One floats along on a stream to which one can offer no resistance. And consciously one exchanges the principle of the Christian life for the unpurified principle of worldly society.<sup>8</sup>

Kuyper concludes the chapter with a very telling section:

The influence which emanates from all these non-Christian organizations is without exception destructive for our Christian confession. One reasons and acts out of principles which are absolutely opposed to ours. If now one allows oneself to enter into such organizations and if one mingles in such organizations with those who are of a wholly other mind, then what they think or judge becomes the starting point of the decisions that are to be taken, and one supports by one's membership what one, in conformity with one's Christian confession, may not support but combat. In such socialistic or neutral associations a spirit is operative which never can or may be ours. The leadership in such organizations falls never to us but always and inflexibly to our opponents. They carry out their intention, and whoever of us embarks with them ends up where they want to land but where we may never

land. Thus our principle settles down at the point of non-activity, loses its position of influence and is pressed into a corner. Mingling with such non-Christian leaders in the labour and political organization itself leads always to a bitter fiasco of Christian principles and prepares the way for their victory and our overthrow. In these labour and political organizations material interests are always and invariably in the foreground; the concern is for more power against the employer and higher wages for one's work. Of course, there is in itself nothing wrong with the fact that everyone stands up for his rights and also attempts to improve his material position. But just for that reason the temptation is so great even for the Christian in such organizations to let the end justify the means, to let material interest prevail over spiritual ones and to float along on a stream which can and may never be ours. The spirit at work in such principally unbelieving social organizations is so alluring and contagious that almost none of us, once he enters into such company, can offer resistance to it. One absorbs this godless spirit without suspecting it. Especially so because one is a part of such organizations, one sees one's Christian principles doomed to silence.<sup>9</sup>

We have also been warned of the secularizing influences at work in the so-called neutral social organizations of the English-speaking world by the Roman Catholic Archbishops and Bishops of the Province of Quebec in the Dominion of Canada. In a joint Pastoral Letter published in 1950, these Quebec bishops had this to say about labor unions which claimed to be neutral:

The mass of the workers receive their education almost insensibly from the association to which they belong. The spirit and vigour which pervades the organized unit proceeds from the mind and heart of the leaders. That vigour reaches afterwards all the members and conveys to them a particular concept of social life and professional relations. *Hence the association is formative.* It will be such in a Christian way, if it expressly adheres, in its very constitution, to the social principles of Christianity, and if the leaders who shape its action are capable through their living faith in the authority of Christ and His Church, of submitting their consciences as leaders to those principles. Otherwise the association will lead the

workers astray to materialism; it will imbue the worker with a false concept of life eventually made known by harsh claims, unjust methods, and the omission of the collaboration necessary to the common good.<sup>10</sup>

Paul likewise calls upon the Christians at Corinth to establish distinctive Christian organizations to deal with the disputes that had broken out amongst them. Rather than take their troubles before an unbelieving judge, they should "suffer injustice and loss," and he then enjoins them to form their own organization and to appoint suitable men to settle such disputes in the future. While Christians cannot leave the world, they must become separate from the world of apostate Graeco-Roman culture, science, and politics. Their social intercourse must be arrested wherever possible from the corrupting influences of the immoral pagans and unbelievers. Then it will be possible for them to conduct themselves properly as followers of Christ toward "them that are without" (I Thess. 4:12; Col. 4:5; I Tim. 3:7; I Cor. 5:13; 6:1-11). According to Paul Christians should form a closely knit community with a style of living all its own. And so there gradually came to be formed not only a cultic community of worship centered around the preaching of the Holy Gospel and the administration of the Blessed Sacrament, but also an isolated Christian community with its own style of life. A similar state of affairs has always existed in the first generation or two of the Christian missionary enterprise. In the former Belgian Congo in the village where I was born and raised, the converted negroes inevitably withdrew from their former heathen associates to build up their own Christian community based upon Christian moral standards.

It seems to be only in lands which have long heard the Gospel of God that it is hard to tell the difference between believers and unbelievers. Is it not high time that modern Christians in the English-speaking world became distinguished for their own peculiar Christian way of life instead of becoming absorbed in the surrounding post-Christian world? The Afro-Asians tend to lump Western Christians into the same mass as the non-Christian Westerners. How much longer are English-speaking Christians going

to continue compromising the Gospel by dragging it down into the mire of modern apostate Western humanism? Experience should by now have made it obvious that it is impossible for true Christians in Western society to associate themselves with non-Christians in the various institutions and organizations of modern Western post-Christian society without becoming corrupted and de-Christianized. How can there be real community between persons who acknowledge the sovereignty of the Lord God and of his Blessed Son and those who prefer to worship their own sovereign reason, scientific technique and method, and their own material happiness? At every point where Christians in Great Britain and North America have tried to cooperate with non-Christians in the various social undertakings and political programs of the past forty years, it is always the apostate humanist policy that has gained ground and the Christian policy that has retreated.

Having said this, let me at once dissociate myself from those Christians who, while accepting the principle of separate Christian political and social action, yet would have the bishops and boards and various councils of clergy direct all the non-cultic activities and affairs of believers. This is impossible if only for the reason that in the Pastoral Epistles neither the State relationship nor the marriage bond nor the family tie is placed under the official supervision of the clergy of Christ *as far as their internal organization and their characteristic activities are concerned*. When Paul urges the believers at Corinth to straighten out their differences, he does not say one word about going to the presbyters. The experience of the Papal Theocracy of the medieval Western Church, as well as of theocratic presbyterianism in Scotland, Geneva, and the New England States, should have warned us by this late date of the dangers of the clergy of Christ themselves engaging directly in practical politics. The work of the clergy is surely to instruct the faithful laity or people of God by so well preaching the Word of God and showing its contemporary relevance that those Christians who engage in practical politics and business can draw their own conclusions from such preaching and teaching for the life of the state and

of business. Laymen and lay women are not babes in Christ as the Roman Catholic clergy has given others occasion to suppose, but rather they are persons who have been called to stand firm in their freedom (Gal. 4:5).

Christian organizations are not in themselves mere departments of the Christian ministry but they grow out of the special gifts of the Holy Ghost described by Paul in his letter to the Corinthians (I Cor. 12). Yet even Christian labor unions, Christian educational institutions, and Christian political parties are and must always remain instruments of Christ the King. It is none other than the Lord Jesus Christ himself who sends out his Spirit and qualifies us for our work, because he must reign as King of Culture and Society until he has put down all enemies under his feet (I Cor. 15:25).

As an example of a Christian political party which really maintains its independence of any ecclesiastical authority, Dooyeweerd cites the Anti-Revolutionary Party in the Netherlands whose political credo and Christian witness is expressed thus:

It avows the eternal principles revealed to us in God's Word also in the sphere of politics; in such a way, however, that the State government shall be bound to the divine ordinances neither directly as in Ancient Israel nor through the judgement of any Church, but in the conscience both of the government and the subject.<sup>11</sup>

As we saw in our study of the Puritan origins of the Anglo-Saxon democracies, this principle of government responsible to the consciences of common English-speaking men and women was the political equivalent of the evangelical Puritan practice of "gathering" a church and founding it upon a "church covenant." In other words, our own English-speaking democracies arose out of this Puritan experience of church democracy. People who chose and called out their own pastors naturally demanded the right to elect their magistrates and politicians.

In theory and in constitutional principle each of us, from the Queen and the President down to the humblest township policeman and dog catcher, is held responsible for

what we do with God's higher moral law revealed in the Ten Commandments. Thus, in theory if not in fact, Almighty God is the real source of all our political and legal obligations, as is still proved by the fact that we have to take oaths of office and to take the oath in a court of law with our hands resting upon the Word of God. Again, no one can hold any office or appointment under the Crown or the President unless he has first sworn to obey the laws of the land. Robert T. Ingram well says in *The World Under God's Law*:

Any system of law requires certain basics to make it operative. One is a penalty for violations. Another, equally essential, is the inviolability of an oath. It is utterly impossible to administer justice, either in the punishment of wickedness and vice or the adjudication of civil disputes, unless men can be required to tell the truth on pain of heavy penalty. The requirement is met by an appeal to what men regard as sacred and inviolable. For Christians it means an appeal to God. To take the name of God in vain—to swear an empty or hollow oath, one that is false—is to commit perjury.<sup>12</sup>

Unfortunately, most English-speaking people today seem quite unaware of the fact that the moral dynamic of the Anglo-Saxon democracies was the creation of Reformed and biblical Christianity and that without such religious roots the flowers of democratic parliaments and congresses, secret ballots, constitutions, and the rest cannot continue long to bloom. The values and moral attitudes underlying the English-speaking democracies as well as Holland's political system are derived from the Word of God himself recorded in the Holy Scriptures, and they will only survive as long as the majority of citizens remain loyal to God's great blue print for our lives. Our belief in the sacredness of individual personality is a truth conveyed to us only by the Bible, without which we could never have realized it. It was never realized by Hinduism with its rigid caste system, or by Buddhism or by Mohammedanism. Wherever Reformed Christianity has failed to penetrate or has decayed, there one will find intolerance, prejudice and passion at work, disrupting human society. Without God



human society falls apart into lawless violence, power has no trace of conscience, and jackboot of tyranny and injustice trample down the weak. When God is rejected by the majority of a nation, all defence against arbitrary power vanishes too at the same time. If Americans, Britons and Canadians will not acknowledge the Sovereign God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ as their Lord and God, then they too will conclude with tyrants as their masters, because it is only the Lord God himself who can subject the power of politicians, judges, police, employers and workers, doctors and teachers, financiers and journalists to conscience. Without such an enlightened conscience, a conscience enlightened by God's Holy Spirit, there can be no abiding defence against injustice and tyranny.

It is precisely because the majority of the citizens of Great Britain and the United States refuse to be so enlightened by God's Word and by God's Holy Spirit that freedom is now threatened. The tragedy of our so-called "liberal democracy" is that millions of Britons, Canadians, and Americans have forgotten that they have been created in God's image and that they are therefore responsible to him for the conduct of their lives here on earth. Our historic Anglo-American freedoms cannot possibly survive if they are severed from their origin in God's will and purpose for us. By wrenching human freedom from its roots in God's will for man we have fallen prey to the false alternatives of laissez-faire individualism or socialistic collectivism. Most of the social convulsions of our age started off in the name of the secular trinity of ideas proclaimed at the beginning of the French Revolution, the ideas of "liberty," "equality," and "fraternity." In that name today flourish more "unfreedoms" than humanity has ever had to bear. Everywhere on both sides of the Iron Curtain they are imposed by the brute force of the State upon the hard-pressed citizens composing both capitalistic and communistic societies. Never have frustrations and disloyalties been so widespread. Never have officers and institutions of the State incurred such contempt and disrespect as they do today in both Western and Eastern societies. Never have law and order, authority and discipline come into such

world-wide disregard. Double standards of conduct and dishonesty have leapt into first place as the common denominator of national and international life, in both Eastern and Western societies, developed and underdeveloped. It is not a very impressive achievement by six generations of so-called liberators, liberal democrats, nationalists, socialists, and scientific humanists; and if it be the chaos of pre-ordination, the order it portends looks even less so.<sup>13</sup>

Nobody is so foolish as to imagine that plants and flowers can live for long after their roots have been cut. They soon wilt and die. Yet precisely that hope seems to be the great delusion entertained about *political and legal* freedom by our apostate secularized post-Christian social scientists, lawyers, politicians, journalists, and television commentators. The greatest threat to liberal democracy today does *not* come from Communism, great and deadly as that threat most certainly is. *A still greater threat lies in the severance of democracy in the great English-speaking democracies from its spiritual roots in the Gospel of Jesus Christ.* This has now become an Anglo-Saxon-American phenomenon as well as a European Continental and Communist one, as our English-speaking world has plucked the tender plant of democratic liberty loose from its soil in the belief that man was created in the image of God and that man was redeemed from slavery to sin by the death of Christ. We have forgotten William Penn's great warning, "Men must choose to be governed by God or they condemn themselves to be ruled by tyrants."

Events today in both Eastern and Western lands fully and tragically bear out the truth of Penn's prophecy. They prove that wherever and whenever belief in God and in his creation of man in his own image is abandoned, political freedom also perishes. The validity of the struggle for freedom in which the Anglo-Saxon democracies are now engaged against Soviet and Chinese Communism rests ultimately upon the Biblical evaluation of human personality being true. And the pursuit of that struggle for freedom by liberal democrats is rendered perilously precarious if this biblical and Christian valuation of human personality is banished from the political scene and from the forum of

public discussion. That peril is apparent in many contemporary social trends. It is apparent in the dilemmas of the Welfare State. In pursuing the liberation of our poorest citizens from the frustrations of poverty, insecurity, and ill-health, the Governments of Great Britain, the United States, and Canada now find themselves regimenting the lives of the peoples committed to their charge to an extent which the liberalism of a few decades ago would have found intolerable. It is apparent in current humanistic trends in education, where it is desired to train boys and girls, not in the discovery of their fulness of personality in the Risen Christ, but in the discovery of their specialized "category" and "function" for the efficient working of the social and industrial machine.<sup>17</sup> It is apparent in current trends in modern methods of mass production where our workers have their dignity as persons sacrificed on the altar of bigger and better production and profits.<sup>15</sup> It is apparent in the perversion of industrial and trade unions which began in the heroic struggle of the industrial workers during the last century to recover their dignity as persons created in God's image but which now deny our workers their right to join the union of their choice.<sup>16</sup>

In all these cases we are here on the verge of a denial of what the State, education, and work have meant and should mean in liberal society, and the cause of this denial lies in the more fundamental denial that man is created in God's image, and that man is a sinner who can only be saved from his sinfulness by the redeeming love and grace of Jesus Christ, the Savior of the world. Instead of looking to God for a solution to our political and social problems, both the liberal and conservative within our midst have looked to "science" and the State for a solution. The root of this modern error of seeking a political and scientific solution for what are fundamentally religious problems is to be found in the illusions of the Romantic movement of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries with its doctrine of the natural goodness of man which taught Western Europeans and Americans to look to a change in social conditions for the abolition of evil rather than to a change of heart. Rousseau proposed to "take men as they are and

states as they ought to be," proclaiming thereby that there is no need to change men, but only to provide the political institutions which will allow their natural goodness to express it. To proclaim as the humanists, both liberal and conservative, today proclaim that "science" and the State can bring about Utopia upon earth is to think religiously. To preach as many humanists now preach that man is good at heart, that human nature does not need cleansing by the blood of Christ, and that man's reason and scientific method applied to social, legal, and economic problems can save man from the consequences of his own sinfulness, is not merely to deny the plain teaching of God's own Holy Scriptures; it is to imply that there is no need for Jesus Christ and his atoning death upon the Cross at all. By accepting this Romantic teaching, Western humanists, both liberal and conservative, have not only suppressed their own sense of sin but they have also set idolatrous objectives for their politics. "Freedom," "Equality," and "Brotherhood" are essentially religious ideals. To set political machinery at work to realize them is to make failure certain; and the more wholeheartedly a government devotes itself to their pursuits the more likely it is to achieve their opposites. By what laws can men be constrained to love one another? What political compulsion will make us lay aside self-interest and suspicion and treat one another as equals? A state with such religious objectives is a totalitarian state. As we saw in our study of his political teaching, Rousseau admitted that in the society of his dreams those who would not obey "the general will" would be forced to be free. We have seen recently what this means in practice in Hungary.

From the point of view of their common origin in the humanist nature-freedom motive and in the seventeenth-century rationalist faith in man's reason, both liberalism and conservatism are derived from non-Christian presuppositions. The left-wing and the right-wing of modern Anglo-American-Canadian political life both represent a meaning that is false because it is a falling away from the original meaning of God's law-order and structure for human society. Liberalism tears "freedom" and "progress" out of their connection with man's responsible position as

office and service of the living God, where he is called to the liberty from sin whereby Christ makes him free. It thus proclaims a destructive doctrine of freedom as independence from God, instead of understanding freedom as being possible only in obedience to God's moral law. Conservatism, on the other hand, drags the religious office of man down to the historically arisen orders and establishments of human society and thereby presents us with a dangerous and distorted view of authority. Thus neither modern liberalism as represented by such men as the intellectuals in the American Democratic Party, the British Labour Party or the Canadian Liberal Party nor modern conservatism as represented by the Bow Group of the British Conservative party, William Buckley of the *National Review* in America and Barry Goldwater of the Republican Party can be acceptable to those Christians who take God's Word rather than man's reason as the criterion of political values and philosophy.

It is for this reason that H. Evan Runner rightly believes that the present organization of Anglo-American-Canadian political life into this kind of political polarity is unacceptable to the convinced Christian. He says:

The implied disjunction is not a proper one. Neither of the alternatives (Liberalism or Conservatism) is correctly formulated, and there is another political possibility: a vigorous political articulation of the central religious knowledge of the divine Thesis that Christians have in Christ.<sup>17</sup>

The great choice in political life, as in all other areas of life, is not one between liberalism or conservatism, socialism or individualism, but between the Kingdom of God and the kingdom of Satan, between good and evil, love and selfishness. If Christians do not allow their *principal* protest to be made known against the present structuration of political life and make no attempt to articulate their own political faith, then they can scarcely be said to be witnessing for Christ. And then they can hardly grumble when they find it almost impossible to express their Christian convictions within the political parties of their genera-

tion and so find themselves squeezed out of the public life of their times and deprived of their influence as *Christians*.

English-speaking humanists reply to this demand for Christian political action that by setting up a Christian political party dedicated to furthering principles of Christian political philosophy, we shall be causing disunity and division within our nations. Thus the the humanist Walter James writes, "The organization of politics on religious lines can on occasion be a divisive force in the nation and no service to Christianity. It emphasizes the distinction between believer and unbeliever."<sup>18</sup>

Walter Lippmann in America likewise prefers the present two-party system where religious issues are conveniently kept out of the way. Both men are horrified at the prospect of *bringing Christ back into the polling booth*. After all, if Christ enters the voting booth anything might begin to happen, especially to the present apostate holders of political office! Lippman argues in his *The Public Philosophy* that our present two-party system necessarily presupposes a fundamental commonness of commitment to ultimate principles concerning man's nature. For Lippmann the present two poles of Anglo-American political life, instead of providing radical alternatives, should be thought of as complementary to each other. We need, he claims, both bold experimentation and the maintenance of historical continuity, but both within a larger frame of reference of a common fundamental belief about the ultimate principles of human life. Thus he claims to be able to find a so-called consensus of the "public philosophy":

The toleration of differences is possible only by the assumption that there is no vital threat to the community. Toleration is not, therefore, a sufficient principle for dealing with the diversity of opinions and beliefs. The principle calls for the effort to find agreement beneath the differences.<sup>19</sup>

Such an agreement Lippmann thinks can be found in a revived doctrine of natural law suitably dressed up to placate the modern liberal humanist.

In these words we have a classic expression of the intolerance of the modern liberal humanist. Christians are

to accept his frame of reference because it is based upon science. The humanist need not bother wasting his time with the Christian position because it is based only on faith. We hope that our summary of Dooyeweerd's critique of the supposed autonomy of theoretical and scientific thought has exposed the fallacy of this humanist argument. The humanist position is just as much based on absolute pre-suppositions taken on faith as the Christian position, with the important difference that the Christian honestly acknowledges his faith principle while the humanist does not. Of Lippmann's words quoted above Runner points out:

Here Lippmann can be seen signing the death warrant of those who would live radically and integrally by the powerful Words of the living God. Christianity will be tolerated where and only where it allows itself to be integrated with the rest of humanity's life. The confession that human life is characterized by a fundamental split of religious commitment is intolerable. We are confronted here with the same old . . . and fundamentally intolerant assertion of a *oneness* of the human race outside of a common submission to Christ according to the Law-Word of God. There is, to be sure, a oneness of the race apart from Christ; the concerted effort of men, for instance, to build the Tower of Babel or a World United against the rule of Christ.<sup>20</sup>

In spite of this attempt to find community in terms of an appeal to reason, utility, and expediency, Christians must not hesitate to point out that true unity and peace among men is possible only with God's blessing and is the result of Christ's work of redemption whereby he overcame the deepest cause of disunity and strife, namely man's sin. Sin, which is disobedience to God's law for man, lies at the bottom of all modern disruption and disharmony. Any effort to establish true community among men, classes, races, and nations which does not take account of this biblically revealed truth can never be really successful, no matter how many bishops and archbishops support the liberal-humanist side.

Does this mean that members of a Christian political party or trade union would be free from sin? It does not.

No Christian organization is based on the self-righteous principle of separating the sheep from the goats but on the biblical principle of faith in God's restoring grace in the lives both of individuals and of society. For this reason a Christian political party would not be a disruptive social force, but a unifying force. It is such in spite of the fact that it may add to the number of existing organizations the reconciling power of the grace of God in men's lives and hearts.

So far from a Christian political party's aggravating the present political life of the English-speaking democracies, it would greatly invigorate political life by bringing out into the open the present religious humanistic faith in human reason, planning and science which now motivates most Anglo-American-Canadian politicians. The electorates of Britain, America, and Canada would at last be presented with real and not imagined and "phony" political alternatives. And since political debates would once more return to first and basic principles, elections would become exciting and once more of crucial importance. Surely no one in his right senses can deny that recent elections in America, Britain, and Canada have been lacking in fire precisely because of the absence of any appeal to such fundamental convictions. Is it not time that the humanists in our midst openly admit the fact that we are living in a pluralistic society of competing religious faiths, viz, scientific humanism, Roman Catholicism, and Orthodox Protestantism? Does not justice require that proper political instruments be found which will implement and reflect these basic life-and world-views? Our present two-party or two-movement system and acceptance of the principle of acquiescence in the decisions of the majority and thus of elections by the majority vote are actually implementations of the humanistic belief in the sovereignty of the people, who are also conceived as fundamentally at one, whose political divisions will therefore always tolerate one another. Instead of working to uphold justice, the present two-party system now manifestly works against the just rights of the Christian minority within our society. The time has come for the adoption of a fairer system of political representation,



namely that of proportional representation which will allow Christians and other ideological groups to live out of their own basic life- and world-views and yet still exist in a political community. Crane Brinton well says in his book *A Decade of Revolution—1789-99*:

It may well be argued that if the main function of a parliament is not to govern, but to provide a focus for public opinion for the guidance of the government, then the group system, since it frankly accepts existing diversity of opinion, is better than a two-party system which tries to gloss over such diversity.<sup>21</sup>

If American and British humanistically-orientated politicians try to argue that such a group system will not work in the English-speaking democracies, then it must be pointed out that it has been working in Western Europe for many decades. In fact, the existence of political and social organizations split along such ideological lines has come to be accepted in such nations as the Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany, Italy, and France as an essential part of a truly free and modern democratic life. Unlike their Anglo-American-Canadian counter-parts, the Christians of the Continent take Christ's sovereignty over culture seriously. As a result of suffering at the hands of apostate humanistic creeds they decided to stand up and be counted for their Christian convictions.

### C. Christian Democracy in Western Europe

According to Michael Fogarty in his great work, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820-1953*,<sup>22</sup> Christian political parties sprang up in Europe mainly in reaction to liberal humanistic attitudes adopted towards Christianity by the liberal and socialist movements in the aftermath of the French Revolution and Napoleon's defeat. Fogarty distinguishes three main phases in the development of Christian political action on the continent of Europe.

(1) To begin with, politically-minded Christians accepted the principle of cooperation with liberal humanists and put away the fears which democracy had aroused. He writes:

The liberal movements of the early nineteenth century carried two messages which in principle were perfectly acceptable to Christians. First, the modern world was a very different place from that of previous centuries and needed new forms of social organization. The number of major inventions, technical and social, appearing in the world from decade to decade had been doubling each century from the Middle Ages on. By the nineteenth century this rising river of change had become a torrent, affecting every corner of social life. To allow for and control these new opportunities, in a society far more open and swiftly changing than in the more traditional past, the liberals proposed certain techniques: political democracy, economic competition, guarantees of the rights of man and nations. A little later, socialists in their turn came forward proposing new techniques of state control and class (trade union) organization. Secondly, seeing that in the modern world beliefs are divided, the liberal movements argued that to impose by force any one set of beliefs would do more harm than good. The right attitude was one of tolerance and mutual respect between different "spiritual families."

Both these positions were acceptable to Christians, but were not immediately or everywhere accepted by them. There grew up among Christians at first a small and then a large and powerful body of opinion which accepted the liberal and in due course the socialist techniques. By about 1880 substantial Christian-liberal, if not Christian socialist, bodies of opinion existed in all the churches, and their victory over traditionalism was assured. The efforts and struggles by which this acceptance of the new social techniques was achieved are the first strand in Christian Democracy's early history.<sup>23</sup>

(2) Fogarty then points out that the strong vein of anti-clericalism in continental liberalism proved too much for its own principle of tolerance and in the course of the century the churches' rights to manage their own internal affairs, to maintain their own organizations, and to possess their own schools, were all attacked. The so-called *Kulturkampf* launched by Bismarck in 1873-1874 after Germany had been united was motivated by the principle that in all matters the church was subservient to the state. Its main rigor was reserved for the Roman Catholics. Diplo-

matic relations with the Vatican were broken off, a censorship was imposed on pronouncement from the pulpit, lay supervision of church schools was stiffened, the Jesuits were expelled from Germany, and many of the bishops and priests who resisted these measures were imprisoned. In reaction Roman Catholics organized themselves politically and founded the Centre Party in 1874. The origins of all the Christian Democratic Parties on the Continent were much the same, if the lay attack on religion was less violent than in Germany. Thus in Holland the Protestants founded the Anti-Revolutionary Party under Groen Van Prinsterer in order to obtain full control over their own Christian day schools. The pattern was repeated over all Europe. Christians organized themselves politically the better to resist attack on their churches and schools. They were supported by the Christian Workers' movements and trade unions and drew from them much of their democratic and social character.<sup>24</sup>

Of this second phase in the development of Christian democracy in Europe Fogarty writes:

What did call forth mass Christian movements—above all political movements—before 1880, and led Christians to insist on an independent voice in the modern world, was the fact that the liberal and related movements were humanist in the sense of laicist, and moreover were militantly so. They denied that the Christian revelation had any over-riding authority in matters of, particularly, politics and economics, or even, often, that it had any authority at all. And they did not stand by their own principle of tolerance and mutual respect. In country after country they insisted that the state was entitled at its convenience to interfere with, suspend, or destroy the church's internal management, its religious foundations, and its schools. . . .

And so it was to affirm the rights of the Church against both old and new opponents that Christians of every shade, traditionalists and modern, in this period could and did stand together and fight. In practice they found more and more that the liberal freedoms, rather than the traditional order, offered the most favourable ground on which to take their stand. In that respect Liberalism rendered Christianity a major service . . . by teaching Christians a great

many things about the management of modern communities. But Christianity returned the compliment. For it was the Christian resistance to attempts to assert the supremacy of the state or of majorities and to over-ride the rights of different "spiritual families," which in its turn forced liberals and socialists to face up to the true meaning of their own principle of tolerance in a plural society.<sup>25</sup>

(3) By 1880 the Christian Democratic Parties on the Continent had said "yes" to the techniques and "no" to the totalitarian claims of secular liberalism and humanism. By this time there were working patterns of political Christian Democracy in Belgium, Holland, Germany, and Switzerland and in some of these countries the beginning of Christian trade unions, Christian farmer, professional, and employer associations. Fogarty points out that it was the task of the next two generations to draw together and complete these beginnings and to build on them by the end of the Second World War a movement both comprehensive and reasonably well integrated.<sup>26</sup>

He notices three main developments between 1880 and 1953. First, Protestants in Germany, Switzerland, and France entered the stream of direct Christian political action, in which their co-religionists in Holland already played an important part under the leadership of Abraham Kuyper.<sup>27</sup> Second, the Christian Democratic youth and family movements, and above all, the Christian trade unions, grew to their full stature and made their weight felt in the political movements.<sup>28</sup> Third, the political movements were completed both by acquiring a broader and a firmer base in the social movements and through an increase in their own strength and numbers. In France and Italy, in particular, full-scale Christian Democratic Parties now emerged.<sup>29</sup>

According to Fogarty, the Christian Democratic Parties had achieved control of the German, Italian, and Dutch governments by 1953. He writes:

The Christian Democratic political parties are today the most prominent and in many countries the most powerful and characteristic manifestation of the whole Christian Democratic movement. Foreigners

may indeed easily over-estimate their importance compared to that of the social movements less well known outside their own environment. The main pillar of Christian Democracy in France is not the M.R.P., important though that party is. It is probable that far more real weight attaches to the Christian trade unions (C.F.T.C.) or to the youth movements such as the Young Christian Farmers or Workers . . . . The Christian Democratic Union in Germany, the Democratic Christians in Italy, and the Christian Social Party in Belgium have been consistently the largest parties in their respective Parliaments, and have at one time or another held absolute majorities. The three leading Christian Democratic parties in Holland (the Catholic People's Party and the Anti-Revolutionary Party and Christian Historical Union, which are Protestant) hold a permanent majority in their parliament. The Austrian People's Party and the Christian Social Party in Luxembourg have never quite attained an absolute majority. The M.R.P. (Popular Republican Movement) in France holds a mere 13% of the seats in the French Chamber of Deputies. But they happen to be the key seats. Taking all these eight countries together the Christian Democrats held early in 1954 37% of all the seats in the lower houses of parliament; half as many again as the next largest fraction, the Socialists. Among the parties whose belief in democracy is clear and beyond question, excluding the extreme conservatives, nationalists and Communists, the Christian Democrats held an absolute majority.<sup>30</sup>

In their principles Fogarty shows that there are strong similarities between Protestant and Roman Catholic parties. As Fogarty puts it, a Christian Democrat would claim that his standpoint is "personalist" but not "individualist" in the sense of taking into account all the dimensions of personality, social and heavenly. Thus the Evangelical People's Party of Switzerland calls for a social order which

. . . allows man to fulfil his divine destiny and freely to develop his personality to that end. The solution of the social question . . . lies in the spiritual renewal of the individual. Injustice and the absence of love and truth have their origin in the individual person, not in his environment.<sup>31</sup>

Personalism, as distinct from individualism, is held by Christian Democrats to require a certain corporate con-

ception of the individual's responsibility to and for the society around him, and as a direct consequence, a "federalist" or "pluralist" ideal of the structures of society and the processes which go with it. According to Fogarty it has three main implications for practical policy:

(1) All social action should be oriented to enabling personalities to form themselves along certain ideal lines; to acquire certain basic characteristics and social and technical skills.

(2) These ideal personalities should be grouped in a pluralist social structure, in which scope is left for the free, though socially-responsible, development of groups of all shapes and sizes, from the family up to international society. Different spiritual families or ideological groups should have freedom and opportunity to work out their own salvation, including "vertical" pluralism, referring to the ideological divisions which cut through society from top to bottom, as apart from "horizontal" pluralism between the different levels of society.

(3) The social structure should be tied together by and operated through sanctions (political, economic, or social) and mechanisms (competition, direction, and consultation) combined so as to maintain its personalist and pluralist character.<sup>32</sup> The Christian Democrat believes in maintaining the autonomy of institutions and associations beneath the state. Thus Roman Catholics speak of the principle of subsidiarity. Pius XI said:

It is an injustice, a grave evil, and a disturbance of right order for a larger and higher organization to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower bodies. Of its very nature the true aim of social activity should be to help individual members of any social body, but never to destroy them (Pope Pius XI, *Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno*, 1931).<sup>33</sup>

For Reformed Christians in Holland the corresponding principle is that of "sphere sovereignty" or "the special task and vocation of each social group," already discussed in Chapter One and Chapter Nine. Fogarty points out:

The Protestant conception underlines the separate and exclusive responsibility of the individual and the small group, though only within defined limits and subject to a vocation of service to others. The Catholic phrasing stresses rather the inclusion of these small units of society in greater wholes, within which however they have a sphere of autonomy on which they have a right to insist. But in practice the two conceptions come to much the same thing. There is work to be done at every level of social organization from the individual to the international community and the responsibility for what can be done at lower levels must not be allowed to gravitate to the top. Every social unit or group has a sphere of work which it can do efficiently in the interests not only of its members but of society as a whole, and this sphere must be defined and reserved for it. [This conception] can be described as "*horizontal pluralism*"; a policy which insists on the independence, rights, and responsibilities of each individual or group which can show that it has a legitimate sphere of its own; independence firstly as against others on the same level of social organization, and secondly as against those at other and particularly higher levels.<sup>34</sup>

The Christian Democrats of Europe defend sphere sovereignty or horizontal pluralism as a way of helping the growth of individual personality. It offers the greatest number of openings for leaders to develop and show their ability and for effective participation by the rank and file. It avoids the dangers of "massification," depersonalization, and "atomisation." The great Dutch trade unions affirm:

The danger of massification is not merely that the individual is swallowed up in the mass and becomes as undifferentiated element of it. It is also that he is simultaneously isolated within the mass. He hesitates to open out to others. He tries to ensure that only superficial contacts develop between himself and others, contacts based on common interests or public events which affect his group, his class, his neighbourhood, his workmates as a whole. But he loses the true warm contact with other human beings. He and his neighbour slip by one another, not knowing the reality and basis of each other's life.<sup>35</sup>

The Christian Democratic movement also supports the idea of "vertical or ideological pluralism." "Vertical" re-

fers to the way in which ideologies cut vertically through all the layers and groups of society, so as "to set a man at variance with his father, and the daughter with her mother . . . a man's enemies will be the people on his own house" (Matt. 10:35-6), in contrast with the horizontal division between, for example, the state and the local community of the Board of Directors and the primary working group. As Continental Christians see it, different "spiritual families"—Catholics, Protestants, Calvinists, Marxists, "humanists," or whoever they may be—should on the principle of "vertical" pluralism be allowed and enabled to follow their own way of life, even when they are in a minority in a nation or group as a whole.

Such "vertical" pluralism is defended, like the horizontal, on grounds of social efficiency. It reduces conflicts, since it allows everyone without discrimination or loss to himself to build up a set of associations which fits his own ideas. Since, in an imperfect world, some conflicts of values and loyalties are inevitable, the essential thing is that they should be fought out in a way which lets the truth eventually emerge and form the basis for a settlement. But this is likely to happen only if the parties in conflict hold firm, clear views which provide a solid basis for argument, and yet are open and sensitive to the views of others, respectful of their good faith and ready to admit their good points. As one standard history of Dutch Christian action states, everyone must sail "under his own flag" or with "banners unfurled." Society must make it possible for him to do this by ensuring that he loses nothing by it, whether in cash and convenience or in social status and respect. And organizations have a right and a duty to "sail under their own flag" in the same way as individuals; for association with others is needed even to reach a full understanding of one's own ideals, let alone express them effectively in action. In short, Christian Democrats ask for the full rights of ideological co-existence.

Fogarty points out that this principle of "vertical" pluralism even more than the "horizontal" is rooted very deeply in Christian Democratic minds. He well says:



Apart from any merely intellectual acceptance, its value has been burnt into their consciousness by generations of bitter experience of what happens when spiritual families' freedom is denied. The State abandoned administrative control of the Protestant Church in Germany and the Catholic Church in France only within the last half-century.

It would indeed be hard to name even one Christian Democratic movement which has not in the last three or four generations known what it was to be a minority . . . to which elementary justice was denied. The political movements have had to fight for generations for freedom for the Churches to manage their own affairs, or to obtain equality for Christians within the fiscal and educational system, especially to prevent tax funds being reserved for non-Christian schools. . . .

These experiences of life as a minority might have led Christian Democrats to safeguard their freedom, not by organizing on their own, but by entering, united that is, non-plural unions or associations or parties, on condition however that their neutrality should be genuine. And so in some places and for some purposes they do. But their experience with "neutral" organizations has often been bad, and has convinced even those least inclined to confessionalism that for some purposes only a pure and unadulterated Christian organization will do. Almost the whole Continental Christian Democratic movement, indeed, owes its existence to the discovery that in Western Europe in recent generations Christians have been unlikely to get their due unless . . . they organized apart. No body, Protestant or Catholic, in the main stream of Continental Christian Democracy supports the agreed syllabus approach to religious teaching.<sup>36</sup>

## THE RISE TO POWER OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

Country	1880's	1950's
Germany	Centre Party (Catholic)—an important factor in politics but yet involved in the formation of a government.	Christian Democratic Union now holds absolute majority; a union of Catholics and Protestants. Major party in power since end of last war.
Holland	Catholic-Protestant coalition able from time to time to form a government. Kuyper becomes Prime Minister in 1901.	Catholic and Protestant parties dominate Parliament when they choose to work together.
Italy	Still in the "intransigent" period. Catholics refuse, at least officially to participate in the life of the Liberal State.	<i>Democrazia Christiana</i> now the largest party in the country; an absolute majority 1948-53. Leading government party throughout the post-war period.
Switzerland	Catholic fraction, informally organized, not yet represented in the government.	Fully organized Catholic party with 2 out of 7 seats on the Federal Council. Small Protestant party.
France	Genuinely Christian Democratic forces very small. Main Christian force monarchist, essentially outside the life of the modern world.	M.R.P. now a key factor in most governmental combinations, though having a smaller electoral support than the Christian Democratic Parties elsewhere in Europe.
Belgium	Catholic Party organized and powerful and capable of forming government on its own.	P.S.C. remains largest party in the country with absolute majority 1949-1953.
Austria	Same as France in 1880.	Austrian People's Party genuinely Christian Democratic, and just short of an absolute parliamentary majority. Permanently in government.

Once it is recognized that Christian organization is necessary, we have also discovered the starting point for setting up a Christian political party. Its program of principles will be its political credo; for it is also a community of faith which tries to bring to realization in the life of the state the ordinances of the Lord for the political sphere of human life. Its nature will in this respect be marked off from other organizations—the Christian school, for example, whose purpose is the rearing of the children of the new covenant “in the nurture and correction of the Lord,” the academic association which seeks to show that Christ is the redeemer of science and scholarship and thus of all theoretical thought. It is also necessary to distinguish labor unions from a political party since a Christian labor union champions the interests of a particular economic group in society and promotes trade union interests, while a genuine political party through its activities in the juridical sphere of the state ought to promote the good of the nation as a whole. As such a Christian Democratic Party must seek to serve the good of the whole nation and not just the believing part of the nation.

### CONCLUSION

The only way in which Christians in the English-speaking world can now hope to stem the rising tide of apostasy from the God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ and the complete de-Christianization of our Anglo-Saxon culture is for them to take effective Christian action in the spheres of labor, business, politics, and education. The taking of such action and the forming of such Christian political and social organizations will itself bring an important reorganization and realignment of political and social forces in the English-speaking part of Western society and force the liberal humanists in our midst to reveal themselves in their true colors as haters of God and of his Christ. At least then the electorates of America, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada will be presented with a clear cut choice; a Christian politics or an individualistic humanist politics or a collectivistic humanist politics.

Of the present cultural situation now existing in the English-speaking world, T. S. Eliot has warned us:

that three Christians of such different ecclesiastical background and origin should thus find themselves in agreement (1) about the necessity for Christian political and social action in modern society, and (2) about the necessity for making such a truly Christian society an open society in which unbelievers would not only be tolerated but also allowed to give expression to their own apostate convictions whatever these might be. Let such atheists, humanists, socialists, and conservatives who wish to operate their own labor unions, day schools, universities, newspapers, television stations, and so on, do so by all means, but let them honestly hoist their humanist colors to the masts of these apostate organizations so that everyone else in society at least will clearly understand what particular ideology it is they are trying to sell to the public. What Maritain, Eliot, and Dooyeweerd cannot stomach is the modern humanist claim to neutrality, because it is patently false and misleading.

Unless such Christian political, economic, and educational action is taken soon, the Christian citizens of the Anglo-Saxon democracies will find themselves enslaved by the apostate humanists within the English-speaking societies who even now are determined to force all Christians to acknowledge the power and direction of government and of applied science as the only savior available to modern men. No longer can the Christians in the English-speaking world afford to compromise with apostate humanists in the fields of education, labor relations, industry, communications, politics, and law. No longer can we afford to compromise with the totalitarian claims to absolute power of the new religion of scientism and its secular humanist devotees. Eliot has truly said:

We must abandon the notion that the Christian should be content with freedom of cultus and with suffering no worldly disabilities on account of his faith. However bigoted the announcement may sound, the Christian can be satisfied with nothing less than a Christian organization of society—which is not the same thing as a society consisting exclusively of devout Christians.<sup>40</sup>

While it may be utopian to expect the Christian re-organization of the Atlantic culture of the English-speaking world, we would agree with Eliot that for a beginning Christians certainly cannot be satisfied with anything less than the *Christian organization of Christians* within that Atlantic culture. In the Christian segment of such a pluralistic Atlantic civilization, not only education, as Eliot suggests, but also labor relations, politics, industry, business and banking, recreation, and communications as far as the Christian part of that civilization is concerned would all be directed by a Christian rather than an apostate scientific humanist doctrine of man in society and its attendant implications for the organization of work, politics, finance, business, leisure pursuits, and communications. It has become the duty of all Christians to struggle for a condition of society which will give the maximum of opportunity for Christians and others who so care to express in their personal and public lives the Crown Rights of the Redeemer, not only in the church but also in all areas of modern life.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Karl Barth, *Church and State* (S.C.M. Press, London, 1939); and *Against the Stream* (Philosophical Library, New York, 1954), p. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. II, pp. 246-247.

<sup>3</sup> Karl Barth, *The Epistle to the Romans* (Oxford University Press, 1950), pp. 140ff.

<sup>4</sup> Henry Van Til, *The Calvinistic Concept of Culture* (Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, Philadelphia, 1959), pp. 182ff.

<sup>5</sup> T. S. Eliot, *The Idea of a Christian Society* (Faber and Faber, London, 1946), pp. 9, 21, 22.

<sup>6</sup> Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, Vol. I, p. 524.

<sup>7</sup> Evan Runner, *Christian Perspectives*, 1962, pp. 176-177.

<sup>8</sup> Abraham Kuyper, *Pro Rege*, Vol. III, pp. 189-191.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 190-191.

<sup>10</sup> Pastoral Letter of the Archbishops and Bishops of Quebec and quoted in *The Problem of the Worker in the Light of the Social Doctrine of the Church* (Palm Publishers, Montreal, Quebec).

<sup>11</sup> Dooyeweerd, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 622.

<sup>12</sup> Robert T. Ingram, *The World Under God's Law* (Houston, Texas, 1962), p. 43.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Sir David Kelly, *The Hungry Sheep* (Hollis & Carter, London, 1955); Samuel Eliot Morison, *Freedom in Contemporary Society* (Oxford, 1957); and Herbert Agar; *The Unquiet Years, 1945-1955* (Rupert Hart Davis, 1957).

<sup>14</sup> H. Blamires, *Repair the Ruins* (Bles, London, 1950).

<sup>15</sup> J. H. Oldham, *The Church and the Disorder of Society* (SCM Press, London, 1948), pp. 29-49.

<sup>16</sup> E. L. Hebden Taylor, *Reformation or Revolution*, (The Craig Press, Nutley, New Jersey, 1969), Chapter Ten, "The Reformational Understanding of Labor and Race Relations." Cf. also Sylvester Petro, *Power Unlimited, The Corruption of Union Leadership* (The Ronald Press, New York, 1959).

<sup>17</sup> Evan Runner, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

<sup>18</sup> Walter James, *The Christian in Politics*, p. 184.

<sup>19</sup> Walter Lippman, *The Public Philosophy*, p. 132.

<sup>20</sup> Evan Runner, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

<sup>21</sup> Crane Brinton; *A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799* (New York, 1959), p. 15.

<sup>22</sup> Michael P. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820-1953* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1957).

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 150.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 153-178.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 152.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter XIII, "The Rise of Christian Democracy, 1880-1950."

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter XIV, "The Protestants Enter the Stream."

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter XV, "The Rise of the Workers' Movements."

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter XXI describes the great efforts of Luigi Sturzo to found *Democrazia Christiana*.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 294-295.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 27ff.; p. 29 for Evangelical Party's policy quotation.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter IV, "Pluralist, Not Collectivist."

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 41ff.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

<sup>37</sup> T. S. Eliot, *The Idea of a Christian Society*, p. 13.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

<sup>39</sup> Jacques Maritain, *True Humanism* (London, 1946), pp. 161, 166, 200, 259, 265ff.

<sup>40</sup> T. S. Eliot, *op. cit.*, pp. 33ff. For a useful criticism of T. S. Eliot's, *Idea of a Christian Society*, H. Evan Runner, *Can Canada Tolerate the C.L.A.C.?* (Christian Labour Association of Canada at 100 Rexdale Boulevard, Rexdale, Ontario 1967), p. 1ff. Also Hendrik Hart, *The Democratic Way of Death*, (The Committee for Justice and Liberty, P.O. Box 151, Rexdale, Ontario Canada, 1968), p. 5ff.

## APPENDIX I

STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES AND  
GENERAL POLITICAL PROGRAM OF THE  
ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

(Drawn up by the Meeting of Duputies, June 10, 1961, in  
Utrecht, the Netherlands)

*Translated by Dr. Bernard Zylstra*

## PREAMBLE

The anti-revolutionary or Christian-historical movement represents that element of our national character which was formed under the influence of the Reformation and the leadership of William of Orange and which acquired its identity in the second half of the sixteenth century.

Its point of departure is the confession that God is the absolute Sovereign and that He has given to Jesus Christ all power in heaven and on earth. Both the Government and the people are to acknowledge this power and are therefore obliged to keep the commandments of God for the life of the state.

In conjunction with the above, the Anti-Revolutionary Party (A.R.P.) accepts the following Statement of its Principles and General Political Program.

## PART I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

## ARTICLE 1

The A.R.P. considers as its calling to strive and struggle for the preservation and strengthening of the authority of the Word of God over public life.

## ARTICLE 2

While recognizing the Church's calling to proclaim the message of the Word of God as it applies to all of life, the A.R.P. believes that Government and people must learn to understand on their own, in the light of Holy Scripture, what this message means for the political life of every age.

## ARTICLE 3

Not the will of the people but the sovereign power of God is the foundation of the authority of Government. While opposed to specifying any single form of government as the only acceptable one, the A.R.P., grateful for the blessing given by God in the House of Orange, judges that for the Netherlands the most suitable form of government is the constitutional monarchy by members of this royal house as it has gradually developed from the Republic of the sixteenth century.

## ARTICLE 4

The A.R.P. acknowledges that the Government is the minister of God invested with the power of the sword, called to maintain justice and to rule the nation for the benefit of the people.

In fulfilling this calling, the Government is to respect the limits determined both by the nature of its office and by the particular calling and responsibility of other societal relationships and of private individuals.

## ARTICLE 5

The Government as the servant of God, by Whose grace it reigns, has as its calling

- a.* to acknowledge God's Name in all of its public activity;
- b.* to take care that God's Word can have free course among the people;
- c.* to extend equal treatment to all churches and all citizens, whatever their religious beliefs may be;
- d.* to abstain, in view of its incompetence in these matters, from all measures which intend to coerce the religious development of the nation in a particular direction;
- e.* to uphold law and order and to insist on sound moral conduct in public life;
- f.* to honor the conscientious objections that any of its subjects may have against a governmentally imposed obligation, provided these objections derive from religious



convictions and are not incompatible with a proper execution of the Government's task;

*g.* to respect Sunday as a day of rest as far as governmental functions are concerned, and to promote such maintenance everywhere within the bounds of its authority;

*h.* to use its right to demand the oath whenever necessary to confirm fidelity and truth;

*i.* to promulgate days of prayer and thanksgiving for special times or occasions in order that the people may be encouraged to invoke the Name of the Lord;

*j.* and further, in general to do all it possibly can within the bounds of its authority that the people live according to the demands of the Law of God.

## PART 2: DETAILED ELABORATIONS

### ARTICLE 6

#### *The Constitution*

The A.R.P. accepts the existing Constitution as the foundation of our political institutions. While taking into account the time and the circumstances, the Party wishes through lawful procedure to develop and reform the Constitution in accordance with the demands of the anti-revolutionary or Christian-historical principle.

### ARTICLE 7

#### *The Influence of the People*

The A.R.P. considers indispensable a powerful influence of the people, to be exercised on the Government through the parliamentary medium of a States-General fully conscious of its particular task and responsibility with respect to both the government in power and the voters and their several parties.

### ARTICLE 8

#### *Province and Municipality*

Provided neither national unity nor civil rights are thereby placed in jeopardy, an autonomous position and a

sphere of authority as broad as possible should be guaranteed to the provinces and the counties, firmly rooted as they are in our history and forming specific administrative communities indispensable for the whole of the Dutch political order.

#### ARTICLE 9

##### *The Administration of Justice*

Justice is to be administered according to laws founded on divine principles of right, albeit that the legislator should take into consideration the condition of the nation's sense of justice.

In civil as well as in criminal cases a verdict ought to be rendered by an independent judiciary.

Penalties should be imposed not only to protect society or to rehabilitate the convicted person but in the first place to restore the violated order of law. For this purpose the Government may, if necessary, resort to its fundamental prerogative of inflicting capital punishment.

To the extent that the activity of the Government should give occasion for conflicts of an administrative nature, a binding decision should preferably be handed down by an independent judiciary. Under all circumstances a solution should be sought in such a manner as to guarantee as much as possible that lawful interests be honored.

#### ARTICLE 10

##### *Church and State*

Inasmuch as the Government is to respect the mutual independence of Church and State, it may not concern itself with internal ecclesiastical matters.

#### ARTICLE 11

##### *Education*

It is a matter of public interest that there be adequate educational facilities and that everyone be enabled to receive instruction and training suited to his aptitude and ability. As a consequence of its duty to protect the spiritual

freedom of its subjects, the Government must base its educational policy on the principle of freedom in the choice of school, in accordance with the general guideline that the free and private school should be the rule and the state school a supplement. The particular responsibility of the parents for the education and development of their children must indeed be recognized by the Government. The Government must accord equal treatment, financially and otherwise, to private and to state education, in order that the freedom of private education be respected and guaranteed.

## ARTICLE 12

### *Government and Culture*

The policy of the Government with respect to the cultural life of the people ought to be founded on the recognition that all culture originates from spiritual roots and can thrive only in spiritual freedom. The Government should therefore not act directly in this field but restrict itself to making possible, encouraging and protecting the development of cultural life. The citizenry's own activity in this area should always have primacy.

Besides the diversity of spiritual attitudes, the Government ought also to recognize and, as much as lies within the scope of its activity, to promote the variety of local and regional cultures, as they form an indispensable source of and stimulus for the culture of the nation as a whole.

The Government should safeguard the treasures of culture against loss, see to it that the available products of culture be made accessible to citizens of all social levels, and do its part to promote international cultural exchanges.

As elsewhere, the Government should bar from the cultural life of the nation all that would be contrary to good order and public morality.

## ARTICLE 13

### *Public Morality*

The Government should watch over public morality, keeping out of public life all that is contrary to decency or

in any other way would tend to debase man, and protecting everything which cannot protect itself against abuse.

The Government should support all spontaneous efforts on the part of the people to raise the level of morality, in particular, actions against improper use of the Name of the Lord, against prostitution, gambling and excessive drinking.

The Government should promote every means conducive to strengthening the moral consciousness of the nation.

#### ARTICLE 14

##### *Public Health*

Health care is first of all a personal responsibility. At the same time, however, the maintenance and protection of the health of the people is a matter of public interest. The Government should watch over the condition of the people's mental and physical health. This ought to be done by supporting the citizenry's own efforts at preserving and improving public health, and, if necessary, by governmental provisions.

#### ARTICLE 15

##### *Social Policy*

Since the doctrine of the class struggle ought to be rejected, our society should aim at a just order for labor, to be realized through mutual consultation of employers and employees in suitable organizations or bodies. Whatever is achieved in this area is to be judged by the Government according to the standards of law and justice, and, in case of deficiency, should be corrected or supplemented by appropriate governmental action.

Industrial law should guarantee to everyone, who is directly involved in industry, the place and the responsibility due to him.

The acquisition of property by all classes of the people merits the active encouragement of every person and socio-economic organ connected therewith. Within the limits of its task and calling, the Government should promote this acquisition of property.

## ARTICLE 16

*Social Work*

The Government must allow ample room for churches and private organizations to be active in the wide area of social work. It should support and promote these activities also by legislative measures. Only in case of evident necessity should the Government undertake this work.

## ARTICLE 17

*Economic Policy*

With respect to economic life Government and industry have a distinct and different task in accordance with their particular nature.

The economic policy of the Government should aim at creating the general conditions conducive to the maintenance and growth of national welfare.

The activity of industry itself, provided it is accompanied with a sense of responsibility, generally offers the best guarantees for supplying the needs of the national economy. Consequently the Government should take part in the production of goods or the provision of services only to the extent that the public interest definitely requires this and private initiative is unable to supply them or clearly falls short of supplying them.

The legislature must leave ample room for industrial life, both in private-legal organizations as well as public-legal bodies, to regulate its own affairs, but at the same time it must guarantee that the Government have sufficient means at its disposal to nullify any activity on the part of industry which would run counter to the public interest.

The Government should promote the discovery and the development of all the resources of the national economy, and it should stimulate the creation of an optimum level of employment, taking into account a balanced development of the nation.

In general the Government should strive for free international exchange of goods and currencies. The Government should do its part in cooperating with international

bodies which aim at removing impediments to reciprocal economic relations among the nations.

#### ARTICLE 18

##### *Financial Policy*

The Government should follow a long-range policy of striking a balance between income and expenditure and of maintaining stability in the value of the currency.

Direct and indirect taxes are to be levied in order to meet the financial needs of the Government. No taxation, however, should be imposed without due consideration of the possible consequences for the socio-economic life of the nation, in particular the course of the business cycle and the level of employment.

When levying taxes on income and property, the Government should take into consideration the composition of a taxpayer's family as well as other circumstances which affect his ability to pay.

As far as lies within its power the Government should avoid a policy of spending which would necessitate an increase in taxes to such a high level as to deprive private initiative of its power and render it ever more dependent on governmental support.

#### ARTICLE 19

##### *The Netherlands, Surinam, and the Netherlands Antilles*

Though looking after their own affairs independently of each other, the Netherlands, Surinam, and the Netherlands Antilles should, when providing for their common interests, do so as equal partners. Furthermore, the close historical ties between these three parts of the Kingdom should bind them together for the purpose of rendering mutual assistance in case of need.

#### ARTICLE 20

##### *New Guinea*

The Netherlands must energetically carry out its moral duty to develop Dutch New Guinea so as to prepare it as

quickly as possible for self-determination. The population's opportunities for sharing in the government of this country must be expanded as much as possible.

Missionary work in the area of education and of medical and social care is entitled to the support of the Dutch Government.

## ARTICLE 21

### *International Relations*

Relations with other nations must be governed by the divine Law for the family of nations. Accordingly the Netherlands, while maintaining its own national independence, should vigorously assist in efforts towards the development of international law and thus towards the peaceful settlement of disputes among the nations. All unlawful coercion must be resisted, if necessary by force of arms. Attempts must be made to build an active community of nations, by general means as well as in the form of special associations, which meet the demands of law and justice and which promote the spiritual and material interests of the peoples.

This may require delegating certain national powers to international bodies or organs; in such a case, however, guarantees ought to be obtained that national interests will not be unjustly harmed.

As far as it is able, the Netherlands should give aid to emerging countries.

## ARTICLE 22

### *Maintaining Our Nationhood*

The vitality needed for maintaining our national position among the nations should first of all be sought in a strengthening of the national consciousness in the broadest sense of the word. For this purpose there ought to be stimulated among the people a knowledge of Dutch history and an understanding of the significance of the struggle for justice and liberty from which dates our independence as a nation.

The Netherlands has the duty to maintain armed forces strong enough to offer resistance to foreign aggression, to safeguard domestic peace, and to enable the country to fulfill its obligations on the international level. The Netherlands should cooperate with efforts at international disarmament agreements that include effective controls.

The Government shares the responsibility for the spiritual care of those who are in the armed forces; it should respect and support the official work of the churches in this field.

#### ARTICLE 23

##### *Co-operation*

In conclusion the A.R.P. declares that it is willing to work together with other parties, on condition and to the extent that such cooperation be useful for bringing about the general aims of its Principles and Program in the actual political life of the nation.

It expressly declares that it strives in particular for the united action of all those who accept the Reformational-Christian mandate, in the sense of this Statement, also for political life.



## APPENDIX II

DECLARATION OF FAITH CONCERNING  
CHURCH AND NATION

(The Presbyterian Church in Canada)

## 1. The Lordship of Christ in Church and State

The one holy triune God, sovereign Creator and Redeemer, has declared and established His kingdom over all powers in heaven and earth. By the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and by His exaltation to the right hand of the Father, all things have been made subject to Him, so that even age-long evil is overruled for good. We worship and obey Jesus Christ as Lord of lords and King of kings, Judge and Governor among the nations. He is both Head of the Church and Head of the Civil State, although their functions under Him are to be differentiated, and their relationships to Him are not to be confused.

## 2. The Respective Functions of Church and State

Jesus Christ, in the administration of His Father's will, employs all the heavenly and earthly powers He may choose to serve Him. He employs the Church and the Civil State, entrusting to each its own distinctive function. He has ordained the Church to serve Him in the proclamation of His word, in the administration of His sacraments, and in the life of faith which works by love. He has also in His grace ordained the State to serve Him in the administration of His justice and benevolence, by discerning, formulating, and enforcing, such laws and policies as will promote the well-being of all its citizens and curb license, discord, and destitution.

## 3. The Authority of the State

Christ, the eternal Word of God, through Whom all things consist and from Whom by the Holy Spirit all men receive their gifts and powers, calls and appoints men to the offices of civil government. He commissions the civil authorities with the right and duty of using force under law against internal disorder and external aggression.

#### 4. The Stewardship of Power

The righteousness of God, which came to decisive triumphs in the cross and resurrection of Christ, is the sole foundation of national justice, development, and destiny. Every organ of power in the Nation, whether cultural, political, or economic, is a stewardship under Christ, and can properly function only by obedience to His revealed word. Every abuse of power constitutes a breach of trust, destructive to the abuser and injurious to the glory of God among His creatures.

#### 5. The Limits of Earthly Authority

It is high treason against the Lord Jesus, and deadly both for the Church and for the Nation, to attribute to any man, group, or institution, the total power that belongs to Him. God alone is absolute Lord of the bodies and consciences of men, and He demands that we obey Him against all authorities, whether civil or ecclesiastical, whenever they claim absolute power, especially the power to control men's thinking on right and wrong.

#### 6. The Church and Tyranny

It is the Church's duty to denounce and resist every form of tyranny, political, economic, or ecclesiastical, especially when it becomes totalitarian. A citizen is not barred from disowning any government or organ of power which usurps the sovereignty of Jesus Christ, and indeed may be obliged by God's word to rebel against it. But if involved in such action, the Church must remember that the weapons of her warfare are finally not of this world. Led by the Holy Spirit she will in any situation bear public witness to the absolute Lordship of Jesus Christ and to the freedom of all men in Him.

#### 7. The Relation of Church and State

The Church and the State are intimately related, with manifold overlying concerns and common responsibility to their Lord. Their true relationship derives from the sub-

ordination of each to Jesus Christ. Each is bound to aid the other according to its appointed power and functions, but neither is given any right thereby to attempt domination over the other. We reject any doctrine which misconceives the Church as the religious agent of the State. We reject any doctrine which misconceives the State as the political instrument of the Church. We reject all doctrines which assume, whether on sectarian or on secular grounds, that the Church's life should be or can be completely dissociated from the life of the Civil State.

#### 8. The Church's Service to the State

The Church must not merge or confuse her Gospel with any political, economic, cultural, or nationalistic creed. At the same time the Church may not hold aloof from the affairs of the Nation, whether the authorities be of the faith or against it, for she must fulfil the ministry laid upon her by her Lord who became one with man for man's redemption. She owes a manifold service to the State. Her preaching, sacraments, and discipline, confront the Nation with Christ's judgement and grace. She offers thanksgiving and supplication to God on behalf of all men, with particular intercession for those in authority, praying that the overruling power of the Holy Spirit may fructify what is good and uproot what is evil in national and international life. In discharging her commission to evangelize she promotes righteousness and peace among men. As her Lord may lay it upon her, she declares and commits herself to His will by public proclamations of her courts or agents. In fulfilment of the law of Christ, she engages in special works of Christian love. Her members take full share as their Christian calling in commerce, politics, and other social action.

#### 9. The Christian's Civil Duty

Christians must always do their utmost to honour the civil laws, and to fulfil all statutory obligations whether financial or personal, as unto Christ the Head. Nevertheless, no citizen is thereby relieved of his constant responsibility to work for the remedy of any unjust statute, or iniquitous assessment, or violation of conscience.

### 10. The Civil Government's Duty toward the Church

In its ordained service of God, the State has a three-fold duty to the Church. It has the duty of establishing public peace and providing protection, guarding impartially the rights of every citizen. It owes to the Church in all her branches, without partiality, the recognition of her office and of her consequent right to due resources, time, and opportunity, for the public worship of God, for the education of her children in His truth, and for the evangelizing of the Nation. It must pay serious attention whenever its office-bearers are addressed by the Church in the name of the Lord Jesus concerning the kingdom of God and His righteousness.

### 11. Reformation by the Word of God

During the present age, while the Lordship of Christ is not yet openly disclosed nor perfectly acknowledged, men are beset by sin in every private and public relation. Our existence in this world is continually threatened by anxiety, covetousness, imperfect justice, and proneness to corruption. The Civil State and the Church are constantly in need of reformation by the Word of God. Wherefore it behoves all civil and ecclesiastical persons to seek the grace of Christ without which they cannot rightly know or do His will.

### 12. The Final Manifestation of Christ's Dominion

The Lordship of Christ, in the midst of the evil and sorrow of this present world, must be discerned by faith, with the full assurance of our hope in Him. He is coming again for the healing of the nations and the perfecting of the Church. In that day when He reveals the New Jerusalem, His sovereign dominion over the universe will be made openly visible to all, causing every knee to bow and every tongue to confess that JESUS CHRIST IS LORD, to the glory of God the Father.

The Presbyterian Church in Canada has adopted this Declaration of Faith Concerning Church and Nation as setting forth the Biblical teaching on their relationship. The Declaration grew out of a Petition by the Presbytery of Paris (1942) and an Overture by the Presbytery of Montreal

(1949). A joint committee of the Board of Evangelism and Social Action and the Committee on Articles of Faith labored on the text through numerous revisions, until the doctrine as formulated in 1954 was given interim adoption by the General Assembly. The Presbyteries of the Church affirmed the Declaration by majority vote under the Barrier Act; and final ratification was signified by the General Assembly in 1955.

## APPENDIX III

Extract from the Constitution of the Canadian Association for Reformed Scientific Studies, 139 Geneva Street, St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada.

## ARTICLE III

## EDUCATIONAL CREED

Believing that Scripture reveals certain basic principles intensely relevant to education, we confess:

**LIFE.** THAT human life in its entirety is religion. Consequently, scholarly study unfolds itself as service either of the one true God or of an idol.

**SCRIPTURE.** THAT Scripture, the Word of God written, in instructing us of God, ourselves and the structure of creation is that integral and active divine Word or Power by which God, through His Spirit, attaches us to and enlightens us in the Truth, which is Christ.

**CHRIST.** THAT the Christ of the Scriptures, the Word of God incarnate, is the Redeemer and Renewer of our life in its entirety and therefore also of our theoretical thought.

**REALITY.** THAT the essence or heart of all created reality is the covenantal communion of man with God in Christ.

**KNOWLEDGE.** THAT true knowledge is made possible by true religion and arises from the knowing activity of the human heart enlightened through the Word of God by the Holy Spirit. Thus religion plays its decisive ordering role in the understanding of our everyday experience and our theoretical pursuits.

**SCHOLARSHIP.** (a) THAT the diligent pursuit of theoretical thought in a community of scholars is essential to the obedient and thankful response of God's people to the cultural mandate. The task of the scholar is to give a scientific account of the structure of creation and thereby to promote a more effective ordering of the everyday experience of the entire community. (b) THAT because of God's

gracious preservation of creation after the fall, men who reject the Word of God as the ordering principle of life provide many valuable insights into the common structure of reality; nevertheless, the central religious antithesis of direction in life remains. We therefore reject the possibility of the synthesis of scripturally directed thought with any other system of thought.

**ACADEMIC FREEDOM.** THAT scholarly pursuits are to be undertaken in the God-given freedom of a complete and voluntary submission to the Word of God and the divine laws that govern human life. The responsible freedom of the scholar must be protected against any constraint or domination of church, state, industry or other societal structure.

**SUMMARY.** THAT all scholarship pursued in faithful obedience to the divine mandate will heed the normative direction of God's Word, will acknowledge His Law to which creation in all its spheres is subject, and will bow before Christ's Kingship over all scientific work.





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